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The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is the central scientific 
network within the massive set of bureaucracies that is responsible for Europe’s Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP). While spending the past 25 years failing to sustain Europe’s fish 
stocks, this management system also became adept at making the lives of its scientists 
miserable. Now it is being confronted by the complex challenge of an ecosystem-based 
approach to fisheries management. If this combination of a multi-national bureaucracy, 
hard politics, and scientific uncertainty has made it impossible to maintain many 
individual fish stocks, how are decisions going to be made that consider everything from 
sea birds to climate change? The old political saw that “if you can’t solve a problem, 
make it bigger” has never been put to a test like this!
Yet ICES has begun to rise in an impressive way to the scientific challenge of providing 
advice for an ecosystem approach within the world’s most cumbersome fisheries 
management system. This book lays out the results of extensive sociological research on 
ICES and the decision making systems into which it feeds. ICES is finding ways to provide 
effective advice in the many situations where scientific advice is needed but a clear, 
simple answer is out of reach. In spite of the difficulties, scientists are beginning to help 
the various parties concerned with management to deal with facts about nature in ways 
that are more useful and transparent.
Doug Wilson is a Senior Researcher and Research Director at Innovative Fisheries 
Management – An Aalborg University Research Centre.
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The Paradoxes of TransparencyA clear analysis of an extremely complex domain—a great achievement, beautifully written. The author leads the reader along with clear, well reasoned arguments, documenting, and 
explaining everything carefully along the way. 
James McGoodwin, Professor of Anthropology, University of Colorado
This is a very good book. It is original, based on a massive amount of self-generated primary 
data, embedded in relevant theoretical and methodological debates, and superbly written. A 
work of real scholarship.
tim Gray, Professor at the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of newcastle
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SERIES FOREWORD
As editors of the MARE Publication Series, we are proud to present yet
another major work on people and the sea. The topic of Doug Wilson’s
important and timely book is the role of natural scientists in fisheries man-
agement and environmental governance. Its focus is on the institutions
that provide the scientific basis for decision-making with regard to Euro-
pean fisheries policy. A prominent organisation in this context is the Inter-
national Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), which involves
twenty member states and serves as the hub of a network of approximately
1600 scientists.
The marine environment is difficult to observe so the scientific uncer-
tainty is very high. Hence the crafting of scientific advice for an ecosystem
approach to fisheries management is a complex challenge. How do scien-
tists communicate uncertainty among themselves and with the outside
world? And how well does science mix with advice? Wilson lucidly dis-
cusses these and other important questions.
Drawing on “communicative systems theory” and employing a wide ar-
ray of data collection methods, Wilson provides deep insights into the chal-
lenges and dilemmas involved in providing scientific advice to a demand-
ing political process. Can science really deliver what stakeholders expect
and policy makers are asking for, i.e. rapid answers with minimum uncer-
tainty to complex issues, without compromising what science is meant to
be?
These are all pertinent questions for fisheries management but they also
have more general relevance. Indeed, fisheries may well provide a test case
for our capacity to deal with a range of environmental issues, in which
science is called upon to provide the knowledge base necessary for effec-
tive and rational collective action. Thus, this book is also a contribution to
the Science and Technology Studies that are now enjoying widespread in-
terest within academic circles and beyond.
Finally this book is valuable in helping to cross the divide between nat-
ural and social sciences. It demonstrates how sociology of science perspec-
tives and methods can help us understand the contribution of natural
sciences, and their representatives, to resolving complex societal issues.
Svein Jentoft (Norwegian College of Fishery Science, University of Tromsø,
Norway
e-mail: svein.jentoft@uit.no
Maarten Bavinck (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)
e-mail: J.M.Bavinck@uva.nl
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Many wonderful people contributed to my formal education, but 20 years
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Preface
The book consists of three theoretical chapters, four empirical chapters,
and a conclusion that seeks to pull the whole thing together. The theoreti-
cal chapters explain a number of concepts that I use to organise and relate
the empirical material, which is mainly a description of the work of the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Fisheries man-
agement is an area of environmental management that contains many po-
tential lessons for how we can relate to our planet in general. The point of
social theory is to provide vocabularies and concepts that allow lessons
learned in one kind of social endeavour to be translated for use in other
kinds. Hence the value of this book, to me, lies as much or even more in
the theoretical discussion than in the empirical work. It helps me, and I
hope others, when thinking about new problems.
However, I realise that the interests of many readers will be simply on
fisheries and marine management in Europe, and that what happens in
ICES is what they will want to read about. Those readers will likely wish to
start with Chapter Four. This should work fine for their purposes. How-
ever, I would encourage this group to skim Chapter One for the sake of
orientation. I would also suggest that they read Section 2.2.1 about Mode
Two Science and Section 2.2.3 about Post-Normal Science and examine
Section 3.1 long enough to get a sense of the way I am using the terms
saliency, credibility and legitimacy. I believe this effort will lead to a quick-
er understanding of the presentation of the case material.
Douglas Clyde Wilson
Hirtshals, March 2009
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1. Introduction
1.1 Sensing the need for change
The topic of this book covers institutional aspects of providing natural
science advice for the fisheries management programmes of the European
Union and its immediate neighbours, particularly as they turn towards the
Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM). In many ways it is
a straightforward application of the sociology of science. It applies various
research methods and theoretical perspectives to the work of fisheries
scientists in Europe to try to draw some insights on how we can do a better
job structuring science for environmental decision-making in general and
for the marine environment in particular.
That is the topic but not what the book is really about, to me at least.
What drives me to write about the way that science fits into decision-mak-
ing is an obsession with adaptation. I was trained as a human ecologist; I
learned to think of society as a set of social systems embedded in a sur-
rounding set of natural systems. What I know of the sociology of science I
learned well after graduate school. I was drawn to it by my reflections on
the four simple steps that General Systems Theory outlines for all adapting
systems. If a system is going to adapt to its environment it must: 1) sense
the need for a change; 2) have its own potential to change in response; 3)
have a way to select the change to make; and, 4) have a way to implement
and maintain the change (Buckley 1967). The first and third steps rely on a
good understanding of nature while the second and fourth steps require
the system to be capable of effective collective action.
So how does a social system ‘sense the need for a change’ when it must
adapt to changes in its natural environment? The term ‘social system’ can
mean a lot of things. In my work, I think of a social system as a patterned
set of communicative actions because this definition allows a firm distinc-
tion between what is social and what is natural. Society and nature are so
intertwined that such a distinction would otherwise be impossible. Is a
farmed field social or natural? Defining society as a set of communicative
actions means that the substance out of which society is built is shared
meaning. This has some strange implications – for example it places our
bodies in society’s environment – but it makes for a clear definition of the
relevant system boundaries from both the ontological and epistemological
angle. If the laws of thermodynamics apply, then the phenomenon is part
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of the environment of the social system. This also allows, in principle, hu-
man ecological reasoning to be applied in lots of areas that are not part of
environmental studies, for example to health care.
Communicative Systems Theory (CST) (Habermas 1984, 1987; Wilson
2003) provides a set of conceptual tools useful for understanding society as
a set of communicative actions. An approach that focuses on the realities
between actors, i.e. shared meanings and the systemic requirements for
reproducing them, provides a meaningful complement to the atomistic
analysis of actors and their incentives that currently dominates social
science. If there is interest in the volumes of argumentation for why this
‘communicative turn’makes for good social theory and hence good human
ecology, then I suggest going directly to Habermas. Otherwise, as Haber-
mas (1990) himself argues, you will have to judge for yourself whether
this approach offers a coherent account of the case at hand.
One thing that I hope this book demonstrates is that CST can make a
contribution to Science and Technology Studies (STS), a broader field of
which the sociology of science is just a part. A great deal of valuable recent
work in STS has emphasised the alloyed social and technical nature of the
modern world, and particularly the products of science and policy. The
idea is that in most aspects of modern social life, scientific and social is-
sues are woven together into complex hybrids (Freudenberg et al. 1995;
Holm 2007; Latour 1991). Nature and technology are important drivers of
social structures, and social structures determine understandings of na-
ture. The co-production (Jasanoff 2005) of science and society through
creative acts equally rooted in humanity and nature is ubiquitous. The zeit-
geist of this literature is that an analysis that seeks to maintain the dichot-
omy between the social and the natural is unhelpful at best and likely to
lead to illusion and error at worst.
While being unable to deny the empirical importance of the co-produc-
tion of hybrid phenomena, I have never been comfortable with the conclu-
sion that an analytical distinction between society and nature is unhelpful.
One reason, mentioned above, is that the distinction is such a central one
to human ecology. Furthermore, a background in critical theory makes one
very distrustful of anything that suggests that reasoning about society and
nature are similar exercises – I view the naturalisation and technicization
of human interactions as a dangerous path.
CST allows us to recognise the hybrid nature of a technological society
while maintaining a strong analytical distinction between society and na-
ture. This distinction finds practical expression in differences in how peo-
ple communicate with one another with respect to facts on the one hand,
and values and interests on the other. The central CST concept of ‘rational
communication’ is based on the requirement of establishing mutual un-
derstanding between two or more parties. Part of rational communication
is the idea that the presuppositions of different kinds of communication
are oriented according to different principles. As I will mention frequently
and in more detail below, a discussion leading towards mutual under-
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standing of facts presupposes the goal of consensus, while a discussion
leading towards an understanding about values and interests presupposes
a goal of compromise. This distinction does not ignore the emergent prop-
erties of socio-technical systems where facts, values and interests are con-
nected in the substance of nearly all the issues we grapple with. It does,
however, introduce a type of rationality which reflects our basic intuitions
about how people understand each other. It is a basis for recognising the
special role of the scientific assertion, and by extension a special role for
scientists whose expertise is based on generating such assertions in a
transparent way. This recognition, however, does not rely on the notion of
science as a white-coated, objective other.
For a communications system to be able to adapt, ‘sensing the need for
change’ has to be more than someone knowing that something important
is going on in nature. It has to move to the next step of finding the poten-
tial to change in response – most generally, this means it has to become
the basis of some sort of collective action, a term I use very broadly to
include everything from effective policies and legislation to decisions tak-
en at a community level. The knowledge about nature also has to be turned
into something that people talk about, i.e. it has to become part of a dis-
course, and this talking has to be translated into some kind of collective
action that has a chance to bring about change. First we need knowledge,
and then we need that knowledge to influence collective action.
Knowledge in itself is a complicated social idea. Everybody has some
knowledge, but the knowledge that scientists have has a special quality.
In environmental studies we tend to think of two groups as having
special knowledge about nature: the scientists who have research-based
knowledge, and user groups that have experience-based, local, ecological
knowledge. The scientists’ knowledge is thought to be the best quality.
Most people think that when a scientist says that some fact about nature is
‘science’, then that fact is as true as can be. I spend a lot of time with fish-
eries scientists, and when they tell me things about fish, I almost always
believe them without question, and if I do not believe them right away, it is
because some other scientist has told me something different.
But being somehow truer is not the real, special quality of scientists’
knowledge. After all, they frequently change their minds. What makes the
scientists’ knowledge special in the imagination of human ecology is the
way it links to the next step that is needed if the social system is going to
adapt. Science has a uniquely high potential to be the knowledge base for
collective action. This uniquely high potential is not a product of science’s
truth but of science’s radical commitment to transparency. The scientific
method is all about transparency. It is about the clear articulation of knowl-
edge in a way that can be clearly challenged, i.e. held clearly accountable
for the truth of its assertions.
This idea has an ironic tinge that stems, in fact, from the paradoxes of
transparency after which this book is named. Science uses special tools
and techniques, especially quantification, to create claims of truth that are
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clearly stated and able to be challenged. But these very techniques, meant
to guard transparency, require skill and training to understand. They have
also developed into cultural images with great rhetorical power. In practice,
one might say, science suffers from transparency-induced opacity.
Effective adaptation is only possible when there is a link between learn-
ing and the decision-making that guides collective action. Our natural en-
vironment is large and complex. Keeping track of changes, whether
brought about by human action or natural processes, requires large num-
bers of people and technologies, purely from the information angle. In
practice, many of these people will be carrying out direct or indirect envir-
onmental monitoring as part of other activities such as extracting goods
from the environment, taking pleasure in it, seeking to conserve it, or
managing it on behalf of the public. All these activities generate knowl-
edge, some of which will be useful for environmental management.
Some of this knowledge will be systematic, but most of it will be anecdo-
tal. This systematic/anecdotal distinction is rooted, as are so many other
things important to human ecology, in the question of scale. What makes
anecdotal information less useful is not that it is less true; it is that it can-
not be linked to information from elsewhere in order to characterise a
phenomenon happening on a broader scale level. The point is that the
systematic information needed to give a picture of widescale phenomena
will rarely be available when environmental changes requiring adaptation
are being recognised. Recognition will be based on anecdotal information
that must then be supplemented by or formed into systematic informa-
tion. In short, the knowledge base for adaptation requires a two-way pro-
cess. It must tap into a lot of diverse information sources, and it must also
find ways to shape that knowledge to get a broader picture. Thus, the need
for wide and interactive participation in environmental management
arises simply through information requirements even before we consider
the decision-making aspects of governance.
Interactive participation (aka authentic participation, participatory de-
mocracy, discursive democracy, etc.) makes effective governance possible
within an ecosystem approach. The translation of decisions into action is
much easier when more people buy into decisions and the science they are
based on. I do not intend to devote space here to showing that broad parti-
cipation is necessary for good governance. This has been done extensively
elsewhere by me and many other people. My general perspective is per-
haps not as strong as that of many advocates of participatory governance
in fisheries. While participation is one of a set of characteristics of effective
environmental management institutions, the most basic of these require-
ments is that the institutions are rooted in the authority of a democratic
government. This is a basic lesson from fisheries co-management systems
around the world. Bottom-up effectiveness through participatory democ-
racy happens best in a top-down, formal democracy context. Without this
underlying top-down system, co-management and participatory democracy
are lost because accountability has to operate both up and down. In any
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event, here I assume rather than defend the need for broad participation in
environmental management and focus on the question of how participa-
tion in building a knowledge base by and with scientists is best achieved.
Participation and science do not go easily together. We analyze participa-
tion by observing the various ‘discoursive themes’ that different groups
draw on in their discussions and arguments (Klenke et al. 2009). Such
themes are formed by linking together facts, values and interests into co-
herent positions and arguments. Certain facts fit in with certain values and
reflect certain interests. By interest here I mean economic and political
interests, but there is also an illuminating connection to the other mean-
ing of the term; your work and your values influence what you find person-
ally interesting. The linkages between facts, values and interests have a
direct impact on the ways that facts are learned, selected and presented to
others. All too often they lead people to stubbornly ignore facts that are not
linked to their values and interests. This can be the result of simple recalci-
trance, but it happens among people who are committed to finding solu-
tions as well. It is not some sort of moral failing, although it often feels
that way when we listen to the people who oppose our positions. It makes
arriving at collective action difficult, but not impossible.
The way we talk about natural facts1 is different from how we talk about
values and interests. This comes from a principle of ‘communicative
rationality’: all speech aimed towards mutual understanding takes place
against a cultural ‘preunderstanding’ which differentiates between claims
about what is true, claims about what is right, and claims about what is
sincere (Habermas 1984, p. 100). Claims about natural facts fall in the first
category, while claims about values and interests fall in the second and
third. The latter are subject to negotiation, and when we discuss them, we
are seeking to find a compromise that people can live with. Discussion of
facts, however, consists of trying to demonstrate that something is true,
and it presumes the goal of agreement about that truth. To arrive at an
agreement about what is going on, for example in the environment, par-
ticipants have to explain how they know what they say they know.
The tools and techniques of science are the Rolls Royce of explaining
how you know what you know because of the commitment to radical trans-
parency. This is not an ideal that is ever reached; even on a philosophical
level, all that can be shown is that something has not yet been disproved,
and in the day-to-day practice of doing science to support decision-making,
it remains distant. Nevertheless, it is this methodological quality, not the
truth of any particular demonstration, that makes science the best basis for
developing a knowledge base for collective action. Because broad participa-
tion is needed both to mobilise information and for effective governance,
striving for this ideal form of demonstration cannot be left only to scien-
tists. Other groups must also participate in creating a knowledge base for
adaptive collective action.
The elephant standing on the table when applying all this theory to fish-
eries, and especially to the EAFM, is scientific uncertainty. Because of un-
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certainty, the particular accuracy of any picture of the environment cannot
be the basis of collective action. Many important facts have not yet been or
perhaps can never be demonstrated to a degree adequate for decision-mak-
ing. Many have argued, perhaps most systematically Funtowicz and Ravetz
(1990), that uncertainty reinforces the need for broad participation. One
reason is that many perspectives and disciplines are needed to judge the
extent of the uncertainty and its implications for policy. Another is that
uncertainty about facts is commonly a mechanism for undermining deci-
sions, especially when uncertainties are ignored or left unaddressed.
How do science and participation mix, then, in a world where scientific
legitimacy is often a function of who is involved in doing the science and
where all scientific activity suffers from transparency-induced opacity?
How should this broader participation in science be carried out when
science in practice is a complex activity requiring extensive skill and
knowledge? What roles should scientists play? What roles should others
play? How does knowledge get translated into advice about what collective
action to take? This book examines what has been learned about these
questions through the work of the International Council for the Explora-
tion of the Sea as it provides scientific advice for marine management in
Europe.
Fisheries are a particularly good place to search for such lessons. This is
not true because fisheries management is a shining example of institu-
tions successfully adapting to environmental changes. Fisheries manage-
ment has hardly been a success at sustaining fish stocks or otherwise pro-
tecting the marine environment, and among developed countries the
European Union has been the least successful fisheries manager. Nor is it
true because fisheries are easy to study from a human ecological view-
point. Sparholt et al. (2007) in an historical analysis of European fisheries
management over 60 years for 34 stocks could only find one completely
clear link between a particular management measure and stock recovery.
However, as a laboratory for human ecology, fisheries are still unparalleled.
Many stakeholder2 groups are interested in the subject, very often with
amazing passion motivated by greed, nature worship and seemingly every-
thing in between. The marine environment is difficult to observe, and
scientific uncertainty is high. Fishers have a great deal of experience-based
knowledge of the marine environment that is available to supplement, or
to contradict, the scientists’ research-based knowledge. Fish stocks are bio-
logically diverse, and approaches to the management of exploited stocks
must often be different. The stocks also respond relatively quickly to
changes in management approach compared with other areas of environ-
mental management, making it possible to learn the results of institutional
changes fairly quickly. In fisheries, in short, there are lots of approaches
and lots of opportunities for comparison between these approaches.
The above is perhaps enough of a general orientation to the perspectives
that guided the creation of the book. However, there is one question, a
basic assumption I am making, that needs to be addressed before getting
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to the substance of the book. The assumption I refer to is that science
actually matters in environmental management.
1.2 Does science matter in politics?
Participation is really just a nicer word for politics. So a question worth
asking is, how much science actually matters in political processes? Is it
true, as Haas (2004, p. 587) claims, that ‘knowledge can speak volumes to
power’? Does science really influence policy? Do people pay attention to
demonstrations of facts? Do they change their minds? These are important
questions if one is using a communication-based approach to social insti-
tutions that begins with the assumption that communication not only mat-
ters, but that structuring mechanisms of communication is what institu-
tions basically do (Habermas 1984, 1987; Wilson 2003). Frankly, the
commonsense answer to these questions, in the European fisheries com-
munity anyway, is (a big) ‘No’! In the face of this commonsense assump-
tion, we need to examine both the theoretical arguments and the record of
experience to find out if it does matter in respect to science and fisheries
management in Europe.
To get at the theoretical arguments for why science matters in politics, I
need to dig a little deeper into Communicative Systems Theory. CST be-
gins with some insights about what is needed for people to make sense out
of what they are saying to one another, i.e. the requirements of ‘communi-
cative rationality’ (Habermas 1984). The idea is that the most basic re-
quirement for sense-making in a conversation is the presupposition be-
hind every statement that mutual understanding is a possible goal. As
mentioned above, communicative rationality also involves the idea that
discussions of facts, social phenomena like values and interests, and inner
feelings involve different kinds of mutual understanding. For facts, a mu-
tual understanding is about whether something is true or not, for social
phenomena it is about whether something is right or not, and for an inner
feeling it is about whether something is sincere or not. We are concerned
in environmental management with facts, values and interests, and to be
communicatively rational means orienting our attempts at mutual under-
standing towards truth in respect of facts and towards a fair outcome in
respect of values and interests. An orientation towards truth assumes that
the goal of the discussion is a consensus; an orientation towards fairness
assumes that the goal of the discussion is a compromise. One way to grasp
this is to think about how deciding to ‘split the difference’ is an honoured
principle in resolving a negotiation about values and interests, while split-
ting the difference in order to come to an agreement about facts is to admit
that you do not know what the facts are. The rationality of communication
requires recognising and dealing with these different communicative or-
ientations. The requirement that a communication be oriented towards
mutual understanding is even more basic than being clear and logical, be-
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cause it provides the rationale for clarity and logic. When you make sense,
you phrase what you are saying in a way that is oriented towards convin-
cing the other person of something – and that is what allows what you are
saying to ‘make sense’. Although for our purposes here ‘making sense’ is
usually oriented towards a mutual understanding of factual conditions, the
basic logic applies to other kinds of mutual understanding; ‘making sense’
may be oriented towards someone understanding that our description of
an internal feeling is a sincere one. Humour, irony and some poetry, of
course, do not make sense directly, nor are they supposed to, but they are
still oriented indirectly towards a common understanding.
Starting with this insight, Habermas has identified some basic social
conditions under which making sense is possible: that there is no manip-
ulation involved in the communication and that anyone involved can raise
a question about any claim being made (White 1988). This is not saying
that people always behave in this rational fashion, but it does say that these
criteria are empirically important because people use them every day to
judge for themselves if a discussion is making sense. The links between
communicative rationality and science are an important part of the theore-
tical discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 and have an important influence on
the interpretation of the case study.
You know you have a social institution when you see repeating patterns
of behaviour over a period of time. Institutions3 simultaneously face two
realities that are often in tension with one another. On the one hand, there
is the competition and struggle over scarce material resources, ideology,
power, etc. On the other hand, there is the need to coordinate behaviour
so that it remains patterned. Even competition requires coordination.
What lies underneath an institutionalised pattern of behaviour is an itera-
tive process of mutual understanding. The basic process is informal. Peo-
ple see other people doing things and hear other people making state-
ments. They interpret these actions through their own knowledge of
institutions. This interpretation then forms the basis of their responding
actions. The behaviour pattern – i.e. the institution – is thereby recreated.
It is also marginally changed because one interpretation and response will
never be exactly the same as another. In modern, developed societies this
change is usually very marginal because in long-term institutions, people
have invested a great deal of resources and skill-building effort in the as-
sumption that the patterns are going to be stable, and they will therefore
place a lot of effort in keeping them stable (Giddens 1984). In less long-
term institutions the changes are likely to be less marginal and will them-
selves become part of competition and conflict. Different people’s interpre-
tations of institutions vie with one another, with limits on this usually set
in modern society by the formal rules that make up the official description
of the institution.
CSTmoves to the institutional level based on the observation that people
have to be able to read and respond to signals in order to follow patterns.
Some mutual understanding is needed, so institutions either have to have
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a mechanism to make some communicative rationality possible or they
need mechanisms that short-cut that process but still arrive at some mu-
tual understanding. In practice, institutions use mixtures of these commu-
nication mechanisms. Money and authority are both examples of just such
mechanisms; they are pre-packaged mutual understandings that maintain
patterns (Wilson 2003). But no institution, not even the most globalised
market, functions for very long without making some use of communica-
tive rationality. Such an institution would be on automatic pilot, incapable
of any adaptation to its environment.
The bottom line is that institutions contain a functional imperative that
forces people to try to reach mutual understanding, and this means trying
to make sense when they communicate. Even the most manipulative liar
or recalcitrant bureaucrat is eventually required to make sense if he or she
wants to participate in functioning institutions. Institutional imperatives
also contain strong pressures to distort communicative rationality, for ex-
ample by trying to make things appear as natural facts that really are not,
but that is another part of the story. For now it is enough to establish that
there are coherent theoretical reasons to expect that people are going to
seek to make sense, i.e. to phrase their assertions in ways that are oriented
towards convincing other participants, in order to create mutual under-
standing. In environmental management, that often requires references to
valid knowledge about nature, even when those facts do not fit easily with
one’s interests.
What about the empirical case? Does science actually have an impact on
political processes and the policies that emerge from them? Clark et al.’s
(2006) review of international scientific assessments does conclude that
the majority of the assessments are not effective in influencing policy and
that even the most influential assessments do not directly determine policy
choices. What science does do, however, is influence the direction of the
long-term development of an issue through such mechanisms as influen-
cing the issue’s visibility, the stakeholders who will take an interest, the
way questions and objectives are framed, and the selection of management
alternatives (see also van der Hove 2007). These mechanisms add up to a
considerable long-term influence on the outcomes of political games. In
some cases credible science can directly shift the discussion even in the
most political of fora. Lenhard et al. (2006) describe an argument around
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Second Assessment Re-
port during which sceptics from the political wing of OPEC withdrew their
veto in response to climatologists who were able to show that they were
using the accepted methods and standards of their field. It seems that an
approach to policy that examines how and when a political process is able
to make use of a common understanding of nature will tell us more than
simply assuming that power and interests tell the whole tale (Haas 2004).
The idea of analyzing institutions in terms of both power and communica-
tive rationality makes sense.
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So what about the common belief that the CFP does not pay attention to
science? Scientists, fishers, and conservation activists repeatedly assert
that the decision-makers pay no attention to scientific advice. Several times
biologist colleagues have asked me to do a sociological study on why ‘they
always ignore our advice’. This idea that scientific advice is simply ignored
in European fisheries appears in the press, often as plain common sense.
The following example appeared in a recent news article in Timemagazine
as part of a very brief description of the European fisheries management:
Q 1.1 The European Commission typically points to scientific evidence
showing a collapse in key catches, and suggests that quotas should be
slashed across the board. And just as predictably, individual governments
within the EU ignore these proposals, and raise the quotas – usually around
50% higher (Cendrowicz 2007).
This statement was presented as a straight news fact while the following
statement was attributed to a conservation activist:
Q 1.2 Mocking scientific advice has become standard practice in the deci-
sions made by the European fisheries ministers (Cendrowicz 2007).
Even ignoring the fact that individual governments do not set quotas and
assuming that the author meant the Council of Ministers, the first ‘news
fact’ is absurd in its characterisation of both scientific advice and the man-
agers’ response. The second quote is merely untrue unless we take the
word ‘mocking’ to mean ‘not following automatically’. This is not particu-
larly surprising because a journalist who interviewed four or five random
people from the fisheries management community in Europe, if his ex-
perience is anything like mine, could easily have heard something like
this from every one of them. It reflects what has become common sense.
But this is a case where the common sense is way off the mark. Two
scientists from the (supposedly ignored) Commission’s fishery team have
done an analysis of 436 records of scientific advice and policy result for
fish stocks ‘that are of principal interest to the European Union’ between
1987 and 2005. They found that ‘management decisions have been mod-
erately responsive to ICES advice in setting TACs’ (Patterson and Résimont
2007, p. 716). The normal pattern is that TACs move in the direction of the
advice, but not as far as the advice recommends, which is what would be
expected if the science is being considered, given that the economic and
social considerations that the Council is weighing in the balance are all
going to pull in the direction of more fishing. It is the Council’s job to take
other aspects of the fishery situation into consideration along with the
scientific advice. The situation that Time magazine reports is the usual
one – raising the quota 50% after a recommended cut – that corresponds
to exactly one of the 436 instances. The basic finding is that the Council
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opts for more stability in catches than the direct application of ICES advice
would allow (Patterson and Résimont 2007).
Science does matter, but it is not decisive because fisheries management
in a democracy is fundamentally a political activity rather than a technical
one. This political exercise revolves around how values, interests and facts
are linked to one another. But facts have a special place in this triumvirate
because their discussion assumes a goal of agreement rather than a goal of
compromise. The key, then, is that the groups involved in fisheries man-
agement must be willing and able to explain in a transparent fashion how
they know what they say they know. Science is rooted in this transparent
accountability; indeed, scientists are the transparency experts. The scien-
tists examined in this book have learned a great deal about how to resolve
the paradoxes of transparency that make it so hard to develop effective
science institutions. It is their experience that provides the substance of
any lessons derived from this research.
1.3 The case: The International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea
This book examines the institutions that provide the scientific advice for
European fisheries management. This means mainly the Common Fish-
eries Policy in the form of the European Commission, but it also involves
other regional management bodies and nations bordering the European
Union, notably Norway which negotiates the division of very important
fish stocks with the EU. The central focus of the study is the International
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Formally, ICES is a multi-
lateral scientific organisation made up of 20 member countries. Infor-
mally, it is a network of approximately 1600 marine scientists, according
to its website at www.ices.dk. ICES’s charge is to coordinate and promote
marine science, particularly in the North Atlantic. It has two main func-
tions: one is the general promotion of quality marine science in the region,
and the other is to provide specific scientific advice to a set of clients in
response to their requests. The largest of these clients is the European
Commission, particularly through DG MARE. The advice is used in large
part to set total allowable catches (TAC) for commercial fish species of in-
terest to the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).
A helpful way to understand the institutional and historical develop-
ment of forms of scientific advice for the CFP is what Holm and Nielsen
(2004) term the TAC Machine. They outline the co-evolution of the prob-
lems that managers and politicians needed the advice to solve – mainly the
need for TACs in order to apportion the fish among the various polities
and stakeholders – and the family of stock assessment models that has
been developed to solve these problems. Their basic argument is that the
CFP has been an institutional success in spite of having done a poor job of
1. Introduction 29
managing fisheries, because it solves important political problems around
the division of fish resources among EU member states.
The CFP is one of the few areas where member states have given EU
institutions full decision-making power. The Council of Ministers makes
decisions about the management of European fisheries resources beyond
12 nautical miles from each country’s shoreline. Arriving at this agreement
required the creation of the rule of ‘relative stability’ under which the EU
cannot change the historical share that member state fleets have enjoyed
for various fish stocks. The main job of the CFP has been to conserve fish
stocks while allocating the allowable catch among member states following
the relative stability rule.
This political requirement fits very nicely with quotas that provide a
mechanism for dividing up the fish. The quotas in turn are generated by a
group of age-structured stock assessment models. What age-structured
models do is follow groups of fish in the same ‘age class’, i.e. fish that are
born the same year, through their life spans while trying to keep track of
how many fish of a particular age live to become one year older. These
models produce, in principle, an estimate of how many fish can be sus-
tainably removed from a fish stock each year. They require a massive
amount of scientific effort and data, and therefore a huge infrastructure
has grown up around these annual fish stock assessments. The result is a
mutually reinforcing system of political and scientific institutions that
works well in terms of EU politics, but much less well in terms of sustain-
ability (Holm and Nielsen 2004).
The scientific advice system is being asked to change. Several priorities
are emanating from ICES clients, who are themselves responding to shifts
in European environmental politics. The CFP has failed in terms of sus-
tainability. Indeed, Sparholt et al.’s (2007) analysis of fish stocks in the
ICES area found that the implementation of the CFP has had no real im-
pact on the condition of fish stocks. The pelagic stocks that are in relatively
good condition currently were already being fished at a moderate level be-
fore the CFP was implemented in 1983. More tragically, the high fishing
pressure on the demersal stocks that are currently in very poor shape sim-
ply continued. Both the fishing industry and conservation groups are deep-
ly dissatisfied with the situation. The industry is pushing for more long-
term management plans that allow rational business planning. The con-
servation groups want to reduce fishing pressure, implement marine pro-
tected areas and bring about an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries
management (EAFM). The European Union’s developing Marine Strategy
strongly reflects these concerns, particularly the EAFM. Both long-term
management plans and the EAFM present new and extremely complex
problems for scientific advice; the TAC Machine will soon be as politically
inadequate as it is environmentally inadequate. How it can be changed,
and what it can be changed into, is the challenge that European marine
scientists are trying to meet.
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1.4 Research methods
The qualitative aspects of case study research include in-depth interviews,
observation of various public and private meetings, and review of many
documents. Notes from observations, informal interviews, and original
documents were analysed using NUD*IST textual data analysis software.
A detailed description of this process as it was applied to the particular
qualitative research goal of identifying the main themes in the discussions
around a reorganisation of the ICES Advisory Programme is found in Sec-
tion 7.3.
This research also makes extensive use of the anthropological method of
participant observation. Part of the time I was researching and writing this
book, I was also serving as the Chair of the ICES Working Group on Fish-
eries Systems. This not only means that I was a participant in the system I
was studying; the assigning of a sociologist to such a role is a reflection of
the opening to new perspectives that characterises recent changes in ICES.
As any participant observation would, I am sure that this introduces some
biases. Indeed, my fisheries science colleagues often tease me about
whether I am being an observer or a participant at any given moment. I
cannot be aware of the biases that this participation introduces to my ana-
lysis – although I do admit to a general admiration of fisheries scientists –
so I must be content with cautioning the reader that it is present.
This book is based mainly on research that was supported by two Euro-
pean research projects. The Policy and Knowledge in Fisheries Manage-
ment (PKFM) project, which ran from 2003 through 2005, supported the
detailed observation of five scientific deliberations within the ICES system
and two meetings overseeing such deliberations.4 The PKFM project also
allowed us to carry out 29 formal interviews with fisheries scientists or
close observers of the fisheries science process. The Scientific Advice for
Fisheries Management at Multiple Scales (SAFMAMS) project ran from
2005 through 2008. In addition to allowing the observation of ten more
ICES meetings5 and six more in-depth interviews, the SAFMAMS project
supported the observation of the March 2005 meeting of the North Sea
Commission Fisheries Partnership and the May 2005 meeting of the
North Sea RAC Spatial Planning Working Group. In addition, the SAF-
MAMS project supported nine workshops at various geographical levels
on developing scientific advice for fisheries management, the results of
which have often contributed to this case study.
In addition, a large number of documents were reviewed. They included
ICES and STECF reports, the Memorandums of Understanding between
ICES and DG MARE, and a number of internal ICES documents, mainly
those distributed in conjunction with the meetings being observed. In the
end the access to both meetings and documents that ICES allowed for this
research was extensive, and I am very grateful for that. It is ICES’s stated
policy that quotations from any of their expert group documents must be
cleared ahead of time, and this certainly applies to some of the even less
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public documents that I was given access to. Therefore, the ICES Director
General has reviewed a draft of this manuscript. However, he did not re-
quest any changes.
The quantitative methodology used in this case was a random sample
survey of European marine fisheries scientists employed in the countries
around the North Sea, namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom and the Far-
oe Islands. A total of 465 valid responses were received. The sample size
was 900, which indicates a response rate of 51.7% – a relatively high re-
sponse rate for a non-telephone survey. The survey procedures and meth-
odologies are described in Appendix 1.
1.5 Plan of the book
This book has two basic parts. The first third, Chapters 1 through 3, is
mainly theoretical and is offered to provide background on the sociological
concepts used in the case study analysis. The present chapter provides a
general theoretical and methodological orientation. The second and third
chapters cover most of the relevant theory. They are basically selective re-
views of studies and theoretical insights drawn from a wide number of
areas in which science and policy-making are joined.
Chapter 2 begins by reviewing three general challenges we face in the
relationship between science and the rest of society. The first challenge is
the ‘inflation’ of the science boundary that results from constant institu-
tional pressure to define more and more issues as being capable of resolu-
tion using scientific methods. The second challenge is the uneasy relation-
ship between the scientific culture and that of decision-makers, which
becomes particularly sharp when scientific ideas about what constitutes
evidence clashes with legal ideas about evidence. The last challenge is the
uncertainty that not only pervades our knowledge of the environment but
is also a general condition of modern society with far-reaching conse-
quences. The chapter concludes with a review of three perspectives on the
changing relationship between science and the wider society that have pro-
ven useful in research on fisheries science.
Chapter 3 focuses on the narrower question of general experience with
the production of science for policy advice. A large number of studies of
how and when science is effective in aiding policy development have been
carried out in many different arenas over the last two decades, especially in
respect to environmental protection. Out of these studies have come three
qualities of science that tend to improve its effectiveness for policy. These
are credibility, legitimacy and saliency. Most of Chapter 3 is spent explor-
ing these three qualities. The chapter then turns to a discussion of the
boundary between science and non-science and ways that have been found
to work across that boundary. This is followed by an explanation of the idea
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of the paradoxes of transparency. Chapter 3 concludes with a summary of
the main theoretical ideas.
The remainder of the book, Chapters 4 through 7, presents the case
study. Chapter 4 orients the reader to the institutions and issues of scien-
tific advice for fisheries management in Europe, particularly the role
played by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES),
which is the central institution in the case study. The demands for scientif-
ic advice that various clients make on ICES, these clients being the Euro-
pean Commission and various other multilateral marine management
bodies, are one of two major forces determining the content of the knowl-
edge base for European marine management. The other major force is the
interests and plans of the European marine scientists themselves, and
these interests and plans are also played out within ICES to an important
degree. These two statements, however, are true for European-level activ-
ities. The same two forces operate at national levels through marine
science laboratories owned by national governments, which I will refer to
collectively as National Fisheries Institutes (NFIs). The two levels are deep-
ly intertwined. Most funding for ongoing, day-to-day ‘turning the crank’ on
fish stock assessment comes from the NFIs and their respective member
state ministries. Much of this money is actually expended through the
ICES system. The NFIs relate to each other through ICES, and the direc-
tors of these NFIs are the single most influential group in the governance
of ICES. They control the bulk of the funds used for ICES activities. Most
forward-looking research funding for new approaches comes either di-
rectly from the EU or from matching grants made by member state gov-
ernments to European-level research projects.
Chapter 5 focuses on the experiences of the individual scientists who
work within the advice production process. It is Chapter 5 that draws the
most heavily on a formal attitude survey of fisheries scientists in northern
Europe.6 Much of the information reported in Chapter 5 is based on com-
parisons of the survey responses of fisheries scientists involved in the ad-
visory process with those who are less involved. A central finding is that
these scientists find the advisory production process frustrating and de-
moralising because it both places tremendous demands on their profes-
sional lives and uses their work in ways that do not meet their expectations
of what science should be about.
Chapter 6 returns in a very direct way to the question of adaptation that
is so close to my heart. One of the central challenges that ICES is facing is
a demand stemming from multiple clients to produce advice for an ecosys-
tem approach to fisheries management (EAFM). It would be difficult to
pull together good scientific information for an EAFM even if it was clear
what such information should consist of, but the practical application of
the EAFM is unclear from the perspective of both the knowledge base and
implementation. ICES has moved ahead as best it can under these circum-
stances, and the institutional issues they are confronting in the process
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provide valuable lessons about how you organise an adaptive learning pro-
cess.
Chapter 7 completes the case study with the story of how ICES has reor-
ganised itself to meet the complex demands of providing scientific advice
for the EAFM as well as a set of other demands related to the practical
implementation of fisheries management. A central rubric of this reor-
ganisation has been an integration of diverse kinds of knowledge that has
presented both technical and institutional challenges. Tracing this reor-
ganisation process allows the case study to examine in depth the political
dimensions of creating an effective knowledge base for policy.
Chapter 8 draws together a set of conclusions about what lesson this
case might provide, in light of the theoretical issues outlined in the first
three chapters, for how we organise ourselves to develop a knowledge base
for environmental management.
This book was a long time coming and seeks to bring together a great
deal of sometimes disparate research. The inadequacies of the attempt will
no doubt become clear to the reader. If the book is able to make a contribu-
tion, most of the credit by far will belong to the fisheries scientists whose
activities and insights I am recording and presenting.
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2. Some general theoretical guides for
understanding the role of science in
society
2.1 Three challenges in science and society
2.1.1 Science and culture: Pressures to inflate the science boundary
Culture and science are bound together in ways we are often barely con-
scious of. While the more radical reflections on science and society may
not have much practical use, they remind us of the weight of the cultural
baggage on the science we are trying to harness to practical ends. To me,
the most illuminating of these radical reflections comes from the Frank-
furt School. This group of thinkers began to blend sociology and philoso-
phy in the 1930s and 1940s to explain the rise of fascism. Communicative
Systems Theory (CST) arose from this tradition a generation later. For
them, science is the ultimate expression of ‘instrumental rationality’, i.e.
rationality focussed on achieving ends. Technical considerations about
how to do things are pushing out moral and practical considerations about
why we do things. The why question has become a private matter; our col-
lective responsibility is to provide each other with the services and tools
needed to reach our individual goals. Ecological degradation is one place
where we are being forced to bring back the collective why, so it is perhaps
not a co-incidence that questions about science and participation arise in
response to environmental problems.
Science is powerful rhetoric. Technical arguments are more convincing
than soft appeals to values because we have so fully internalised the differ-
ence between negotiation and demonstration, while often missing the
practical and rhetorical links between them. Pelletier et al. (2000) did a
study using before and after attitude measurements of agriculture stake-
holders involved in a participatory action conference. Shifts in attitude as a
result of the discussion were much stronger in response to technical argu-
ments than value-based arguments. The presentation of something as
‘science’ can be and is used to silence people’s concerns (Beck 1992; Irwin
1995). Kaminstein (1996), for example, analyzed responses to a public
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meeting in which an agency was presenting information about a toxic
waste site in the United States. He found that the technical and bland lan-
guage calmed the audience. When people did express emotions and wor-
ries, they seemed very out of place. The community people reported feel-
ings of frustration afterwards. They experienced the officials trying to be
friendly and positive as mockery, and compliments such as ‘that is a good
question’ made them feel less able to complain, dispute and disagree over
what was in the end a political rather than a technical question.
The concept of the science boundary, the boundary between what is and
is not scientific knowledge and who is and is not a scientist, is an impor-
tant concept in STS (Gieryn 1983). People make use of this rhetorical
power of science. They try to present their values and interests as technical
requirements, undermining the credibility of science in general when they
do so. This phenomenon, then, might be called ‘inflating’ the science
boundary. Habermas (1984) warns against a tendency, rooted in a desire
for control, to try to redefine culture phenomena into technical ones.
When this happens, social relationships are made to appear as natural and
inevitable, rather than as the concrete results of real decisions made by real
people who could have chosen another route. Herbert Marcuse (1964)
points out that instrumental rationality is built into the very heart of natur-
al science; because the methods of hypothesis and experiment consist of
prediction and manipulation, and hence the domination of nature, science
is inescapably linked to control. Suggesting that something is the appropri-
ate object of a scientific analysis casts that object into a particular and sub-
ordinate cultural role. This casting can be and is done inappropriately to
the detriment of both science and policy.
One point CST makes is that bureaucracies and markets have particu-
larly strong institutional imperatives to make the subjective appear objec-
tive, often by getting things stamped as ‘scientific’ facts. The argument is
that some kinds of institutional coordination require ‘empirically moti-
vated ties’ that are based on objective facts, rather than ‘rationally moti-
vated trust’ based on social relationships (Habermas 1987). The empirical
ties are needed by institutions that rely on pressure to create compliant
behaviour, rather than on convincing people to behave a certain way (this
distinction is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.4). Coercive coordina-
tion is needed for institutions operating on large scales because it makes
behaviour predictable. Markets use market pressures that take final form
as take-it-or-leave-it offers, while bureaucracies use legal authority backed
up by sanctions. Neither requires the rich and nuanced communication
about choices that is found in institutions that coordinate action by convin-
cing people that something is the case. Indeed, that would be impossible
because rich communication on large scales would be too costly.
To make the pressure work, such institutions have to use decision rules
that make reference to something ‘objective’ so such decision rules require
material facts. Social psychologists have long recognised the different be-
havioural implications of ‘facts’ versus ‘social attitudes’, the difference
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being whether or not it is possible in principle to check some objective
reality (Festinger et al. 1950). This need is clear in respect to bureaucracies
that have to meet objective legal standards in decision-making, though – as
discussed in the next section – ‘objective’ when it comes to legal standards
means something subtly but importantly different from the scientific idea
of ‘objective’.
The functional differences between facts and attitudes are also impor-
tant for how markets function, although this is much less studied because
it is so far outside what can be accommodated in standard economic theo-
ry. It was shown in one study of an African labour market that natural risks
affected labour prices exactly as a market model would predict, i.e. people
paid to reduce risk. Risk arising from social relationships, however, such
as increased danger of being cheated when working with people who are
not kin or not from the same ethnic group, did the opposite of what the
market model would predict. People paid more money while taking on
greater risks. This was found in data for kinship and, more strongly, ethni-
city (Wilson 1998).
The bottom line is that institutions trying to coordinate behaviour across
large scales have to be able to make operational references to ‘indisputable
facts’, while having very limited communicative resources for convincing
people that these facts are true. The more questions that can be defined as
issues of fact with objectively true answers, the easier it is for such institu-
tions to function because they are able to bring more contingencies under
their direct control. Bureaucrats are continually trying to expand the arena
of questions that can be answered by ‘scientific facts’ into areas governed
by moral and practical rather than technical rationality.
Scientists, however, have their own reasons to resist these trends.
Science depends on ‘rationally motivated trust’ to coordinate behaviour
(Habermas 1987, pp. 182-184). Scientists must convince other scientists
that something is true and make use of rich and complex communications
to do so. This requires focussing on questions where a rationally motivated
factual truth (Habermas 1987, p. 184) can be reached through processes of
consensus, characterised by disinterest and scepticism and oriented
around universal criteria such as precise definitions, the falsification of
hypotheses and replicability (Merton 1968b). Only this narrowness of fo-
cus makes possible the internal trust of both people and results that en-
ables scientific inference (Barnes et al. 1996) because it defines the criteria
and extent of such trust. Therefore, scientists resist external pressures to
change the subject matter and the operating modes of science. An ex-
tended example of both bureaucratic pressure to inflate the science bound-
ary and the fisheries scientists’ attempts to accommodate this where they
could and resist it when it went too far is the discussion of mixed-fishery
management in Section 6.1.
The temptation to try to change political, social or cultural phenomena
into technical ones is always present. Environmental management re-
quires us to address social behaviour, and so we search for techniques to
37
do so. Management involves manipulation, and it is out of this tension that
the question of governance arises when democratic societies seek to ad-
dress social and environmental problems. This problem is exacerbated
when actors seek to obscure rather than clarify the distinction between
technical and cultural phenomena. The usual motivation for this is to
make a policy choice appear as a technical necessity. As one scientist in-
volved in environmental management put it ‘If ... a manager suggests that
a decision is based solely on scientifically-derived biological considera-
tions, the manager either misunderstands the nature of science ... or is
deliberately trying to disguise ... a value judgement’ (Decker et al. 1991,
quoted in Minnia and McPeake 2001).
2.1.2 Clashing cultures and notions of evidence
Science for legal and policy uses places demands on science and scientists
that challenge their modes of operation. Policy processes use different
standards of evidence and burdens of proof than science. Scientists want
to see that there is a small probability of a null hypothesis, while policy-
makers are more concerned with the costs of being wrong (Kinzig et al.
2003). As an exaggerated but illustrative example, a policymaker would
hardly want to reject a potential cure for cancer because there was only an
89% chance that it would work.
Managers employ scientists, but they see things through different cul-
tural glasses. Cullen (1990) observed interactions between water use plan-
ners and limnologists and found many differences in expectations and
mutual perception. The managers viewed limnology as a curative practice
while scientists saw it as preventative. Planners saw scientists as unable to
agree on a conclusion and driven by a need to publish rather than getting a
planning process done. They also thought the scientists were poor com-
municators. The scientists felt isolated and underutilised, they saw the
planners as unable to interpret data or even find information, indeed as so
ignorant that they did not know what they did not know. They also thought
the planners were poor communicators. Cohen et al. (2001) did 55 semi-
structured interviews with scientists working in eight public-sector re-
search science institutions in the UK. A majority of their respondents ob-
jected to the idea of being accountable to politicians and managers whose
purposes they saw as being at odds with science.
Salter (1988) explores in some detail what happens to scientific practice
when it is mandated as part of a policy process. The burden is placed on
the scientist to produce work that is sufficiently credible, salient and legit-
imate to support the policy. Policymakers want science that is intelligible to
non-scientific audiences, and in doing so represents a clear body of evi-
dence and appears to be rational. The ideal it is meant to project is that of
something free of value judgements, using clear methods that produce
credible results. At best, it is characterised by open debate, anonymous
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peer review, and academic publication. In addition to projecting this ster-
ling public image, it must present the policymakers with clear policy
choices. Of course, as Salter points out, real science in support of policy
conforms to none of these ideals. It makes moral dilemmas explicit, pro-
duces conflicting results that cannot be resolved by further studies, and is
often seen as corrupt. The policymakers desire transparent knowledge to
facilitate and justify their choices, but the actual transparency just reveals
more uncertainty.
Where these differences really become apparent is when science is
drawn into legal proceedings. As Smith and Wynne (1989) argue, legal
institutions have their own ways of defining what counts as fact, and they
are not the ways found in science. In court it is the law that decides what
the factual question is that the scientist must answer. They further argue
that ‘adequate evidence’ is fundamentally problematic in courts because of
the unremitting scepticism. In Latour’s (1987) terminology, opposing law-
yers always push scientific facts back towards the conditions of their pro-
duction and expose the role that scientists’ tacit assumptions, experimental
skills, and professional judgements played in the production of knowl-
edge. Within the scientific community these perfectly normal aspects of
scientific work are handled by expectations of trust in intellectual integrity
and the resulting importance of scientific reputations (Barnes et al. 1996).
In court they can be portrayed by opposing counsel as simply unprofes-
sional.
2.1.3 Uncertainty
In the 1980s, prominent social theorists began to argue that the West has
become a ‘risk society’ in which anxiety over uncertainty is the driving
force in the development of both the self (Giddens 1991) and institutions
(Beck 1992), and that science is the key institution that we look to in order
to relieve these anxieties. We now live in a ‘post-modern’ society charac-
terised by inescapable uncertainty due to both information overload and
the loss of the ability to trust traditional sources of valid knowledge.
Science has become an arena where disagreements over how to respond
to risk and uncertainty are played out (Irwin 1995). People simultaneously
look to science as an institution for answers, while viewing individual
scientists and their results with scepticism. The desire for scientific an-
swers is great, while the automatic authority of science is a thing of the
past. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, p. 251) tell us that in any policy arena
where the stakes are high, ‘the political manipulation of uncertainty is now
the focus of any relevant epistemology’. As research results presented in
this volume strongly illustrate, scientists cast in this central role as arbiters
of uncertainty have their own identities as scientists, challenged in ways
that have a direct impact on their morale.
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Any number of categories of that phenomenon for which I am using the
generic term ‘scientific uncertainty’ has been proposed. Harwood and
Stokes (2003), for example, suggest a fairly simple and concrete classifica-
tion of uncertainty from their direct experience with fisheries manage-
ment. They suggest that uncertainty in fisheries consists of:
– process uncertainty, which is also called natural variation or stochasti-
city;
– observation error, in which data input is faulty;
– model error, in which the model does not accurately specify the causal
processes; and
– implementation error, in which the resulting measures are not trans-
lated into actual behaviour in the way the models had foreseen.
To this list Kell et al. (2005) add error related to the estimation of para-
meters as a form of model error, as distinct from that related to accurately
reflecting system dynamics. Harwood and Stokes (2003) also contrast epis-
temic uncertainty, which is related to things that can be measured, and
linguistic uncertainty, which is uncertainty in the language used to de-
scribe or classify desired states.
These categories come from fisheries scientists and reflect the steps of
fish stock assessment estimation and its communication. We can also clas-
sify uncertainty in terms of its degree. Wynne (1992) suggests that the
term:
– ‘risk’ be used when behaviour is known and outcomes can be assigned
probabilities;
– ‘uncertainty’ be used when important system parameters are known,
but not their probability distributions;
– ‘ignorance’ be used when what is not known is not known; and
– ‘indeterminacy’ be used when causal chains, networks or processes are
open and thus defy prediction.
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) take a similar approach to classifying the un-
certainty of numbers, but they also link the degree of uncertainty to scien-
tific capabilities. They begin by arguing that there are scientific tools avail-
able to deal with three kinds of uncertainty. The first deals with
measurement errors and assesses the reliability of instruments. The sec-
ond deals with the probabilities that arise through the combinations of
different variables. The third deals with the error terms related to statistical
sampling. They relate these three types of tools to what they call the three
limits of scientific knowledge: errors in measurement made by real instru-
ments over and above that which can be handled by reliability testing; the
randomness that stems from the limits to causal understanding in the real
world; and the correspondence between descriptive objects and the reality
to which they refer. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) conclude this analysis by
proposing three kinds of uncertainty:
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– ‘inexactness’, which is usually expressed by numeric confidence limits
and reflects the spread found in any data set;
– ‘unreliability’, which is expressed by the level of the confidence to be
placed around a statement and is often expressed by semi-qualitative
statements such as ‘conservative by a factor of 10’; and
– ‘border with ignorance’, which can only be addressed by describing the
state of the art that produced the quantity.
Technical responses can be made to improve exactness, and for this stan-
dard routines, such as statistical techniques, are usually adequate. Unrelia-
bility is addressed in the search for improved methodologies. ‘Border with
ignorance’, they argue, calls for significant shifts in the way that science is
done and requires the support of an extended peer community of other
experts, with practical, experience-based knowledge being a possible
source of such expertise, including both user groups and policymakers
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990).
Scientists involved in supporting policy are constantly required to deal
with uncertainty. This is especially problematic at the border with ignor-
ance because this moves them beyond their training and even their under-
standing of what it means to do ‘science’. This can mean a direct challenge
to their professional identities and conflict with their scientific standards,
values, or ideals. Our research with fisheries scientists in Europe found
that many of them experience being asked to play a difficult role under
sometimes trying conditions and then having the results of these efforts
pulled out of the cultural context that produced it, in other words from the
background understanding that makes the results ‘science’ in the eyes of
the scientists.
Scientists look for ways to respond to these challenges while maintain-
ing their self-image of doing quality science. One basic choice is that when
formulating scientific advice they can choose to simplify the uncertainty,
or they can choose to emphasise the uncertainty. Both of these involve
trade-offs. If they simplify the uncertainty, the caveats they offer may be
ignored; if they emphasise the uncertainty their advice may be ignored
entirely (Harwood and Stokes 2003).
Shackley and Wynne (1996) review some of the strategies that scientists
have used in their presentation of uncertainty in the context of global cli-
mate change. One approach they term the ‘clarification and management
of uncertainty’. Here scientists are selective about the uncertainty they are
willing to communicate to policymakers, and understandings within the
scientific community, such as a general agreement about the precautionary
approach or other policy directions, reduce the probability that other ex-
perts will challenge these selective reports.
The second approach is to ‘do more research to reduce the uncertainty’.
This is in some ways an obvious response, but it has also been criticised as
a ‘devil’s pact’. Policymakers are able to avoid changes, while scientists use
uncertainty to justify research budgets. Shackley and Wynne (1996) argue
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that policymakers like ambiguity because it shields their authority. They
use the reduction of uncertainty as a rhetorical device to proceed with cur-
rent knowledge, while the scientists use it both to get funding and because
areas on policy uncertainty are also areas where they find interesting re-
search questions. In the area of global climate change, for example, space
agencies are in search of new tasks while governments want to postpone
action and therefore welcome uncertainties. Governments want to fund
more research rather than change energy policies; scientists are happy to
play up uncertainties to keep funding coming. Policy becoming more
science-dependent reflects a convergence of interests between opponents
to policy change and the scientific bureaucracy (Boehmer-Christiansen
1994).
Shackley and Wynne (1996) call the third approach the ‘transformation
of uncertainty’. The phenomena Wynne (1993) terms indeterminacy is re-
cast as uncertainty while those involving ignorance are recast as risk. This
makes things appear more tractable to the managers while helping the
scientists to maintain authority. The extreme application of this strategy
they term the ‘condensation of uncertainty’. In this approach all the uncer-
tainty is collapsed into one category, in their example this is risk, and the
other forms are treated as superfluous in communications outside the
scientific community. Degnbol (2003) argues that this basic error was
made in fisheries science when they first began to address the precaution-
ary approach. Uncertainty was treated as error that could be estimated and
used to support decision rules built around limit reference points. This
approach reflected a perceived need for clear communication of the con-
tent and implication of scientific advice, but it was an approach to the pre-
cautionary principle that excluded too much of the other forms of uncer-
tainty that decision-makers needed to be cautious about.
Using Wynne’s (1993) categories, Harremoes et al. (2001) argue that it
is ignorance, not risk, which is the main issue that precautionary decision-
making must address. They argue for the benefits of casting a wide net for
knowledge to address ignorance by reducing obstacles to interdisciplinary
learning and making use of lay and local knowledge. The white-coated ex-
pert is passing away, from the perspective of both what is being called for
to improve the use of science for decision-making and what is observed to
actually be happening to the day-to-day practice of science. The shifts are
rooted in how to handle the problem of uncertainty. Funtowicz and Ravetz
(1992) argue that addressing the limits of ignorance requires skills and
practice in the form of a ‘learned art’ that resembles the activity of a con-
sultant more than that of a research scientist.
The uncertainty of the ‘risk society’ appears in fisheries science to a
greater extent, perhaps, than in other areas dealing with more easily obser-
vable phenomena. It has become a key, perhaps the key, principle in the
organisation of fisheries science institutions. The discussion of the
changes in ICES in Chapter 7 outlines how they are developing a form of
‘consistency’ that applies the standard questions of methodological reliabil-
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ity to social processes. This is what I refer to as Type E consistency in Sec-
tion 7.3.1; it is consistency in the linkage of scientific methods to advisory
problems. The need for this kind of consistency is rooted in scientific un-
certainty.
2.2 Three perspectives on science and decision-making
processes
Almost all observers of the present state of science are seeing profound
changes in scientists’ roles, based on different ways of interacting with
decision-making processes. These observers also see some different things
happening, or at least they place considerably different emphases on the
changes they think are important. In the remainder of this chapter, I will
review three of the more prominent approaches. I consider them all useful
theories because in my research on European fisheries scientists I have
seen the patterns that each one would predict, and all of them have im-
proved my understanding. The first, called ‘Mode Two Science’, sees
science taking on a much more subservient role to other social institutions
than it has in the past. Some of the people taking the Mode Two approach
celebrate this shift, while others see cause for worry. The second perspec-
tive, ‘Epistemic Communities’, sees scientists much more on top of things,
as equal partners or even drivers in policy changes, but only when they
have a strong scientific consensus. The third perspective is called ‘Post-
Normal Science’ and is more of a philosophical reflection on how science
can be the most helpful.
2.2.1 Mode Two science
Mode Two science is most closely associated with Michael Gibbons. He
suggests that science is operating in a new mode that is trans-disciplinary,
characterised by shifting rather than permanent institutions, and con-
stantly moving back and forth between the fundamental and the applied
(Gibbons et al. 1994). The driving force here is that society has learned to
speak back to science. Society is transforming science by demanding that it
respond to specific contexts where innovations require ‘trans-disciplinary’
efforts. ‘The epistemological core of science has, over time, become
crowded with norms and practices that cannot be reduced easily to a single
generic methodology, or more broadly, to privileged cultures of scientific
inquiry’ (Gibbons 1999, p. 83).
Science is shifting from a search for truth to a more pragmatic aim of
providing a provisional empirical understanding of the world that works in
a practical sense. Reliability has been redefined as what works (Gibbons
1999). Scientists have had to learn to fit their research agendas into the
agendas of funding agencies and firms (Gibbons et al. 1994). Many Mode
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Two authors seem to shift between offering explanations of empirical
changes in science institutions and advocating their encouragement. This
advocacy seems driven by the idea that science has been operating as an
unaccountable elite, and the changes pointed to by the Mode Two ap-
proach are a timely corrective (Elam and Glimell 2004).
Scientific labour has become more like a commodity, driven by contracts
offered through tenders that deal more with scientific person-hours than
with actual scientists (Waterton 2005). Managers and funding agencies
have made scientists into interchangeable units of labour. This is very dif-
ferent from the ways they used to be employed when they were thought of
more as creative intellectuals. They are also more strongly subjected to
social accountability through such things as greater concern with research
misconduct, data availability, conflicts of interest, human subjects re-
search, and cultural limits being placed on the pursuit of knowledge (Gus-
ton 2001a).
Mode Two raises serious questions about what is happening with scien-
tific quality control as the current peer review system is closely associated
with established disciplines. Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that quality con-
trol has become more localised and rooted in the institutions where the
research is taking place. Mode Two science grows and expands in a differ-
ent way than did ‘Mode One’ science, i.e. scientists fitting the classical
understanding of independent intellectual pioneers organised in disci-
plines. This new form of much less disciplinary expansion makes the ap-
plication of widely accepted standards in quality control much more diffi-
cult. More intensive communication has arisen, between practitioners and
between science and society, as people seek to address issues of quality
(Gibbons et al. 1994). How adequate this communication is in ensuring
quality is questionable, especially as universities as well as the private sec-
tor are now crowded with researchers with financial stakes in research out-
comes (Guston 2001a).
An important distinction is the one between multi-disciplinary ap-
proaches, where scientists from different disciplines work together as a
team on a particular problem, and trans-disciplinary approaches where
scientists seek to create new questions and methods that draw upon many
disciplines. Mode Two scholars see trans-disciplinary work becoming
more common, and many celebrate this shift. But trans-disciplinary
science is another source of quality control challenges. Cohen et al.’s
(2001) survey (p. 31) found a consensus that discipline-based approaches
could not deal with the complex environmental issues that were the central
concern of the organisations where the scientists they studied were work-
ing. Disciplinary standards for testing new knowledge are no longer ade-
quate. New kinds of standards have to be developed as part of the research
process. External quality control focuses on the procedural mechanisms,
rather than taking the form of peer reviews, and the research process itself
becomes the object of evaluation (Guggenheim 2006).
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The transition to a consumer-contractor relationship has been the ‘re-
form’ which has had the biggest impact on work and organisation. This
includes new structures of accountability that replace a collegial environ-
ment of trust (Cohen et al. 2001). It is in these structures that new forms
of quality control arise. Guggenheim (2006) studied 20 environmental
consulting companies, a well-developed form of Mode Two Science. The
tendencies he found are startling but will likely not be nearly as well devel-
oped in more traditional science institutions such as universities, non-
profit research organisations, and public sector research institutions. How-
ever, in the EU context, research projects organised around time sheets
and project deliverables that are subject to limited peer review are increas-
ingly important in these institutions as well.
In the companies Guggenheim (2006) studied, the scientists have no
time or incentives to write journal articles, and traditional mechanisms of
peer review do not apply. The quality control mechanisms they do use are
mainly internal – quality management systems (QMS) and time sheets.
They also have supervisory oversight from clients and universities. Be-
cause the companies are not organisationally bound to a traditional scien-
tific institution, they have to be monitored by ‘real’ scientists.
The internal quality control mechanisms have the greatest impact on
how science is done. The QMS are quite the opposite of a requirement to
use transparent methods. They are proprietary, secret and aimed primarily
at singling out the company from their competitors. They are based on
internationally recognised variables but also on the company’s own stan-
dards in respect to these variables. They are usually formalisations of pre-
viously existing rules. The companies keep them secret because they be-
lieve that it is their organisational procedures which distinguish them
from their competitors. Their real accountability is in the usefulness of
the actual products. This is where reputations are built (Guggenheim
2006).
Time sheets are the main mechanisms used to coordinate projects and
the key expression of the reduction of scientists to interchangeable units of
labour. The time sheet approach has a strong impact on science because
the ‘interchangeable units’ work on parts of projects, rather than on the
intellectual object of the research (Guggenheim 2006). In Cohen et al.’s
(2001) survey, scientists working under contract arrangements reported
that they missed the opportunity to focus on one question for a sustained
period of time.
This new way of producing knowledge replaces quality control based on
reviews of results with quality control based on procedures and processes.
This reinforces the Mode Two move away from the search for general
knowledge to answers to specific practical questions. The scientific contri-
bution is judged only with respect to its effectiveness in pleasing a client by
solving a problem, rather than with respect to the development of theory
within a scientific discipline in order to achieve a common and expanding
body of knowledge. These are ‘non-scientific’ mechanisms in the sense
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that the quality control is shifted to agents and mechanisms outside of
scientific organisations (Guggenheim 2006) and even outside the scientif-
ic community.
Recent scholarship has challenged some of the empirical arguments
underpinning the Mode Two approach. One thread suggests that the fre-
quency and importance of trans-disciplinary research have been exagger-
ated. Universities, industry and the government remain highly differen-
tiated, and there are strong structural reasons why the current basic
division of labour between the three will continue (Shinn 2002). Indeed,
some of the ground that Mode Two is argued to have gained in respect of
disciplinary science may even be lost. One piece of evidence for this is
provided by a study of the recent history of science funding in Sweden. A
number of political challenges to the value of funding independent basic
science arose in the early 1990s. A special fund was set up to support work
addressing specific problems of concern to industry and environmental
regulation. These funds grew to the point where they were seen as a chal-
lenge to the university establishment. The universities were able to reas-
sert a commitment to basic research activity within national funding
(Elam and Glimell 2004). Nevertheless, as will be seen in later chapters,
many of the trends described by the Mode Two approach are present in
fisheries science as it is carried out in Europe.
2.2.2 Epistemic communities
Peter Haas (1989) developed the concept of the ‘epistemic community’
within the discipline of international relations as a way to try to explain the
successful emergence of the Mediterranean Action Plan, a pollution con-
trol regime around the Mediterranean Sea. He took the term from the phi-
losophy of science where it was used to mean scientists who share certain
assumptions about what questions are worth asking. He argued that the
Mediterranean Agreement came about because of the existence of an eco-
logically oriented epistemic community, made up mainly of people work-
ing in the environmental ministries of the various countries. They shaped
their governments’ policies, hired people who thought like them and
gained international support (Haas 1989).
The idea of the epistemic community has proven useful to many obser-
vers of science-based international management regimes. Haas (1992a, p.
3) defines an epistemic community as:
Q 2.1 A network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence
in a particular domain and with authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic com-
munity may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and back-
grounds they have:
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(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members;
(2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between
possible policy actions and desired outcomes;
(3) shared notions of validity – that is, inter-subjective, internally defined
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their exper-
tise; and
(4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices asso-
ciated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is
directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be en-
hanced as a consequence.
Epistemic communities are a particular type of policy network charac-
terised by this general agreement. Members of an epistemic community
share a strong normative orientation (Haas 1992a). Epistemic commu-
nities are an example of the ‘international civil society’ where people divide
their allegiance between domestic constituencies and international peer
groups (Engles et al. 2006). Haas (1992b) argues that the success of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer can be
attributed to an epistemic community. The first countries to actively en-
courage control were those in which both the epistemic community and a
tradition of pro-environmental sentiment were strong. Once channels be-
tween other countries’ national administrations were established and the
epistemic community broadened, then the other countries began to sup-
port action. His analysis found that it was these contacts that made the real
difference, rather than public opinion or the actions of environmental
NGOs. These things only became important later in the process after gov-
ernment regulations had been introduced. Interestingly, for Haas (1992b)
the key actor was the DuPont Corporation, which broke ranks with other
chemical companies in an act that was critically important to the momen-
tum for international action. Haas (1992b) argues that the difference was
that key decision-makers on this issue at DuPont were all chemists who
modified their positions in reaction to advances in scientific understand-
ing.
The epistemic community approach takes a more deferential attitude
towards science than is usually found in STS. The effectiveness of the
scientific community in international regime formation is rooted in the
ability of the scientists to reach a consensus and to overcome their natural
inclination to extreme caution. These characteristics can be seen in the
formation of international regimes that were science-driven, including the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the Inter-
national Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Young
1989). The key to effectiveness is that knowledge on which the epistemic
community is based is ‘accurate, accessible, and contributes to the achieve-
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ment of collective goals’. It must ‘represent consensus and be provided
through a medium that is politically palatable’ (Haas 2004, p. 575).
The emphasis on consensus has been the characteristic of the epistemic
community approach that has brought the most criticism, especially from
scholars trained in STS. Lidskog and Sundqvist (2002) argue that Haas
was right about the importance in international relations of a common
picture of reality to challenge the idea that national interests alone drive
outcomes. However, they accuse him of a naive view of science, almost to
the point where he introduces a consensus notion of truth as part of the
epistemic community argument. Others question the strong programma-
tic emphasis on consensus because disagreement is not only going to be
found within any scientific community; it is a positive force driving new
thinking (Young 2004).
Both the strength and the weakness of the epistemic community ap-
proach are that it posits an ideal situation: a strong consensus among
scientists reflecting truth about nature that has clear implications, and pol-
icy alternatives that all of the scientists can gather around. It describes
what has actually happened in several successfully negotiated environmen-
tal protection regimes. These empirical examples, while limited in num-
ber, do show that success is possible and provide a set of experiences of
success from which lessons can be drawn. The weakness of the epistemic
community approach is also rooted in its focus on an ideal situation. What
about the majority of environmental problems where the degree of agree-
ment among scientists is a mixed bag of agreement about some facts (and
some values), but not others? Haas’s (2004) response is that we must wait
for the consensus, and until that consensus emerges, scientific and policy
developments must be kept insulated from one another. This response is
inadequate. It is grounded in a naive view of both the way the science
boundary works and the degree of urgency we face in tackling many of
these issues. Uncertainty is a reality we have to learn to deal with.
The epistemic community idea sees cooperation as an either/or proposi-
tion (Sebenius 1992) that fails to consider the multiple bottom lines that
participants in negotiations face. Ways that policy development can move
forward do not emerge all at once. What is most critical is that the people
involved in ongoing negotiations are able to move forward when the oppor-
tunity arises, in a way that their ability to work together in the future is
enhanced rather than impaired. Such a community may become a true
epistemic community when uncertainty is reduced and the way forward
becomes clear, but it must continue to learn and adapt in small steps the
rest of the time.
2.2.3 Post-normal science: New forms of scientific practice
Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz developed the idea of Post-Normal
Science (PNS). PNS happens in policy areas characterised by both high
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uncertainty and high stakes. Under these conditions it is very difficult to
keep facts separate from the interests and value positions, especially as
they are usually expressed as probabilities. Where the stakes are high, in-
terests and values determine how participants perceive the associated
risks. Their basic argument is that such conditions require a more partici-
patory decision-making process.
A central concept in PNS is the ‘extended peer community’. To deal with
new problems in a high uncertainty/high stakes area, an open dialogue is
required because the quality of the science depends on an ‘extended peer
review’. The important thing to keep in mind to understand PNS is this
link to quality. The idea of the extended peer community is close to, but
not synonymous with, stakeholder involvement in science. The extended
peer community is about the science itself, it is a new kind of quality con-
trol. It is made up of experts, even if some of these people base their exper-
tise on experience-based knowledge, say of a policy process or a fishery,
rather than research-based knowledge.
The ideas of PNS begin with a set of philosophical developments about
the nature of quantification. Their arguments are mathematical ones
broadly understood and do not begin with empirical observations the way
that both the epistemic community approach and the Mode Two science
approach do. It is from this philosophical perspective that they developed
the NUSAP notation for quantitative statements. In the NUSAP notation,
in addition to the familiar categories of number, unit and spread, Funto-
wicz and Ravetz (1990) introduce the new categories of assessment and
pedigree. Assessment and pedigree are both about the characterisation of
uncertainty.
Assessment relates to uncertainty rising from problems in the reliability
of a quantity. It could be expressed, for example, in arguments about what
level of confidence should be placed around a statement. Should it be 95%,
99% or some other level? Assessment is about the different kinds of jud-
gements that one would see expressed by statements such as ‘conservative
by a factor of 10’. As Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990, p. 28) describe it, ‘our
knowledge of the behaviour of the data gives us a spread, and our knowl-
edge of the process gives us an assessment’.
Pedigree relates to uncertainty rising from the border with ignorance,
discussed above (Section 2.1.3), in the context of their categorisation of
types of uncertainty. Here Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) step entirely into
the qualitative aspects surrounding the quantity. Pedigree addresses the
relevant epistemological, historical, sociological and institutional contexts
needed if one is to understand the implications of a quantity for policy.
They develop ‘pedigree matrices’ based on a hierarchy of modes of knowl-
edge: a deductive argument is stronger than an inductive inference which,
in turn, is stronger than an analogical argument. All three of them are
considered stronger than conventional definitions. They offer a number of
examples of pedigree matrices. A very basic example is this pedigree table
for research information (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1 Research pedigree matrix
Theoretical structure Data input Peer acceptance Colleague consensus
Established theory Experimental data Total All but cranks
Theoretically based model Historic/field data High All but rebels
Computational model Calculated data Medium Competing schools
Statistical processing Educated guesses Low Embryonic field
Definitions Uneducated guesses None No opinion
Source: Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990, p. 140)
The table establishes a hierarchy which allows the receiver of the quantity
communicated with the NUSAP notation to evaluate basic levels of cer-
tainty. The NUSAP notation and the pedigree table help clarify the idea
that it is in the extended peer community that the relevant forms of quality
control for the quantity arise, in contexts of high stakes and high uncer-
tainty. The extended peer community is made up of the various groups
that can contribute their perspectives on the policy and their own knowl-
edge. The extended peer community consists of the people who have the
knowledge to fill out the pedigree table, knowledge that is found in both
the scientific disciplines themselves and in the sociology of knowledge of
the policy arena. Ravetz (1999) argues that effective science-based policies
in arenas of high stakes and high uncertainty require an open dialogue
with all those affected. The extended peer community improves quality by
mobilising ‘extended facts’ to help develop a shared understanding of the
uncertainty in areas of conflicting values and agendas (Healy 1999).
This extended peer community is not meant to reduce the authority of
science or to make it explicitly political. It addresses the problem that in
these high-stakes, high-uncertainty areas, the traditional mechanisms for
assuring quality are not adequate. Accredited experts need the assistance
of the extended community to get the necessary job done. Establishing the
pedigree of a quantity requires a broad understanding of its saliency, cred-
ibility and legitimacy that only a broader group can provide. Ravetz (1999)
expresses concern that seen out of context, these ideas may appear to re-
duce the authority of science; he stresses, however, that PNS is not about
traditional areas of research, but new areas with high social and economic
importance where traditional mechanisms for assuring quality are not ade-
quate. PNS is not meant to be an attack on accredited experts, but a way of
describing the kind of assistance needed (Ravetz 1999).
The way the relationship between scientific experts and other partici-
pants should be structured is one of the most helpful insights of PNS.
Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) often make use of the contract between
‘knowing-that’ vs ‘knowing-how’ when discussing scientific quality control
in contexts of high uncertainty. Traditional science has seen itself basically
as the first, but PNS requires a new emphasis on the second. There are
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several dangers in trying to maintain traditional styles of practice in uncer-
tain conditions. Scientists over-sell their science, feeling that they have to
show more confidence and authority than the situation warrants. This
leaves them, in turn, facing exactly what they were trying to avoid: a con-
tinuous decline in respect for expert claims (Irwin 1995). Science policy
settings in Europe and Canada often involve ongoing discussions with in-
terest groups, and these discussions help guard against attempts to justify
value-based choices with post-hoc scientific arguments (Jasanoff 1986).
Knowing-that is about the ultimate attainment of truth, while knowing-
how is about practice. Knowing-how is about using skill, it is rooted in tacit
knowledge and not part of the traditional philosophy of science. In re-
source management scientists playing this kind of role can be seen in cer-
tification programmes where management programmes are evaluated ac-
cording to a complex set of criteria. Issues of uncertainty become areas of
ongoing negotiations between the scientists and those who desire certifica-
tion.
Within a high-stakes, high-uncertainty context, scientific skills provide
‘rubrics, guidelines and elicitation procedures, for the expression of uncer-
tainty, for the assessment of quality, and also for the training in both skills’
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1999, p. 68). Scientists working interactively with
others can act as facilitators of transparency, while simultaneously taking
advantage of different kinds of knowledge to try to describe and deal with
the implications of uncertainty and ignorance.
Scientists are currently not trained to be consultants, but it is the skills
of the consultant that are required here. These are the skills to work with
policymakers and other stakeholders in a process linking the uncertainty
and quality of the information with the needs of the policy. They point out
that where experts in consulting professions normally have very long, prac-
tical, apprentice-type training after their formal educations (e.g. doctors),
scientists generally do one major research project under supervision and
then are certified as able to operate as an independent scientist. They ar-
gue that the ideas of skill and craftsmanship can be the basis of a way to
reformulate the science boundary in areas of high uncertainty (Funtowicz
and Ravetz 1990). The shift is from trusting science as a ‘truth machine’ to
trusting the scientific institutions and procedures to make science that
works in practical situations (Healy 1999).
Again, the strengths and weaknesses of the approach are closely related.
Because it begins from an essentially philosophical perspective, the NU-
SAP notations provide a clear rationale, grounding the science boundary
in epistemological rather than practical considerations. At the same time,
the emphasis on scientific skills and the consultancy model suggests an
appealing programme for implementing science in areas where boundary
work can become very difficult. The idea of the extended peer community,
however, needs sociological examination. The extended communities in-
volved in science-based policies include groups with conflicting objectives
who bring their own sets of relevant facts, values and interests into the
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discussion. Legitimacy can be lost if scientists are seen as closer to one
interest group than another. Given the level of social conflict involved,
what are the conditions under which an extended peer community adds to
the quality of the science, rather than just adding some chaos to the com-
plexity and uncertainty?
All three of these approaches to understanding the changing institu-
tional context of science are helpful in understanding the case study pre-
sented here. While each of them can effectively supplement a human eco-
logical approach, none of them addresses the question of adaptation
directly. Nor do any of them even begin to address the complexity of under-
standing scientific institutions that seek to take an ecosystem approach to
fisheries management. In seeking to support European fisheries manage-
ment policy, the scientists in the ICES system both reflect and speak back
to these three tendencies. Because they are doing so within a formal policy
context, they share a set of more specific demands on their science with
other scientists who work with policymakers. It is this exchange between
science and policy that Chapter 3 addresses.
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3. Developing scientific advice for policy
3.1 Saliency, credibility and legitimacy
Over the last 25 years or so, many social and natural scientists have begun
to ask, some more and some less systematically, under what circumstances
scientific findings are able to influence policy. Most of these investigations
have been motivated by frustrations over the seemingly slow response of
policymakers to environmental issues.
One of the most useful efforts to examine the use of science in policy is
the Global Environmental Assessment Project, a large comparative re-
search project carried out by the Kennedy School on the policy uptake of
results from global scientific assessments (Cash and Clark 2001; Cash et
al. 2002; Clark et al. 2002, 2006). As mentioned in Chapter 1, they con-
clude that the majority of the assessments are not effective in influencing
policy, but they do affect the long-term development of an issue through
such mechanisms as influencing the issue’s visibility, the stakeholders
who will take an interest, the way questions and objectives are framed,
and the selection of management alternatives (see also van der Hove
2007). Hence, an approach to understanding international policy that ex-
amines the creation of common understanding within a political process is
more instructive than simply examining issues of power and interests
(Haas 2004). This influence of science on policy is reflected back on
science through the influences of the policy process on scientists and their
work.
Questions of policy and the needs of policymakers have a strong influ-
ence on science. As Young (2004) argues, international institutions influ-
ence the topics being studied and the kinds of models being created. Policy
influences science directly by determining what scientific questions will
receive funding, and less directly through changes in standards of quality
control. When policy addresses areas of high uncertainty, and therefore
competing interpretations among scientists, changes in the standards that
determine the ‘best available knowledge’ become extremely important (van
der Hove 2007). Debates about the credibility and uncertainty of results
forming an important part of the negotiations are a very common feature
in diplomacy related to environmental issues (Backstrand 2004). Scien-
tists deciding which directions to take in the creation of new knowledge
are strongly influenced by their experiences with what has proved useful
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and interesting to policymakers in the past. This desire for policy influence
can also lead to downplaying disagreements in the search for consensus,
in spite of the fact that ‘within reason, disagreement is a positive force in
the scientific world’ (Young 2004, p. 223).
The Global Environmental Assessment Project made use of three analy-
tical concepts that proved very useful in understanding the uptake of
science to policy. Clark et al. (2002, p. 7) define these three as follows:
Q 3.1 ‘Saliency’ reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment to be
addressing questions relevant to their policy or behavioural choices;
‘Credibility’ reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment’s arguments
to meet standards of scientific plausibility and technical adequacy; and
‘Legitimacy’ reflects whether an actor perceives the assessment as unbiased
and meeting standards of political fairness.
A scientific result needs all three of these attributes to some degree if it is
to influence policy. An important difficulty, Clark et al. (2002) argue, is
that there are often trade-offs between the three. Indeed, they suggest that
efforts to bolster one usually only succeed at the expense of another. For
example, efforts to increase saliency by narrowing the questions to be in-
vestigated can decrease legitimacy by making the process appear to have a
political bias. Conversely, adding stakeholders to increase legitimacy can
reduce saliency as issues are raised that are outside of the policymakers’
remit. While these relationships may usually involve trade-offs, they can
also lead to mutual reinforcement and complementarity. For example, an
effort to increase credibility by including new knowledge may also increase
saliency and legitimacy. These observations form the basis of their empiri-
cal investigations of science policy institutions, suggesting that the main
differences lie in the ways that they shape and balance the trade-offs
among saliency, credibility and legitimacy.
It is important to note that these or similar categories also emerge in
various ways in studies of the perception of scientific information in local
contexts. It is these local contexts, rather than abstract ideas about science,
that provide the tools that people use to make sense of the information
(Irwin 1995). Michael (1996), for example, conducted a series of inter-
views with the general public about radon. They were interested in how
people understood the categories of ‘ignorance’ and ‘expertise’. They found
that three kinds of responses were the most common and these three cor-
responded roughly to credibility, legitimacy and saliency. One was the ba-
sic, unsurprising idea that some people know more than others and the
experts should be listened to. The second was the notion that understand-
ing radon is ‘not my job’, suggesting an understanding of ignorance and
expertise that was based on a legitimate division of labour. The third main
response was in terms of saliency, the information about radon was simply
not interesting to them. Yearley (1999) held a series of focussed group
interviews with different stakeholder groups around air pollution models
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being used by a local government agency. They found that three factors
influenced the public understanding of the models’ output. The first two
corresponded to legitimacy and credibility. The first was the respondents’
assessment of the trustworthiness and agenda of the agency, and the sec-
ond was their confidence in their own technical knowledge and ability to
judge the technical merits of the model. The third was also related to cred-
ibility and reflected the importance that people attach to direct experience:
they judged the models in terms of their evaluation of the assumptions
about social behaviour that underlay them. All three of these factors were
more important than the face credibility of the models based on realistic-
looking simulations and projections.
3.1.1 What is saliency?
Saliency is very similar to ‘relevance’, in fact ‘relevance’ appears in the de-
finition, and my fisheries science colleagues have from time to time
wanted to know why social scientists insist on using this weird word in-
stead of just saying ‘relevance’. The difference is that many scientific find-
ings are relevant to policy in the sense that they could logically be consid-
ered in making the policy without actually being salient. By using the term
‘saliency’ we are emphasising that particular facts become prominent be-
cause of their usefulness in responding to the needs of policy develop-
ment.
In practice, policy-making must select from among a broad range of
relevant facts to steer activities. The competition among stakeholders in
environmental management in developing the knowledge base for man-
agement consists of each group trying to move a set of facts from being
merely relevant to being salient. This competition happens within man-
agement systems that already presuppose a great deal about what facts are
salient. Considerable aggravation is experienced by conservation interests,
user groups and scientists alike when the facts they see as most relevant
are not salient in the decision-making process. Many feel that there ought
to be an objective, ‘scientific’ way to determine which facts should be sali-
ent. We expend a lot of energy in identifying the right ‘indicators’ and ‘dri-
vers’ and experience a great deal of frustration when these lists quickly
become very long. While science can perhaps eliminate some candidates
for saliency in an objective manner, the movement of facts from relevance
to saliency is unavoidably a political process.
3.1.2 What is credibility?
Credibility is about making sure that the scientific result reflects nature as
closely as possible. Credibility comes from applying the scientific method,
i.e. the testing of a falsifiable hypothesis, along with that method’s guar-
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dians: quantification, replication and peer review. In fisheries science this
methodological ideal is often difficult to achieve in the day-to-day world of
trying to understand what is happening in the ocean. But the ideal remains
a very real force because it provides the standard against which a scientific
effort is judged. It is adherence to the ideal of the scientific method which
confirms the scientific result to be an objective fact. Credibility is the con-
cept most closely related to the phrase ‘best available science’ when it is
used in a legal context as the required basis for policy. As a concept stand-
ing beside legitimacy and saliency, we can think of credibility as the idea
that is most ‘internal’ to science as it is usually understood.
The question of credibility comes up in a number of ways within the
CFP. Managers at DG MARE are constantly challenged with having to de-
termine the credibility of particular pieces of scientific advice. In an inter-
view, a high-level officer at DG MARE said:
Q 3.2 I think we in the Commission are very careful before we choose to
deviate from scientific advice, but in taking that position we are aware that
the quality of advice is very uneven. And that could be for many reasons; it
could be that scientists simply haven’t been given worthwhile or reliable
data on which to make any analysis at all. It could be that the number of
people involved in the analysis has been maybe too small to allow the injec-
tion of alternative ideas or alternative approach, it could be that ICES itself
has not really applied some form of quality control peer review, to make
sure that everybody is working to the same standards in terms of quality of
data. It may be that scientists aren’t being honest enough.
The line between scientific credibility and legitimacy is a difficult one; in a
practical sense we are always dealing with degrees of subjectivity as the
application of the scientific method can almost always be challenged. Re-
plication is a laboratory ideal that is very difficult in biology and environ-
mental sciences; even in physics replication is heavily dependent on scien-
tific skills (Collins and Pinch 1998). Peer review, for example, is closely
tied to the social processes of science discussed below. Studies of peer re-
view have shown that standards are a matter for negotiation and compro-
mise. Peer review is a social process created and influenced by the com-
munal needs of modern science (Jasanoff 1990).
3.1.3 What is legitimacy?
While Clark et al.’s (2002) definitions of saliency and credibility are fairly
straightforward, their definition of legitimacy needs some fleshing out. I
hope to show in this section that there is a lot more to the idea than simply
‘unbiased’. Traditionally, legitimacy has meant a valid claim to a status.
Someone is a legitimate child or a legitimate ruler. In our case we are talk-
ing about a claim that something is ‘science’ or, put more strongly, a claim
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that something has the status of fact rather than opinion. While the ideas
of legitimacy and credibility are certainly different, they are linked together
in a way that neither is with saliency. The ideas are distinct, but it is hard to
raise the one question without considering the other. In this section I try to
think through this distinction using a thought experiment in which I apply
to scientific legitimacy some of the concepts developed by people studying
political legitimacy. By doing this I am trying to tease out the part of scien-
tific legitimacy that is purely political from the part that is rooted in the
credibility of the science itself.
Political legitimacy is operating when people claim the authority to gov-
ern, and others assent to that claim. Max Weber was the founder of politi-
cal sociology. His work offers a model of ‘legitimate orders’ based on three
categories of legitimate domination (Weber 1968). For Weber a regime is
legitimate for no other reason than people believe it is legitimate. He ob-
served that such beliefs have historically been based on one of three broad
categories of grounds: rational grounds, traditional grounds or charismatic
grounds. A rational ground rests on a ‘legally established impersonal or-
der’. In other words such legitimacy comes from respect for the rules
which are administered impersonally without anyone having special privi-
leges. A traditional ground rests ‘on an established belief in the sanctity of
immemorial traditions’. A charismatic ground rests on ‘devotion to the ex-
ceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person’
(1968, p. 215). For Weber legitimacy is simply conferred, it is in the eye of
the beholder.
Some scholars, among them Hyde (1983) and Jentoft (1998), challenge
Weber on this point. Both draw on Habermas and argue that legitimacy
contains dimensions, particularly social justice and democratic participa-
tion, that are independent of people’s attitudes – legitimacy is not just in
the eye of the beholder, it stems from the characteristics of a process. I am
very much in sympathy with the idea that there are universal rational
grounds for legitimacy, and so much so that I relate an idea below – like
my colleagues drawing on Habermas – that I think achieves this.
On one level, we can say that if credibility comes from the application of
a methodology for establishing something as an objective fact, then legiti-
macy is something additional that makes that something a fact rather than
an opinion ‘in the eye of the beholder’. When applying Weber’s categories,
it is fairly easy with the first two to identify this additional thing. But for
the category of ‘rational legitimacy’, which is a kind of legitimacy drawn
upon frequently in discourses about science, these two things are not easi-
ly distinguished. What question can be raised about the rational legitimacy
of a scientific process that is not a question about its scientific credibility
derived from the application of the scientific method within that process?
This problem is addressed here by arguing that one kind of rational legiti-
macy – process legitimacy – is best understood as the beholder asking pre-
cisely if the process meets a set of universal criteria. Those criteria encom-
pass the scientific method but extend further into the social processes in
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which the scientific claims are made. It is the greater complexity of these
criteria that allows us to think of this kind of legitimacy as being more than
just the question of credibility.
Are there ‘traditional’ grounds for scientific legitimacy?
An important book by Barnes et al. (1996) suggests that the answer is yes;
grounds that any scientist would recognise in his or her own day-to-day
experience doing science. These sociologists were writing partially in re-
sponse to extreme ideas about the ‘social construction of nature’ that are
found among many sociologists of science. They agree with the basic idea
that social considerations influence our scientific picture of nature, but
also believe that external reality plays an important role in determining
what will count as fact. The role they see social considerations playing
comes from the traditions of scientific communities, but not in a way that
sees tradition as a source of dogma or as restricting the importance of facts
in nature. They borrow Kuhn’s famous idea of the scientific ‘paradigm’
and think of it as a kind of community. Then they look back to the found-
ing work in the sociology of science in the 1950s and revive Robert Mer-
ton’s (1968a, 1968b) concern with the epistemological importance of the
scientific community.
What makes scientific inference possible, they argue, is the trust pro-
vided by the culture of a scientific community. A theory that seems initially
implausible will have a hard time competing with one that seems initially
plausible, and this plausibility comes from the consensus of the scientific
community – i.e. a cultural tradition. Scientists operate as a social commu-
nity, but all scientists believe that external nature determines their find-
ings, and they use this basic belief to coordinate their actions. Hence there
is no contradiction between recognising that science is governed by social
processes, including traditions, and believing that science deals in facts
(Barnes et al. 1996).
Such traditions are clearly not grounded in the sanctity of the immemor-
ial, but they are very real and have an important influence on what science
is seen as legitimate. In fisheries science in Europe, these communities
include both the broad scientific community and more narrowly defined
ones. Reference to the broader scientific community can at times be
brought directly into the politics around the science being used in support
of fisheries management. One such event that created a lot of tension was
an inquiry by the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) (2004) that focussed,
among other things, on the scientific validity of the ICES system. Their
report suggested that scientists had to take some of the blame for the con-
dition of the North Sea cod stock as well, because their advice for a quota
value in 1997 was too high and led to the destruction of a strong year class
that could have led to the recovery of the stock. Specifically, the executive
summary reads:
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Q 3.3 A major strategic error was made in the management of the abundant
1996 year-class in the North Sea, when scientists recommended increases
in TACs instead of recommending low fishing mortality that would, if ac-
cepted, have averted the current crisis. In general, cod stocks have been
over-fished in compliance with erroneous advice from ICES Advisory Com-
mittee on Fishery Management (ACFM) until the last few years when ad-
vice was to reduce fishing for cod to the lowest levels and then to close the
fishery altogether (Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE) 2004, p V).
This report received a great deal of publicity in the UK. One of our respon-
dents experienced an uncomfortable amount of public attention and
blame. He pointed out that his lab had been reviewed by six outside groups
in the past year, and that none of the other five had placed any direct blame
for the state of the stocks on fisheries scientists. He argued that the Royal
Society had actually gotten quite a bit of its information wrong about how
stock assessment is currently carried out:
Q 3.4 They have got a lot of information wrong on what we do. They talk
about using VPA, we have not used VPA for years, they talk about we
should use statistics based models, which is precisely what this lab in parti-
cular has been pushing out through the assessment world. Their descrip-
tion of VPA is wrong, indeed elements of the report are inept to the point of
incompetence ... For example ICES has not recommended TACs since
1990, and it said it isn’t going to recommend TACs because they don’t ...
regulate fishing mortality and that is what you need to regulate. ICES has
said for years after that that you need a direct reduction in fishing effort.
Part of the MoU between ICES and its customer groups like the EU, the
customers demanded numbers in terms of quotas, but nevertheless the ad-
vice has always recommended direct reduction of a substantial amount in
fishing mortality through direct control. So if the Royal Society had read the
report they would have realised that ICES did not, as they said it did, recom-
mend a TAC.
This respondent felt that the fisheries science community should have
adopted a more aggressive defence against this report. He felt strongly
that this episode called into question the level of his own future participa-
tion in stock assessment. This had been an activity on which he had been
willing to spend a good deal of time, in spite of limited personal rewards
and substantial professional costs such as lost chances for research and
publications. This incident made him feel that doing stock assessments
was not being appreciated, either by the broader scientific community or,
to some extent, by ICES and his own superiors who were unwilling to
defend their work sufficiently from unfair criticism. The point here is not
so much the merits of the RSE critique as the importance that this critique
held for this scientist, even when it was just one of six reviews.
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Other sub-groups of scientists are also important, for example ones
working in environmental protection, marine scientists, or more specific
disciplinary categories such as biologist or ecologist. These boundaries are
necessarily fuzzy and will change depending on which common under-
standings one is pointing at. This fuzziness is not really important. The
main point is that there is a ‘traditional’ basis for scientific legitimacy in
sets of common understandings reproduced through such things as orga-
nisations, task-oriented professional networks, conferences, and journals
that form loose communities with shared ways of looking at problems.
Their particular importance in fisheries science is reflected in many
ways, but two prevalent general attitudes stand out and have a strong and
growing influence on the fisheries scientists working in Europe. Both of
them, without any particular empirical content of their own, have a power-
ful influence on which scientific results and interpretations of those re-
sults are going to be seen as legitimate. These are the general support for
the ecosystem approach to fisheries management and the precautionary
approach to environmental risks. Many examples in this book will demon-
strate that these two ‘scientific ideologies’ are having a profound effect on
the legitimacy of marine science in Europe.
Are there ‘charismatic’ grounds for scientific legitimacy?
The importance of charismatic grounds, i.e. of ‘devotion to the exceptional
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person’ (Weber
1968, p. 215), is somewhat easier to establish for science than traditional
grounds were. Even the editors of tabloids recognise that only ‘top’ scien-
tists would be qualified to invent a new pill to reverse the aging process.
We can all recognise that the endorsement of some scientists lends greater
legitimacy to a finding than the endorsement of others.
More important perhaps for fisheries and other areas of science-based
policy is the charisma of certain journals. In the public eye Science and
Nature in particular play the role of the ‘go to’ source of information for
non-scientists who want the straight scientific facts. The legitimating
power of scientific charisma, and the difficulty it presents given the attrac-
tions of publicity, is illustrated by the recent controversy surrounding the
article by Worm et al. (2006) in Science. This article contained dire predic-
tions about a global fish collapse based on evidence that was strongly dis-
puted by a large number of fisheries scientists. According to Longhurst
(2007) a number of critical comments were offered to the editors of
Science but none have appeared to date in the journal. In response to Long-
hurst’s own submission, the editors informed him that they were aware
that ‘areas of legitimate disagreement exist’ (2007, p. 1), but how this ob-
servation justifies not publishing critiques of the article is not clear. Simi-
lar controversies related to the earlier work of Worm among others led Ray
Hilborn, himself a top scientist, to opine as follows in the journal Fisheries:
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Q 3.5 Two journals with the highest profile, Science and Nature, clearly pub-
lish articles on fisheries not for their scientific merit, but for their publicity
value. Beginning in at least 1993 with an article I co-authored …. Science
and Nature have published a long string of papers on the decline and col-
lapse of fisheries that have attracted considerable public attention, and oc-
casionally gaining coverage in the New York Times and the Washington Post.
I assert that the peer review process has now totally failed and many of
these papers are being published only because the editors and selected re-
viewers believe in the message, or because of their potential newsworthi-
ness (Hilborn 2006, p. 554).
The New York Times (Dean 2006) did indeed publicise the Worm article.
The article quoted Boris Worm saying, ‘there is not a piece of evidence’
that contradicts the dire conclusions. To be fair, the article also quoted
Steve Murawski, Director of Scientific Programs and Chief Science Advi-
sor for NOAA Fisheries, saying that the conclusions did not jibe with the
trends that NOAA was observing, although he was the only one of the four
scientists quoted that questioned the results. The Times also published a
column by their right-wing columnist (Tierney 2006) that did express
scepticism about the Worm prediction.
Other examples of the charismatic legitimation of science come easily to
mind. To some extent there is a real need to christen certain sources of
information as ‘trusted’ to make day-to-day information processing feasi-
ble. But such christening is dangerous; peer review no longer seems to
function, if it ever did, as a sufficient guarantor of credible information.
The scientific community can, in the long run, correct particular failures
of peer review, but this may be too slow a process to provide an adequate
filter to keep controversial results from being the basis of policy when top
scientists and top science journals have blessed them.
Are there rational grounds for scientific legitimacy that are distinct
from scientific credibility?
This is the most complex question about the nature of scientific legitimacy.
There are two kinds of rational legitimacy, and the response is strongly
influenced by which kind is being considered. Several scholars who have
examined the question of political legitimacy as it touches on policy-mak-
ing have suggested a division of the rational grounds for legitimacy into
two basic types: process legitimacy and outcome legitimacy (Jentoft 1993;
Meunier 2003; Scharpf 1999). Meunier (2003) describes these two types
of legitimacy as follows:
Q 3.6 Process legitimacy: This vision of legitimacy focuses on the process
by which decisions are made. It is based on the assumption that the people
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are the only source of sovereignty. Policies are legitimate when policy-
makers are representative, accountable and placed under public scrutiny…
Outcome legitimacy: This vision of legitimacy focuses on the policy even-
tually made, and not on the process through which it was made. In this
case, what makes a policy legitimate is its capacity to solve problems requir-
ing collective solutions, and solve them in a way benefiting the ‘public inter-
est’ (2003, p. 76).
The distinction between process and outcome legitimacy means that there
are two basic ways that people rationally evaluate whether a decision-mak-
ing process is legitimate. The first is based on the process by which the
decision gets made; the second is based on the characteristics of the deci-
sion itself.
Even when science is evaluated in terms of process legitimacy, the an-
swer to the question in the title of this section is yes, but the scientific
legitimacy is very closely tied to the question of credibility. The beholder is
in fact evaluating aspects of the process that are directly linked to the ques-
tion of credibility, and the response to challenges to procedural legitimacy
is made by defending the credibility of the science. For process legitimacy
to say that a scientific process is illegitimate is tantamount to saying that
the methodology followed was unscientific. This is not quite as straightfor-
ward as it might seem, though. What I will try to convince you of in this
section is that the rational source of process legitimacy for any decision is
based on the same underlying principles as the scientific method. The an-
swer to the question is yes because the questions of process legitimacy
include but are wider than simply the scientific method – they also extend
to surrounding social processes.
Is it possible to have a concept of the legitimacy of a process that is not
just a set of opinions about what a process should be like? Can there be
process legitimacy that is not in the eye of the beholder? Meunier (2003)
says that a legitimate process should be ‘representative, accountable and
placed under public scrutiny’. That sounds fine. But does it have any basis
beyond ‘this is the way we like things done in Europe’? I think there is
such a concept, which can be arrived at by an argument I find logical and
compelling and, more importantly, which links up directly to our general
understanding of what makes science credible.
Again I am referring to the concept of communicative rationality that is
at the centre of Communicative Systems Theory. To repeat the basic idea,
communicative rationality is the logic that we use when we talk to each
other to make sense of what we are saying. It can be thought of in a pure
sense that would be useful for looking at philosophical arguments, but we
also use it in day-to-day speech to understand normal situations. At the
social level, it depends on two general rules: that there is no manipulation
involved in the communication – meaning that no one is prevented in
principle from participating or is forced or paid or tricked into making
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statements that do not reflect their true beliefs – and that everything com-
municated is open to question about its validity (White 1988, p. 56).
Now this ideal is not meant to describe a real situation. Habermas him-
self uses the term ‘partly counterfactual’ (Habermas and Nielsen 1990, p.
105) meaning that while these ideals exist only in people’s heads, they are
still a very real, concrete aspect of a situation. This is because people are
always using them to evaluate the communications they are engaged in,
and they have to believe that the standards are met, at least to some degree,
if they are going to trust the communications enough to be able to build a
shared reality. For example, your boss can tell you to be quiet because he
says so, but that does not help you and your boss come to a mutual under-
standing about what your situation is. In fact, it is irrational because it
keeps you from reaching a better understanding. We see this ideal operat-
ing every day. No one takes statements made in marketing or political con-
texts very seriously because we know that in these arenas communications
are highly manipulated and rarely have to respond to serious questioning.
Planning meetings with colleagues – at my workplace and I hope at yours
– are taken very seriously, people really have to explain why they see things
the way they do, and serious violations of the ideal standards would be
seen as major betrayal. Of course, these standards play a role in broader
discourses as well. The rules against manipulation are the basis of accusa-
tions that scientists have been corrupted by their funding sources. As dis-
cussed in the next section, these are perhaps the most common challenges
to scientific legitimacy.
To a degree, this is all a fancy and detailed way of saying that people have
to be fair and listen carefully to one another if they are going to understand
each other. It is pretty much common sense. It has to be very common
sense because we all have to live together and coordinate our actions all
the time, so we all have to make use of these standards in day-to-day
speech. But underneath this common simplicity Habermas (1990) has
found an elegant result, one that yields a concept of process legitimacy
that is not just an opinion.
These standards of ideal speech are not the basis of process legitimacy
because of their functional usefulness. We cannot assume that a process is
legitimate just because it works well to achieve some end. This would then
raise the question of the outcome and goals of the process, and these out-
comes and goals cannot turn around and determine the legitimacy of the
process that created them. Legitimacy is a normative concept, an evalua-
tion of legitimacy requires showing objectively that the process is as it
ought to be. You cannot settle an argument about what ought to be by point-
ing at evidence. However, you can settle it if you show an internal contra-
diction in the opposing argument. You can prove X by demonstrating that
any argument that objects to X already assumes X (Habermas 1990). The
ideal speech standards achieve this. In fact, they are very likely the only
thing that does. They are inescapable presuppositions of any argument –
just by raising an argument you are assuming that they are in force be-
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cause otherwise there is no point in making the argument. In other words,
you cannot logically raise an argument against the basic rules that make
raising arguments meaningful in the first place. Therefore, these com-
monsense rules of how we make sense to one another also point to con-
text-independent criteria that can always be used to evaluate the rational
legitimacy of communicative processes, including decision-making pro-
cesses.
The concepts that we commonly use when talking about process legiti-
macy, where they are valid, are all ways of trying to uphold the standards of
ideal speech. The first three principles of good governance articulated in
the European White Paper (CEC 2001a), participation, openness, and ac-
countability, are all rooted in the demands of ideal communication. Meu-
nier’s (2003) ‘representative, accountable and placed under public scru-
tiny’ criteria are as well. ‘Participation’ is a restatement of the requirement
that no person or argument be excluded, while ‘representativeness’ is
about trying to find a fair way to do this when the scale of the discussion
does not allow everyone to speak. ‘Accountability’ is the demand that peo-
ple account for themselves, that they explain what they think and why they
think it. ‘Public scrutiny’, ‘openness’ or ‘transparency’ is in many ways the
critical technique for guarding the standards of ideal speech. Transparency
makes accountability possible and is the main safeguard against manipula-
tion.
What science does that is special, and this is I think the essence of the
scientific method, is that it takes these general rules for rationally legiti-
mate decision-making and turns them into a rigorous procedure. The ideal
of the scientific method can only be approached, not achieved in practice,
in the same way that the standards of ideal speech are never completely
met. The scientific method rejects dogma, in principle, no claim is ex-
cluded on a priori grounds, and all claims must pass the same universal
set of procedures to be verified. In practice, of course, the majority of
claims are ‘black boxed’ in the sense that they are assumed to have been
already established, and notions of plausibility in the tradition of the scien-
tific community play the role of gatekeeper in deciding what claims will be
examined. This process is carried out, however, in a way that recognises
the application of the same set of procedures to all claims.
The scientific method takes accountability and transparency to their lo-
gical extreme. The statement of a falsifiable hypothesis sets up the clearest
accountability one can imagine. Quantification and experimental replica-
tion require the scientists to explain how they know something with such
precision that someone else can go out and repeat the experience. This
makes quantification and replication the ultimate ideal of procedural
transparency. The precision of language that mathematics brings to de-
scriptions of natural phenomena provides the most transparent account-
ing possible. Ultimately, this radical commitment to the standards of ideal
speech is why we turn to science when we want to resolve questions about
nature. Science is cast in the role of the arbiter of truth because of the
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transparency of its philosophically clear, if practically obscure, ability to say
how it knows what it knows. The irony is that these procedures for radical
accountability and transparency, and the tools of precision they have en-
gendered, are what has made science so opaque to the non-specialist.
The question behind the eyes of the beholder under the rational cate-
gory of legitimation of science, when the beholder focuses his or her
judgement on procedures, is the question of scientific credibility. This
does not mean, however, that scientific process legitimacy is the same thing
as scientific credibility. Scientific process legitimacy places the question of
scientific credibility in a wider context; it examines the entire gamut of
standards of ideal speech when asking the question of scientific credibility.
Process legitimacy demands freedom from manipulation. When a drug
company pays for research on the effectiveness of its own drugs, a ques-
tion of procedural legitimacy is raised – were the results manipulated in
order to maintain funding? The response to these questions of manipula-
tion, however, is to seek to demonstrate in a transparent way that estab-
lished scientific methodologies were adhered to.
Process legitimacy demands freedom from the suppression of relevant
claims. Science that is selective about its evidence can be very damaging,
especially when the results have an influence on policy. A very famous and
far-reaching example in fisheries management is the ‘tragedy of the com-
mons’. This is a theory made popular by Hardin (1968) that has had a
tremendous influence on natural resource policies. Hardin took a basic
result in resource economics showing that when a natural resource is
managed under open access – i.e. when anyone can use it – it will be over-
used to the point where the economic benefits will be wasted and the re-
source may even be destroyed. He gave this result the catchy title ‘tragedy
of the commons’. What Hardin and other adherents to this theory did,
however, was to conflate ‘open access’ with ‘commons’ and conclude that
only private property or government control can avoid the tragedy. This
‘tragedy of the commons’ parable became common sense in natural re-
source management for decades, ignoring mountains of evidence that
property owned in common by small groups was very often not open ac-
cess, but rather managed in ways that avoided resource degradation. The
real tragedy that emerged from all of this was decades of ineffective top-
down management that assumed that when it is not feasible to establish
private property rights, only government agencies could manage re-
sources.
Finally, outcome legitimacy also points to a kind of scientific legitimacy,
although it has little to do with issues of the common good and everything
to do with the potential policy impact of the new information. Policy de-
bates are not made up of discussions naming long lists of independent
facts. Instead, they are made up of discursive themes. A discursive theme
is a way of linking facts, values and interests together into a story line that
makes sense. It is these linkages that compete in the discussion. The story
lines do change, but only slowly. When a new fact is presented that fits into
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an existing story line without problem, it is quickly taken up – i.e. it is
treated as legitimate. When a new fact does not fit easily into a story line,
it is resisted. Such resistance does not necessarily include an attack on the
credibility of the process that created it. It can also mean simply ignoring
the fact or treating it as unimportant. This kind of rational legitimacy is
similar to the saliency of the result, but it is not about how well it fits into
a policy process as much as how well it fits into the constellations of facts,
values and interests that different stakeholders are bringing to the discus-
sion.
3.1.4 Saliency, legitimacy and research on risk perception
A number of studies have been made of the impact of the source of scien-
tific information on its saliency, credibility and legitimacy. Risk studies
have shown that people care more about how decisions are made and their
fairness than they do about the magnitude of a risk (Chess and Lynn
1996). The perceived saliency of an issue, and related scientific communi-
cations, also emerge as important in research on perceptions of environ-
mental risk.
Furthermore, credibility and legitimacy are both closely tied to the
source of the information. People perceive both themselves and others as
having or not having a right to talk about something (Michael 1996). This
is not surprising when we consider what might be the most basic observa-
tion from the sociology of knowledge: the social location of facts is what
determines their effective validity. For example, as Collins and Pinch
(1998) point out, you and I base our personal knowledge about nature,
e.g. that it is not possible to travel faster than light, entirely on our personal
knowledge about society that such information resides with physicists
rather than Star Trek scriptwriters.
One of the corollaries of this observation, which has been well docu-
mented in research, is that in the event people do have personal experience
of a phenomenon, they weight that experience much more highly in com-
parison to information that is merely communicated. Perceptions of risk
in general are higher when they are more salient to the perceiver, for ex-
ample if they know somebody who personally suffered the adverse event
(Kolker and Burke 1993). The inverse, however, is not true; higher risks are
not necessarily the more salient ones. In fact, people see risks with middle-
level probabilities as the most salient, and high-probability dangers are
overlooked because they are more accepted, for example traffic accidents
(Douglas 1985).
In another example of exaggerated trust in one’s own experience, people
overestimate their ability to detect risk themselves. Many non-specialists
believe that they should be able to detect risks with their own senses, for
example one study of risk perception found that non-scientists thought
they could taste pollution (Johnson and Griffith 1996). Judgements about
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whether scientists and others are aware of risks are not correlated with
concern about the seriousness of the risks (Fife-Schaw and Rowe 1996).
Whether or not the risk is seen as under one’s own control or as forced
on one by another party is also important, not only in perceptions of fair-
ness and legitimacy but in respect to saliency as well. A risk that becomes
well-known is generally connected to some issue of legitimacy; therefore,
moral concerns are involved not just in the response to risk but in its per-
ception (Douglas 1985).
I do not know of any research that directly links these findings about
saliency and risk to the question of how stakeholders will perceive the sal-
iency of scientific advice for policy. It is a reasonable hypothesis, however,
that advice based on findings linked to experience and previous knowledge
of an issue will not only be seen as more credible, they will also be seen as
more salient.
Legitimacy and source are linked in ways that are filtered through local
experience. People dealing directly with the public have completely differ-
ent ideas than scientists about what makes a communication credible.
Chess et al. (1995) interviewed 145 risk communication researchers and
practitioners about what scientists and people dealing with policy thought
was important in the presentation of risk information. The technical peo-
ple saw the question of how to express probabilities and communicate evi-
dence to support their assertions as the heart of the problem. The practi-
tioners were much more concerned with how to integrate political and
value-based concerns into the policy responses.
Legitimacy is tied to the source of the information most often by ques-
tions about the interests of the researcher. Scientific findings are often
seen as purchased. In fact, the notion that science is an expression of poli-
tical interests is a form of ‘common sense’ among much of the general
population; claims of factuality and objectivity, rather than increasing cred-
ibility, are often seen as just one more marketing tool (Irwin 1995).
McKechnie (1996) in field work in a rural area found that sources are
seen as credible only if their self-presentation is consistent with local va-
lues and that assertions about having esoteric knowledge actually undercut
credibility as the source is seen to lack ‘common sense’.
This common sense has a factual basis. It is becoming increasingly
common for scientists to have direct financial stakes in outcomes. Com-
parative, statistical studies of the outcomes of drug trials have found that
drug-company funding has a strong influence on results: 89% of com-
pany-funded studies showed new drugs to be more effective than older
ones compared with 61% of those not company-funded. Moreover, the
authorship of articles in major medical journals is routinely hidden; one
study found that 29% of articles used such devises as guest authors or
ghost authors (Guston 2001b).
Frewer et al. (1996) did a series of semi-structured interviews related to
the source of information about environmental risks. They found that
trusted sources are characterised by multiple positive attributes. Interest-
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ingly, while observers of policy process often assign a high weight to ‘inde-
pendent’ sources of information, the people interviewed in this study
found that sources which operate under moderate accountability, rather
than complete freedom, are trusted more. Television current affairs pro-
grammes and quality newspapers are among the most trusted, with the
tabloids and government the least trusted.
These potential linkages between risk perception, saliency and legiti-
macy take us close to the central issue of uncertainty. Jasanoff (1986)
points out that officially sanctioned risk assessments focus mainly on tech-
nical questions, and their guidelines emphasise using multiple sources of
uncertainty to make numerical assessments. This in itself has a political
dimension as environmentalists feel that risk assessment creates a false
impression of certainty. Shackley and Wynne (1996) are concerned that
scientists are motivated to demonstrate control over uncertainty, for exam-
ple by its quantification as risk, because they see uncertainty as a challenge
to the authority and use of science in policy-making.
The question of legitimacy and source is an important one in the
science underlying the Common Fisheries Policy. One question in our sur-
vey asked the extent to which scientists in expert groups suspected other
scientists of arguing in a way that was consciously biased by that scientist’s
national interest (Table 3.1). The overall mean is just below the middle
point of 4. Mean answers from those scientists whose last group was di-
rectly involved in stock assessment were slightly higher than from the
others.
Table 3.1
When participating in working or study groups how often have you suspected that a scientist
was arguing in a way that was consciously biased by his or her national interests?
1 = never, 7 = very frequently
Last group was not a stock assessment group Mean 3.51
N 161
Last group was a stock assessment group Mean 3.89
N 123
Total Mean 3.68
N 284
Relationship is significant at .06. Excluded to reach N of 284: 148 respondents who indicated not
having participated in an expert group in the last five years; 20 who did indicate participating but did
not make clear which kind of group and therefore did not fit in any of the two categories; six who
failed to answer whether they had been in an expert group or not; and seven who did not answer the
question on bias.
Scientists have also expressed feeling on several occasions that particular
countries were withholding contributions of information that they should
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be making. Perceptions of national perspectives that reflect local fisheries
but are not seen as full-blown biases are also found. One Scottish scientist
told us that ‘you could never get a Danish scientist to say that industrial
fishing is a bad thing’. If other scientists have suspicions of national
biases, it is reasonable to suppose that non-scientists have the same suspi-
cions at an even higher level.
3.2 Boundary organisations and objects
The science boundary is the line between which claims are or are not
science, between which procedures do or do not produce such claims, and
between who is and who is not qualified to carry out such procedures.
Science in support of policy needs to be careful about where it places the
science boundary when trying to increase its credibility, saliency and legiti-
macy. As we have seen, in situations of high uncertainty, there is a greater
need for expanding participation in scientific activities. In addition to the
needs of addressing uncertainty, pressures to inflate the science boundary
also emerge through policy processes seeking ‘scientific’ answers to more
and more kinds of questions. In this section I briefly review the research
that has been done on placing and maintaining the science boundary.
This constant focus on maintaining boundaries around science is criti-
cal to the functioning of both science and policy. It allows scientists and
policymakers to bring a clear accounting of knowledge, including an ac-
counting of uncertainty, into policy decisions, and this accounting, and the
status distinctions that support it, should not be discounted because they
cannot be perfect (Collins and Evans 2002; van Zwaneberg and Millstone
2000). The demand for objective standards for decisions, and the confer-
ral of a special status on particular forms of knowledge to protect these
standards, is not a denial of democracy; it is a product of it (Porter 1995;
Ozawa 1991). One of the most basic insights from science and policy stu-
dies is that boundary work must be taken seriously. It cannot be treated
naively; neither by assuming that the distinction between what is science
and what is policy, advocacy or values is easily made in concrete situations,
nor by assuming that it does not really exist. Boundary work as it emerges
within policy debates is not an all or nothing affair (Guston 2001b). In
more participatory decision-making processes, it is called upon to support
specific judgements in circumstances where there are checks and balances
on its use.
In fisheries management, what might be called the mainstream view of
the role of science within the policy process is articulated as follows by DG
MARE:
Q 3.7 Visibly free of political influence: Scientists in most national adminis-
trations are generally placed at a distance from administrative and political
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pressures by the national fisheries laboratories. Those who are not so dis-
tanced quickly lose credibility and influence (CEC 2003a, p. 15).
Science must stand off to the side so that the other players in the policy
debate have a common set of facts to debate about. Otherwise, following
this logic, there is no possibility of a rational conclusion. The most con-
crete expression of this role is when DG MARE is able to point to scientific
conclusions to justify particular management measures. This need is only
intensified by the move towards the use of harvest control rules which, in
the final analysis, uses the scientific finding as a mechanism to shortcut
the policy debate, hence adding predictability and continuity to the polices
to everyone’s benefit.
On the surface, this mainstream view is an expression of communica-
tive rationality in the way it seeks to separate facts from values and inter-
ests. However, as the research described in this section demonstrates, the
view laid out in Q 3.7 is an utopian construct with a number of problems.
The focus is on the objective assertions made by people assigned the role
of being the objective people. In communicative rationality, assertions of
fact are unique because they are carried out in discussions that presuppose
consensus as a goal, a presupposition that makes transparency about the
reasons for the assertion a central concern. Here the scientists’ expertise in
the methods of transparency is what is critical, not some privileged access
to objectivity. The mainstream view expressed in Q 3.7 is not, in fact, com-
municatively rational at all because it prejudges assertions based on their
source.
Boundary work is difficult. Scientists, of course, have the primary stake
in boundary work. Within STS the early work on ‘boundary maintenance’,
particularly Gieryn (1983), has now achieved a seminal and classic status.
The basic argument was that within policy deliberations, scientists work to
enhance their authority by defining what knowledge is really science, who
is really a scientist (Jasanoff 1990; Gieryn 1983), and which questions are
to be considered scientific (Dietz et al. 1989). When something is labelled
as science, those who are not scientists are de facto barred from having
anything to say about its substance (Jasanoff 1990). When this labelling is
successful, knowledge becomes a ‘black box’ for the non-scientist until an-
other expert challenges it.
Constant pressure is seen in policy contexts to make the political appear
objective (Ozawa 1991). The constant pressures to inflate the science
boundary to treat more and more things as appropriate for a scientific ap-
proach was discussed in Section 2.1.1. Seeking to make political decisions
seem objective is not necessarily a product of fraud or opportunism – it
can arise simply from the nature of the problem to be solved. In science in
support of fisheries management, for example, one critical issue is the
need for the operational units reflected in the advice to match those of the
actual fishing activities that are being managed. Fisheries scientists tradi-
tionally worry about units defined by nature. These are mainly single fish
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stocks, or increasingly biological and ecological interactions between
stocks and between the fish and their environment. These are all things
that exist independently in nature. They are not, in principle, created by
people, and they operate under natural laws. I say ‘in principle’ here be-
cause attempts to describe and measure these things are created by people,
and actions by people have a powerful impact on their condition. Man-
agers, however, manage fisheries which are complexes of fishing ports,
fishing boats, and fishing gears that are hybrids of natural, technical and
social phenomena, some of which are entirely human inventions (Wilson
and Delaney 2005). Fisheries scientists are being pulled more and more
into hybrid domains that they share with social scientists and stakeholders.
Fishing fleets can, and do, read scientific advice based on their behaviour
and then change their behaviour, often in ways to avoid the implications of
the scientific findings. Fish stocks do not. When scientists are dealing with
such slippery units of analysis as these, it is very hard to separate the ‘poli-
tical’ and the ‘objective’.
Tensions on the science boundary have many other sources. Gibbons
(1999) argues that there is nothing really new about the boundary prob-
lem; reliable knowledge has always been reliable within certain bound-
aries. What is happening in policy contexts with the risk society is an in-
crease in contestation. Knowledge that is incomplete now is not just
knowledge that is waiting for better science; it is knowledge that will be
contested. This contestation then puts further strain on the science bound-
ary. Evans (2005) observes one case of scientific controversy where the
more one side tried to show themselves as more scientific than the other,
the more they broke down the appearance of science, and each began to
appear as ‘scientific’ as the other. A number of studies have shown that
boundaries that are too rigidly maintained can lead to scientific elites
being shielded from accountability until a crisis is required to expose the
problems (Waller 1994). Increasing competition is also exposing scientific
boundaries to increasing strain. Waterton (2005) carried out a large set of
interviews in which she asked scientists to reflect on science. She asked
about the impacts of the rise of contract-driven science, and many of her
examples were from scientists involved in policy support. Scientists in-
voked scientific norms as something that has been lost fairly recently as
science has become more and more contract-driven.
Boundary work is a response to the repeated failure of methodological
definitions to determine what is and is not science in practical contexts
(Evans 2005). Science in practice can no longer be easily reduced to a sin-
gle methodology or ascribed to a privileged subculture (Gibbons 1999).
Halffman (2003) argues that neither the ‘cage model’ nor the ‘seamless
network’ model seem to accurately describe the policy science interface.
The ‘cage model’ is based on the idea that it is possible a priori to establish
criteria about what is ‘science’ and what is ‘politics’. It is the model sup-
porting the mainstream view displayed in Q 3.7. In the ‘seamless network’
model, for which Halffman (2003) cites Actor Network Theory as the most
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extreme example, the attempt to make a distinction between science and
politics is abandoned. Halffman (2003) argues that both approaches fail to
describe the actual division of labour of regulatory regimes, and they both
reduce the real efforts to negotiate the boundary to ‘misrepresentations’,
i.e. independent science on the one hand or false dichotomies on the
other. These difficulties have led to contradictory messages. Irwin (2006)
offers an interesting analysis of current statements about science and pol-
icy being made by responsible institutions in the UK. The statements
being made still remain rooted in a traditional understanding of science
as purely objective information that can still play the role of an objective
‘other’ standing apart from the policy process, while the statements are
simultaneously promising a more democratic approach to science. The
two narratives of inclusion and otherness go on at the same time from the
same sources without resolution.
One way of enforcing the mainstream view is to discourage scientists
from articulating policy opinions. One role of fisheries scientists in Europe
is to provide support to international negotiators, and one of our respon-
dents related that he was present at the negotiations when the North Sea
cod closure was decided on in 2001. Afterwards he told the press ‘well, it’s
a waste of time, it won’t work’, for which he got his ‘wrist slapped’. He felt
a role contradiction because on the one hand he was a part of the negotiat-
ing process and he should support it, indeed he was expected to by his
employers, but scientifically he could not.
Another respondent articulated this tension this way:
Q 3.8 Scientists shouldn’t be stakeholders. We should be objective outsiders
and advisers and we shouldn’t be seen as stakeholders. But as I see it ...
catch advice would/should be accompanied by much wider input from, you
know, other stakeholders ... and it would be a mistake for us to run a whole
series of projections and more bigger and complex models and just give a
whole set of numbers. That would seem to me to be pointless and repeating
the mistakes of the past ... of just saying: ‘Us scientists know the answers
and here are your numbers’.
Both of these scientists seem to be reaching for a new way to articulate the
role of science within the policy process. This is based both on their own
beliefs about the policy process as it is currently structured, not seeming
able or willing to respond to scientific opinion, and by the ways they are
seeing other stakeholders looking at them. The scientist in Q 3.8 men-
tioned in another part of his interview:
Q 3.9 Interviewer: When you’re doing the assessment, you think ‘this will
be scrutinised’ ... is that something that is in the back of your mind? Re-
spondent: Yes, very much so. I always like to think that the difference be-
tween the guys in the Mediterranean, for example, and the way that we
work in the North Sea, they almost still have the [environment where if ] a
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scientist has an opinion therefore this is true. And one gets the impression
that they’re actually listened to, in their own countries. Whereas, we seem
to have the philosophy here whereby if you have an opinion, you have to
have the data to back it up.
Here we almost feel a hankering towards a perhaps imagined situation
where the scientist’s word will be accepted as science, but a recognition
that in the environment where he is working, he will only be believed up
to the point where he can back up his words with evidence that he brings
to the public arena. The scientist is like any other stakeholder and what he
brings to the table is scrutinised, with little of the ‘distance’ that brings
‘credibility and influence’ in the words of DG MARE (Q 3.7; CEC 2003a,
p. 15).
Boundary analysis was a central tool that Cash et al. (2002) used to de-
scribe the trade-offs and synergies among credibility, legitimacy and sal-
iency. Maintaining strong boundaries runs the risk of decreasing saliency
by removing decision-makers from helping to define questions. But me-
chanisms that limit participation of decision-makers, as well as other
stakeholders, sceptics and/or non-mainstream experts, to maintain cred-
ibility decrease legitimacy. Increasing legitimacy by greater inclusiveness
can decrease saliency by re-framing the issue in a way that is irrelevant to
policy decisions, as well as leading to accusations that the science can be
seen as ‘tainted’ by politics.
Q 3.10 If boundary spanning is too strong in coupling producers and users
of assessments, suspicions arise that policymakers are not only asking the
questions but also determining the answers, thus reducing the credibility of
the assessment and thus its influence ... Effective institutional arrange-
ments for boundary spanning facilitate agreement between scientists and
decision-makers over what questions an assessment will address, what
kinds of evidence and expertise it will employ, and what processes it will
follow (Clark et al. 2002, p. 9).
Structuring the science boundary for maximum credibility, legitimacy and
saliency requires a consideration of the timing of processes, in particular
the timing of the use of different disciplinary perspectives and/or stakehol-
ders. Inclusion of a wide group in order to increase legitimacy can fail on
all three dimensions if the inclusion comes so late in the process that it
cannot influence the questions being investigated. But there is stress be-
tween this consideration and the roles of various disciplines in establish-
ing credibility. Lenhard et al. (2006) suggest that the transparency derived
from using established disciplinary approaches early in the process can be
used to establish scientific credibility that will support the later develop-
ment of scientific legitimacy. They relate this to the incident mentioned
above from the negotiations over the content of the Intergovernmental Pa-
nel on Climate Change’s Second Assessment Report in 1995, where scep-
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tics from the political side of OPEC withdrew their veto with the decisive
factor in their decision being a frank appeal by the climatologists to the
accepted methods and standards of their field.
Several observers of the evolution of science-based policies argue that
the patterns they see are nothing like the traditional idea of a scientific
result becoming the basis of a policy. They argue that the interactions be-
tween the two domains are so close that they should be thought of not only
as intersecting, but even as co-evolving domains of human activity (van der
Hove 2007). Jasanoff (2005) takes the ‘co-production’ argument even
further, arguing that thinking of natural and social understandings being
produced together provides explanatory power in many domains. Policy is
so dependent on science, and the science used to support that policy is so
dependent on direction and support from the policy process, that the two
are developing a common product. Clark et al.’s (2002) results certainly
suggest such joint activities have been a feature in the successful uptake
of scientific knowledge into policy. Some even argue that the long-observed
cultural distinctions between the two communities are weakening, and
that scientists working in support of policy and policymakers are becom-
ing part of a single culture creating projects that support the legitimacy of
both (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002).
Scientists working in these hybrid science-policy communities find
themselves having to negotiate their credibility and legitimacy not only
among policymakers but also among their fellow scientists (Shackley and
Wynne 1996). The legitimacy problem raised by these patterns of co-pro-
duction of science and policy, Shackley and Wynne (1996) argue, arises
not so much from what might be the commonsense idea that the scien-
tists’ intellectual integrity has been ‘bought’ as it does from the ways that
uncertainty is handled. Within such tight communities scientists learn to
represent uncertainty in ways that never challenge the assumption found
in the policy world that risks are tractable and that current institutions are
capable of managing them.
Rothstein et al. (1999), for example, argue that co-production is a good
term for describing the agrochemical review process in the UK, where a
network of environmental toxicologists in both government and industry
has emerged. In reaction to a number of costly regulatory decisions, the
industry developed a substantial in-house scientific staff and gave them a
lot of decision-making power over the development of new products. This
network is relatively small and informal, and scientists move between gov-
ernment and industry positions. While this network has a positive impact
on the saliency of the scientific information for policy development, there
has been a substantial cost in credibility. Critics, especially elsewhere in
Europe, have assailed the system for being too quick to accept new chemi-
cals. The problem here may not be simply that the networking between the
government and the industry is too tight, rather it is the exclusion of other
stakeholders, most pointedly environmental NGOs, that creates the real
costs in credibility.
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One area where questions of legitimacy and saliency are often raised in
respect to the science boundary is the question of scientists playing advo-
cacy roles. Scientists have a right to participate in political interest groups
just like anyone else, but there is a clear tension between this role and
making a claim of producing a disinterested analysis that would have the
highest legitimacy. Young (1989) argues that the kinds of claims scientists
should be making and in what context forms a boundary issue. Is it possi-
ble for them to take off and put on their ‘scientist hat’ in different situa-
tions? Will they be given permission to do so? Scott et al. (1990) document
three examples of people who tried to be neutral investigators in scientific
controversies. In all three cases they were pulled into the controversy in
spite of trying very hard not to be. Most often their attempts at even-hand-
edness were interpreted by others in the controversy as an attack on the
orthodox position. In most situations where scientists are acting as advo-
cates, they are confronting opposing interests that are marshalling their
own science and scientists. The result is an undermining of the credibility
of the original scientists’ expertise and that of science in general (Gill
2001). In the United States the emphasis on making decisions through
confrontations between experts in legal fora has led to both an overblown
idea of the importance of the ‘expert’ and unlimited scepticism towards
particular expert judgements (Jasanoff 2002).
The discussion of scientists as advocates leads to real boundary difficul-
ties even at a more abstract level of definition. Minnia and McPeake (2001)
are two scientists struggling with the advocacy question. Their main con-
cern seems to be that advocacy will lead to accusations and perceptions of
bias. ‘When the object is consonant with the personal values of the advo-
cate, the appearance of bias enters; in other words the advocate appears to
have a personal agenda’ (Minnia and McPeake 2001, p. 6). They do not
believe that in and of itself advocacy implies bias. Indeed, they differentiate
between advocacy and ‘extremism or irrationality’, suggesting that it is in
the latter case that bias is introduced while mere advocacy, paradoxically,
can remain objective. In making this argument, they also suggest a dichot-
omy between a ‘personal’ agenda and a ‘conservation’ agenda, with the im-
plication that a conservation agenda is more objective and scientific than a
personal one would be. Doing science rather than advocacy, in their imagi-
nation, seems at least partly a question of maintaining a reasonable style of
presentation and advocating for things that are generally accepted to be
good rather than simply seen as good in someone’s personal opinion. In-
deed, they justify this by pointing to the mission statements of the wildlife
agencies that employ scientists. This sort of reasoning about the science
boundary is not uncommon, nor should it be rejected because it is so in-
coherent from a philosophical perspective. Within the context in which
these scientists are operating, these distinctions may well be practical and
serviceable.
In the lessons they compiled from their comparative analysis of the up-
take of global assessments into the policy process, Cash et al. (2002)
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placed the structuring of the science boundary in the centre. They found
that science-based policy is most effective when use is made of ‘boundary
objects’. Examples of such objects would be models, indicators, collabora-
tive research designs and data collection efforts that are used to provide a
way to structure discussions between different perspectives. The most ef-
fective science policy efforts were found where boundaries were recog-
nised and respected but not used as a rigid barrier to interaction. Participa-
tion was allowed across a recognised and selectively permeable boundary.
The effective structuring of science-policy boundaries is delicate and com-
plex. It depends on the nature of the problem to be addressed and the
degree of consensus over policies and values as well as scientific facts
(Engles et al. 2006).
Often, individual scientists find themselves trying to negotiate bound-
aries without the aid of any organisation or clear guidance on which stan-
dards should apply to what kinds of decisions (Waterton 2005). The need
is for well-designed ‘boundary organisations’, i.e. institutions set up to
straddle the boundary, facilitate communication and provide important
mediating functions (Clark et al. 2002; Guston 1999, 2001c). These ar-
rangements can be very simple; one example of an effective boundary or-
ganisation was simply a set of two-day sessions to familiarise policymakers
with acid rain transfer and deposition models developed by scientists
(Haas 2004). They can also be very complex; Dalrymple (2006), for exam-
ple, argues that the CGIAR network of agricultural research institutions
has evolved into a boundary organisation mediating between agricultural
scientists and international development donors. Research suggests that
the ways these organisations are set up is important. There are identifiable
national styles in how governments seek to structure these interactions
with consequential outcomes (Halffman 2005; Jasanoff 2002, 2005).
Niederberger (2005) reviews the policy successes and failures of the Ad-
visory Group on Climate Change Research and Policy. This is a Swiss in-
stitution that was created to serve as an interface between science, govern-
ment agencies and the public. She makes a distinction between a
boundary organisation and an independent intermediary organisation, ar-
guing that while the latter is basically about facilitating communication,
the former should be understood as playing a deeper role. Where simply
facilitating communications leaves intact the two separate sets of stan-
dards and forms of accountability found in science and policy institutions,
co-production involves more fusion between the two. She argues that if the
Advisory Group had been a true boundary organisation involved in co-pro-
duction, it would have had a stronger policy impact. Niederberger’s (2005)
distinction seems to be more theoretical and philosophical than empirical;
one could well imagine that the changes in policy themselves would be
taken as evidence of the existence of the kind of co-production she is look-
ing for.
Other researchers have not found boundary organisations emerging
where they might be expected to. Waterton (2005) was surprised by the
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lack of reference to institutions resembling boundary organisations in
spite of the fact that the scientists she was interviewing were often working
at the policy-science interface. She argues that the scientists often find
themselves having to negotiate the boundaries alone, and she found that
they are sometimes doing this self-consciously and sometimes finding this
painful and difficult. She suggests that ways of maintaining the science-
policy boundaries are diverse and complex, and we should not allow the
idea of boundary organisations to obscure this complexity.
Following Guston (2001c), the trick seems to be how to blur boundaries
without making them too blurry. He argues that successful boundary orga-
nisations meet three criteria: they provide opportunities for jointly creating
boundary objects or standards; they involve people from both policy and
science, including professionals who can mediate between these groups;
and, they exist on the boundary of the two worlds while having strong lines
of accountability into both. This emphasis on accountability points us to-
wards the critical question of how to achieve transparency at the science
boundary.
Cash and Clark (2001) suggest that it is not effective to try to maintain a
large distance between the science and policy based on some a priori defi-
nition of roles nor to place them so close together that there is no credible
independence. What is required are structures that allow more complex
interactions to evolve. They summarise their review of international scien-
tific assessments with a concept of integration expressed in the dimen-
sions of science, decision-making and scale. They further suggest that
movement in these dimensions has been promoted on the technical side,
while the social processes and institutional structures required have re-
mained understudied. They conclude (2001, p. 11) that assessments that
work have three common institutional features:
Q 3.11 Multiple connections between researchers and decision-makers
which cut across various political and organisational levels (polycentric net-
works);
Boundary organisations – institutions that act as mediators between science
and policy and across levels; and,
Sustained and adaptive organisations that allow for iterated interactions be-
tween scientists and decision-makers.
The emphasis on cross-scale operations is a basic one that emerges fre-
quently in ICES’s case. The concept of polycentric networks that Cash and
Clark (2001) introduce parenthetically is also an important idea that I have
not yet touched on. The concept of polycentrism comes from political
science and is most closely associated with the work of the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University, a group which
enjoys considerable influence on natural resource social science (McGin-
nis 1999).
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Ostrom (2001), who is trying to explain the sustainable management of
forests, defines polycentric systems as
Q 3.12 the organisation of small-, medium-, and large-scale democratic
units that each may exercise considerable independence to make and en-
force rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a specified geogra-
phical area (Ostrom 2001, p. 2).
For Ostrom the strength of a polycentric governance mechanism is its abil-
ity to experiment with diverse approaches and provide for a range of re-
sponses to external shocks. While her focus is on sustainable governance,
there is a clear analogy to science-based policy-making in conditions of
uncertainty. Information processing, including the access of the smaller
units to various knowledge sources, their ability to process feedback from
policy changes and communicate these experiences to the parallel units, is
a key part of the strength of polycentric polities. Polycentric approaches are
also complex, redundant and hence expensive, and resistant to top-down
steering (Ostrom 2001).
The polycentric networks Cash and Clark (2001) see in science for policy
contribute for similar reasons. They are able to provide methodological
coherence across scale levels while still allowing local specialisation; the
redundancy of the system provides for multiple pathways to encourage in-
novation and flexibility. A polycentric network also facilitates stakeholder
capacity building and involvement (Cash and Clark 2001). It is an institu-
tional design that gives form to the continuously operating process of com-
municative rationality. It is also the appropriate institutional design for an
adaptive system. A polycentric network has multiple sources of knowledge
and capacities for responding to problems as they arise on the scale level
they arise at. They are, as Cash and Clark (2001) tell us, structures that
allow more complex interactions to respond to needs.
Polycentric networks also reflect current thinking about effective fish-
eries management in general that I would argue is broadly applicable to
the EAFM. This is the idea of placing the burden of proof on those who
wish to engage in economic activities and within a ‘results-based’ manage-
ment structure. A belief that this is the appropriate framework for marine
management strongly influences my assumptions about the kinds of insti-
tutions that can benefit from the reflections I am offering on the nature of
transparency and the production of scientific advice. The basic idea is that
someone who wants to become involved in some activity in the marine
ecosystem, such as fishing, is licensed to do so through a results-based
agreement. This means that, in exchange for an otherwise secure and
high-quality right to a stream of benefits, they must demonstrate that they
honour a series of limits on their ecosystem impacts, for example limits on
the catch, bycatch, impacts on habitat, etc. This requires scientific pro-
cesses both at the level of limit-setting and at the level of particular activity
staying within those limits. The economic actors will demand transpar-
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ency in the limit-setting process, and managers and other interested par-
ties will demand transparency in the demonstration that limits have been
honoured. This would require the development of science in an interactive
way for a wide range of possible activities at different geographical scales.
If this is the institutional path towards EAFM that is chosen, and I believe
it reflects our best lessons from fisheries management, a polycentric net-
work of boundary organisations is bound to emerge. When I am discuss-
ing science and negotiation processes in these pages, this is the kind of
framework I have in mind.
The institutional form for effective adaptation seems to be polycentric
networks of boundary organisations. These networks facilitate complex in-
teractions that address emergent boundary issues at appropriate scales in a
way that allows us to hold them accountable for both good science and
good policy. Guston (2001c) tells us that successful boundary organisa-
tions have lines of accountability into both the science and policy commu-
nities, while current thinking on effective management institutions tells
us that accountability to line managers and interested stakeholders is also
critical. To be effective, such accountability requires transparency. So what
we are after is a flexible, polycentric network of science-policy boundary
organisations that are transparent both among themselves and to society
at large. The critical institutional challenge that must be managed to
achieve this goal I call the paradoxes of transparency.
3.3 The paradoxes of transparency
Chapter 1 argued that the basic social function of science is to achieve the
maximum possible transparency of knowledge so that knowledge can be
used to guide collective action. Transparency may seem like a fairly simple
idea. It is certainly often treated like a simple idea, easily achieved through
passing ‘sunshine laws’ or inviting someone to observe something. But
achieving what we want to achieve with ‘increased transparency’ is rarely
straightforward. Transparency is not just about observing something going
on, it is about understanding what is going on. Understanding a complex
situation requires that it be articulated or described clearly and honestly,
yet the very techniques used for clarity and openness often seem to lead to
transparency-induced opacity.
As I went about analyzing the case presented here, I found myself com-
ing back frequently to this idea of the ‘paradoxes of transparency’. Trans-
parency presents itself as a paradox in many ways and situations because
the techniques used to achieve it often undermine themselves. This self-
negation is a common pattern. Because of this I thought of calling the idea
the singular ‘paradox of transparency’. I chose ‘paradoxes’ because I kept
coming across so many different ways the self-negation happens, and they
did not seem to share a general characteristic, save that they all made
transparency more difficult. As this idea began to gel, I tried to give names
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to the various paradoxes of transparency. I offer four of them in this sec-
tion. Many of the ideas behind them appear fairly frequently in the litera-
ture although, with the exception of the ‘paradox of surveillance’, they are
not used as concepts for understanding transparency as such. In this sec-
tion I describe each of these paradoxes in turn. It is quite possible that, if
others find this idea of the paradoxes of transparency useful, they will be
able to sketch out others and perhaps develop a more rational scheme than
mine.
3.3.1 The paradox of precision and expertise
For the problems of creating a knowledge base for the EAFM, quantifica-
tion is perhaps the main culprit behind transparency-induced opacity. The
importance of quantification for science has long been recognised. Kant
(1950/1783) argued that judgements of experience are always synthesised
out of individual observations, while mathematical judgements are a priori
and not based on experience. Quantitative methods are the paradigmatic
form of science because they tap into the power of these a priori judge-
ments. They begin with the accurate and consistent measurement of com-
parable units. When meaningful comparability and accurate measurement
can be achieved, mathematical laws are mapped onto the phenomenon
under study. Disputes must focus on either the comparability or the mea-
surement of the units, and these two questions must be outlined with the
greatest possible clarity if a result is to be acceptable as science. When this
is achieved, this mapping of mathematical laws attains the greatest possi-
ble transparency of argument because it makes precise replication of re-
sults possible, in principle, if often not in practice (Collins and Pinch
1998).
Beyond science, the clarity of quantification is also critical for demo-
cratic governance. Porter (1995) links the rising importance of quantifica-
tion to democracy. Decisions made by bureaucrats and politicians, who are
open to public criticism, need to be objectively justified. Decisions made
by aristocrats do not. The rule of law can no longer rely on aristocratic
judgement and is forced to rely on accountancy, statistical and often scien-
tific analysis to provide that justification, usually in the form of some num-
bers (Porter 1995).
The paradox itself arises from the fact that mathematical expertise is a
difficult skill to acquire, as well as the fact that even those with the skills do
not have the access and time required to assess the comparability or mea-
surement of the relevant units. Finding mechanisms for collaboration and
communication that are able to facilitate interaction across levels of math-
ematical skill is becoming very important in scientific activities and is tak-
ing up more and more scientists’ time. This is certainly true among Euro-
pean fisheries scientists and is a problem that will be returned to
frequently in this book.
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3.3.2 The paradox of quantification and reification
The idea that quantification is about transparency is not paradoxical simply
because mathematics require so much skill. To reify is to treat something
abstract with an inappropriate level of concreteness. Reification is a con-
stant danger when using numbers because the aura of objectivity that
quantification lends to the measured often obscures aspects of its nature.
Arithmetical language actually has a great deal in common with ordinary,
informal language (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). The formality of the
mathematical language is lost when expressed in normal speech, and
numbers are used in ordinary speech to mean very different things. Funto-
wicz and Ravetz (1990) offer an analysis of numbers as a language based
on the observation that a discussion about a formal language cannot take
place in the language itself. They tell us a joke. A museum guide was
showing some schoolchildren a collection of dinosaur skeletons. A little
boy asked how old one particular dinosaur was and the guide said, ‘50
million and 12 years old’. The boy frowned ‘That’s a funny age?’ ‘Well
yeah, but they told me it was 50 million years old when I started to work
here 12 years ago, so it is just simple arithmetic!’ Numbers are used in real
speech to mean quite different things, and we laugh at the guard because
in this situation that is obvious.
This informality inherent in discussing mathematics, however, is often
obscured, and the aura of formality remains. Measuring something can
change the way it is seen so much that it becomes a different thing. An
obvious example is ‘teaching to the test’ in educational measurement, but
this phenomenon does not require awareness of the measurement pro-
cess. Porter (1995) argues that the concept of ‘society’ itself was in part a
statistical construct and that people didn’t really talk about ‘society’ before
there were statistical handles to do so. Crime rates and unemployment
rates made it possible to talk about a society involving collective responsi-
bility instead of just the condition of individuals. The measured items of-
ten evolve into standardised categories where individual variation is ob-
scured. Porter (1995, p. 28) quotes an official of the US Bureau of
Standards: ‘We have now reached the stage where there is a federally man-
dated method for measuring almost every physical, chemical or biological
phenomenon.’ Accommodating variation in measurement practices is im-
possible for a bureaucracy; even improvements are unhelpful unless made
universal. But measurement is hard, and such standards also obscure this
truth when reports contain spurious levels of precision. The transforma-
tion of landing figures into catch figures and thence into stock assess-
ments is an example anyone in fisheries is familiar with. Measurement
problems are easy to forget and ignore. In the American television crime
drama ‘Numbers’, applied mathematics is transformed into an initially
plausible form of magic by pretending that measurement is never a prob-
lem.
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This combination of the hidden informality of numbers in speech and
the ways that measurement transforms and invents phenomena has pro-
blematic consequences. A large part of the literature on local knowledge
points to communication breakdowns that emerge when the day-to-day ex-
periences of user groups are presented to them in the form of unfamiliar
numerical categories. Roepstorff (2000) in his study of fisheries science in
Greenland suggests that fishers ‘focus on fish as a living being’ and think
of them as ‘mass nouns’, while the scientist sees the fish as a ‘count noun’,
meaning that the individual fish is a representative of the stock in the
sense that the stock is the arithmetic sum of the single fish.
Just as in daily speech numbers lose their precision while maintaining
their aura, the quantitative presentation of material may also obscure un-
derlying uncertainty. Mathematical models have been called a ‘technology
of hubris’ when they imply that managed use is feasible where precaution
might be the wiser choice. They overstate the known and downplay ignor-
ance, uncertainty and conflict (Harremoes et al. 2001; Jasanoff 2002). In
many policy contexts some stakeholders will be distrustful of the models at
the same time that others are praising them (Jasanoff 1986). The greatest
danger in the application of quantification to policy is when a goal is given
special importance, simply because its attainment is easily measured.
Quantification creates the possibility for great transparency in demon-
strating that something is true, while simultaneously undercutting that
transparency with an aura of formality and objectivity, and a precision that
is often not justified.
3.3.3 The paradox of surveillance
The surveillance paradox is well recognised in respect to negotiations and
other processes seeking compromise and understanding among diverse
parties. The world-famous Chatham House Rule, ‘When a meeting, or
part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free
to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation
of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed’, is
based on this understanding. When it is invoked, participants are much
more open to information-sharing and search for compromise than when
they have to account to their home constituency for every word they say.
Especially the very formal and comprehensive transparency rules such as
those found in policy-making in the United States hide as well as disclose
important information; openness rules alone do not provide missing infor-
mation, expose all the hidden assumptions and may even dampen novel
interpretations of facts (Jasanoff 2002).
Degnbol and Wilson (2008) suggest that it is helpful to distinguish in-
ternal and external transparency. Internal transparency addresses the need
for stakeholders to be transparent to each other so that areas for potential
compromise and common ground can be found. This is not always easy
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when people involved in negotiations are having everything they say scru-
tinised by their constituencies. External transparency allows decision-mak-
ing processes to be accountable to outsiders and finally to the public. Be-
cause of this, internal transparency must be limited, and attention must be
paid to balancing the two kinds. The paradox is simply that in negotiations,
transparency to others – i.e. to the public – reduces the internal transpar-
ency that allows negotiators to understand each other and search for possi-
ble compromise. The paradox of surveillance leads to complex dances in
structuring complexity. One example is the discussion in Section 7.3.5 by
the ICES delegate who was willing to have stakeholder observers at physi-
cal meetings but not video meetings, because it would be impossible to
observe which stakeholders were present and how much they were influ-
encing the scientists.
This is not something, however, that applies only to negotiations looking
for compromise. It also applies to discussions of nature that are seeking
consensus. Pictures of nature can be self-reinforcing. The facts that create
the picture may not be wrong, but especially when they fit a particular
political narrative, they can make it difficult for contradictory facts to be
raised. This becomes a particular problem when facts take on a symbolic
importance to particular groups. Groups have unifying symbols, and such
symbols take many forms, including particular assumptions about natural
facts. In fisheries, as elsewhere, belief in certain facts can act as an ideol-
ogy that maintains and tests loyalty. This symbolic status shields these
facts from criticism. The North Sea experience with illegal or ‘black’ land-
ings for fish in the 1990s and early 2000s fits this pattern. Individual fish-
ers were quite open about the extent of the problem privately – in confi-
dential interviews, for example – but it was a long time before it could be
honestly addressed in public fora. In fact, this did not really happen until
stronger enforcement mechanisms were put in place, making it possible
for fishers to comply without simply hurting their own finances while
helping no one.
3.3.4 The paradox of scale
Often when one hears discussions of transparency, the speaker seems to
be referring to making a process transparent to a very wide number of
people, or even to the public as a whole. Transparency involving greater
numbers of observers leads to greater accountability with respect to a
wider range of values. The problem is that the larger the number of peo-
ple, the greater the distortion of information introduced by the systems
meant to make transparency possible. A good example would be the way
the activities of one member of a polycentric network of boundary organi-
sations are transparent to the rest of the network. The paradox creates sub-
stantial difficulties for both the larger group wishing to observe and the
smaller group being observed. In a perhaps confusing way, this large and
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small distinction applies both up and down a hierarchy of institutions; it
can mean a group of high-level decision-makers being held accountable to
the entire interested public, as well as one particular fishing fleet being
held accountable for their activities.
Discussing the paradox of scale with the detail I think it deserves means
taking my last dive into explaining the basic concepts of the Communica-
tive Systems Theory (CST) that has guided my research. As I discussed in
Section 1.2, institutions are not only arenas of competition and contention,
they also require the coordination of behaviour if they are to function. CST
focuses on the communicative mechanisms that make such coordination
possible. Up until now I have mainly discussed only one of these mechan-
isms, rational communication. Table 3.2 lists all the communication me-
chanisms used in institutions, and any institution will use a mixture of
some of these mechanisms to coordinate action. The reader should be
warned that while the basic ideas behind these mechanisms were inspired
by Habermas’s (1984, 1987) concepts, especially that of ‘steering media’, I
have taken his ideas in a direction that he would likely not recognise. This
means that any incoherence is my fault rather than his.7
The main difference between the mechanisms is the degree to which
they are embedded in what Habermas (1984) calls the ‘lifeworld’, which is
the rich mixture of shared background meanings that make communica-
tion possible. The mechanisms towards the bottom of Table 3.2 are based
on simple mutual understandings that require little or no discussion. A
can buy a candy from B, or drive through his country, without even shar-
ing a language. If A has authority over B, A can get compliance from B
with very little discussion. The mechanisms closer to the top of the table
draw much more heavily on the shared lifeworld. The more embedded
mechanisms motivate behaviour by convincing people that something is
true or right, and these behaviours are much less predictable than the less
embedded mechanisms which rely more on coercion. This is a fairly broad
use of the word coercion, in that I apply it to choices in which people are
faced with a take-it-or-leave-it decision, as well as situations in which direct
sanctions are invoked to win compliance. The model in Table 3.2 is very
similar to the state – market – civil society model, the first use of which is
often credited to Polanyi (1957), and that is still widely used today (Jentoft
and McCay 2003). The main difference is that it focuses on the mechan-
isms that handle the communication needed to coordinate action, not on
the institutions themselves.
On lower scale levels, i.e. among fewer people, coordination is handled
mainly by coming to a mutual understanding through rational communi-
cation.
On broader levels, the communications that allow coordination must be
streamlined and made more predictable. This means that the orientation
of the discussion towards convincing participants that something is true or
right begins to break down. As the level on which the institution operates
grows larger, coordination requires a presupposition in communications
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that the opinions and values of individual participants do not matter; hence
the use of the word ‘coercion’. This is the reality of what must be in place if
behaviour is to be coordinated across broad-scale extents. The information-
processing problem it presents, however, is a severe loss of richness and
nuance in the information that the institution can identify and respond to
and that rational communication makes most abundantly available. The
result is a high potential for a systematic distortion of communication.
Table 3.2 Four continua characterising the CST communications
mechanism
Communica-
tion mecha-
nism
Embedded-
ness in life-
world of com-
municative
resources
How the
mechanism
elicits behav-
iour
Predictability
of outcomes
when mecha-
nism is used
Scale Examples of
institutions
that rely heav-
ily on this
mechanism
for coordina-
tion
Rational com-
munications
More em-
bedded in the
lifeworld
Relies more
on convincing
Less predict-
able out-
comes
More effec-
tive on smal-
ler scales
Science
Social move-
ments
Prestige
Influence
Local com-
munities
Social net-
works
Authority
Money
Right-of-way
Less em-
bedded in the
lifeworld
Relies more
on constrain-
ing
More predict-
able out-
comes
More effec-
tive on higher
scales
Governments
Markets
Traffic
A similar table was originally published in Wilson (2003)
Adaptive ecosystem-based management requires above all a capacity for
institutional learning, and the paradox of scale has direct implications for
how institutions learn. Institutional learning across scales requires that
knowledge flows both up and down, and this requires the translation of
information into forms useful at another scale level. Such translation often
distorts the information in the eyes of its producers, as is often seen when
trying to use fishers’ local ecological knowledge in management (Holm
2003). The information required can range from data about natural or so-
cio-economic processes, to scientific findings of expert groups, to informa-
tion about the basis and results of decisions made by lower-level manage-
ment institutions. A process of diffusion from higher levels is necessary to
establish and maintain a system for transparency and accountability. Then
a process of concentration of information is necessary to gather and con-
dense the information. Concentration involves packaging information into
a form that will be useable on the higher scale level. The information that
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is the product of these packaging processes is not merely raw data and
particular indicators; it includes findings, behaviours, scientific findings
and group decisions. One of the interesting lessons for me from this case
study is that this whole process requires many kinds of consistency (Sec-
tion 7.3.1).
The packaging process involves four processes of the transformation of
knowledge:
– Simplification means the filtering of the knowledge to leave only the
knowledge that will be useful on the scale level receiving the knowl-
edge. This might be thought of as increasing the ratio of signal to noise
in the information;
– Abstraction means formatting the knowledge for applicability to wider
situations than the one that produced the knowledge;
– Codification means categorising the knowledge within a symbol sys-
tem that will be used to generate further knowledge through compari-
sons;
– Standardisation means simplifying, abstracting and codifying knowl-
edge according to a common system.
The heart of the problem of institutional learning across scales is the dis-
tortion of communication (Habermas 1987). By communicative distor-
tions I do not mean factual inaccuracies or poor interpretations of infor-
mation. Nor do I mean the information-packaging processes as such,
though it is in these packaging processes that the communicative distor-
tions do their damage. Communicative distortions are severe deviations
from the requirements of rational communication: that 1) people can effec-
tively raise any claim without manipulation and 2) discussions of fact are
separated from discussions of values and interests. In the diffusion pro-
cess, claims are often blocked by heavy reliance on coercion-based commu-
nication mechanisms. This means, for example, that instructions about
how to package information are formalised and even made into legal re-
quirements, which in turn must be very strictly defined in order to be en-
forced. Enforcement institutions are not geared to take into account ques-
tions about how well these packaging instructions handle the information
they are meant to communicate. The packaging can become routinised to
the point of being ritualised, resulting in everyone being forced to take a
cynical distance from the ‘knowledge’ being created. This formalisation
and specificity of communicative content reduce the richness of the infor-
mation being gathered, while at the same time allowing the people on the
level doing the packaging to be selective about the information they are
sending, because all that is really required is formal packaging. They can-
not raise claims, and they cannot be effectively questioned. For example,
the impacts of this blockage of questions and explanations accompanying
required findings on scientists working in ICES expert groups is a central
topic in Chapter 5.
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Wilson and Degnbol (2002) outline an example of this kind of commu-
nicative distortion. A group of scientists shared a belief about the condi-
tion of a fish stock. The key assumption of the model they chose to define
formally as the ‘best available science’ for this fish stock, however, was the
precise opposite of what they believed to be true. The issue here from the
perspective of institutional analysis is not how well the model they selected
reflected the real situation in the ocean, as their original belief could also
have been wrong. The issue is that a group of scientists was forced by a set
of institutional imperatives to say the opposite of what they believed; they
were effectively blocked from raising their claim about what they actually
thought was going on. What blocked them was a combination of legal re-
quirements for particular model parameters and the characteristics of the
institutional peer review process they were operating under. These require-
ments were put in place precisely to help a large-scale science-policy com-
munity ensure the transparency of scientific decisions.
These distortions of communication within marine management insti-
tutions can be hypothesised to operate in particular directions. I would
suggest that they would tend to make management problems appear more
tractable than they are. This is because during the simplification and stan-
dardisation processes, information about local nuances will be excluded,
and this will hide problems. They would also tend to make their manage-
ment seem more effective than it actually is, because the same information
that is formulated through institutional imperatives is used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the institution. Furthermore, they may tend to hide link-
ages between scale levels because the packaging of knowledge from the
lower level is given form by questions that are driven by the level and reso-
lution at which the questions are posed. They may also be subject to a
positive feedback loop. The responses by higher-level institutions to the
results of communicative distortions are to create even more stringent
packaging requirements that then increase the distortions.
The paradox of scale is a particularly dangerous challenge when trying to
figure out how to structure transparent institutions.
These four paradoxes mean that transparency can never be taken for
granted. It must always be fine-tuned, and as a result transparency can al-
most never be brought about simply by setting up rules. Too often a sim-
plistic approach to transparency will simply end up making matters worse.
3.4 Summary of the theoretical discussion
These first three chapters trace a theoretical path towards understanding
science for an ecosystem approach to environmental management. My
broadest starting point has been an approach to human ecology that sees
the social system as a communicative system governed by shared mean-
ings functioning within a set of environmental systems governed by natur-
al laws. Given this orientation, CST is an informative way to think about
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how the social system works. The ecosystem approach is thought of as the
problem of the social system adapting through communicative processes
to the changing realities of its physical environment.
Such adaptation requires gathering information about the natural sys-
tems and making that information the basis of collective action. Looked at
through the lens of CST, science is the best kind of information for sup-
porting collective action, not so much because it can produce objective
knowledge, but rather because science is rooted in a radical form of trans-
parency. Coming to a mutual understanding of nature on which we can
base effective collective action requires us to explain to each other how we
know what we say we know, and science is the institution that is the most
dedicated to such explanations. Science makes heavy use of the rules of
‘rational communication’, the basic rules that communications must fol-
low to make mutual understanding possible. These rules are that no argu-
ment or person is excluded ahead of time from the discussion, that there is
no manipulation in the communication, and that the discussions of fact,
values and interests are treated differently because they presuppose differ-
ent goals. A discussion of fact is oriented towards reaching a consensus
about what is true, while a discussion of values and interests is oriented
towards reaching a fair compromise.
Chapter 2 explored some of the recent literature on science as an institu-
tion within a changing world. Science is under constant pressure. Many
interests seek to ‘inflate the science boundary’ by defining more and more
things as technical problems demanding scientific solutions. Inflating the
boundary reduces science’s ability to fulfil its role of facilitating transpar-
ent claims about nature by mixing questions of fact with questions of
values and interests. The driver of this inflation is the common desire to
have one’s own goals treated as technical necessities, a pattern found fre-
quently within decision-making bureaucracies that need to point to some-
thing external and objective to justify their decisions. The use of science
within legal processes forces it to answer questions defined by the law
rather than by natural processes to deal with alien standards of proof.
Within research institutions and universities the ever greater demand that
science serve primarily social needs, rather than the generation of new
knowledge for its own sake, has become pervasive enough that some ob-
servers are calling the phenomena ‘Mode Two’ science. More science is
being done under client-driven, consulting-type arrangements than in the
past. This has limited the effectiveness of traditional mechanisms for qual-
ity control such as peer review.
Within an EAFM, as well as many other areas of social life, the greatest
challenge for science is how to respond to the need for clear descriptions
of nature under conditions of high uncertainty. An emerging response to
this uncertainty has been an increased reliance on partnerships with ex-
perts and even lay people outside of the traditional scientific disciplines.
Some have seen this movement as undermining, or even making redun-
dant or inappropriate, the separation of discussions of scientific fact from
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discussions of values and interests. I suggest, to the contrary, that these
linkages make this need more urgent than ever. The error is rather trying
to make scientists, with their skills as transparency experts, into an objec-
tive ‘other’ somehow sitting outside the policy discussions. Scientists can
play an important role in upholding communicative rationality in policy
processes. This cannot be achieved if we simply decide that irrationality is
inevitable.
Chapter 3 examined studies that have focussed on the practice of creat-
ing scientific advice for policy support. This research has found that three
things seem to have the highest influence on the degree to which science
will be taken up into a policy process. The first is credibility, meaning the
basic scientific quality and believability of the result. The second is sal-
iency, meaning the relevance of the result to the questions that the policy
process needs and is ready to have answered. The third is legitimacy,
meaning the believability that the result derives from the social context
surrounding the scientific process. This can involve many factors. Exam-
ples include how plausible the result is in light of expectations, the prestige
of the scientists involved, or the source of the money that paid for the
science.
The studies addressing advice generation echo the discussion of uncer-
tainty in their focus on the relationship between the scientists and the con-
sumers of science. While the science boundary must be protected from
‘inflationary’ pressures in order to preserve credibility, it cannot be made
too rigid in order to preserve saliency and legitimacy. The emerging insti-
tutional form, identified in many studies, is the ‘boundary organisation’ in
which scientists work together with policymakers, managers and stakehol-
ders to develop mutually useful joint products. In an adaptive approach to
ecosystem management, flexible ‘polycentric networks’ of boundary orga-
nisations are emerging that are able to respond to issues that arise, operat-
ing on scales appropriate to the problem. This is a phenomenon that is
already noticeable in European marine management.
The overall framework I envision when discussing potential improve-
ments in scientific institutions throughout the book is results-based man-
agement. Under such a framework, permission for a particular activity de-
pends on demonstrating that the impact on the ecosystem stays within
scientifically identified limits. This requires accountability and transpar-
ency through interactive science on both the level of limit-setting and lim-
it-honouring. Such processes will need to be carried out on multiple scales,
for a wide range of activities and potential impacts.
How is accountability possible within polycentric networks facilitating a
results-based approach to the EAFM? How can managers and the broader
interested public know what is going on within all these complex marine
management challenges? As I have examined this question within the
ICES case, I have come to think of this challenge in terms of the paradoxes
of transparency: the idea that attempts to establish transparency often un-
dermine themselves. I have sketched out four such paradoxical patterns:
89
the way that the precision needed for clear explanation leads to a need for
expertise and background knowledge that excludes most observers; the
way that the quantification needed for clear accountability of findings and
achievements can obscure and even change the substantive meaning of
what is being measured; the way that demands that interactions be open
to the public make people unable to be transparent to negotiating partners
in ways that discover potential compromises; and the way that attempts to
make things transparent to larger numbers of people can distort the infor-
mation they need to grasp what is going on. The idea of the paradoxes of
transparency, I believe, helps explain quite a bit about the challenges that
ICES has been grappling with when providing science for the Common
Fisheries Policy.
This briefly summarises the theoretical questions I have brought to my
examination of ICES. Now I turn to the meat of the matter – the efforts
that are going on to produce science for the CFP as it moves towards an
EAFM. I will return briefly to these general theoretical reflections in the
conclusion.
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4. The Science Assembly System for
European fisheries management
With contributions from Rikke Becker Jacobsen
When carrying out a case study, it is always an interesting question what
the borders of the case actually are. During the course of this study, the
way I was thinking about the object of my research would subtly shift. In
the beginning it was the institutions involved in the production and use of
scientific advice in support of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). That
way of thinking about the case eventually became both too broad and too
narrow: too broad because there are so many such institutions that merely
describing them in a balanced fashion would be an entire, rather boring,
book; too narrow because of all the influences from factors outside of the
EU. I finally settled on ICES as the focus of the case study. Formally speak-
ing, ICES is a single organisation, and although it is also a network with-
out distinct borders, its extent is at least clear enough for discussion. More
importantly, ICES must respond to demands for formulating advice by
drawing on this broad and varied network. This affords opportunities for
observing the interface between the various understandings of science,
from pure academic science through legalistically conceived mandated
science. As a result of the initial focus of the research, however, most of
the discussion of ICES’s external relationships relates to the CFP. Limita-
tions in my own knowledge force me to lump all the non-EU users of
ICES’s advice together as the ‘other clients’; they play a role in the analysis,
but it is a secondary one.
The case study is covered in four chapters. This chapter describes the
stage on which ICES performs. It begins with an overview of the advice
system for marine and fisheries management in Europe (Figure 4.1).
ICES provides advice for management in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean,
including the Barents, Baltic, North and Norwegian Seas, and their advice
is used by the governments of the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia, as well
as several international commissions. Marine and fisheries management
on the Mediterranean Sea involves the European Union, but under a com-
pletely different system rarely involving ICES. The other important line
around this stage is the one between fisheries management and broader
marine management. The case study focusses on fisheries management,
and a good deal of the discussion is confined to Holm and Nielsen’s
(2004) TAC Machine because the advice system mainly responds to the
imperative of setting and distributing quotas of fish. However, the central
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question the case study asks is how the system can move beyond these
narrow confines to the EAFM, which does incorporate the broader marine
management. At the moment, adding DG Environment to Figure 4.1
would add more clutter than substance. That will likely not be true five
years from now. The second half of this chapter is a discussion of the prob-
lem of scientific advice as it arises within the European fisheries manage-
ment system and some of the ways people are seeking to change the advice
provision system.
The case study then continues with Chapter 5 focussing on the situation
and attitudes of individual scientists working within this system. It draws
mainly on survey data comparing fisheries scientists heavily engaged in
fisheries advice production with their peers. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on
ICES as an organisation. Chapter 6 looks at the question of the challenges
ICES faces in mobilising science in support of an EAFM. Chapter 7 re-
views a recent reorganisation of the ICES Advisory Programme, examin-
ing how the effort to develop an EAFM influenced this restructuring,
among other things.
4.1 An overview of the advice system
The advice production system for European fisheries management is part
of a larger, self-reinforcing system of political necessity, scientific techni-
que and infrastructure development. It is a hard thing to change. Holm
and Nielsen (2004) identify three institutional aspects of this ‘TAC Ma-
chine’ that make it resistant to change, even in directions that many man-
agers, scientists, conservationist and fishers would agree upon.
First, the TAC Machine is based on a single-species rather than a multi-
species approach and creates incentives to both continue to use a single-
species approach year after year and to use a similar approach for all the
species within the system. Institutional forces reinforcing single species by
single-species management impede two current reform priorities that seek
to come at management from a broader perspective. At the simpler level,
they present a challenge to long-term, mixed-fisheries management,
although one could see a single-species approach as a building block that
can contribute to mixed fisheries management. At a more complex level, it
is difficult to reconcile species-by-species management with an ecosystem-
based approach to management (Holm and Nielsen 2004).
Second, both the biology of most fish and the organisation of political
life lend themselves well to a yearly rhythm. Age-based models producing
a TAC (total allowable catch) for each species, which then can be easily
divided into quotas, are a natural approach to producing science to support
the system. The institutional forces that reinforce one particular modelling
approach have channelled the handling of uncertainty into a narrow path
that has proven inadequate in the long term. This inadequacy is especially
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evident in the way that the precautionary approach has been implemented
in European fisheries management (Holm and Nielsen 2004).
Third, the TAC Machine system allows and indeed requires making
scientific practice routine with standardised data as input and a standard-
ised product as output. It is based on an illusion of a clear division of
labour between science and management that obscures the many difficul-
ties with this division discussed in Section 3.2. This routine-based system,
in turn, depends on a very extensive, expensive and difficult to manage
data collection system. Institutional forces reinforcing a huge data infra-
structure are not in and of themselves problematic; fisheries management
is always going to require a lot of data. However, both the rigid division of
labour between science and management and the huge data-gathering sys-
tem make it difficult to mobilise appropriate expertise and data to address
complex management problems that exist on multiple scales (Holm and
Nielsen 2004).
Others have noted this institutional inertia. In the EASE project report,
fisheries scientists noted that ‘resources have been deployed to service the
annual advice system, rather than developing or refining methods to
match data, knowledge and advice needs’ (2007, p. 14). They estimated
the cost of scientific advisory work and related research activities in Europe
in 2002 at about 78 million euros, with 59 million euros spent on data
collection and directly advice-related work and 19 million euros on re-
search conducted by fisheries research institutes. Just the international
meetings that provide science in support of the CFP entail 4500 person-
days annually (EASE 2007).
This section begins with a brief overall picture of the institutions that
make up this overall system. Then I turn to more detailed discussions of
some of the more important nexuses within the system: the data-gathering
system; the National Fisheries Institutes (NFIs); ICES; the Scientific Tech-
nical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF); and the Directorate
General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE).
4.1.1 The main parts of the system
The outline of the system is shown in Figure 4.1. On the left-hand side,
symbolised by circles, are the only parts of the system that actually touch
the sea, the fishing vessels and the research survey vessels. Both of these
feed data into the NFIs. Survey vessels do so through scientific protocols,
the fishing fleets do so through mandated data collection procedures out-
lined by the EU’s Data Collection Regulation. This system is carried out by
the member states and operates on national and regional levels. The advice
provision system moves up to the European Level as the NFIs supply their
experts, armed with their country’s data, to the ICES expert groups (see
Figure 4.2). These expert groups are the entry level for the ICES system,
which takes the results of these groups through a series of stages until the
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official ICES advice emerges. As the NFIs employ these people and pay for
their participation in the expert groups, they exercise an important indirect
control over these central ICES activities. They also hold considerable for-
mal control over ICES because of their membership on the ICES Council.
What exactly they are controlling, and how much they are really control-
ling it, are open questions. ICES is a lot of things. It is an intergovernmen-
tal scientific organisation which is charged with producing scientific ad-
vice to be used in official decision-making. It is a primary professional
organisation for marine and fisheries scientists in Europe and an impor-
tant secondary organisation for North American scientists. It is a building
in Copenhagen where a professional staff processes data, edits kilograms
of scientific advice, and constantly hosts meetings on many subjects. It is
also a loose network where approximately 1600 scientists work together to
address scientific questions, some of which they are eager to examine and
some of which they wish had never been asked.
Formally, ICES is an intergovernmental organisation with 20 member
countries. Each member country has two delegates on the Council, and
the Council is the highest decision-making level in ICES. It is chaired by
the ICES President. The two delegates from each country are usually the
Director of the country’s NFI and someone from the relevant central min-
istry. The Directors are the more active of these two groups, and all current
members of the Bureau, an executive committee elected by and from the
delegates, are NFI Directors.
Figure 4.1 Overview of the advice system for marine and fisheries management in
Europe
ICES must also respond to its clients. The biggest of them is the European
Commission, mainly in respect to the Directorate General of Maritime Af-
fairs and Fisheries (DG MARE), but ICES also receives some advice re-
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quests from DG Environment. The regular clients include the government
of Norway, the OSPAR and HELCOM Conventions, the North East Atlantic
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), and the North Atlantic Salmon Conserva-
tion Organization (NASCO).
ICES is very dependent on the willingness of scientists to make their
expertise available. It is true that many scientists, even while sometimes
referring to themselves as volunteers, participate in ICES expert groups
because they are assigned to do so by their laboratories. However, the de-
gree of enthusiasm with which they do so is very much under their own
control. Furthermore, many other scientists participate in expert groups
solely because of their own interest in the issue or the scientific subject
matter. As explored in some detail in the coming chapters, mobilising
these people’s expertise is a real challenge, and the attitudes of the consti-
tuent scientists make up an important part of the political environment of
ICES.
The next section of Figure 4.1 is the box marked European Union that
contains a number of sub-sections. The central actor, although not the fi-
nal decision-maker, is DG MARE. Like other clients, DG MARE directs
funds and requests to ICES. The amount of money involved is not huge;
the current Memorandum of Understanding between ICES and DG
MARE puts the figure at approximately 750,000 euros for the recurring
advice. The group at DG MARE that actually uses the advice, however,
does not formally receive the advice directly from ICES. Through a fairly
recent change in procedures, official advice must pass through the Scien-
tific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF). Their job
is to receive the ICES advice, review it, add economic information as ap-
propriate, and pass it on to DG MARE. An important difference between
STECF and ICES is that STECF is DG MARE’s own body, and its budget is
under the direct control of DG MARE. An important similarity between
STECF and ICES is that these are very often the same scientists, who are
getting their per diems paid by a different public body. DG MARE also has
the option to send requests directly to STECF, an option that it exercises
frequently for certain types of short-term and very specific requests.
In addition to the scientific advice from STECF, DG MARE also consid-
ers political and social advice from two stakeholder structures. The Region-
al Advisory Council (RAC) system was set up by the European Council in
2002 (CEC 2002) and given practical form in 2004 (CEC 2004). They are
meant to be stakeholder fora bringing together divergent groups to try to
produce a consensus approach to fisheries management problems to help
meet management goals. There are seven such RACs; five correspond to
the geographical level of a shared sea, the other two relate to particularly
far-ranging fisheries. A RAC is required by the Council Decision (CEC
2004) to allocate two-thirds of the seats on its executive council to the har-
vesting sector and one-third to ‘other interest groups affected by the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy’ (256/17). The other group, the Advisory Committee
on Fisheries and Aquaculture (ACFA), is similar in purpose to the RACs,
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but operates at a European level representing mainly cross-European
groups. ACFA is even more strongly weighted towards economic interests
than the RACs are.
DG MARE’s output is proposals to the Council of Ministers for decision-
making. The decision-making power has recently been expanded by the
Lisbon Treaty to include a ‘co-decision’ by the European Parliament, but
how this will influence the process is unclear, and the Commissioner’s
current position is that it will not influence the settings of TACs. Up until
now their role in fisheries has been advisory. The Council of Ministers, in
hectic end-of-the-year sessions, decides on the fisheries legislation for the
coming year. While they do issue a number of ‘technical measures’, i.e.
rules about how to catch fish and some restrictions on how much fishing
will be allowed, the most important decisions are related to setting the
TACs for each species and their associated member state quotas. The quo-
tas are governed by the relative-stability rule, under which the quota alloca-
tion is based on the proportion of the catch which the member states en-
joyed before joining the CFP.
Under the CFP the member states are to receive an allocation, and it is
up to them how they distribute that allocation to their fishers. Member
states are also responsible for passing the relevant laws and regulations,
monitoring and enforcing compliance. The EU role in this area is growing
rapidly. This includes not just the fisheries management measures but the
data-gathering activities as well. Monitoring and enforcement at the mem-
ber-state level has been the weakest part of the CFP. But data-gathering,
behaviour-monitoring and enforcement have improved significantly in the
past few years, due to the tightening of standards by the European Union
as well as a growing influence of conservation groups at the member-state
level in response to the CFP’s poor conservation record.
4.1.2 Gathering the data for fisheries advice
The various scientific survey vessels owned and operated by the NFIs pro-
duce the valuable ‘fisheries independent data’ that constitute the most im-
portant input, at times even the only empirical input, to the stock assess-
ment models. The cost of scientific surveys added up to 34 million euros,
making surveys the largest single expenditure in the entire scientific ad-
vice system. ‘Fisheries dependent data’ that comes mainly from sampling
landings constitutes the second largest expenditure of 19 million euros. As
discussed below, the quality of these data has been the single most promi-
nent issue in European fisheries management. These data-gathering ex-
penditures can be compared to the 7 million euros that pays for all the
analysis, stock assessments and advisory work (EASE 2007). These re-
sources have been invested somewhat unevenly among the different fish
stocks, with the northern area, including the North Sea and Baltic demer-
sal stocks, attracting the most resources. Some 40% of the resources was
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spent on these stocks, while the rest of the demersal stocks received 20%,
pelagic stocks 30%, and deep sea stocks 5% (EASE 2007).
In 2000 the European Union established a common regulation for the
collection and management of fisheries data for all member states. This
regulation is known as the Data Collection Regulation (DCR). The DCR is
the answer to a need for harmonised procedures for data collection that
remain the same from one year to the next. It is meant to provide an over-
view of the activities of the fishing fleets, total catches, price trends and the
economic situation in the sector. The DCR has undergone some develop-
ments since its first adoption in 2000. The reason for this is especially the
2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy through which the EU man-
agement of fisheries has been moved from a concern with how to manage
individual stocks to a concern with how to manage the social and econom-
ic units of European fisheries and fleets. The main trend within the devel-
opment of the DCR has been towards meeting the need for multi-species
fleet- and area-based advice. It is anticipated that from 2009, data will be
collected by fleet and fishery, rather than by stock.
In March 2008 a new version of the DCR was adopted that is intended
to prepare the system for the EAFM. The new DCR introduces satellite
monitoring of vessels. It expands the EU-funded data collection pro-
grammes from one to three years. It places more emphasis on the gather-
ing of social and economic data so as to provide a basis for impact assess-
ment of new legislation and to allow monitoring of the performance of the
European fleet. Paragraph 8 in the proposal for the new version states as
follows:
Q 4.1 Data collected for the purposes of scientific evaluation should include
information on fleets and their activities, biological data covering catches,
including discards, survey information on fish stocks and the environmen-
tal impact that may be caused by fisheries on the marine ecosystem. It
should also include data explaining price formation and other data which
may facilitate an assessment of the economic situation of fishing enter-
prises, aquaculture and the processing industry, and of employment trends
in these sectors (CEC 2007, p. 9).
To many fisheries scientists, the data directive guidelines of 2002 actually
implied a decrease in international coordination. The data directive had
established sampling schemes for all of the EU member states to adhere
to, but by doing that, it had also de-emphasised former cooperative sam-
pling programmes. Since that time a new system has been created under
more direct EU auspices. New internal mechanisms were needed to en-
sure the international coordination of sampling. The sampling of discards
was one of the areas which proved to be a challenge. While all member
states should engage in a national sampling programme, it was left to the
individual member states to decide how to estimate the discards. There
was no international coordination in place to ensure that sampling oc-
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curred from all the fleets fishing any particular stock, and this in turn pre-
vented the full utilisation of discard estimates into the stock assessments.
The international coordination of landing samplings was complicated
further by the very heterogeneity of the authorities responsible for enforce-
ment and inspection (e.g. the navy, the police, customs, etc.). The scientific
methodology relating to the length and ageing of landings was also in need
of international coordination as some laboratories had no established ex-
pertise. Tools were required for analyzing and storing international sam-
pling results, and the division of responsibilities for the management and
development of the international sampling system needed to be clarified.
These issues are being addressed to some degree. The concerns in the
previous paragraph were themes in interviews done in 2003 and 2004.
International coordination is increasing, especially through programmes
designed at the regional (e.g. North Sea) level. Here is a respondent from
the data programme at DG MARE speaking in 2007:
Q 4.2 Interviewer: How much of your time do you spend talking to people
in member state ministries? Respondent: Rarely, I would say. With the data
collection system we have regular meetings with member states, normally
when we are evaluating their national programmes. We are not in the pro-
cess of evaluating their national programmes in 2008. We have bilateral
meetings, and my unit is participating in all this regional coordination
work. This is a good occasion where you meet not the higher level deci-
sion-makers but the people involved in implementation. These are obser-
vers and people coordinating observers, people dealing with data collection
issues.
Data for fisheries advice are not available in either the quality or quantity
DG MARE would like to see. According to one of our respondents from
DG MARE, they had the sense that processing data for advice is not attrac-
tive to the employees of the national fisheries institutes. They thought this
true even to the extent that those who do it are not seen as scientists, and
there is little money available for these activities in comparison with re-
search projects. One point of the new initiatives was to make some invest-
ments to change this situation. The impact of stock assessment work on
scientists’ careers and working conditions is the central theme of Chap-
ter 5.
A respondent at DG MARE:
Q 4.3 The data collection framework has been running for five years now. If
you listen to an end user like ICES, they say that the programme is func-
tioning well. It has stabilised the flow of data to the assessment work. That
does not always apply to the quality of the data. That is a problem, and most
of the problems are with missing landings, misreporting, black landings or
whatever you want to call it.
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Fisheries data also raise questions of confidentiality and control. Because
of the concerns of member state governments, reflecting in turn the con-
cerns of their fishers, the current legislation does not allow DG MARE to
have its own databases, and they are only allowed to use data for 20 days.
Getting data is actually easier for scientists when they request it wearing
an ICES hat than if they request it wearing an STECF hat. If they want
information for STECF, the request has to go from DG MARE to the Min-
istry, but if they want it for ICES, they can just make a request directly to
the NFIs. DG MARE can also make the data from fisheries inspections
available to ICES, although with a number of restrictions.
An agreement between DG MARE and ICES about the use of commu-
nity fisheries inspections data for scientific purposes was described by an
ICES official. It is a long and complex document. It specifies exactly what
DG MARE is willing to provide, requires that ICES not publish the data
and restricts access to members of relevant expert groups. Furthermore,
ICES must only analyse the data for purposes of assessing catch statistics
for assessment and advisory purposes, and in ways that are restricted in
terms of geographical resolution. ICES is also restricted from making
comments about individual member states, let alone individual fishing
vessels. Some member states also specifically bar scientists from access to
data from the vessel monitoring system (VMS) satellite tracking.
While efforts at standardisation have been critical, problems with fish-
eries data are extensive and often politically charged. The most basic issue
is the cooperation of fishers with the data programmes and the related
problem that the fish catch is not the same thing as the recorded fish land-
ings. This happens because of discarding of fish at sea or ‘black’ landing of
the fish. There are many possible reasons for both problems (Wilson
2000). Very briefly, discarding may be because of ‘high-grading’, throwing
out fish caught earlier to accommodate more valuable fish caught later, or
‘regulatory discards’ where fish are caught that are illegal to land for quota
or other reasons. ‘Black’ landings may be a way to avoid either fishing
regulations or taxes. At the ACFM meeting in September 2004, the issue
of Eastern Baltic cod was discussed as a particularly difficult example.
Landings from this stock were estimated to be underreported by as much
as 35%. Yet the scientists have been concerned that if they pushed this
issue, they would get even less cooperation from the industry. These con-
cerns are reflected on the member-state level as well. Some countries in
the area have a rule that scientists can only use official data, so they created
a category called ‘unallocated’ data to detach the estimated misreporting
from national data. When this decision was reviewed, these scientists re-
ceived comments back that this category was not acceptable. This kind of
restriction means that the data cannot be evaluated. It creates ‘black boxes’
in the system and undermines scientific credibility of the scientists in-
volved, even up to the ICES level. One scientist complained that if one
names a specific country in trying to address misreporting, this will just
make the situation worse. Indeed, this person suggested that this worsen-
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ing may even extend to relationships with the scientists from that country.
Another scientist from the region said that for these reasons, they never
mention the countries where misreporting is undermining the value of
the data. Very similar problems have been found in the North Sea and else-
where.
Data on discards and bycatch are both particularly sensitive. One scien-
tist we interviewed was charged with putting together discard information
so that it would be commonly available to scientists throughout ICES. This
proved to be a problem because various countries did not submit their in-
formation while other countries submitted all that they had. The database
they created was very patchy, although he argues that the new EU regula-
tions have improved this situation. Three countries had already collected
the discard data as part of a research project, but when these data were
desired by an ICES study group, one country would not provide it because
of a disagreement with their fishing industry about whether the results
were representative.
A good example of the problems around data and fishers’ cooperation is
Scotland’s experience. Scotland has been a particular place of contention
with respect to discard information. Scotland was the earliest place to be-
gin a regular programme of hosting observers on board fishing vessels to
gather such data. Once the data were made available, they drew attention
from both the EU and local conservation NGOs that increased pressure on
the industry. This led in turn to a feeling among the industry that the data
that they were helping to provide were being used against them in a way
that penalised them more than other fishers who had not provided the
data. In at least one case this led one of the fishers’ organisations to with-
draw from providing more data. Interestingly, Scottish scientists felt some
kinship with the industry on this issue. On two separate occasions Scottish
scientists in interviews indicated that Scotland had made more than their
fair contribution to data-gathering, though their reaction was that it was
high time other countries started picking up their slack rather than that
Scotland should pull back.
A scientist we interviewed in 2004 who works directly with the Scottish
observer programme reported that it is becoming more difficult to solicit
cooperation. This is something that has built up gradually, but the quota
setting for 2003 seemed to have been a watershed event. At that point it
became clear that fishers’ organisations no longer wanted to provide coop-
eration at the previous levels. It was not the discards issue per se, but a
general attitude towards government establishments that contribute to-
wards quotas and management. The data went through the labs, and the
fishers felt that they were only providing information that would be used
against them. The observer programme still gets cooperation; our respon-
dent argued that the personal approach was still the most important. But
this withdrawal of cooperation has had an impact on the observers’morale,
and these are not easy positions to fill or train people for. It has also, on
rare occasions, meant a hole in the sampling scheme; he estimated
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roughly that five trips failed in 2003 out of a total of 70. The most extreme
expression of industry refusal to cooperate with data collection took place
in Northern Ireland where fisheries officers were kept from sampling
landings through threats of violence. A scientist involved in the expert
group says that this activity has had an impact on the Irish Sea stock as-
sessments.
The increased emphasis on data-gathering and especially investments in
general fisheries enforcement should begin to make a difference. For one
thing, video surveillance on fishing boats is beginning to appear rapidly.
Enforcement is a critical support in bringing about any kind of coopera-
tion. Even fishers with the best of intentions are forced to cheat in a system
where there is no enforcement; otherwise they hurt their own families
while benefiting no one. Earlier in this decade, when the enforcement and
data problems were finally beginning to get considerable attention, a pat-
tern in interviews with fishers was for them to begin by talking about how
much they had been misreporting their landings, and how much they
wanted to see a system where they did not have to. Hopefully, such a sys-
tem is beginning to be put in place.
4.1.3 The National Fisheries Institutes
In this chapter and throughout this book I refer to what may be the most
important institutions in the whole advisory process using the single term
‘National Fisheries Institutes’ or more often NFIs. I thought it was impor-
tant here to offer some very short descriptions of a few of these organisa-
tions. What follows is not an in-depth history or analysis, indeed the infor-
mation comes almost entirely from the institutes’ own websites. Such an
analysis is not necessary for adequately describing the case at hand. What I
hope this section does do is give the reader an idea of both the similarities
and diversity of these entities that I for the most part treat almost as a unit.
They have diverse cultures, quite proud scientific histories, and different
organisational structures, while also having both similar missions and a
need to respond to similar stakeholder groups. They are the employers of
most of the scientists interviewed for the book, and hence their primary
institutional identity. Some are government entities fully encompassed by
the ministry in charge of fisheries, others are parts of universities. Both
DTU Aqua and IMARES recently changed from independent research in-
stitutes to university research centres. After the short descriptions some
general remarks about the NFIs complete the section.
The Institute of Marine Research in Bergen, Norway
The Institute of Marine Research (IMR) is the largest centre for marine
science in Norway. The scientific focus of IMR is on aquaculture and eco-
101
systems. The main task is to advise Norwegian authorities on ecosystems
and aquaculture, and half of IMR’s revenue comes from the Norwegian
Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs through earmarked advisory con-
tracts. IMR organises its marine and ecological research into 19 research
groups, and together they cover a wide range of research on e.g. different
maritime species, health, animal welfare, genetics, oceanography and data
maintenance. The subjects of fisheries dynamics and fish capture consti-
tute two fields of their own within this structure of 19 research groups.
The group of fisheries dynamics studies capture rates, effort and fleet de-
velopment, collects fishery-dependent data and performs monitoring ser-
vices. The fish capture group, for its part, seeks to develop capture meth-
ods that are at once environment- and resource-friendly and energy-
efficient. IMR has recently started to work more closely with the industry
in order to improve the data collection and information flow between fish-
ermen and scientists. This is being done through their ‘Reference Fleet’
programme where IMR pays a small group of fishermen to provide de-
tailed information on their fishing activity and catches.
IMR’s history as an institution goes back to 1860 with a parliamentary
proposal to fund practical-scientific fishery research in 1859 (Nordstrand
2000; Schwach 2000). This led to the first investigations of herring and
cod fisheries in the early 1860s. In 1900 the Norwegian parliament estab-
lished its first fishing directorate and divided it into a practical-administra-
tive and a scientific branch. The scientific branch was reorganised in 1947
and developed into the institute named IMR. IMR remained part of the
Norwegian fishery directory until 1989, when the former scientific branch,
now an independent institution, split from the administrative one. Today,
the two old branches continue to cooperate, and they share the same phy-
sical facilities.
Due to its national advisory function, the main geographical areas of
research interest are the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea
and the Norwegian coastline. In addition to the many activities near
home, IMR also supports fisheries research and management in develop-
ing countries. Through their ‘Centre for Development Cooperation in
Fisheries’ IMR has worked with Asian, African and Latin-American coun-
tries and describes itself as heavily engaged in development aid activities.
IMR also engages in international research activities which are not at-
tached to development aid. It advises international organisations and com-
missions and works with international sister institutions including 50
years of cooperation with the Russian PINRO Institute.
The Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science in
Lowestoft, England
For England and Wales, CEFAS acts as the main aquatic scientific research
and consultancy centre. It provides the UK government and other clients
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with research, advisory, monitoring, consultancy and training services.
The goal of CEFAS’s scientific endeavour is to help preserve the aquatic
environment, develop sustainable management and protect the public
from aquatic contaminants. CEFAS is engaged in a broad range of re-
search and advisory activities within both fisheries and the broader field of
marine science.
CEFAS’s research area is divided into the three categories of ecosystem
interactions, organism health and resource management. Fisheries re-
search is a subfield of its own under the latter and refers primarily to the
exploration and assessment of the impacts of human activity and manage-
ment on aquatic resources. Back in 2003 CEFAS began to work directly
together with British fishermen due to a funded initiative by the UK gov-
ernment. Working together with fishermen organisations, CEFAS is build-
ing up relationships between fishermen and scientists in scientific coop-
eration.
What is today known as the ‘Centre for Environment, Fisheries and
Aquaculture Science’ started out as a fisheries laboratory in the town of
Lowestoft in 1902. It was established as the UK’s contribution to the then
newly created ICES. Being an executive agency of the UK government’s
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Advice, CEFAS is strongly
connected to a UK national political agenda and has to provide the UK
government with a range of services. CEFAS is mandated by the central
and local government to licence deposits at sea, undertake visits and re-
commend enforcement actions. Their history is an extremely proud one.
It was at the Lowestoft laboratory that Raymond Beverton and Sidney Holt
developed the basic concepts and equations on which modern fisheries
management is based.
From a research and funding perspective, CEFAS’s profile is national,
European and global. Most of CEFAS’s current projects are ordered and
funded by the European Union and have either the North Sea or Europe
as their area of research. The UK government remains CEFAS’s other
large customer. Having international aid agencies and national govern-
ment bodies from outside Europe on its list of customers, CEFAS also en-
gages in global-scale research and consultancy.
Fisheries Research Services in Aberdeen, Scotland
In Scotland, the Fisheries Research Services (FRS) acts as an advisor for
the Scottish and UK governments. The primary task of FRS is to advise
these governments on marine fisheries and aquaculture and the protection
of the aquatic environment and its wildlife. FRS became a government
agency in 1997. It is an agency under the Scottish Government Marine
Directorate and is a purely government-owned institution. Its research ac-
tivities are to a large extent confined to the Scottish context and defined
according to government policy interests.
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FRS divides its work into research, monitoring and advice. The scientif-
ic research of FRS is conducted in order to understand the aquatic ecosys-
tems, its human impacts and the options for sustainable fishing and aqua-
culture. Monitoring is related to the state of the aquatic environment and
involves the maintenance of long time-series data sets, sampling and ana-
lysis. The advisory function is of central importance to FRS. Advice is pro-
duced to guide policy development and support the obligations of the gov-
ernment in relation to the management and conservation of fisheries and
the protection of the aquatic environment and wildlife. The control of fish
diseases and the protection of the consumer are FRS areas of advice as
well. FRS divides its scientific work into the different categories of aqua-
culture and aquatic animal health, aquatic environment, fisheries manage-
ment, freshwater laboratory and marine ecosystems. In relation to fish-
eries management FRS primarily works with analysis and advice on stock
assessment and conservation measures.
FRS engages in two kinds of direct contact with the industry. The first is
primarily of a one-way character as FRS holds briefing sessions for the
industry where the industry is advised about science developments. The
second kind of contact can be characterised more as a partnership. Since
2006, the Scottish government has earmarked funding for joint industry/
science research projects, and FRS plays a central role in the administra-
tion and development of these projects. It participated in several research
projects which were defined as being of interest to industry. These projects
related to the effect of management measures and concerned issues such
as the effectiveness of survey trawls, area closures, technical measures and
the identification of spawning areas. Fishers participated either individu-
ally or through the fishermens’ different producers’ organisations. The
government-funded industry/science project is to continue in 2008-2009,
and the aim is to generate research ideas of common interest to industry
and the government, to speed up or broaden current research work and to
improve the relations between science and industry.
The Wageningen Institute for Marine Resources and Ecosystem
Studies in Ijmuiden, the Netherlands
Wageningen Institute for Marine Resources and Ecosystem Studies (IM-
ARES) in the Netherlands offers strategic and applied marine research.
IMARES addresses the sustainable protection of the open sea and coastal
area. Fisheries is but one area within the wider field of marine and ecolo-
gical research. IMARES is the result of a recent merger. RIVO (the Nether-
lands Institute for Fisheries Research), the forerunner of IMARES, be-
longed to the Department of Ecological Risk within the Netherlands
Organisation for Applied Scientific Research, a Dutch organisation that
promotes applied knowledge. In 2006 IMARES was established as a joint
activity of the NTO and Wageningen University.
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IMARES’s main work is related to the waters of the Netherlands, mean-
ing the North Sea together with Dutch waters and river deltas. IMARES’s
history and funding situation does not, however, link IMARES as strongly
to the national government as most of the other fisheries laboratories in
northwest Europe. Until 2006, IMARES was an independent organisation
under a public law that promoted the application of knowledge by busi-
nesses and the government. Today, after the merger with Wageningen
University, IMARES still emphasises its function as a ‘knowledge partner’
for government authorities, business and social organisations who work
with marine living resources.
The research fields of IMARES are ecology, environment, aquaculture
and marine fisheries. In regard to fisheries, the organisation’s overall em-
phasis is on sustainability in both economic and ecological terms. IM-
ARES offers its expertise in the various areas of inland, coastal, shrimp,
flatfish and pelagic fisheries and the effects of fishing.
DTU Aqua in Charlottenlund, Denmark
DTU Aqua is a Danish fisheries research centre. It was formerly one of a
number of sector research centres in Denmark, with this one being under
the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. DTU Aqua can be
traced back to early forerunners who performed biological investigations
in the flora and fauna of the Danish seabed in 1889. In 2006 the organisa-
tional make-up of the institute changed as it merged with the Danish Tech-
nical University and took on the status of an university institute. This is
similar to what happened with IMARES, but it took place as part of a gen-
eral merger between the Danish sector research institutes and Danish uni-
versities that resulted from a high-level government initiative. At that time,
the institute also changed its name to DTU Aqua. As the institute became
part of the Danish Technical University, it started to expand its postgradu-
ate educational programme. DTU Aqua depends on state funding to the
extent that the government provided 45% of its 2007 budget.
Unlike other research centres, to which fishery science is but one area
within a broader range of marine sciences, this centre defines all its re-
search in terms of fisheries-related issues. Having fisheries-related issues
as its dedicated area, however, does not seem to limit its variety of research
interests.
DTU Aqua represents its field of research as embracing all the different
aspects relating to the exploration of the sea and the freshwater together
with their living resources. It is occupied with all the links ‘from water to
table’ as it provides research on aquatic ecosystems as well as fishery tech-
nology, fishery management and the production of fish consumer prod-
ucts. The Institute’s research projects often concern themselves with the
fishery-related issues connected to the waters bordering Denmark. The in-
stitute also participates in European research projects.
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The institute advises the Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fish-
eries as well as public authorities, international commissions and the in-
dustry. The institute has started to work in closer and closer cooperation
with the fishing industry in pursuit of more nuanced data and the advance-
ment of scientific methodology. As the institute works to assess the fish
stocks and their developments, knowledge about the stocks and the fisher-
men’s planning is considered necessary.
This concludes the short description of a few selected NFIs. These insti-
tutes are the heart of the system for assembling fisheries science advice.
They operate at times under considerable strain, especially with increasing
special requests for scientific advice. A scientist at a NFI related in an inter-
view that in a period of two weeks his lab received 78 written questions
from their ministry originating from members of the national legislature.
This was an unanticipated task which alone took up four person-weeks and
for which there was no particular budget. As discussed in the following
sections, ICES and DG MARE also feel the strain of an increased number
of special requests.
The NFIs are the main employers of fisheries scientists engaged in ad-
vice production, and the heads of these institutes make up the most en-
gaged portion of the ICES delegates. The NFIs’ budgets are a critical
source of support for ICES in that they pay for the salaries and participa-
tion costs of most of the experts in most of the ICES expert groups. Some
of DG MARE’s frustration in trying to get the fisheries science advice it
needs, both through ICES and more directly though STECF, is related to
the fact that so much control in the system is located in the member state
ministries and particularly in the NFIs.
Scientists often view themselves as doing ‘volunteer’ work when they
staff ICES expert groups. Indeed, a scientist in a leadership position at
ICES described this ‘we are volunteers’ interpretation of their status as
quite widespread among ICES scientists. The degree of commitment the
NFIs actually have for the ICES system is perceived in various ways. One
scientist interviewed during a meeting observation reported that the ex-
pert-group work is seen by his institute as being ‘in brackets’, by which he
meant that he is supposed to do it without reducing his other work. His
institute director sees this work as a side issue, and the relevant ministry
does not provide sufficient funds to enable participation in the group. A
scientist from another country at the same meeting had a very different
experience. His institute saw expert-group participation as part of their
central mission.
In our survey of fisheries scientists, respondents were asked to rate on a
scale from one to seven the degree to which their employer encouraged
their participation in expert groups. The average among 169 employees of
national fisheries institutes who had attended expert groups of all types in
the past 5 years was 5.8 out of 7. So the experience of the second scientist
in the previous paragraph is closer to the average. For all scientists who
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attended expert groups, those whose most recent expert group had been
directly involved in producing stock assessments for management advice
(including STECF) rated this encouragement higher. For NFI employees,
however, their institutes’ support for expert-group participation was not
significantly influenced by the type of expert group (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1
Your employer considers working/study groups to be:
1 = totally immaterial, 7 = absolutely central to your job
by type of expert group
All scientists who attended expert groups
Type of last expert group attended Mean N p
Not directly related to stock assessment 5.06 160
0Directly related to stock assessment 5.72 123
Total 5.35 283
NFI employees who attended expert groups
Not directly related to stock assessment 5.65 81
0.11Directly related to stock assessment 5.92 88
Total 5.79 169
Excluded from N of 283: 148 respondents who indicated not having participated in an expert group
in the last five years, 20 who did indicate participating, but who did not make clear which kind of
expert group, and six who failed to answer whether they had been in an expert group or not.
Furthermore, eight did not answer the question on support from employer. In the second analysis,
114 non-NFI employees are excluded, giving an N of 169; of the 114 excluded, 12 were excluded
because they did not identify their employer.
4.1.4 The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICES is one of the oldest intergovernmental scientific organisations. It has
a storied and prestigious past and there exists a very comprehensive recent
history of the organisation (Rozwadowski 2002). From a STS perspective
ICES is something of a history-maker as well. The production of science
for policy support was an explicit part of ICES’s formation in the late 19th
century when scientific organisations tended to be disciplinary and fo-
cused on pure science. In his ICES centenary lecture in 1999, Griffith
(2003) offers the following quote from the Sixth International Geographi-
cal Congress in 1895:
Q 4.4 A resolution was passed that the Congress ‘recognises the scientific
and economic importance of the results of recent research in the Baltic, the
North Sea and the North Atlantic especially with regard to fishing interests
and records its opinion that the survey of the areas should be continued and
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extended by the co-operation of the different nationalities concerned on the
lines of the Scheme presented to the Congress by Prof. Pettersson’.
This makes ICES one of the earliest precursors of Mode Two science.
As detailed in Chapter 7 (see especially Figure 7.1), Griffith (2003) goes
on to outline how the structure of ICES is constantly in flux, seen from the
perspective of a century of history. Figure 4.2 shows the current structure,
which dates from 1 January 2008. The discussions that led to the adoption
of this structure are the subject of Chapter 7. In fact, as I write, ICES is in
the midst of similar discussions about the reorganisation of the Science
Programme to be decided upon in late 2008.
I described the Council and Bureau at the head of the chapter. At the
ICES Secretariat in Copenhagen sit the 48 people who actually draw a sal-
ary from ICES. They are directed by the Secretary-General who reports to
the Council and Bureau and has the direct formal responsibility for certify-
ing on behalf of the Council that a piece of science or scientific advice is
the official advice of ICES. The Secretariat has extensive and growing re-
sponsibilities for data management through the ICES Data Centre. In ad-
dition, the Secretariat has managerial responsibility for the two main divi-
sions of ICES: the Advisory Programme and the Science Programme.
Within the Secretariat, most employees are assigned to the Data Centre or
one of these two programmes. When referring to these two activities with
respect to ICES as a network, I and many of the scientists I quote usually
refer to the ‘science side’ and the ‘advice side’ of ICES rather than to the
two programmes.
Both the formal and informal aspects are important. Within the net-
work, as described in some detail in the next chapter, whether an ICES
scientist works mainly on the advisory or the science side to some degree
reflects their status and has implications for their activities and carriers.
The formal programmes have their respective staff in the Secretariat, and
are governed by different committees (Figure 4.2). The Advisory Commit-
tee (ACOM) governs the Advisory Programme with its counterpart being
the Consultative Committee8 (ConC). All of ICES’s expert groups report,
directly or indirectly, to one of these two governing committees. Under
ConC, the Science Programme has eight committees under which are
found two forms of expert groups. ‘Working groups’ designates a relatively
permanent group, while ‘study groups’ meet a specific number of times.
Under ACOM are found those working groups and study groups that con-
tribute directly to the advice, as well as types of expert groups not found in
the Science Programme. These last are review groups that, as one might
expect, review the scientific production of the expert groups in the Advi-
sory Programme, and advise drafting groups that take the outcomes of the
review groups and draft the advice for consideration by ACOM. The Advi-
sory Programme also includes Benchmark Workshops that periodically
take an in-depth look at the methods being used for analysis and advice
for a particular group of species.
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National representation is much more important in the Advisory Pro-
gramme. ACOM is made up of two representatives of each of the member
countries. Expert groups that report to the ACOM operate under a differ-
ent set of rules than do expert groups reporting to ConC. Advisory group
membership is determined by the delegates, while the chairs of expert
groups in the Science Programme can allow membership on their own
initiative. Several related issues are involved here. One is simply funding
for participation as mentioned in the last section. The second is that parti-
cipation in advisory expert groups requires the permission of the national
delegates of the participant’s country. An advisory expert-group chair can
nominate but cannot officially permit nor fund someone’s participation.
While this is the official procedure, it is not always followed in practice
because expert group chairs are concerned primarily with addressing their
group’s Terms of Reference (ToRs) and are interested in identifying and
recruiting this expertise. They may not always find time for following offi-
cial channels, especially as there is no particular system in place – beyond
the attention of the chair – for making sure that no one is present who is
not supposed to be.
ICES also has a concern that limiting participation will lead them to be
accused of excluding people for political rather than scientific reasons. Of
particular concern, again, are potential sensitivities with respect with na-
tional representation, but there are also concerns with the possible atten-
dance of scientists whose views are not entirely orthodox. This second con-
cern comes up in particular on the science side where the chairs can allow
participation at their own discretion, but where results will still be under-
stood as coming from ICES. Scientists feel that there are roles to be played
by both delegates and chairs in the control of expert-group participation,
but agreement on these matters is not easy:
Q 4.5 Scientist One: The scenario Scientist Two is pointing to [the accusa-
tion of political exclusion] is foreseeable. For working groups that are not in
the advisory process, then the Delegates should also have a hand in it.
Scientist Three: It has to be at the invitation of a chair, and chairs have to
be able to say no. Scientist Two: I want no part of that. Scientist One: Why?
Scientist Two: I am thinking of the boundary between advice and science,
which is the path we are on if we go with ecosystem and integrated advice.
There are areas with a wide range of scientific opinion ... Experts with quite
good credentials could see a terms of reference and consider it a refusal to
invite them. Scientist One: We get that anyway. Scientist Four: We should
make honest a practice that goes on. We know that individuals find their
way into working groups. At this stage let’s just make the system honest.
The simplest thing is to just acknowledge that people can self-nominate
with the agreement of the chair, adding a clause that they should be able to
contribute. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September
2004)9
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Thus, a practical solution is reached that will likely last until someone de-
cides to make an issue out of someone else’s participation in an expert
group. It is interesting to note here the reference to the EAFM. This is the
first mention of the related issues of the science/advice boundaries and the
mobilisation of the many different kinds of expertise that the EAFM will
require. These issues will be dealt with much more in Chapter 6.
Figure 4.2 The current structure of ICES (www.ices.dk)
Figure 4.3 outlines the ICES structure before the changes that began in
January 2008. The major difference is the creation of ACOM in place of
what had been the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme
(MCAP) and the three previous advisory committees: the Advisory Com-
mittee for Fisheries Management (ACFM), the Advisory Committee for
Ecosystems (ACE) and the Advisory Committee for the Marine Environ-
ment (ACME).
According to its current Memorandum of Understanding with DG
MARE, which is available on www.ices.dk, ICES provides recurring advice
for 38 species or species groups. Recurring usually means annual, but par-
ticularly poor data or special characteristics in the biology of the animal
may require a different time interval. The ‘38 species’ also implies a much
higher number of fish stocks, and the annual fisheries advice is of the
order of 1600 pages long. In addition, ICES provides non-recurring advice
through special requests that are negotiated on a case by case basis.
Table 4.2 is provided to give some examples of the kinds of advice re-
quested. Some of these requests may be so-called ‘fast track’ requests (ex-
amples in Table 4.3) that ICES must organise and respond to under excep-
tional time pressure.
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Figure 4.3 The structure of ICES before the reorganisation (ICES 2007c)
Nevertheless from a DG MARE perspective, in spite of the fast track sys-
tem, the advisory system is not designed to respond swiftly enough to ur-
gent requests (CEC 2003a). DG MARE is considering making greater use
of short-term contracts and more stringent prioritisation procedures in or-
der to address issues which arise in the EU political arena or in interna-
tional negotiations, for example, that need quick scientific assessments.
Because ICES is geared towards addressing the ongoing annual rhythm of
stock assessments and generating advice for TACs, it is difficult for them
to organise resources to address such requests from DG MARE.
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Table 4.3 Fast track requests to ICES in 2005
Client Fast track request
DG MARE
DG MARE and
Norway
DG ENV
NEAFC I
BSFC
OSPAR
HELCOM
Norway
1. Compile status list of EU fish stocks
2. Sole in IIIa B new information to be included in re-assessment of stock
3. Bycatch of common dolphin
4. Advice on deep-sea stocks
5. Long-term management of Baltic cod
6. Request on restocking of glass eel
7. DNA analysis of Baltic salmon
1. Long-term management advice
1. Influence of sonar on marine mammals and fish
1. Information on stock identity of Sebastes mentella and quantitative in-
formation to allow spatial and temporal limitations in catches
2. Advice regarding the proposal for the protection of vulnerable deep-
water habitats
3. Stock assessment methods for Atlanto-Scandian herring and blue whit-
ing stocks
4. NEA mackerel stock assessment methodology
1. Advise on areas with the Gotland Deep and Gdansk Deep where the
hydrological condition allow for a successful cod spawning in 2005
1. The design of one-off surveys to provide new information for a number
of OSPAR Chemicals for Priority Action
2. Quality Assurance of Biological Measurements in the northeast Atlantic
1. To coordinate quality assurance activities on biological and chemical
measurements in the Baltic marine area and report routinely on planned
and ongoing ICES inter-comparison exercises, and to provide a full report
on the results
1. Catch of NEA cod and haddock for 2006
Thanks to ICES for providing this information.
4.1.5 Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
The STECF has been producing reports since at least 1995, but the current
STECF was legally created by the same European Council legislation that
reauthorised the CFP in 2003. Article 33 of that document reads as follows:
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Q 4.6 – 1. A Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries
(STECF) shall be established. The STECF shall be consulted at regular inter-
vals on matters pertaining to the conservation and management of living
aquatic resources, including biological, economic, environmental, social
and technical considerations.
2. DG MARE shall take into account the advice from the STECF when pre-
senting proposals on fisheries management under this regulation.
Members of STECF are appointed for three-year terms by DG MARE.
There are currently 32 members and 39 reserve members. The STECF
holds a plenary meeting twice a year. The fisheries advice is reviewed, and
an Annual Economic Report is produced. Part of this is an estimate of the
economic impact of the current ACFM advice. When scientists attend
STECFmeetings, DG MARE pays for travel expenses, but they remain em-
ployed by their home organisations even though they are working on as-
signments put to them directly by DG MARE. Member states can be more
willing to send people to STECF than ICES because they see it as closer to
the decision, and work at ICES is paid for by the NFI.
As mentioned above, STECF and ICES expert groups draw on the same
pool of people. In recent years STECF has begun to have similar recruit-
ment problems to those found in ICES. The Joint Research Centre, a Com-
mission entity which is acting as the STECF Secretariat, is having increas-
ing problems recruiting scientists for expert groups. According to a
respondent at DG MARE, the problem is much more finding people than
it is having the money to put them to work.
Some in DG MARE do not find this continued dependence on the em-
ployees of other institutions adequate because it prevents the expansion of
STECF tasks beyond what the goodwill of the NFIs and other employers
allows. The need for a true in-house science capacity at DG MARE is an
ongoing debate. Some scientists working at DG MARE strongly believe
that DG MARE needs its own in-house fisheries science capacity. While
the ICES system with STECF review may provide independence, and
hence increased legitimacy, it is inefficient. A Commission employee de-
scribes their position this way:
Q 4.7 This is quite a strong opinion, actually, from those who are writing
these regulation proposals. They have good reasons to have that opinion; I
understand perfectly where it is coming from. All these concerns about
whether it is legitimate outside the house and whether it is scientifically
credible in terms of being properly peer-reviewed and based on models
that have been scrutinised becomes less of a concern. It is not really that
the in-house advice may have less standing in civil society generally, in the
public debate that is not an issue. If you are under pressure and you have to
say so many days for a hundred different fleets, you have to come up with a
number for the next regulation, you just need that number to come from
somewhere, and as long as it is on the best possible technical basis you
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could just consider it to be engineering rather than science, and it may be
perfectly valid without having all these features that you would need to have
legitimate and credible science.
The relationship between ICES and STECF can be tense. One issue is that,
in spite of the fact that they are competing for the same people, it has been
difficult to avoid overlap and duplication. Another is feedback when
changes in the advice are recommended. A respondent who works in the
Advisory Programme at ICES:
Q 4.8 Interviewer: Do you find DG MARE helpful partners in terms of
eliminating ICES STECF overlap? Advisory Programme Leader: Yes and
no. Yes, when we have face-to-face talks and we resolve issues, but not in
terms of planning. I find it very difficult to understand the logic of DG
MARE about when they use groups in ICES and when they set up different
groups in STECF. And in general there is very little communication from
STECF to ICES. So if there’s a group evaluating North Sea flatfish manage-
ment plan, we don’t see it, and there’s no formal exchange of reports.
One of the most fascinating things in this entire system is how essentially
the same fisheries scientists seem to adapt to quite a different scientific
culture when working in STECF or working in ICES. There is a story that
has been repeated many times now about STECF and ACFM. It is outlined
in detail in Section 6.1 because it illuminates a great deal about the work-
ings of the science boundary in the advisory system. The reason for men-
tioning it here is that the way it is so often repeated, and even has become
part of the cultural mythology of the advisory community, illuminates the
tension that exists between STECF and ICES, even though they are usually
the same people. The story is that the ACFM had refused to do mixed fish-
ery assessments because of a lack of data on discards that they felt made
the analysis impossible. After this happened, DG MARE brought several of
the same scientists who had been at that ACFM meeting to a meeting of
the STECF and asked them to do the analysis that ACFM had refused to
do. Those scientists did provide the requested results to DG MARE. When
the story was retold at ICES, it was also mentioned that some DG MARE
employees had said that this outcome demonstrated that ICES should have
been able to do the analysis in the first place. The ACFM members who
related this anecdote were quite offended by this. One scientist got a laugh
at an ACFM meeting by joking that ‘DG MARE is better than ICES be-
cause they are able to do more work with less data’.
The following is from an interview with a scientist active in STECF. He
describes the relationship between STECF and ICES advice in terms of the
actual practice of how they receive the ICES advice and then pass it on to
DG MARE. He also mentions this same story about the mixed fishery as-
sessments:
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Q 4.9 Interviewer: So you think, that’s how STECF is working, as a sort of
an extra quality control? Respondent: Well, not so much quality control. It
just adds, you know, if you look at our annual stock review that we do in
STECF, in 99%, or at least 95%, we just say ‘No comment’, or ‘We agree
this, that or the other, but we note that’. And the only reason that there is an
STECF comment is that somebody has thought something was question-
able with the ACFM report and that always comes back to the member
state, to the scientists on the ACFM from the member state that put in the
request. I would suggest. I mean we don’t sit around and read the whole of
the ACFM report in that STECF subgroup and start asking questions. We
say ‘All right, do we have any questions about this advice? And if we have,
let’s look at it. Interviewer: But that’s only one part of the STECF role, and
the other, it has a wider mandate than that? Respondent: Yeah, but it’s actu-
ally an important part because it’s written in the STECF regulations that you
have to provide an annual review of stocks. Um, it has a wider role, and it’s
a consultation role, it’s a consultation committee for DG MARE. So DG
MARE can ask it any issue that it wants, really, and sometimes there’s actu-
ally a bit of naughtiness on DG MARE’s part, if you like. They try to ask
questions that support the answer they first thought of, and if that answer
isn’t supported then they often come down and say, well, why can’t you do
this? You know, a couple of years ago there was an example ... all the heavy-
weights came into the room and said, ‘look we need a table in your report of
what comes out of this mixed fishery forecast’, and of course we all smelled
a rat. And reluctantly we agreed that we would put a table in as an example,
and of course as soon as it was in the report, it was used as the proposal to
start negotiations. So that was a bit err, we weren’t very happy about that.
The importance of these references to the table being ‘an example’ that
they were not ‘happy’ about should not be exaggerated. STECFmade some
very specific distinctions about the questions they were and were not will-
ing to answer (Section 6.1). Previously in the interview, he also said, how-
ever, that sometimes ICES is simply not pleased to have another commit-
tee second-guess its advice. He believes that STECF should be seen as
another opportunity for DG MARE to get needed work done, even if this
closer association sometimes provides ‘scope for people to be rather
naughty’ as he later puts it. Members of ACFM have been known to go
back to the members of their home institutions and report that they do
not agree with the result in the ACFM report, and that they intend to try to
get the advice changed at STECF. Another stock assessment scientist told
us that DG MARE organises STECF and related meetings on short notice
‘because they need something that is called ‘science’ to be used as the basis
of a decision’. He sees the less structured STECF as almost a way ‘DG
MARE exploits scientists’. These are classic tensions between gaining
some legitimacy while losing some saliency through increasing the dis-
tance between managers and scientists.
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The importance of the formal distinction between in-house and inde-
pendent science is debated. In the private sector in-house science has actu-
ally declined because of costs and because high uncertainty means that
firms are not sure what knowledge they need (Gibbons et al. 1994). How-
ever, some have suggested that in policy matters, this is a very important
variable. Clark et al. (2002) report that how much a scientific assessment
is carried out by or under the control of the subsequent users is one of the
top three features in determining the future use of that scientific assess-
ment. This is a function of increased saliency. Alcock (2004) makes a simi-
lar claim in a study of the organisation of fisheries management, while
simultaneously pointing out that fisheries science under control of the
management agencies also raises suspicion among stakeholders. His ana-
lysis, however, conflates in-house (in his terms ‘embedded’) science with
top-down management. He characterises the pre-cod collapse Canadian
system as embedded, while seeing the US system as disembedded because
of the existence of the Regional Management Councils. This characterisa-
tion underestimates both the relative degree to which scientists have influ-
ence over NOAA Fisheries and the degree to which NOAA Fisheries has
influence over the Regional Management Councils. His suggestion that
the more independent science has a higher legitimacy among stakeholders
would also fail in a comparison between North America and Europe,
where ICES is formally entirely independent of the Commission and
where the legitimacy crisis in fisheries is particularly focussed on science
(Schwach et al. 2007). The bottom line seems to be that what is really im-
portant with respect to saliency is the ease of communication between pol-
icymakers and scientists and, with respect to legitimacy, the perceptions of
independence, rather than in either case the legal relationship between the
two groups.
4.1.6 DG MARE
DG MARE uses two main types of biological advice from ICES. These are
the annual advice on TACs and the more specific special requests de-
scribed above. Many of the special requests derive from derogation re-
quests, meaning requests by member states for the special application of
regulations, but many also derive from ideas about technical measures for
specific fisheries. DG MARE will also sometimes request ICES advice with
respect to strategic fisheries management directions.
Needs for advice are identified in DG MARE, usually from someone
charged with writing the regulations or with handling the annual negotia-
tions both among member states and between the EU and its fishing
neighbours. The annual advice is delineated in the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding between the DG MARE and ICES. Until recently, ICES pro-
duced advice in June and October on management of a range of different
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stocks. This timeline is now being moved up in a process called ‘front-
loading’ in order to accommodate more input from stakeholders.
When the advice arrives from ICES, DG MARE immediately asks
STECF for an opinion, and they create a study group of approximately ten
people and write a report commenting on the advice. A respondent at DG
MARE described this process as ‘quite extensive, they do a thorough job,
not a rubber stamp, but basically they do end up agreeing. They comment
on all issues relevant to DG MARE’. Simultaneously, DG MARE is already
beginning to draft measures because of time pressure. If STECF does re-
commend something different than what ICES did, they then make the
required modifications. The final proposal is sent to the Council of Minis-
ters. Once this proposal is made, the negotiations start.
The derogation requests can become quite extensive and are usually
dealt with by STECF. DG MARE is, in fact, required to respond to any
citizen, so of course any communication from a member state ministry
asking for a derogation must be responded to. A Commission respondent
said that at any such request, ‘the machinery starts and a group in STECF
is formed’. However, this is not quite as ad hoc as it sounds. The requests
from each member state are bundled, and most come in the beginning of
the year right after the Council of Ministers has made its final decisions.
When this system was set up in 2002, the member states sent many re-
quests that got no response from STECF beyond ‘we don’t have the data
needed to evaluate this’. Without an analysis a derogation will not be
granted, so more and more often the member states now provide some
sort of backing for the request including a scientific rationale, which gives
STECF something to review. The final decision is made by the Council of
Ministers, and the decision about what will be sent on to them remains
with the full-time DG MARE staff.
The final political decision-making process for the CFP sits in this rela-
tionship between the Council of Ministers and DG MARE. The Council of
Ministers reflects the desires of the member states, while DG MARE re-
presents the European perspective. The Council makes its decisions by
‘majority vote’, meaning majority in the EU’s weighting system in which
larger countries have more votes. The Council has the final decision, but
DG MARE is not at all powerless because only DG MARE has the power to
propose. The Council can only approve their proposal. So when DG MARE
makes a proposal to the Council, its role has not ended. Once the proposal
is made, a negotiation starts in the form of ‘if you propose this, we will
agree to it’.
With uncertain advice, everything becomes even more negotiable, and
this creates a dilemma. The scientists at DG MARE say that they struggle
with the extent to which they should try to foresee the reaction of the
Council and be more precautionary. In the end, a respondent said, they
usually try to give the advice based on what is seen as the most appropriate
reaction to the kind of uncertainty involved. The Council generally does
not consider itself bound by the precautionary approach in the sense that
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having less information means less fishing. One attempt by DG MARE to
introduce this directly was rejected (a rule that when data were poor, the
TAC would be reduced by 25%). The proposal did, however, convince cer-
tain fisheries where there had been some obstruction in data-gathering to
start being more forthcoming. A more common reaction of the Council to
uncertainty is to just carry over the existing TAC from the year before.
Once the negotiation process starts, the role of scientific advice is for-
mally ended. While DG MARE is required to consider the best available
science when making its proposal, the Council is not required to do so.
The same is true of the impact assessments that are required for Commis-
sion proposals but not for Council decisions. As a Commission respon-
dent phrased it:
Q 4.10 The requirement is that the proposals from DG MARE must be
based on this [best available science], but it is interesting that when the
Council decides something else without having any scientific opinion on
the impacts, that is not considered an issue. That is a little bit of a paradox
... the initial Commission proposal must be backed by science and all this,
but it is true that DG MARE is responsible because it says we are not going
to do this, and DG MARE agrees to a compromise, then the Council takes
it. This compromise does not have to be validated according to any princi-
ple of governance, impact assessment, scientific justification or stakeholder
consultations. The principles apply only to the first proposal.
Another possibility would be that the Council has the power to simply
allow DG MARE to manage a species as they see fit. DG MARE is trying
to move in this direction, as no one is satisfied with the current system in
which, at the end of the day, the cabinet ministers of world powers are
sitting in a room haggling over numbers of monk fish. They hope to move
towards a system where the Council focuses on principles, not on tonnes
of fish. The main strategy for this is developing long-term management
strategies based on harvest control rules.
4.1.7 Priorities for reform
From the point of view of the managers in DG MARE, there is currently a
gap between the form of advice that the scientific system is geared to deli-
ver and the form of advice that is increasingly needed. Under the current
reform process launched in 2002, the Council of Ministers identified a
number of priorities with direct implications for how scientific advice
should be provided. The major priority was moving from short-term year-
by-year management to a long-term framework based on harvest control
rules (HCRs). HCRs are rules for imposing catch and effort limits that are
developed before the need for them arises, and so they are, in principle,
able to avoid arguments over the immediate imposition of limits on fish-
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ing. This is the critical reform needed to move the system away from the
bottleneck around the decisions in the Council of Ministers. Another im-
portant driver is the desire of the fishing industry for a stable business
based on predictable catches. Accompanying this shift to long-term man-
agement is a movement towards management based on fleets and fish-
eries rather than fish stocks, because these are the units that are actually
regulated. DG MARE needs scientific advice that they can apply to the
management of fisheries, i.e. fisheries-based, multi-species advice. These
changes have important implications for how scientific advice is to be for-
mulated and communicated.
Table 4.4 Prioritisation of problems with respect to the process of
producing scientific advice for management
Last expert group attended
Problem
No expert
group
Non-as-
sessment
expert
group
Assess-
ment
expert
group
Total
Mean P
Difficulties with producing mixed-
fisheries advice
3.9 3.91 4 3.94 0.77
Difficulties with producing fishery-
based advice
2.8 3.18 3.33 3.11 0
Difficulties tailoring advice to har-
vest rules
2.66 2.6 2.26 2.51 0.1
Inconsistencies between different
stocks in how advice is determined
2.85 2.54 2.82 2.72 0.11
The length of time between data
gathering and the generation of
advice based on that data
2.79 2.77 2.59 2.72 0.58
Respondents were asked to prioritise these problems with respect to one another, resulting in scores
from 1 (lowest priority) to 5 (highest priority). N = 341. Excluded: 20 who did indicate participating in
an expert group but did not make clear which kind of group and therefore did not fit in any of the
three categories; six who failed to answer whether they had been in an expert group or not; 69 who
chose not to answer the question; and 29 who failed to rank according to instructions.
Table 4.4 indicates the priorities that the fisheries scientists give these var-
ious reform items. The only point of significant disagreement is that advi-
sory scientists give a higher priority to fisheries-based advice than their
colleagues do. It is striking, however, that the scientists are very much in
agreement that the time lag between data-gathering and basing advice on
that data has a very low priority. This is likely the problem that fishers
would cite before the rest. The other low priority, the question of inconsis-
tencies between stocks with respect to advice, is something that is very
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much of concern to clients and the leaders of the ICES Advisory Pro-
gramme. This issue is discussed extensively in Section 7.3.1.
Another priority for reform among some, but not all, clients is formal
transparency. Transparency is called for directly in ICES’s MoU with DG
MARE, and it was a topic that got some attention in the recent restructur-
ing debate as discussed in Chapter 7. ICES is opening up meetings to ob-
servers much more than in the past. In 2004 they began to invite repre-
sentatives from both industry and conservation NGOs to sit in on the
meetings of ACFM. This was in response to the desire of both DG MARE
and the stakeholder groups who have been working in various ways for
such access.
I did short interviews with all of the observers who attended the October
2004 and the June 2005 meetings and solicited email reflections from the
ACFM membership about their reactions to being observed. Of the 12
scientists who offered such input, seven wrote that they rarely or never
found themselves aware of the observers’ presence during the meeting;
four reported that they were aware some of the time; one reported that he
was aware of them most of the time. This last scientist was playing a facil-
itation role in the meeting that required such awareness. Nine of the 12
scientists said that they did not believe the presence of observers had any
influence on their statements or behaviour. One scientist said that he be-
lieved that it made him more circumspect in the way he discussed the
issue of misreporting and that he may have ‘pulled his punches’ a little in
these statements. Another scientist said that he believed that the observers
influenced behaviour in a ‘not necessarily negative’ way in that they pro-
vided an incentive to behave more ‘properly’. This was in reference to the
fact that scientists commonly read email or news on their computers when
the meeting is discussing stocks that do not interest them. The observers
made them a bit more self-conscious about this. A third scientist said that
he was aware of trying to articulate things in a less technical fashion, but
suggested that this might also have positive aspects.
The observer programme, however, hardly introduced concerns about
outside inspection. In working sessions scientists are very conscious that
their work will undergo scrutiny, and there is an increased appreciation
that this examination will go beyond the ACFM and even beyond the client
groups such as DG MARE. This awareness is reinforced by these clients,
as in the following short exchange:
Q 4.11 Scientist One: [representing a client] Don’t write anything, leave it,
too complicated, just say they have been updated ... Scientist Two: a couple
of well crafted sentences about changing age ranges and rescaling the refer-
ence points to make it clear what we have done in the introductory pages,
otherwise I agree with Scientist One. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Com-
mittee for Fisheries Management meeting, October 2003)
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One impact of this expectation of scrutiny is that the ability to clearly ex-
plain becomes a criterion for the validity of results. This is evident in Q 6.1
where the scientists agree that if they cannot explain the model under dis-
cussion, they should not put it forward. What this actually means is a bit
controversial as can be seen from the quote from Scientist Three. On the
one hand, he recognises that laypeople are going to read the report, but at
the same time he feels that they should be writing their report for other
experts, i.e. ACFM, and not be constrained to write with laypeople, even
managers, in mind. Nevertheless, towards the end of the meeting as the
report is being finalised, the following exchange took place that showed
considerable awareness of the possibility of a politically oriented lay audi-
ence.
Q 4.12 Scientist One likes the run number to come after the description of
what it is doing, and Scientist Two agrees. They say this is easier to under-
stand because you start your thinking with the run description. Scientist
Three does not want on line 16, page 5 to have someone with a 40% cut
described as suffering little, suffering less would be better. Scientist Two: I
have difficulty interpreting the conclusion because of not understanding q.
Scientist Three agrees. Scientist Two: If you speak to a manager how would
you explain q and p? Scientist Four: I have some text on that. Scientist Two:
Lift it in. (Observer’s notes at the Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal
Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak meeting, September 2003)
Transparency depends on the ability of fisheries stakeholders, including
scientists, to be able to explain how they know what they say they know. A
number of forces are pushing this requirement deeper into the workings
of the scientific deliberations than it was before. These demands to in-
crease transparency, while often enjoying very strong support, begin to
quickly run into the paradoxes of transparency as soon as they begin to be
systematically applied.
4.2 Numbers, words and people: Uncertainty and the science
boundary
The limits of the advice assembly system are most clearly revealed when it
encounters the scientific uncertainty that is such an important factor in
marine science and the management based on it. The quota allocation
problem that characterises the European fisheries management system re-
quires an answer to one main question: ‘How much fish can we take this
year and still have enough left over for long-term exploitation?’ The most
useful answers to this question are generated by quantitative forecasts of
the future state of fish stocks under various conditions, most importantly
levels of exploitation. These forecasts are based in turn on stock assess-
ments that characterise the present state of the stock based mainly on data
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gathered by survey vessels. Fisheries-dependent data gathered in fish land-
ing ports is also used, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the spe-
cies, to increase the accuracy of the assessments. Previous assessments
also play an important role in current assessments. The length of the time
series of data available, the number of fish that die as a result of fishing as
opposed to other factors, the accuracy of estimates of fish ages and how
much they weigh when they are at particular ages, and the relationship
between the number of fish in a stock in one year and the number of fish
that will be ‘recruited’ to that stock in the next year are all important for
most stock assessments. These factors are all more or less uncertain, again
depending on the species. Uncertainty in these factors, as well as in others
that may be important, has a powerful influence on scientists’ confidence
in their forecasts of future numbers of fish. It is difficult for scientists to
finesse this uncertainty verbally. Splitting hairs is a constant temptation,
but the reality of the need for the numbers means that fine distinctions
have little meaning for the overall system:
Q 4.13 Scientist One: We don’t reject the assessment, but we reject it as a
basis for a forecast. Scientist Two: Different words, same meanings. (Obser-
ver’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, Octo-
ber 2003)
To be salient, the advice needs to provide a clear basis for deciding how
many fish can be caught. To be legitimate, it must pass through the ICES
process, but in the end it cannot be open to various interpretations by the
different stakeholders. To be credible, it must account for the underlying
uncertainty. These demands arise in very practical ways within the political
milieu surrounding the implementation of the advice. One illustrative ex-
change was related to us by an ICES official about discussions with DG
MARE on how the advice should be communicated. DG MARE wanted
ICES to account for uncertainty when providing its advice, but not in a
way that made it unclear what the advice actually consisted of. ICES agreed
that the advice should be clear and said that they would continue to work
on the problem ‘along with DG MARE observers at the ACFM meetings’.
For ICES the particular problem in deciding how to articulate official
scientific advice is something that the scientists and the managers need to
work out together. DG MARE sometimes sees the problem as that of ICES
presenting results in a way that understates the uncertainty and allows the
fishing industry to seize on a particular result that they like and ignore the
uncertainties underlying the result. This is, of course, a common accusa-
tion that the fishing industry makes of the managers as well. At other
times, of course, the parties would like their preferred choice to be pre-
sented with less emphasis on uncertainties.
One example emerged around the 2002 North Sea cod assessment. The
assessment had indicated an increasing biomass and decreasing fishing
mortality over the two most recent years. This had been taken by the in-
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dustry as evidence that the regulatory measures were working and that
stronger measures, which both DG MARE and ICES thought necessary,
were in fact not necessary. DG MARE believed that the uncertainty under-
lying these results had not been effectively communicated. They wanted
the advice to be placed in the form of HCRs with expression of uncertain-
ties around the assessment numbers. They did not specify what these ex-
pressions of uncertainties should consist of, and our respondent felt that
this decision was, somewhat unfairly, being left up to ICES. The scientists
did not have an agreed method for calculating the precision of assess-
ments. Even more important, the real uncertainties for the scientists arose
from the fact that the population dynamics of the stock at such historically
low levels were not understood. There is good reason to think that meth-
ods that work fine in assessing and making forecasts about healthy stocks
are much less reliable when stocks become very small. They also noted
that the recent assessments had been overly optimistic about the rebuild-
ing of the cod stock, which they attributed to data problems arising from
discarding or from the swift changes in fishing patterns that are common
in mixed fisheries governed by a number of separate quotas. This is a com-
plex mix of sources of uncertainty that required judgement calls in place of
fully transparent scientific methods, and therefore required a degree of
trust in the scientists’ ability to make these calls in a balanced, well-in-
formed fashion.
The underlying issue in this disagreement between the scientists and
the managers is the complementary and contrasting roles of quantitative
tabular data as opposed to qualitative textual information in the scientific
advice for fisheries. On the one hand, we have the one main question
mentioned above, ‘How much fish can we take this year and still have en-
ough left over for long-term exploitation?’ DGMARE, at the end of the day,
wants scientific advice that will allow them to choose a number that they
can justify. On the other hand, as the concerns in the last paragraph reflect,
the credibility of results requires that uncertainties be explained with
phrases such as ‘stock dynamics at low levels are not understood’, ‘data
problems from discards’ or ‘changing fishing patterns’. Whatever DG
MARE means by ‘expression of uncertainties around the assessment num-
bers’, and they likely do not have a clear, operational idea themselves, it is
closer to a quantity such as a confidence interval than it is to a long digres-
sion about the real sources of uncertainty that ICES is facing.
What is being wrestled with here is the line between what Funtowicz
and Ravetz (1990) would call the spread and assessment of the number
and its pedigree. The fisheries professionals are comfortable thinking
about spread, somewhat comfortable thinking about assessment, but they
do not have the language to talk about pedigree. Dealing with uncertainty
requires the development of trust because the procedures of transparency
cannot be brought to bear. This means an alternative social process involv-
ing the development of trust in judgements based on both trust in the
judgement of others and a degree of participation, and hence ownership,
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in the judgement itself. These are the requirements of an effective ‘ex-
tended peer review’. This also implies that institutional forms are needed
that are able to limit the size of the group where these trust-based mechan-
isms for addressing uncertainty have to take place – i.e. nested systems
and the separation of different levels and types of transparency mechan-
isms. This is a central question in the case to which I return in the final
chapter.
The following exchange took place at the ACFM meeting after the dis-
cussion related above between DG MARE and ICES. It is a long excerpt,
but very illustrative of the problems that they are facing and of how both
quantitative advice and its qualitative context come together in trying to
formulate the advice that is really relevant for how they see the actual con-
dition of the fisheries. The discussion is about how to formulate the advice
for North Sea cod in a mixed-fisheries context. The text under discussion
says that the cod catch should be ‘as close to 0 as possible’, recognising
that there will be discards of cod from fishing boats targeting other spe-
cies.
Q 4.14 Scientist One: Last year we gave strong advice because the stock was
in desperate and dire state, and we wanted to prevent its commercial extinc-
tion, this kind of wording takes us back to wording that got us criticism in
the past. ‘Close to 0 as possible’ what is that? Now we give unequivocal
advice, and we get attacked. I don’t want to be unhelpful to managers but ...
I am unhappy with this kind of phrasing. We had a long discussion from
last year and Scientist Two’s text is a reaction to manager feedback, but my
view is that the state of the stock has not changed. Do we just bend? We
need to be helpful, but do we bend to every wind? Scientist Two: No and
this should not be seen as a retraction from last year or the seriousness of
the situation, I agree to anything that says it is as bad as it was, but in mixed
fisheries, if we say the catch should be zero, then we are saying ‘Close all
demersal fisheries’. There is no way of getting around saying that mixed
fisheries should prioritise clean [i.e. little bycatch of species of concern]
fisheries, but there will not be 0 catches, unless you want to say close all
demersal fisheries. Scientist Three: Yeah, how much do we read into chang-
ing ‘reduced catch of cod’ to ‘no catch of cod’. What do we want to advise?
Scientist One: If we are really serious then we say this is the advice and the
caveat comes with it, if there are other reasons they decide to go ahead, fine,
but we should make sure they recognise what they are doing. Scientist Two:
We could have an opening statement saying the catch should be zero and
all fisheries closed, then continue with this text. Scientist Four: I agree to a
large extent, but it should be made conditional on the implementation of
the recovery plan that would take account of the mixed fisheries. (Observer’s
notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, October
2003)
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Not only must the advice for cod within the mixed-fisheries context be
communicated using text,10 how the advice will be phrased is directly af-
fected by both the ongoing discussions with the managers and their spec-
ulations about how the advice will be taken up and used. Scientist Four’s
contribution is perhaps the most interesting as it indicates a desire to
make the advice conditional on a specific set of management measures. In
this particular comment, such reflexivity is perhaps especially ironic be-
cause this scientist is referring to taking ‘account of the mixed fisheries’
when DG MARE is asking for tools to do just that. Tools that, in a few
days, the ACFM is going to decline to provide because of discomfort with
the units of analysis required and the levels of uncertainty attached to
them (Section 6.1). While this is a particularly dramatic example, com-
ments indicating that scientists need feedback from managers are very
common at both the ACFM (now ACOM) and assessment expert group
levels. The following exchange addresses this question even more directly,
also in terms of how to handle mixed-fishery advice and this time in the
context of how to apply the precautionary approach to which ICES is pub-
lically committed. It took place at the committee in charge of the Advisory
Programme:
Q 4.15 Scientist One: This is how ACFM must deal with this; when they
give multispecies advice, it must be consistent with the precautionary ap-
proach. I thought the interpretation is that below Blim they had to go to 0
catch ... Scientist Two: No, they have to have a recovery plan. Scientist One:
But as long as there is no recovery plan in place, they have to advise 0 catch.
The recovery plan is not in force now. Scientist Three: It is not ACFM that
has to recommend a certain recovery plan. Scientist One: No they have to
recommend the catch level and that must in some way be consistent with
the precautionary approach. Scientist Four: No. Scientist One: I’m sur-
prised you don’t think so. Scientist Three: We can ask Scientist Five about
that. Scientist Four: You are right in that the reference points are from
ACFM, they take the precautionary approach into account, but they don’t
check against it afterwards. Scientist One: We should check how close we
are to these goals. (Observer‘s notes at the Management Committee for the Ad-
visory Programme meeting, September 2004)
It is in these kinds of comments that we can see how the line between the
science and management has become truly reflexive. MCAP actually wants
to follow up and see how the advice is actually being used in terms of
ICES’s precautionary goals, presumably to inform how future advice will
be set. A lack of follow-up on what happens to ICES’s advice is a systemic
problem, as discussed in Chapter 7.
At one point in this October 2003 ACFM meeting, a document was pre-
sented suggesting guidelines on the use of language in the report text. The
word sustainable and its relationship to the fisheries management targets,
for example, were discussed at length. There was some fear that they
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should not be tied too closely as ICES may be changing the way it defines
these reference points. Another concern was that after they had gone
through all this trouble to define what they mean, readers may not even
bother to turn to these definitions. It was suggested, albeit factiously, that
instead of using a word like ‘sustainable’ in the text that a code such as
‘Concept One’ be inserted instead so that people would be required to look
up exactly what they meant.
It is not just the ACFM that takes the text of the advice very seriously in
terms of seeking to limit how the advice will be used. This is also true of
scientists in the expert groups that feed into the ACFM. Consider the fol-
lowing exchange:
Q 4.16 Scientist One: Yes, you are adding another rinkydink. We should
stop pretending we know how many fish there are. Scientist Two: That is
where we are going. The trend is there, but the scale is wrong. Scientist
One: The system will use it at the Council of Ministers. Scientist Two: That
is why I want all these caveats. (Observer’s notes at the Working Group on the
Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak meeting, Septem-
ber 2003)
The text here is the mechanism that allows the scientists to continue to see
themselves as doing science while having to articulate results in the midst
of great uncertainty. The scientific norm of organised scepticism (Merton
1968b) retains a good deal of force. Scientists want to be either sure or
silent, with the text they can at least show where they are sure about what
they do not know.
Not all scientists are comfortable with this use of text, and this depends
on the kinds of advice being developed. Consider the following point made
by a scientist at a meeting in reference to the development of advice for
EAFM.
Q 4.17 If you give loose, non-quantitative advice to managers, then that is
what they want because it gives them permission to do what they want, so
you shouldn’t do it because they get used to a casually written narrative
essay. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September
2004)
Text is important to others as well. One of our respondents, who is a nego-
tiator for the fishing industry and who was one of the observers at the
ACFM, put it this way:
Q 4.18 Respondent: [In] the consultations between Norway and the EU for
example where they use the ACFM advice, from that I know how much
they look into the wording of the advice, so it was quite interesting to see
how it was done. Interviewer: The wording? Do you mean the text? Respon-
dent: Yes, the text exactly. They look into the text and say why they use this
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word, why do they use ‘may’ instead of ‘must’ and is there a hidden mean-
ing in this, they really look into it during consultations, and it was interest-
ing to see how aware they are of the importance of how they put the words,
how they make the text.
So while the primary interest of DG MARE may be the numbers found in
tables, when these numbers are thrown into a political process, the text
sometimes does have an important impact on how the numbers will be
used – at least according to one person who is both deeply involved and
financially interested in the outcomes. The textual aspects of the advice
confront the limits of its role as a scientific recommendation. This is nicely
illustrated by the desire of the scientist in Q 4.4 to make the interpretation
of the advice contingent on a particular management approach. In the tra-
ditional view of science and policy, science is supposed to be the objective
other that provides the parties involved in the policy negotiations with an
agreed basis for discussion. Yet here it is seen to be very difficult to pro-
duce the science without being already involved, at least to some degree, in
that discussion. This provides an illustrative grounding for Jasanoff’s
(2002) argument that to ‘politicise’ science by making it available for pub-
lic scrutiny and input can promote the interests of both science and de-
mocracy.
Struggles over the science boundary apply as much to people as they do
to results. When someone has been stamped a ‘scientist’, the power to
designate a fact is to be used at the behest of the bureaucracy, not the indi-
vidual scientist. The designation is based on employment rather than on
education. In the mainstream view of the role of science in fisheries policy,
introduced in Chapter 3, the role of scientists is something you are hired to
do rather than something you are trained to be, though obviously the train-
ing is a prerequisite to the hiring. Indeed, one scientist told us that not all
members of expert groups have university degrees. One that we talked
with had been hired as a technician and received a degree in statistics after
he was already a regular participant in the assessment group. Biologists
working for the industry are lobbyists and negotiators, even if scientists
find them easier to work with than they do fishers. Administrative bureau-
cracies often seek to define scientists (and themselves) as non-stakehol-
ders. They resist seeing scientists as stakeholders because if they are stake-
holders, then they bring their own values and interests to the debate, and
not merely facts to be used at the discretion of others. Again in the words
of DG MARE (Q 3.7, CEC 2003a, p. 15), if the scientists want ‘credibility
and influence’, they must keep their ‘distance’. From the scientists’ per-
spective, the distance may make the promise of influence look somewhat
empty when, as in Q 4.4, they are trying to guess the managers’ intentions.
The scientist who had his ‘wrist slapped’ in Chapter 3 reflects this way
on the science boundary:
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Q 4.19 Interviewer: But how do you make that distinction when sort of, the
boundary between what is science and when it turns into management? It’s
not always that clear cut. Respondent: It’s not always clear and … yeah, one
can end up in a deep hole [laughs]. I’m always aware of it, but it isn’t always
successfully avoided. But that’s also quite an exciting part of the job as well,
I think. Interviewer: You like it? Respondent: Yes, I like, I like the confron-
tational aspects of – of science, industry, officials, and the tension that’s
associated with that. I find that quite interesting. In fact, it’s the only inter-
esting part of the job at the moment. There’s no science left. That’s my
impression. Not in the role I have.
As we will see in Chapter 5 the feelings and experiences that the respon-
dent is pointing to with his exaggerated phrase ‘there’s no science left’ is
both widespread among fisheries scientists and more problematic for
many of them than this quote would indicate.
Here is another example of a Commission scientist describing the need
for a feedback process in the face of the fact that a simple ‘the advice is X’
ignores the interdependence between advice, management measures, and
fishing activities. The topic under discussion is how to develop a manage-
ment strategy approach to management:
Q 4.20 Commission Scientist: As a manager I can illustrate some points
here. Baltic cod is illustrative; it is a single-species fishery. The BSFC [Baltic
Sea Fisheries Commission] developed a management plan to maintain the
two stocks above the Bpa, they set a harvest control rule, and an increase in
biomass of 30% per year. The advice came out that this was OK, but the
unreported landings were too high to make it real. At the same time we got
new advice that because of this uncertainty, they refused to give us short-
term assessment. So the advice is ‘no fishing’. These are the two problems.
We don’t get the science to implement it, so the plan on paper does not
work. It is very clear that in addition to the SSB objective, we have to ad-
dress the problem of scientific input and the availability of knowledge, a
feedback process. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries
Management meeting, September 2004)
In the following quote, from the same Commission Scientist in response
to the October 2003 ACFM decision about multi-fishery advice, the last
sentence borders on lamentation.
Q 4.21 What we have now is in some ways weak advice. We say you do this,
you do that. There is no data besides one table offered about interactions. It
leaves managers to decide how they can define fisheries and take bycatch
considerations. We have the same situation as last year. We are on our own
in Brussels. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Manage-
ment meeting, October 2003)
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No one involved in the production of scientific advice in support of fish-
eries management would suggest that the drawing of the science boundary
is not problematic. DG MARE sees the problem in the context of the main-
stream view of the role of science in policy (Q 3.7), and this leads them to
cast the problem in terms of the clarity of statements of management ob-
jectives. ‘Unclear statement of objectives’ is a phrase very often heard in
critiques of policy by natural scientists. DG MARE describes the problem
in detail as follows:
Q 4.22 One of the difficulties with much current scientific advice is that the
division of labour between the scientist and the manager is sometimes con-
fused. Some scientific advice may be based on assumptions about policy
objectives that are the responsibility of the manager, with the result that the
advice becomes open to question because of its policy assumptions. It is
therefore important that requests for scientific advice be formulated in a
way that leaves no doubt as to what assumptions the scientists are being
asked to make. At least two approaches are possible. The first is for the
management authority to state clearly what its management objectives are
and to ‘impose’ those constraints on the scientists. This approach might be
followed by the Community in the case of agreement on multi annual man-
agement plans, where targets in terms as, for example, biomass, fishing
mortality rate, yields or catch stability could be fixed. The second is for the
management authority to request advice on different management options
before deciding on which one to choose. In this case, those giving advice
would be required to identify the assumptions underlying such options and
to indicate the alternative strategies to be followed. Greater clarity concern-
ing the assumptions about policy objectives will be needed (CEC 2003a, p.
13).
They want to make the process tighter and the goals clearer. The science
process itself remains a linear one with requests for sets of facts being
responded to with the provision of facts. This makes an interesting con-
trast with the scientists from both ICES (Q 4.6, Q 4.8, Q 6.1, Q 6.4) and
DG MARE (Q 6.4) calling for greater reflexivity, conditional advice and on-
going interactions across the science boundary. The second choice they
mention, however, is very close to the idea of scenario-based participatory
modelling that is an important emerging model for new kinds of scientific
practice.
Much like the mainstream view of the role of science, in the face of
these actual experiences, the notion of clear statements of management
objectives contains utopian elements. Management objectives are set by
political negotiations in the face of changing environmental conditions.
Science is done in a highly variable climate of uncertainty from both phy-
sical and social sources. Hence, in fisheries, objectives that are clearly sta-
ted are almost always very abstract and become unclear as soon as they
begin to be operationalised. While it is important to keep trying to make
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them as long-term as possible (e.g. greater use of HCRs), they will never
stay clear for very long, and their clarity cannot be relied upon as the basis
of a smoothly running linear advice system.
4.3 Conclusion
Within the advisory system of the CFP, there is a marked desire for in-
creased centralised control that is having some real impact. This can be
seen in the desire for an in-house advisory system, the increased reliance
on STECF, and the ongoing tightening of the European data-gathering and
fisheries-monitoring systems. These changes are in response to very real
needs if the CFP is going to become a more effective fisheries manage-
ment system. However, the many costs involved, both financial costs and
costs in legitimacy and democratic governance, simply reflect the fact that
the CFP is an attempt to manage fisheries on a continental scale. To some
extent this reflects the biological requirements of managing shared stocks,
but this has been intensified for reasons of European politics.
For very good reasons rooted in the complexity of the required informa-
tion and knowledge, the global trend in natural resource management in
the past 30 years has been towards making decisions at the lowest possible
level. This begins with trying to leave as much discretion in the hands of
individual fishers as is feasible and then moving upwards. The creation of
the RACs reflects this in Europe, but the way this creation was such a baby-
step in the direction of the cooperative management systems used in the
rest of the developed world is another reflection of how slow Europe has
been in modernising its fisheries management. The tendencies towards
increased centralisation, while necessary to make the CFP work, move in
the opposite direction. Larger-scale systems have to rely much more on
mechanisms that shortcut communications. They squeeze out the com-
municative rationality that makes systems sensitive to the need for change.
This squeezing out of communicative rationality takes various forms in
this case study, but most of the important ones have to do with giving
space for reflection and review of where the science boundary needs to be
set. When observing ICES, I rarely heard the ‘engineering versus science’
comparison that I encountered in DG MARE (Q 4.7). In ICES science ver-
sus advice is the much more common distinction. This indicates a large
jump in understanding of both science and advice between the two institu-
tions. The engineering rhetoric is a way to side step the question of scien-
tific legitimacy from peer review. Engineering does not require peer re-
view; it demonstrates its credibility when the engineered product works.
DG MARE is looking at this in a very similar way, but ‘works’ does not
mean here, at least not in the first instance, ‘accurately characterised the
state of a fish stock’. The history of the CFP indicates that ‘works’ has not
meant maintaining stocks of fish. ‘Works’ means sufficient to allow the
regulatory process to move forward. This is a very short-term perspective.
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It is not driven by the desires that individual scientists at DG MARE have
for the way the system should work, it is driven by the pressures they are
under to keep the TAC Machine running. For the Advisory Programme to
operate as an effective boundary organisation, even in the relatively simple
problem of single-species fisheries management, it must make time and
space for reflection under strong pressure from the broader system for
clear and quick results. As will be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, this is an
important point where the question of social power forces its way back into
what is on the whole a functionalist analysis of what is needed for an
EAFM.
As we will see in later chapters, the debate within ICES between science
and advice is very much a parallel of this discussion; advice there is what
allows the science to work for the client. Both groups are looking for Gus-
ton’s (2001b) serviceable truths. What counts as serviceable within the
management bureaucracy seems to be much less dependent on the proce-
dures of scientific legitimacy. From DG MARE’s point of view, however,
this is not because they do not care how credible the number is, it is be-
cause the system that produced the advice is so large and expensive that
they have no realistic way of assembling a better one.
Scientific boundary work is more than simply determining what sort of
facts and results will be stamped ‘science’ and which will not. Also in-
cluded are questions about who will play the role of science, what data the
scientists will have available to them, how they will present their work; and
even the ways that they will behave as they play their scientific roles are in
dispute. The boundary is very vulnerable to pressures, and the scientists
doing the boundary work find themselves badly squeezed. This becomes
acute when uncertainty rises high because then issues of transparency of
argument and methodology become entangled in issues of trust and parti-
cipation. The next chapter gives a glimpse of just how squeezed these
scientists feel.
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5. Attitudes and working conditions of
ICES advisory scientists
With the co-authorship of Troels Jacob Hegland
The focus of this chapter is the experience and attitudes of individual
scientists within the fisheries advisory system. Most of the information is
taken from the survey of fisheries scientists, but we have added a number
of quotes from meetings and in-depth interviews where this helps give a
fuller picture. One important task is to compare the experience of fisheries
scientists who are more involved in the advice generation system with that
of their colleagues who are less involved.
Most of the tables draw comparisons between scientists who work for
different kinds of employers or based on the type of the last expert group
they participated in, which we consider the best single measure in the sur-
vey of participation in the advisory system. We consider this measure to be
a good one, but far from perfect, as explained in Appendix 1, where the
details of the survey methodology are outlined. Basic information about
expert group participation is given in Table 5.1. The types of attitude scales
used here are the most useful for the two tasks of comparing differences in
attitude among groups and looking for correlations among the attitudes
themselves. It is also reasonable to make rough statements about where
on a scale a group of respondents scores, e.g. ‘well above the neutral point’
or ‘around the neutral point’, but these scales are not meant to invent and
then measure precise differences among peoples’ attitudes.
This chapter has three parts. The first focuses on the impact of the advi-
sory system on scientists’ careers and working conditions. The second
focuses on scientist’s attitudes towards the precautionary approach that
frame much of how fisheries scientists see the meaning of their advisory
task. The third section focuses on scientists’ attitudes towards the advisory
task itself.
5.1 Advice provision, career and working conditions
5.1.1 Expert group participation
The simplest way to get at working conditions through a survey question is
to ask: ‘Please rate your overall job satisfaction.’ The results related to place
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of employment are reported in Table 5.2. NFI scientists have a lower over-
all job satisfaction than all other employment categories. The scientists
employed in academic institutions place themselves close to the mean,
and scientists employed in NGOs have the highest job satisfaction. One of
the main differences between NFI scientists and scientists in the other
employment categories is the former’s greater involvement in assessment
expert groups, as shown in Table 5.1.
Those whose last expert group was an assessment expert group rate
their overall job satisfaction lower than other scientists (Table 5.3). Do
these numbers reflect the expert group itself or simply being employed
somewhere where more people are sent to assessment expert groups? To
answer this question, we analysed job satisfaction for each employment
category in relation to expert group participation. The results for NFI
scientists are reported in Table 5.4. The table shows that lower overall job
satisfaction is most closely related to the last expert group being an assess-
ment expert group. Scientists who participate in assessment expert groups
rate their job satisfaction lower than other scientists from their own em-
ployment category.
Table 5.1 Composition of survey sample – employer and expert
group attendance
NFIs Acade-
mia
NGO EU Other
private
Other
gov.
Total
Not attended expert
group meeting
Row
percentages
27 39 6 8 15 5 100
Column
percentages
18 54 100 34 40 47 34
Last attended expert
group meeting not
directly dealing with
assessment
Row
percentages
53 25 0 6 11 5 100
Column
percentages
40 39 0 31 33 53 38
Last attended assess-
ment expert group
meeting
Row
percentages
73 6 0 9 12 0 100
Column
percentages
42 7 0 34 27 0 29
Total 50 24 2 8 12 4 N = 418
100 100 100 100 100
Percentages are rounded and do not always add up to 100. Excluded: 20 who did indicate partici-
pating in an expert group but did not make clear which kind of group and therefore did not fit in
any of the three categories; six who failed to answer whether they had been in an expert group or
not; and 21 who did not identify their employer.
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‘I moved away from assessment and advisory groups six years ago; feeling
better,’ one scientist said in an interview. Another scientist explained why
he rated his job satisfaction so low:
Q 5.1 I am currently over-committed to projects in my laboratory. ICES is
putting increasing demands on me to work on ad hoc fast-track advice and
review groups. The quality of assessment data is deteriorating and there is
still an expectation at WGs to come up with good scientifically based assess-
ments, which cannot be done!
NFI scientists who last participated in non-assessment expert groups actu-
ally rate their overall job satisfaction somewhat higher than those who
have not participated in expert group meetings at all in the last five years.
While some non-assessment expert groups have had some advisory func-
tions in response to requests from ICES clients about marine manage-
ment issues outside of fisheries, the majority place greater emphasis on
research questions of direct scientific interest to participants. They are at-
tractive opportunities in many ways for the scientists, almost like long and
well-focussed conferences. This distinction between the Advisory Pro-
gramme and the Science Programme within ICES is a very important one.
With the rise of EAFM discussed in Chapter 6, more involvement of non-
stock assessment groups in advice production is needed, and this means
some cultural changes are required.
Because these non-assessment group meetings are more attractive than
the assessment groups, there is a tendency for very senior scientists to
attend them rather than the assessment groups (Table 5.5). A third of the
attendees in the non-assessment expert group are very senior scientists.
Only a fifth of the attendees in assessment groups fall in this category. The
data also show that the most junior scientists are a bit more likely to be
assigned to attend the assessment expert groups.
The training of scientists for assessment work is an issue that ICES em-
phasises. Assessment work requires specific quantitative skills that are not
always sufficiently covered in the education of biologists. One of our inter-
viewees stated that ‘biology is seen as the thing to do if you want to do
science and can’t do maths’. The same scientist indicated that those math-
ematicians or biologists who are involved in assessment work often get
involved ‘by accident’ and then subsequently have to acquire the necessary
skills. ICES conducts various courses related to the training of assessment
scientists. Junior staff are also brought to expert groups specifically for
training, which then takes place through a master-apprentice type of rela-
tionship.
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5.1.2 Work pressure
Work pressure related to assessment expert groups is high and increasing,
as Q 5.1 suggests. In interviews, other scientists complained about the
overall amount of work in connection with assessment expert groups. One
of the scientists told us that he had had to take two months off because of
stress. Another told us that the meetings of one expert group, where our
research project had an observer team, had become increasingly chaotic
and that it was impossible to stick to the planned and already long working
hours. This was emphasised by a scientist who approached our observer to
say that the previous day’s work had carried on to 4 a.m. This was the only
time a scientist at any meeting we were observing – and all the scientists at
these meetings knew why we were there – asked that something go into
our report.
The uncertainty involved in assessments seems to be a major factor in
not being able to stick to the planned working hours. One scientist linked
this to software problems.
Q 5.2 Interviewer: It seemed like uncertainty was a major driver in making
people stay up all night. Does that sound sensible to you? Yes, you are al-
ways thinking, what if I tweak this? The problem is that a lot of the software
we use is not user friendly, you can tweak quickly, but then you are cutting
and pasting for a couple of hours for figures.
This scientist never feels that the job is done. This is partly due to the time
constraints in an overstretched system. It also shows an entanglement be-
tween the uncertainty of the scientific tasks and the difficulties of man-
aging these tasks. The high uncertainty about nature also means high un-
certainty about when you have done enough in attempting to describe
nature.
One survey question read: ‘In the previous three years, how has the
pressure you experience on the job changed?’ To get a picture of actual
changes in the work pressure, rather than changes related to advancement,
we report only the results of respondents holding the same position as
three years earlier (Table 5.2 and Table 5.3). The correlation between job
satisfaction and experience of changes in pressure at the job is -0.23 (p =
0.01), suggesting that increasing pressure at work is moderately linked to
lower overall job satisfaction at a general level. However, pressure can in-
crease simply because the scientist gains more experience and thereby
seniority, even though he or she remains in the same position. In fact,
increased pressure is not necessarily experienced as negative. One respon-
dent indicated that his job pressure had increased substantially but com-
mented on it in this way:
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Q 5.3 Being a young scientist the greatest changes in my work activities
have been increases in responsibility, which we consider very valuable. The
diversity of activities (sampling, writing proposals, analysing, publishing,
giving presentations, coaching students, etc.) has also increased.
The survey data, however, do not show a relationship between assessment
expert group participation and increased job pressure over the past three
years (Table 5.3). The same is true if we look only at NFI scientists (Table
5.4). We know that the advisory process is making increasing demands,
but because of the increased external control pointed out by the Mode Two
theorists, all scientists are under more pressure from many different direc-
tions.
The fisheries scientists estimated that they travel on average 43 days per
year in connection with their work (Table 5.3). Those whose last expert
group was an assessment expert group travel the most (Table 5.3); on aver-
age, they estimated that they travel ten days per year more than others.
Those in assessment expert groups are also more dissatisfied with the
amount of travelling than others (Table 5.3). One scientist involved in as-
sessment work said in an interview:
Q 5.4 For the good of your health, you can’t carry on like that. [I have] spent
half my life away from the lab under difficult circumstances in the last
three years, often having to travel at less than 24 hours notice for three to
four days. This was constant.
Q 5.4 suggests that the problem is not the amount of travelling as much as
the circumstances of the travel. In addition to the short notice, some Brit-
ish scientists felt that the implementation of the EU Working Time Direc-
tive has removed an important incentive for travelling by cutting the
amount of overtime that can be saved up. This means that the travelling
scientist is not able to compensate his or her family or social life by taking
time off at another date to the same extent as before. Table 5.2 shows that
there are large differences in the amount of travel between scientists in the
different categories of employment. Scientists from academic institutions
travel least, with a mean of 35 days a year. Scientists in the ‘other private’
group travel the most, with a mean of 57 days a year. Unlike the case of
assessment scientists, however, this does not seem to translate into dissa-
tisfaction with travel in general (Table 5.2). It is also important to point out
that all of these differences in attitude towards travel revolve very closely
around the neutral position (4). The level of dissatisfaction with travel may
vary systematically between different groups of scientists, and we know
from interviews that there are strong feelings about travel among some
individuals, but the dissatisfaction is not very strong overall.
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5.1.3 Research and publications
Participation in assessment expert groups negatively influences the scien-
tists’ opportunities to publish in peer-reviewed publications. One question
was: ‘How much does your job encourage or hinder you from producing
the number of peer-reviewed publications you feel you would like to be
producing?’ The mean for all scientists is almost exactly the neutral four
(Table 5.3). However, for the group of scientists who last attended an expert
group that dealt with assessment, the mean is 3.25. Scientists who did not
attend an expert group meeting in the last five years constitute the other
extreme with a score of 4.54. The difference is even more pronounced if
we look at NFI scientists alone (Table 5.4). It is not simply publications as
such; publications represent the ability to remain focussed on valuable re-
search. One scientist currently chairing an assessment expert group sug-
gested in an interview that the amount of travelling involved in ICES and
EU work meant that he could seldom ‘sit and pursue a line of research’.
As many as one-quarter of the scientists indicated that they would abso-
lutely be willing to forego career advancement in order to spend more time
doing research. We say ‘absolutely’ because this figure is based only on
those who checked 7 on the scale of 1 to 7; if 6 is also included the figure
is over 50%. Ironically, in most institutions employing scientists, it is quite
normal to be promoted out of research to research administration or other
administrative duties. The two first questions reported in Table 5.6 relate
to how important it is to the respondent to do research rather than other
tasks. NFI scientists and scientists employed in academic institutions
score relatively high on their desire to do research. Several scientists added
as a comment to the question that they have already passed over an ad-
vancement possibility because of the administrative duties involved. NGO
scientists score lower on these questions, which is not surprising as these
positions usually have no research component.
In all employment categories, advancement is perceived as leading to
fewer chances to do research. However, NFI scientists are more pessimis-
tic than scientists from academic institutions and NGO scientists. This
corresponds to the over-representation of NFI scientists among those men-
tioning administration in the open-ended question on changes (Table 5.7).
The most interesting information in Table 5.6 is, however, the distance
between the scientists’ emphasis on research and the possibilities of doing
that later in their career – the distance between wishes and expectations.
NFI scientists show the biggest difference. NGO scientists end up with a
very small difference, based mainly on the lesser desire to do research. The
relative match between wishes and expectations is, no doubt, part of the
reason for the high job satisfaction that NGO scientists reportedly enjoy
(Table 5.2).
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5.1.4 Funding and administration
One of the things that the Mode Two approach emphasises is the relation-
ship between the way science is funded and how it is carried out, especially
in relationship to quality control. One of the most important changes in
fisheries science in recent years has been the change towards reliance on
‘soft’ money that scientists or institutes have to apply for. This has affected
working conditions in several ways:
Q 5.5 When we first came here ... in those days the government used to give
us a pot of money and say, ‘here’s your pot of money. Do what you like with
it, as long as you keep us happy.’ Um, internally we would then compete for
shares of that money to do interesting biological studies that would actually
help.
The scientist indicates that the current funding arrangements are not lead-
ing to better research, rather the contrary. This particular scientist suggests
that scientists had previously been able to decide for themselves and pro-
duce better – or at least more interesting – research results instead of
being caught in fulfilling contractual demands.
Table 5.5 Type of last expert group by seniority
Type of last expert group
Seniority Definition Non-assessment group Assessment group Total N
Row % Col % Row % Col %
Very senior PhD before 1986 or
MSc before 1984
68 32 69
33 20
Senior PhD 1986-2001 or
MSc 1984-1999
54 46 135
51 58
Junior PhD after 2001 or
MSc after 1999
50 50 46
16 22
Total N 143 107 250
Relationship is significant at .09. Excluded in all questions are 148 who did not attend any expert
group, 20 who did indicate participating in an expert group but did not make clear which kind of
group, six who failed to answer if they had been in an expert group or not, and 41 who did not report
the year of their terminal degree.
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The scientists in our survey were asked to give a short description of the
most important changes they have experienced in their work activities
since assuming their current position. This was an open-ended question,
meaning that no answers were suggested. As it turned out, answers to this
question fell into two categories. One group of scientists discussed con-
crete changes in fisheries research issues, for instance the increasing fo-
cus on ecosystems. The other group discussed changes in their working
conditions. Two issues recur in many of the answers: funding sources and
administration. The answers of several respondents included both, for ex-
ample:
Q 5.6 A lot of pressure (and time spent) to secure funding for research and
less time to actually do research. More bureaucracy, meetings and manage-
ment responsibilities.
To get an idea about any interesting differences between those mentioning
funding and/or administration and those who did not, the answers to this
question were coded so that they could be compared with other questions
in the survey database. Answers were placed in two categories with respect
to both funding and administration. For funding, answers that referred to
changes in funding sources were placed in one category, while answers
that did not mention funding or only mentioned general changes in fund-
ing levels were placed in the other. For administration, answers mention-
ing management, administration, bureaucracy, or meeting activity were
placed in one category, and all other answers were placed in the other. Two
coders were used as a check against bias (Table 5.7).
Sixty scientists mentioned changes in funding sources. This is a consid-
erable number given that the responses were the result of a completely
open-ended question about general changes. Several mentioned that the
need to write applications for funding puts additional pressure on them.
Some also argued, as in Q 5.5, that the changes in funding sources have
had implications for the type of research carried out. One respondent ar-
gued as an example that the ‘decrease in central funding and the need to
seek outside funding [is] limiting the opportunity to undertake basic re-
search’. Differences in the perspective on funding relate also to the type of
employer. Table 5.7 shows that 24% of the scientists in academic organisa-
tions mentioned this change, but only 14% of the scientists in the other
groups combined.
Another question asked how much the scientists’ employers were en-
couraging them to participate in externally funded research. The answers
revealed significant differences across the categories of employers. The
overall mean was 5.7 on a scale from 1 to 7, which suggests fairly strong
encouragement. NFI scientists were close to the overall mean, whereas
scientists from academic institutions gave a significantly higher rating (Ta-
ble 5.2).
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Scientists employed in academic institutions are also the second highest
employment group in experiencing increased pressure on the job (Table
5.2). It is likely that this feeling of increased pressure is related to the
stronger emphasis on external funding. One academic scientist said with
respect of funding that he felt a ‘pressure to do it, but no other tasks are
taken away to permit this’. The survey data also show that those who men-
tion sources of funding as an important change also feel a greater increase
in work pressure (5.82 v 5.38/7 P = 0). NGO scientists feel the least pres-
sure from their employer to obtain external research funding. This may
mean that the pressure on them is to find funding for advocacy, or that
NGOs tend not to use their scientific staff for fundraising because it is
carried out by others.
Table 5.7 Percentages mentioning issues of funding and administra-
tion by type of employer
Subjects mentioned without prompting in replies to
the following open-ended question: ‘Please give a
short description of the most important changes you
have experienced in your work activities since assum-
ing your current position’
NFIs Not
NFIs
Acad. Not
acad.
N
Administration as impor-
tant change
Mentions issue 39 26 117
Does not mention issue 61 74 242
Funding sources as im-
portant change
Mentions issue 24 14 60
Does not mention issue 76 86 299
N 183 176 82 277 Total
N 359
Rounded percentages. Excluded: 22 did not identify their employer and 84 did not describe the most
important changes. NFIs against all others combined gave a Chi-Square of .01 for administration.
Academia against all others combined gave a Chi-Square of .03 for funding.
The open-ended question on most important changes in work activities
also generated many answers, almost one-third of the total, mentioning
administration along the lines of Q 5.6. Scientists employed in NFIs men-
tion these issues significantly more often than others do (Table 5.7). Some
39% of NFI scientists mention administration as opposed to 26% of all
other groups combined. One scientist offered the observation that there is
a ‘much greater emphasis on administration and monitoring of work tar-
gets with no improvement in work output’.
Administrative pressures are to some extent related to pressures from
the industry, the EU and other elements. In particular, assessment scien-
tists have to be increasingly aware of how they formulate their advice, how
they present uncertainties, that their assessments are consistent from spe-
147
cies to species, etc. As discussed in Chapter 7, these issues are having a
tremendous impact on how ICES is organising itself, certainly with respect
to the traditional advisory structures, but increasingly in terms of changes
in funding structures and administrative loads. These pressures are hav-
ing a number of unintended, negative consequences on the lives of these
scientists.
Table 5.8 Patterns in expert group assignments by gender
All respondents
Type of last expert group Total P
No WG Non-assessment WG Assessment WG
Men 76% 84% 80% 80% 0.15
Women 24% 18% 20% 20%
Total N 148 167 123 438
Employees of National Fisheries Institutes
Men 68% 86% 82% 81% 0.08
Women 32% 14% 18% 19%
Total N 38 83 87 208
Excluded in all questions are 20 who did indicate participating in an expert group but did not make
clear which kind of group, six who failed to answer if they had been in an expert group or not, and one
who did not indicate gender. The second question also excludes 21 who did not identify their employ-
er, and 209 who did not work in NFIs.
5.1.5 Gender
Fisheries science in support of fisheries management has noticeable gen-
der patterns, and some female fisheries scientists have related experiences
of discomfort in professional situations because of their gender. Compared
to many other sciences, the proportion of female scientists is low. Partici-
pants in all of the meetings we observed were largely middle-aged white
men. Only 20% of our survey respondents are women, and this distribu-
tion holds fairly evenly across all employment categories. Women’s num-
bers within fisheries science are increasing. Among the most junior third,
the respondents who received their last degree within the past seven years,
32% are women. Among the most senior third, respondents who received
their last degree 17 or more years ago, only 5% are women.
Women rate their job satisfaction slightly lower than men do at 5.09/7
compared with 5.36 (p = .09). A weak pattern is visible in the assignment
of men and women to types of expert groups (Table 5.8). Women are over-
represented among those who do not attend expert groups and under-rep-
resented among those attending the more desirable non-assessment ex-
pert groups. Assignments to assessment expert groups show no gender
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pattern. This pattern is the same, but less pronounced, among the more
junior third. It is statistically significant at 0.10 only among NFI employees
(Table 5.8). The overall picture seems to be a slowly changing working en-
vironment where full gender integration is being approached, but still not
reached.
5.2 The precautionary approach
Most fisheries scientists understand their advisory task as using the best
available science to provide advice for implementing a precautionary ap-
proach to fisheries management. The precautionary approach is not itself
a scientific concept, but rather a framework for the delivery of science. It is
not merely an official doctrine. In expert group and other meetings there
are constant references to the precautionary approach as the guiding prin-
ciple for making judgements in uncertain situations. As discussed in
Chapter 3, in a way similar to the EAFM, it is a very important ‘scientific
ideology’ in fisheries science in Europe.
Table 5.9 Responses to attitude scales about the precautionary approach by
type of employer
Type of employer
NFIs Acade-
mia
NGO EU Other
private
Other
gov.
All P
It is critical that fisheries man-
agement be risk-averse and
chooses lower fishing pres-
sure when stock condition is
uncertain.
Strongly disagree = 1 ... 7 =
strongly agree
Mean 5.71 5.83 6.3 5.3 5.44 5.00* 5.66 0.12
N 220 105 10 33 54 17 439
To what degree should judge-
ments made in preparing
scientific advice be influenced
by the precautionary ap-
proach?
never = 1 ... 7 = always
Mean 5.94 6.21*** 6.60* 5.39*** 5.49*** 6 5.92 0
N 219 104 10 33 55 17 438
* indicates significance at 0.1, *** indicates significance at 0.01. Asterisk indicating significance refers to category
compared to all other categories combined. Excluded in both questions are 22 who did not identify their employer.
Furthermore, four did not answer the question on risk-adverse fisheries management, and five did not answer the
question on judgements.
The precautionary principle as a general norm in environmental manage-
ment came to the fore through the Rio Declaration (UN 1992). The United
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Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks (UN 1995) first articulated the principle for fisheries with the fol-
lowing definition:
Q 5.7 States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreli-
able or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not
be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and man-
agement measures (UN 1995, p. 6).
The precautionary principle is the official doctrine of the Common Fish-
eries Policy, and indeed of the EU. The following is from the Council Reg-
ulation dealing with the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy:
Q 5.8 (3) Given that many fish stocks continue to decline, the Common
Fisheries Policy should be improved to ensure the long-term viability of the
fisheries sector through sustainable exploitation of living aquatic resources
based on sound scientific advice and on the precautionary approach, which
is based on the same considerations as the precautionary principle referred
to in Article 174 of the Treaty (CEC 2002, p. 59).
The treaty referred to here is the treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity. The precautionary approach is how the precautionary principle be-
comes operational. ICES mentions greater emphasis on the precautionary
approach in the discussion of its basic mission in its strategic plan, which
was formally adopted by the contracting parties in 2002:
Q 5.9 The Mission statement is noteworthy in terms of the evolution of
ICES. Marine ecosystems are inclusive of fisheries, but much broader and
more complex. The emphasis on marine ecosystems does not diminish the
priority that ICES will give to fisheries. Advice on fisheries will continue to
be a prominent part of the ICES programme, with an increased application
of the precautionary approach and within a wider ecosystem context (ICES
2002).
Beyond simply doctrine, it is widely supported among fisheries scientists.
In the US research, 80% of the marine scientists we surveyed agreed with
the statement, ‘It is critical that fisheries management be risk-averse and
choose lower fishing pressure when stock condition is uncertain’, while
44% agreed strongly (Wilson et al. 2002).
Table 5.9 lays out the relationship between two statements about the
precautionary approach and the type of employer. No relationship was
found between these scales and type of expert group. The first statement
is a restatement of the precautionary principle, and it gets high agreement
across all categories, the lowest being scientists working in the ‘other gov-
ernment’ category. The other statement related directly to the question of
the degree to which precaution should influence judgements in preparing
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advice. Scientists working for the European Commission still scored above
the centre of the scale on this question, but below all other categories. The
highest scorers were the NGO scientists, six of whom chose 7, with the
other four choosing 6.
Even with this kind of general support for the precautionary approach,
real disagreements and confusions exist about how it should be imple-
mented. The following quote from ACFM is typical of many such discus-
sions about advice and is a good illustration of both the basics that the
scientists agree on and the pressures and temptations that they struggle
with in the implementation of precaution:
Q 5.10 Scientist One: Would it be better to highlight that the estimate is
close to Blim, and whether it is above is to a large extent how you do the
model, and we can’t really tell. We can shortcut the discussion and say that
apparently we are very close and it is not an either or. Scientist Two: So we
just say that Blim is very sensitive to the assumptions made in the forecast
and a 40% reduction would rebuild to Blim. It would be very difficult to say
we think this would do the job in accordance with the precautionary ap-
proach. We have tried to do the best we could with the management plan
and now we are sliding on to saying yes as if these numbers are certain.
The precautionary approach is exactly that, we are not in a position to say
the stock will recover [General agreement around the table]. (Observer’s
notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, October
2004)
A conceptual framework has been developed and used for the inclusion of
the precautionary approach in Europe that identifies ‘precautionary refer-
ence points’. The basic idea is that stock assessment models are used to
identify Blim, which is the lowest level a spawning stock biomass should
ever be allowed to get, and Bpa, which is the larger spawning stock bio-
mass used as a target in order to reduce the chance that a stock is ever
fished down to Blim. This conceptual framework is what Degnbol (2003)
describes as stochastic predictability:
Q 5.11 ... because [in the implementation of the precautionary approach] the
basic concept of predictability was maintained, but the predictions of the
effects of management measures were expanded to include an estimate of
the associated uncertainty (2003, p. 40).
He argues that while the precautionary approach is about accepting the
fact of uncertainty, this approach treats it as a supplementary consideration
within the standard and traditional framework of stock assessment models
and their associated management techniques. The fundamental question
of the conditions of predictability themselves were not examined. This is
an excellent example of Shackley and Wynne’s (1996) transformation of
uncertainty.
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A constant tension in the discussions among ICES scientists in the pre-
paration of advice is the movement between precaution, as it is expressed
through stochastic predictability, and the underlying issues of uncertainty
that resist being expressed as error terms in stock assessment models. The
argument is not with the precautionary approach itself but in the way it
was defined with respect to single-species stock assessment models in a
reductionist manner. As discussed further in Chapter 7, this was seen by
many scientists as a block to the development of a comprehensive ap-
proach to precaution, multispecies approaches, and finally the EAFM it-
self. The following quote comes from a scientist who works for the Euro-
pean Commission:
Q 5.12 Respondent: I have to say that the precautionary approach killed
most of the fisheries science in Europe for almost 6 years. Interviewer:
What do you mean? Respondent: Simply because they stopped all initia-
tives. It was like everyone started from scratch in discussing precautionary
[processes] and reference points, and by the end of the day what we have
achieved after 6, 7, 8 years is hardly anything. It is just more or less the
same. But it blocked, at the same time it blocked any initiatives in relation
to mixed fisheries species interaction. I would say, basically science was
better off in the beginning of the 1990s – fisheries science – than we are
today.
Here we see a frustration with what the precautionary approach has done
to fisheries science, not simply with respect to advice, but as a discipline.
On the one hand, he explains elsewhere in the interview that when the
precautionary approach started, it stalled some initial attempts in the early
1990s to refuse to give advice where the information did not warrant it.
One could interpret this as saying that the way that precaution was adopted
in the mid-1990s as ‘stochastic predictability’ deflected a deeper critique of
the underlying uncertainties of the TAC Machine (Holm and Nielsen
2004) system. He goes on to argue that precaution was probably good for
management as such because it forced the system to deal more seriously
with what was happening with the fish stocks. But fisheries science began
spending all of its energy on the sterile pursuit of precautionary reference
points while issues like multi-species interactions were neglected. If this
scientist is correct in his historical interpretation, the interpretation of the
precautionary approach as stochastic predictability had important implica-
tions for fisheries science as a whole and not just for the advice process.
Precaution raises questions about the respective roles of managers and
scientists. It is another area where the science boundary is being pushed,
but this time the pushing is coming from the scientific community.
Strongly but not inaccurately stated, precaution as stochastic predictability
has meant the incorporation of scientists’ political positions directly into
stock assessment models. Precaution is an area where they have very
strong prescriptive opinions, and this tension is very difficult and some-
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times painful for the scientists. At the end of the day, the precautionary
approach is a political rather than scientific principle. It is a judgement
about who, most broadly present or future users, should bear the risk of
poor fish yields that the uncertainty about the stock condition represents.
It is also a judgement in which the scientists and managers have an in-
direct interest. When stocks collapse, they are the brunt of a great deal of
criticism.
The scientists, however, particularly when discussing it in the terms
given them by the ‘stochastic predictability’ approach, often seem to treat
it as an objective outcome rather than a political judgement. Some of their
observers can be very critical of the degree to which the scientists lean
towards the precautionary approach. We asked one biologist, who was em-
ployed by the fishing industry and observing ACFM, what surprised him,
and he replied:
Q 5.13 I am surprised by the reluctance to increase quotas. I have always
argued among my constituents that people in ACFM are not opposed to
fishers, and the appearance that they are is not real. I think I have to revise
that to some extent and that is surprising to me. They question any positive
trend above and beyond what is reasonable.
The precautionary approach is going to continue to create difficulties for
how science is done. The precautionary approach is the place where scien-
tists most clearly take on the role of advocates. Related to this, indeed per-
haps a reason for it, the precautionary approach reaches beyond the areas
where quantitative models can provide clarity into the truly treacherous
depths of applied uncertainty. Many of the real sources of uncertainty in
fisheries, let alone an EAFM, simply cannot be reduced to probabilities, so
the precautionary approach will never be fully encompassed by stochastic
predictability or even the more advanced tools of risk analysis.
In the final analysis, the precautionary approach confronts scientists
with a paradox that is a particularly acute one within a scientific culture:
the less they know, the stronger their opinion should be.
5.3 Scientists’ attitudes towards the advisory task
One of the clearest results of this research is that fisheries scientists’ atti-
tudes towards producing scientific advice are strongly negative. Pressures
on the science boundary and the constant demand to produce answers for
the next cycle of the TAC Machine are having an impact on the scientists’
morale. A large number of scientists believe that much of their work is
ignored by the management system. This belief, as argued in Chapter 1, is
often exaggerated, but it is certainly an often encountered and honestly
held perception. Many scientists are experiencing a real discontinuity be-
tween what they see as the science they want to do and many of the advi-
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sory activities they spend their time on. In an interview, one scientist ar-
ticulated this very succinctly:
Q 5.14 I think there is an increase in the amount of time that is directed
away from doing what you might call science into simply number manipu-
lation and giving advice.
This dissatisfaction takes two main forms. One is that advice work is sim-
ply less scientifically attractive, just ‘turning the crank’ on stock assess-
ments is often seen as routine and of limited value for career development,
especially when one is not one of the ‘gurus’ who work on developing these
methods. This leads to an advice-related frustration with one’s own career.
The second is a feeling that the advice being produced is not only not taken
sufficiently seriously by the system, it has become so divorced from what
is going on in the natural world that they are ‘pretending’, to use the term
chosen by the scientist in Q 4.16.
This leads to an even more basic conflict with the scientists’ own identi-
ties as scientists. We think a good word to describe this experience, one
that has a long history in sociology, is ‘anomie’. It was coined by Emil
Durkheim, one of the 19th-century founders of modern sociology. The
American Heritage Dictionary (2000) defines anomie as ‘alienation and
purposelessness experienced by a person or a class as a result of a lack of
standards, values, or ideals’. The anomie of the scientists arises from being
asked to play a difficult role under sometimes trying conditions and then
having the results of these efforts ‘disembedded’ from the cultural under-
standings that produced them. ‘Disembedding’ here means the separation
of the results from the background meanings, practices and assumptions
that allow the scientists to consider the results to be ‘science’. The respon-
dent we quote in Q 5.14 above illustrates this disembedding at another
point in the interview:
Q 5.15 It’s not really science anymore. We’re number engineers. We fiddle
with numbers to, you know, try to add some scientific credibility to an opin-
ion.
Again we encounter the image of the scientist becoming an engineer, a
tinkerer who carries out a technical assignment without reflection, while
still being expected to lend scientific credibility and legitimacy derived
from more than just what works. The lack of faith in results evident in
this quote arises from the way the entire system handles uncertainty. As
another respondent said:
Q 5.16 You can elaborate the methods, but if the data aren’t good enough to
support them, what’s the point? You’re just fooling yourself that you’re get-
ting a better assessment. The strength of this, the accuracy of the assess-
ment depends on the weakest link in the chain.
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Or as the first respondent put it:
Q 5.17 There are a lot of people who are directly or indirectly involved in the
advisory process. We have to rely on people to do data extraction, so we can
manipulate the numbers.
A third respondent points to the cyclical growth of bias and uncertainty
that he suggests is built into the TAC Machine system and for which it is
hard for scientists to determine when they should say that it is impossible
to come up with a scientific result.
Q 5.18 We’re giving advice for TACs although it’s been clearly stated in the
past that they don’t work, and though we know that TACs will widely lead to
non-compliance, which then screws up your basis for setting TACs in the
future. So there is some extent to which we’re guessing, really the extent to
which boats are misreporting in order that you can estimate the TACs for
them to misreport next year. So that is a sort of downward spiral ... It’s ...
But at what point would we say ‘no we can’t ...’? I think with a lot of stocks
we’re quite close to that. It’s hard to define exactly what would lead me to
make that statement.
A fourth scientist sees a similar systemic trend towards less and less realis-
tic stock assessments, though from a slightly different point of view that
adds some technical details to the reasons for this expected decline:
Q 5.19 Maybe TSA is not suitable, we had a lot of trouble with it at the
Northern Shelf with the gadoids, and we did a number of different ana-
lyses, and the results from TSA, XSA [types of assessment models] and this
survey thing we have been developing all were surprising and contradictory,
and we decided to put forth four assessments. This kind of uncertainty
about model choice is going to get worse because the quality of catch data
is declining. And the survey data as well because they may not be as good at
picking up fish when there are few of them.
These observations are not atypical and indicate a growing discomfort
among fisheries scientists about the value of their work with respect to
fisheries management. Several of the statements we have reported here
are emblematic of this. The most striking one in some ways is the plea by
the scientist in Q 4.16 that they stop pretending they know how many fish
are in the sea. This demand was expressed with complete certainty at a
plenary session in front of 25 colleagues (as well as 2 outside observers)
who were working to assess some of the most important fish stocks man-
aged by the CFP. The context of the quote was what was going to happen to
the results in the larger world after they finished fiddling with the details.
This anomie is happening mainly to the scientists working for the na-
tional fisheries institutes directly in stock assessment processes. These are
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the scientists who have the largest gap between their desire to do research
and their perceptions of their future chances to do so (Table 5.6), who are
feeling somewhat more pressure from administrative work than other
scientists (Table 5.7), are the least satisfied with their opportunities to pub-
lish, and who have the lowest job satisfaction. They still, however, rate their
job satisfaction above the mean of the scale. It is important in this discus-
sion to recognise that, while this dissatisfaction is real, they are still people
with relatively good and interesting jobs who do not suffer the conse-
quences of the problems with the fisheries management system in any-
thing like the way that people in fishing communities do.
One question that the survey data can answer is if this discomfort about
the science they are doing has a negative impact on the scientists’ job satis-
faction. The survey contained the following two questions:
Q 5.20 In our interviews scientists have reported many different internal
reactions to the experience of producing scientific advice for use as the ba-
sis of policy decisions. For each of the following quotes, we would like you
to indicate how often you have felt this way while participating in the pro-
duction of scientific advice.
I am being asked to answer impossible questions.
I have never felt like that = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = I often feel like
that
and
I am being asked to create certainty that is not really there.
I have never felt like that = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = I often feel like
that.
Before answers to these two questions can be compared with answers to
other questions, attitude measurement theory tells us that one thing has to
be examined. This is the question of whether or not they are measuring
the same underlying attitude or two different ones. If they are measuring
the same thing, the answers should be added together to make a combined
scale. A test is necessary because two mistakes are possible here. On the
one hand, if we combine the two and they really are different, we run the
danger of covering up important differences. But if they are really measur-
ing the same thing, then the measurement is statistically more accurate if
the two questions are added. This is especially true when evaluating the
relationship between the discomfort about science and other questions be-
cause it would create statistical co-linearity. Two basic tests exist. One is
simply to ask if a reasonable person would say that the two questions as
phrased are basically asking about the same thing. The other is to look at
the simple correlation between the two answers, with the rule-of-thumb
being that correlations between survey responses of greater than 0.5
means that the questions are addressing the same underlying attitude
(Nunnally 1978). We believe a ‘reasonable person’ would think that ‘an-
swering impossible questions’ is an idea that is very close to ‘creating un-
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certainty that is not really there’, and responses to these two questions have
a simple correlation of 0.47. This just misses the 0.5 rule-of-thumb, so our
judgement is that it is better to add them together to make a single vari-
able.
The survey question measuring job satisfaction looked like this:
Q 5.21 Please rate your level of overall job satisfaction.
I am
not at all = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = very well
satisfied with my job overall.
Because many of these people who are involved in advice giving have other
reasons for lower job satisfaction, we added the answers to some other
questions to the regression analysis to control for their influence. These
questions are:
Q 5.22 My job
severely hinders = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = strongly encourages
my production of the level of peer-reviewed publications we would like to be
producing.
and
Q 5.23 How do you feel about having to travel this much? (Referring to a
previous question about the amount of travel involved in their job.)
I would enjoy travelling more = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = this is far
too much travel.
and
Q 5.24 Did you find participation in this working/study group personally
enjoyable?
I detested = 1__ 2__ 3__ 4__ 5__ 6__ 7__ = I very much enjoyed
participating in this group.
Table 5.9 reports the results of a linear regression of the model just de-
scribed. The result is quite clear. Controlling for the impact of differences
in working conditions and personal enjoyment of the expert group, the
more scientists feel that they are being asked to create certainty and an-
swer impossible questions, the less satisfied they feel with their job.
A scientist who had moved from an academic to applied research envir-
onment within the last few years submitted the following reflection to us
along with the survey answers:
Q 5.25 I found that in the circles of [applied] fisheries science, there are
actually a lot of clever people who are motivated to do things right, but our
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scientific work is very much constrained by the inertia of the system we
work in, and of course by time constraints. The system we work in is the
factor with the most impact, we think. We have seen people doing clever
research throughout the whole year, but in the assessment WG they just
become different people, suddenly stuck to traditions. I ask myself: Why do
we let ourselves be manipulated into doing bad science?
For fisheries scientists providing scientific advice to support European
fisheries management, this is not an atypical experience.
Table 5.10 Regression on attitude scales
I am not at all = 1 … 7 = very well satisfied with my job overall B Beta t p
(Constant) 4.75 8.35 0
Working and career
conditions
How much does your job encourage you to
or hinder you from producing the number
of peer-reviewed publications you feel you
would like to be producing?
0.25 0.33 6.36 0
Did you find participation in this working/
study group personally enjoyable?
0.28 0.24 4.49 0
In the past three years how has the pres-
sure you experience on the job changed?
0.3 0.2 4.1 0
Experience of results
as unreal
Scale made from experience of being asked
to ‘answer impossible questions’ and ‘cre-
ate certainty that is not really there’.
0.1 0.1 2.6 0
N = 270 AR2 = .29 Exclusions: 148 respondents who indicated not having participated in an expert
group in the last five years, and six who failed to answer whether they had been in an expert group or
not. Sixteen respondents did not rate their level of enjoyment; seven did not respond to the publica-
tions question; eight did not respond to the pressure question; nine did not respond to one of the
questions about impossible questions or certainty; and one did not rate his or her job satisfaction.
5.4 Conclusion
A good metaphor for what stock assessment scientists are experiencing is
that they are being asked to mould factual bricks from uncertain clay,
stamp ‘science’ on them, and then hand them to someone else to use to
build a bridge. This runs directly counter to the culture that scientists have
built over centuries to maintain the communicative rationality that keeps
science working well. These are the things that I have variously described
here in terms of openness to new claims, the fair evaluation of arguments
based on rigorous and prescribed methodology, freedom from manipula-
tion, a background assumption of trust for other scientists, and disinterest-
edness and scepticism in respect of the results. The anomie and resistance
of the scientists working within the advisory system are a good illustration
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of the discussion in Section 2.1.1 about the reasons the bureaucratic sys-
tem has for inflating the science boundary and the ways the scientists re-
sist that inflation. Unless, of course, as in the precautionary approach, they
have their own values which they would like to see made into technical
necessities.
In this respect, the production of scientific advice for European fisheries
management can be seen as a process of cultural alienation. It is ironically
very similar to what many researchers looking at local ecological knowl-
edge have said about what happens to the knowledge of fishers when it
falls into the hands of managers and scientists (Agrawal 1995; Holm
2003). Like that of the fishers, the knowledge of scientists is disembedded
from the knowledge culture that created it and is transformed by manage-
ment into something alien.
The pressures to inflate the science boundary will always be a constant
factor because they are not based on a conspiracy to cheat science (or fish-
ers), but on the real practical problems that arise in the management bu-
reaucracy because of the way their authority functions. Beyond the man-
agement bureaucracy is the wider scientific community and the
conservation values that are enshrined there.
The inflation of the science boundary is hardly the only thing that makes
management advice a less attractive task for European fisheries scientists.
Participation in advice reduces levels of publication, and increases undesir-
able travel. Perhaps the most difficult aspect is the way that the very high
uncertainty not only translates into frustration about the quality of the
science, it also makes it very difficult to organise activities and know when
a task has been adequately accomplished.
The system described in this chapter and the previous one is what is in
place now. It is a system that examines species one by one and tries to tell
us how many fish can be taken from the sea. So far it has not worked well
for this task, but this task is a relatively simple one compared with consid-
ering fisheries in the context of the ecosystem as a whole. As will be dis-
cussed extensively in the coming chapters, mobilising the knowledge of
these scientists becomes even more difficult in the face of the EAFM.
A maxim of politics tells us that one strategy for solving a problem is to
redefine it as an even larger problem. Perhaps that strategy can work in
European fisheries management. The EAFM will require ICES to call
more and more strongly on the ‘science side’, i.e. those scientists who
have been much less involved in the production of scientific advice. At the
same time the conditions that fisheries scientist are facing have also cre-
ated a great deal of energy for reform. The scientist in Q 5.25 is not alone
in asking, ‘Why do we let ourselves be manipulated into doing bad
science?’ In the precautionary approach and the EAFM, this frustration
has found an ideology and an opportunity that provide a platform for work-
ing for change. The next chapter examines how ICES scientists are begin-
ning to meet this challenge.
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6. Science for the ecosystem approach to
fisheries management
The scientific advisory system for European fisheries management is in a
process of rapid change. The internal pressures described in the previous
chapter mean that there is a strong desire for change within the scientific
community. These demands take several forms. The fishing industry is
looking for advice that extends beyond one year. The environmental com-
munity, along with many scientists and backed up by international agree-
ments, is looking for an ecosystem approach to fisheries management.
The fisheries managers in Brussels are looking for advice that they can
apply to mixed fisheries. ICES is looking for ways to respond to all of these
demands, and in doing so they are addressing both scientific and organisa-
tional issues. While these things cannot really be separated, this chapter
emphasises the first set of issues, and the next chapter emphasises the
second with a discussion of a recent reorganisation of the ICES Advisory
Programme.
This chapter is in some ways the heart of the case study because it fo-
cuses directly on the problem of knowledge and the adaptation of the so-
cial system to its environment. The subject is the EAFM, but the chapter
leads into the EAFM through a discussion of a similar problem at a lower
level of complexity: multi-species, mixed-fisheries advice.
6.1 Multi-species, mixed-fishery management advice
DG MARE need scientific advice that they can use to manage the complex
mix of fleets, fisheries and fish stocks that make up European fishing as it
is actually practised. There is a strongly felt need for fisheries-based advice
that can be used in situations where complexes of fisheries and fleets oper-
ate in one region and catch more than one species. The driving force be-
hind the move to fisheries-based advice is again the division of fish. A
politically viable way has to be found for dividing fish among different
fleets. Some of these fleets capture different species that they specifically
target; others catch fish as ‘bycatch’, meaning that they catch them while
targeting other species. One difficult example arises when there is a need
to reduce the bycatch of fish from stocks that are believed to be in serious
trouble, such as North Sea cod, by fleets that are targeting healthy fisheries
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in the same area. Different fleets with different gears fish for different
healthy stocks while having different bycatch rates for the cod. If the man-
agers can find a ‘scientific’ way to divide the allowable bycatch for cod, then
this solves the very serious political problem of how you treat all these
different fleets, which often belong to different member states.
The single-species approach is a component of the overall TAC Ma-
chine, and so it is very resistant to change (Holm and Nielsen 2004) be-
cause it is directly linked to other parts of this self-reinforcing system. Mul-
ti-species, fisheries-based advice presents problems for fisheries scientists
who are trained to deal with units such as fish stocks that are defined by
nature rather than units like fisheries, where natural, technical and social
phenomena are mixed together (Wilson and Delaney 2005).
I offer as an illustration of these difficulties the story mentioned in
Chapters 3 and 4 about the development of mixed fishery advice for the
North Sea. The story begins with observing an attempt to develop a multi-
fleet, multi-fishery model for 83 North Sea fleets at an ICES Working
Group on the North Sea and Skagerrak (WGNSSK) in October 2003. The
purpose of the model was to calculate the individual impact of these many
different fleets on the North Sea cod stock. The group was working on this
task in response to an urgent request from DG MARE where tremendous
political heat was being felt around the issue of allowing several cod stocks
to recover that were in perilous condition.
In developing the model, the scientists immediately encountered a
daunting dual problem: defining the different fleets and getting compar-
able data for them. The problem with fleet definition is that individual
fishing vessels have their own patterns of fishing in terms of location, spe-
cies and gear, and these patterns change during the year. So any definition
of ‘fleets’ is artificial, to some degree. Vessels can and do move between
the various fleets, no matter how the fleets are defined. This problem is
reduced by the fact that the management system has become so reliant on
these artificial definitions over the years that they have been reified into
actual fishing behaviour through licensing and other regulations. A critical
downside of this reification is that it has become more and more difficult
for fishers to adapt their fishing activities in response to changes in the
resource.
Getting reliable and comparable data on fish discarded at sea was a par-
ticular problem for these scientists. In fact, they ended up with 83 fleets
because those were the fleets they had comparable data for, and those data
were only complete for one year. The next time this model was used, the
number of fleets was no doubt different. These data problems were signif-
icant because tests showed that small changes in how fleets were defined
had noticeable impacts on the results.
These scientists saw themselves as experimenting; they knew that the
data problems meant that official decisions could not be based on this
work. The WGNSSK scientists believed that these data problems pre-
cluded the use of the model in decision-making, and the scientists were
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concerned that this initial work would be misinterpreted as more solid
than it actually was.
Because of the need to rely on the essentially social concepts of fishery
and fleet (Wilson and Delaney 2005), the mixed-fishery approach is one
place where there is considerable pressure on the science boundary. Dur-
ing the meeting the form that the report of the WGNSSK was going to take
became controversial:
Q 6.1 Scientist One: We are trying to do a mixed-fishery forecast. You just
suggested we put forward a scenario, while I thought this was just sensitiv-
ity analysis. If you suggest options, then one may be taken up, but this
sensitivity analysis shows that this model is very sensitive to how it is set
up. Scientist Two: But that is a political decision. If we don’t think we can
explain this we should not put it forward. Scientist One: After this discus-
sion with [another scientist] it sounds like we can’t really explain this model
... I have not been in the sub-group, if they can explain it then I have no
problem. Scientist Three: If they can explain this for lay people, who will
read this? We are not writing for managers, we are writing for ACFM, and
they can decide if they want to go forward. Scientist One: I want clear text
from the sub-group that they are ready to take this forward. We should not
have scenarios in there that may be picked out. Scientist Three: I just want
this in the working group report, not in the ACFM report. (Observer’s notes
at the Working Group on the Assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea
and Skagerrak meeting, September 2003)
The results were discussed at the ACFM, however, because of the urgent
requirements of DG MARE. ACFM took the challenge of producing multi-
species advice with evident seriousness in their October 2003 meeting,
continually coming back to discuss the implications of the new emphasis.
A multi-species section was created in the report, and the advice for cod,
among other key species, was reported in that section, rather than in the
section describing the individual stocks. ACFM recognised that the data
were weak. Still as they had to respond, they concerned themselves with
less refined alternatives that depended less on precise data:
Q 6.2 Session Leader: The problem is the linkage of stock and fisheries
advice, and that is a problem. We should not say ‘closure of all fisheries’
but ‘a zero catch of cod’, then we raise the question of closing the fisheries.
But we have to keep the fisheries and the stock separate things ... [ further
discussion]. Scientist One: We don’t want to take away the strong message
[about the cod, but] we are giving unclear advice that says you can have fish-
ing and not, we cannot escape criticism. Session Leader: This is moving in
the right direction, we must anticipate that criticism with some text. (Obser-
ver’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, Octo-
ber 2003)
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The scientists wanted to stick to dealing with the cod stock. They could not
offer scientific results with respect to fisheries because the data they had
were not strong enough to provide ‘analytic forecasts’ of the impact of all
these fleets on the cod stock. At the same time they knew that the stock
was in very bad shape, and they wanted their advice to give a clear mes-
sage: the cod stock should not be fished. They also did not want to deal, in
a scientific sense, with the sticky issue of how to implement this impera-
tive among all the different fleets, many of which were, after all, fishing
healthy stocks and only catching cod as bycatch. They saw their role here
as ‘raising the question’ of closing the fisheries. The official outcome read
as follows:
Q 6.3 It is not currently possible to provide analytical forecasts for input
into mixed-fishery evaluation models. The main obstacle is that ICES does
not have access to discard data for most fisheries. Development of such
capability furthermore requires better catch monitoring, fishery analyses,
and management decisions. The lack of such mixed-fishery forecasts neces-
sitates the development of complementary processes that do not require
analytical short-term forecasts. ICES has in this report taken a first step
towards the formulation of advice in a mixed-fisheries context ... ICES ac-
knowledges that defining relevant allocation scenarios places difficult de-
mands on managers and that mixed fishery advice in particular will require
interactive communication between scientists and managers. DG Fish has
indicated to ICES some scenarios that would be of interest for managers.
However, mainly because discard data for most fleets are not available,
ICES is unable to provide the required scenarios at this time (ICES 2003,
pp. 5-6).
What ACFM was doing here was redefining the problem of how to move
from single-species-based advice to multi-species, fishery-based advice in
two directions. These directions were not mutually exclusive, but they did
have very different emphases. The first, in keeping with the tradition of the
TAC Machine, was to define the problem as a lack of data, with the solu-
tion then becoming an even more intensive and extensive data-gathering
apparatus. On the other hand, they were calling for a move towards pro-
cesses that ‘do not require analytical short-term forecasts’ and that rely on
more ‘interactive communication’ between managers and scientists about
what the alternatives really are. This can be read at least in part as a desire
to adjust the science boundary and move back out of science some of the
social and political questions that the development of complex models for
dividing mixed fisheries among multiple fleets was trying to solve. This
suggestion provides a lesson. They are suggesting increased interaction
with non-scientists as a way to clarify and reinforce the science boundary.
The ACFM agreed with the WGNSSK that the data were insufficient to
forecast the impact of various combinations of fleet effort. They did indi-
cate that if reliable landings and discards data were available by fleet, they
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could ‘present forecasts based on major groupings of fleet/fisheries, and
evaluate the impacts on cod and other rebuilding species of various distri-
butions of effort among fleets’ (ICES 2003, p. 222).
This response was not good enough. It stalled the machine, something
that had real consequences for a lot of people. DG MARE had a very diffi-
cult time moving the decision process forward. A Commission scientist
described the issue in a public lecture:
Q 6.4 ICES just said do not fish cod. There should be a recovery plan for
plaice without cod bycatch or discards. For cod there should be a zero catch
until the SSB is within safe biological limits. So this means no cod catch
and would require closing the demersal fisheries. So basically the advice is
no fishing [ for all demersal fisheries in the North Sea]. They gave us some
defined biological limits but have refused to give forecasts for cod, haddock
and some others. This is the advice I have received. What will you do, I ask
you? No fishing is not an option. Scientists don’t tell you the elements of a
recovery plan, they don’t guide you. This is why this is such interesting
work, it is really, really interesting work to do. (Audience lecture notes, Janu-
ary 2004)
The answer to the question ‘What will you do, I ask you?’ was that in No-
vember just after the ACFM meeting, the STECFmet and was asked by the
Commission to evaluate the ICES advice, among other things with respect
to the possibility of mixed-fishery forecasts. Calculation of these mixed-
fishery forecasts, using a model called MTAC, required as a ‘major input’
(CEC 2003b, p. 2) the analytical forecasts of impact on the cod that the
WGNSSK and ACFM had specifically declined to make due to lack of ade-
quate data. The STECF recognised the validity of ACFM’s reasoning but
also believed that ‘despite its numerous limitations, it would be more ap-
propriate to provide advice based on evidence for the mixed-species nature
of the different fisheries than advice that completely ignores the effects of
technical interactions on the implementation success of TAC-based man-
agement’ (STECF 2003, p. 56).
The rationale for their decision was the distinction between using
MTAC to provide the basis for mixed-fishery advice and using it as the
basis of mixed-species advice. ACFM was particularly concerned that the
MTAC model should not be used as the basis of advice because 1) data on
discards were insufficient (the most prominent of several reasons for their
refusal to make the short-term analytical forecasts) and 2) the definitions
of ‘fisheries’ were too coarse. STECF agreed that these would be fatal flaws
for the mixed-fishery advice, but they did not believe that this would be so
for the multi-species advice. The practical implication of this was that
STECF saw themselves as able to address one of the central multi-species
management problems: that of fisheries where technical interactions
caused fishers to fish on more than one TAC-controlled stock while har-
vesting their quotas at different rates; but not the other key problem, which
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was allocation of the harvest of such protected species among different
fisheries (CEC 2003b).
The STECF ran the multi-species analysis that ACFM had declined to
do. In their report they offered a set of eight scenarios which illustrated
the different political options, mentioned in Q 6.1, that were built into the
model. Moving a step beyond the use of models to produce numbers de-
manded by political needs, the scientists were now self-consciously build-
ing political options into their models. This self-consciousness is impor-
tant. In other ways, such as in the use of precautionary judgements in
assessments, fisheries scientists have been building political options into
models without referring to it as a political decision (Wilson and Degnbol
2002).
At the same time there was clearly no consensus on what constituted
reliable and useful data. This back and forth between ICES (ACFM/
WGNSSK) and the Commission (STECF) was a debate over the science
boundary. ICES was unwilling to stamp any results from the MTAC mod-
els as science valid for advice, while STECF was willing to do so with res-
pect to fish species, but not to fisheries, a social unit for which data are
much harder to define and collect. This meant that none of the scientists
were willing to provide a quantitative underpinning for the allocation of
stocks among fisheries. The unwillingness in this case was justified by
specific technical problems, not by the principled stance that allocation
decisions are political and not scientific decisions as fisheries scientists
have argued under other circumstances (Wilson and Degnbol 2002).
As complex and difficult as they are, these issues around moving from
single-species, stock-based advice to multi-species, mixed-fisheries advice
are merely a shadow of the problems we face in generating scientific ad-
vice for the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries Management (EAFM). Most
realistic approaches to the EAFM retain these same questions of managing
the impacts on many fish stocks of many different fleets, while also incor-
porating an expanded agenda involving fisheries impacts on the marine
environment and the need for fisheries to share the marine environment
with many other users. The responses and positions that have emerged
with respect to multi-species, mixed-fisheries advice foreshadow the strate-
gic alternatives we face. On the one hand, we can emphasise a concep-
tually simple and practically challenging strategy of merely expanding the
approach from management based on single-species, stock-assessment
models to management based on ecosystem models. This would mean a
commensurate expansion of the monitoring, data-gathering and data-man-
agement systems. On the other hand, we can emphasise a more interactive
approach that to some degree substitutes negotiations about how to handle
uncertainty among stakeholders for the search for the perfect model. This
process could be simplified, for example, by using spatial tools.
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6.2 The ecosystem approach to fisheries management
That fisheries management should move in the direction of an ‘ecosystem
approach to fisheries’, to use the FAO’s term (Garcia et al. 2003), is a broad
but shallow consensus among fisheries scientists. The consensus is broad
in that nearly everyone agrees that it is a good idea, and that fisheries can-
not be considered apart from their interactions with the broader marine
ecosystem. The consensus is shallow in that there are many different ideas
about how this approach would work in practice. The term ‘ecosystem ap-
proach’ is often used as a way to justify the inclusion within fisheries man-
agement policy of a sub-set of important related issues, e.g. the impact of
fishing on the sea bottom, bycatch of marine mammals and birds, that
need to be addressed but are outside the traditional fish stock focus of
management. In the last few years it has also become associated with the
movement towards greater use of marine protected areas. An earlier
phrase, ‘ecosystem management’, has largely been abandoned because of
the twin realisations that we do not govern nature, we govern people, and
that ecosystems are much too large and complex realities to try to manage
in any direct sense.
6.2.1 The need11
The need for a broad approach to fisheries management is driven by a
complex set of related issues. Some are very specific and immediate con-
cerns with environmental damage from fishing. Others are longer-term
and broader problems involving the overall role of fishing in the marine
ecosystem and the human food system. Fishing activities have impacts on
fish stocks and on the broader marine environment. Other natural and hu-
man-induced processes in the marine environment have impacts on fish-
ing.
The ecological importance of traditional management
The discussion of fisheries in the context of the broader environment be-
gins with two salient facts of human ecology. The first is that fisheries and
aquaculture are the single largest class of human impacts on the marine
environment. These impacts are continually increasing as fishers pursue
new species, penetrate new fishing areas and develop new gears in search
of a way out of the ‘commons’ dilemma in which they find themselves.
They are competing with one another for a continuously declining re-
source in order to pay off the already far too large investments they have
had to make to remain competitive. This pressure is the classical concern
of fisheries management, but it is also this pressure that has resulted in
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the most profound impacts of fishing on the marine environment, and
this is true beyond simply the condition of the target stocks.
The second salient fact is that capture fisheries are one of the most en-
vironmentally benign sources of animal protein in the food supply system
with great potential for shrinking our overall environmental footprint. The
human ecological importance of fish begins with the fact that they have the
highest protein content in their flesh of all food animals and that no other
food animal converts feed to body tissue as efficiently as fish (Smil 2000).
Capture fisheries in particular make a critically important contribution be-
cause they do not generate the waste and disease problems found in both
terrestrial and aquatic animal husbandry. If effective ways out of the dilem-
ma described in the last paragraph were implemented, the result would be
a slowing of the rate of fishing to allow stocks to recover and produce new
fish at a much higher rate than they do in their currently depleted state.
This could be done with a far lower fishing effort, energy use and other
environmental impacts that such effort entails. This would mean a poten-
tially large increase in the production of capture fisheries and a substantial
lowering of the price of fish products, a situation which would hold great
potential for relieving overall human pressure on the environment.
What these two human ecological facts make clear is that the EAFM
begins with the traditional concern of fisheries management, i.e. balanc-
ing fishing pressure and the natural production of fish biomass to gain the
largest long-term yield of protein from the sea. Most of the problems dis-
cussed below would be vastly improved simply by getting an adequate han-
dle on controlling fishing pressure. Understanding fisheries in its ecologi-
cal context means understanding that capture fisheries potentially provide
a critical substitute for both terrestrial and aquatic animal husbandry prac-
tices that are less sustainable in the long run.
Incorporating ecosystem considerations in fisheries stock
assessments
An accurate assessment of the condition of a fish stock relies on knowing
the impacts of other environmental factors beyond fishing. Predator-prey
interactions are an important part of this, leading to the importance of
multi-species assessments discussed in the last section, but there are
many other considerations. Changes in climate, salinity and temperature
have an impact on stock recruitment relationships, species composition,
natural mortalities and growth (ICES 2006b). Life histories may shift, and
this might change the availability of food (ICES 2006b). These impacts
run all the way from the local impacts of pollution on a spawning ground
to the possibility of ecological ‘regime shifts’. For example, the North Sea
has undergone such major changes in its overall ecology in both 1983 and
1997 (ICES 2006a). In the North Sea these changes seemed to be linked to
huge climatic rhythms like the North Atlantic Oscillation (ICES 2006b),
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but they are not entirely natural. Research on the Scotian Shelf in Canada
has documented a regime shift that seems to have been driven in large
part by the removal of a huge number of fish (Choi et al. 2004).
Environmental impacts from fishing
Fisheries generate a number of impacts on marine habitats. The most di-
rect physical impact is that of fishing gear on the sea floor. The ICES
Working Group on Ecosystem Effects of Fishing Activities (WGECO)
(ICES 2000) has summarised studies of the impact of trawl nets on the
sea bottom. They conclude that the evidence shows that bottom trawls can
remove some physical features, and reduce the complexity of the physical
and biological structures that are critical for maintaining both biodiversity
in general and fish yields in particular. The other main impact from fish-
eries on the marine habitat is through pollution. While capture fisheries
generate some pollution in the form of engine leakage and offal discards,
the most critical pollution is generated by aquaculture. Pollution also has a
serious impact on fisheries. The majority of pollution is from land-based
sources, and as most fish spend part of their life near shore, there is a
severe risk of exposure (Parrett 2001).
Fisheries threaten biodiversity in a number of ways. Depleting a stock
may reduce its ecological niche, making recovery more difficult or even
impossible (ICES 2006b). Biological extinction from directed fishing pres-
sure alone is rare, if not non-existent, but these heavily depleted species
may easily become bycatch in fisheries directed at other species. This is
because fish populations become commercially extinct, meaning that the
declining population becomes unprofitable to catch well before it reaches
the level where biological extinction is threatened. Pressure from overfish-
ing increases the vulnerability of a population to extinction from other
sources, such as climate change or habitat destruction. Bycatch, the cap-
ture or entanglement of untargeted species in fishing gear is a problem in
fisheries the world over. While research has focussed more on problems
with marine mammals than it has on seabirds and benthic organisms
(Payne 2001), all three areas are a problem. Bycatch of depleted stocks that
are no longer targeted can contribute to extinction dangers, especially for
long-lived, late-maturing species (Musick 1999). The once abundant com-
mon skate in the North Sea, for example, has been extirpated in some parts
of its range, mainly as a result of both commercial and recreational fishing
pressure and bycatch (Hilton-Taylor 2000). The barndoor skate in North
America has suffered a similar fate entirely as a result of bycatch (Casey
and Myers 1998).
WGECO also emphasises that fishing changes trophic relationships
through the relative abundances of predators, prey and competitors, and
creates changes in the genetic make-up of populations (ICES 2006c).
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6.2.2 The ecosystem approach and governance
From the side of nature, the idea of an ecosystem approach emerges from
ecosystems being inescapably interconnected, open systems with ambigu-
ous boundaries and highly complex linkages. This makes a strong argu-
ment for considering the entire system before making decisions that affect
its parts. This reality takes on a different aspect when looking from the
viewpoint of society – i.e. when the question of governance12 for an ecosys-
tem approach is raised. This interconnectedness, openness and ambigu-
ousness have made the idea quite attractive to all the various groups that
have sought to turn its practical operations in specific and diverse direc-
tions while agreeing to the vague generalities (McCay and Wilson 1997).
The ‘ecosystem approach to environmental management’ has become a
unifying phrase for many different kinds of efforts to improve governance.
The idea of an ‘ecosystem’ is a fundamentally ambiguous concept
(O’Neill et al. 1986). When introduced to policy-making, it becomes an
‘essentially contested’ (Gallie 1955) concept, meaning that its definition al-
ways depends on the speaker’s interest in how it is defined. In Europe, in
particular, there is no baseline concept of what an ecosystem is. All ecosys-
tems, including marine ecosystems, have been ‘disturbed’ by centuries of
human use, and all ecosystems are subject to both shorter-term natural
variability and long-term evolution.
Most practical experience with ‘ecosystem management’ has been on
land. The idea became very prominent in the late 1980s and 1990s in
managing terrestrial environments in the western part of the United
States. At least 18 agencies of the United States federal government, as
well as many local governments, examined the implications of ecosystem
management for their operations (Haeuber 1996; Yaffee 1996). Through-
out this history there has been an ongoing struggle between ‘biocentrism’
– nature should be ‘managed’ for itself – and ‘anthropocentrism’ – nature
should be managed for the sustainable production of goods (McCay and
Wilson 1997). Scientists advocating managing ecosystems for production
are found mainly in natural resource management agencies, while inde-
pendent and academic natural scientists support the idea of ‘managing
nature’ for its own sake (Grumbine 1994). Grumbine (1994) reviewed 34
articles on ecosystem management and found biocentrism to be wide-
spread among academic scientists. The emphasis was much more on eco-
logical integrity than on sustainable use. The main goals being articulated
were maintaining viable populations of all native species, representing all
native ecosystems, conserving evolutionary potential, and basing geogra-
phical scales on the needs of the largest carnivores. Human use, on the
other hand, was to be allowed only when these other goals were met.
This same division is found in fisheries, and these two basic viewpoints
explain a lot about disagreements in marine management. Many people,
principally found in the commercial fishing industry and government
agencies, seem to see the sea as a ‘farm’ and fisheries management as
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exclusively about maximising long-term food production. Many others
seem to see the sea as a ‘park’ and management about protecting it for its
own sake. In this view fishing can be allowed if it has no impact on any
other marine creatures. Some even refer to the sea as the ‘last wilderness’
(e.g. Dinwiddie and Thomas 2006) as if it were some final bulwark against
the planetary encroachment of humans. Responsible stakeholders do not
hold to these viewpoints in any absolute way, but they are clearly present.
Fisheries scientists tend towards the ‘park’ pole (Wilson et al. 2002); after
all, many of them came into the business through a love of nature. Our
data on fisheries scientists’ attitudes indicate the same differences between
agency and non-agency scientists found by Grumbine (1994) with respect
to terrestrial ecosystems. This can be seen, for example, in their attitudes
towards the precautionary approach (Table 5.9).
An ecosystem approach has been called for in a range of documents
from international conferences and codes relating to general environmen-
tal issues, natural resource management and specifically fisheries. The ba-
sic idea has had a long history in land and forest management agencies,
going back at least to the 1930s (Haueber 1996). Turrell (2004) documents
the development of the concept of an EAFM in three strands of UN agree-
ments: the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; the UN Conferences on
Environment and Development, i.e., the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio
Declaration, the Johannesburg Declaration, etc.; and the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Each of the areas has seen a proliferation
of documents, agreements and ideas about what an ‘ecosystem approach’
might be. For the marine environment, early articulations of related con-
cepts from as early as the 1950s emphasised the interrelatedness of the
‘ocean space’ (Turrell 2004, p. 7). In the 1970s the ocean space idea began
to be linked to an ecosystem approach to ‘sustainable development’. The
1972 Stockholm Declaration called for more rational management of the
seas through an integrated and coordinated approach based in ‘rational
planning’. The late 1970s and 1980s saw the articulation of the value of
‘biodiversity’ which was linked to the ‘precautionary approach’ (see Section
5.2) by Agenda 21 and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity pro-
cesses in 1992. The actual term ‘ecosystem approach’ in the form ‘ecosys-
tem process-oriented approach’ (Turell 2004, p. 16) first appeared in 1995
in support and advisory meetings to the UN Convention on Biological Di-
versity process. It was specifically linked to the concept of ‘ecosystem func-
tions’ and the development and use of ‘models of ecosystem processes’
(Turrell 2004, p. 16).
The FAO process has been the most prominent one in fisheries, and
their 2003 technical paper on the subject (Garcia et al. 2003) has become
an important reference document. From an institutional perspective they
emphasise the need for strong legislation with effective implementation
and enforcement. They also focus on the need for coordinated decision-
making among agencies.
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Q 6.5 Intersectoral planning and coordination must be improved, on an
ecosystem basis, particularly when resources are shared (e.g. space shared
among aquaculture, transportation and fisheries) or nuisances are trans-
boundary. This requires developing collaboration between institutions in
charge of the different economic sectors as well as of research, environ-
ment, etc. Such collaboration will not be very effective without explicit allo-
cation of natural resources and space and improved coherence between sec-
toral legislative frameworks. A requirement in this respect is to improve
coordination between regional fishery and environmental commissions
(Garcia et al. 2003, p. 37).
Under the subject of governance, they offer the following list of needed
components:
Q 6.6 Decentralisation of decision-making and management responsibility
to lower-than-central national level (e.g. to coastal communities), building
the necessary capacity at that level.
– Higher participation of stakeholders in decision-making through open-
ing of institutions, broader public debates, development of representa-
tion of the sector, etc. Various forms of partnership management (co-
management, community-based management, etc) are available.
– Improved transparency, diffusing more information and instating over-
sight mechanisms.
– Establishment (or confirmation) of user rights, communal or individual,
free or against payment, exchangeable or not, depending on the circum-
stances.
– Bilateral and international agreements are required to optimise manage-
ment of shared and straddling fish stocks. This implies agreeing on re-
source allocation and, in the ambit of regional fisheries commissions,
with the issue of new entrants and illegal fishing. Agreements may also
be needed to deal with transboundary pollution.
– Cooperation between regional fishery bodies and environmental com-
missions ... need to be significantly upgraded in many areas.
– Oversight mechanisms by institutions and individuals independent
from sectoral interested pressures would help build objectivity and pub-
lic confidence in fisheries governance (2003, p. 39).
A tension can be seen in these FAO reflections on what is needed for
EAFM governance that I think is a central institutional issue within the
EAFM idea. It is also reflected in tensions over how science in support of
an EAFM should be done. On the one hand, there is the need for strong
legislation and a comprehensive, inter-agency, decision-making process
that is able to make practical decisions related to the whole ecosystem. On
the other hand, there is just as clear a need for more cooperation from
more groups in society operating on multiple scales. This need is reflected
in Garcia et al.’s (2003) call for decentralised decision-making, greater par-
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ticipation, and transparency. The need for more participation has a good
empirical basis. Steven Yaffee and his students at the University of Michi-
gan identified 662 sites of ecosystem management and did case studies of
77 (Yaffee 1996). Ecosystem management in practice turned out to be
much more than management coordination and inter-agency collabora-
tion; everyone interviewed talked about more effective public involvement.
Both viewpoints are right. We do need increased interagency coordination
and more decentralised and participatory decision-making across multiple
scales. This is a major governance challenge with strong implications for
science.
The EAFM increases the number of groups that would have a stake in
any given decision. Consider how the simpler problem of predator-prey
interactions in fisheries has made policy alignments more complex by in-
volving more players. Two examples from the 1990s come to mind. One
involves the struggles around menhaden management in the United
States where the issue was the degree to which fish targeted by an indus-
trial fishery were needed as fodder by popular recreational species. The
other is conflicts around the protection of sand eel that are a critical prey
for kittiwakes in the North Sea. In both cases, management based on pre-
dator-prey relationships was successfully implemented after considerable
effort – and this was against fisheries operating at a long distance that had
little or no local political clout. Given the increased policy complexity that
developed around these relatively simple inter-specific interactions, it is
clear that the social complexity implied by an EAFM creates a major chal-
lenge for any current management institution.
The term ‘ecosystem approach’ is routinely used by stakeholder groups
precisely to legitimate their having an influence on fisheries decisions. In
recent European discussions around marine ecosystems, the term ‘ecosys-
tem approach’ is often used as a general way of describing responses to the
problems that have traditionally been left out of fisheries management,
particularly ones by environmental groups involved with birds and marine
mammals. The term is often used simply to mean taking into account im-
pacts on habitat and other species than commercial fish. ‘We should be
taking an ecosystem approach’ means ‘we should be thinking about this
issue that my group is concerned about’.
The problem raised by the intersection of increasing both the number of
uncertain scientific claims that must be defended and the number of
stakeholders scrutinising them has also been missed by some of those re-
sponsible for designing management systems. The European Commis-
sion’s Biodiversity Action Plan for Fisheries suggests that while manage-
ment of biodiversity, which is how the document conceives the ecosystem
approach, will initially bring higher catches, the consideration of the state
of other species or habitats ‘will lead to less exploitation, less fishing oppor-
tunities and lower employment in the fishing sector’ (CEC 2001b, p. 6). In
a continent-wide policy arena, where even mild reforms of the Common
Fisheries Policy are politically difficult, to suggest that an ecosystem ap-
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proach, with all its complexities and uncertainties, will be the basis of re-
duced fisheries employment on the general behalf of other species and
habitats indicates that the Commission has not thought through the social
and policy realities. Nor, apparently, has it considered the far greater ecolo-
gical importance of increasing the amount of protein derived from capture
fisheries through traditional fisheries management goals as discussed
above.
Nor do ecosystem approaches reflect the realities of bureaucratic envir-
onmental management. Bureaucracies depend on calculable rules to trig-
ger responses (Porter 1995), while ecosystem approaches present complex
interactions of parameters that are difficult to quantify and impossible to
interpret in real, decision-making time. More fundamentally, the concepts
needed to make ecosystem management work do not translate into firm,
legal definitions, not even ones as simple as boundaries (Haueber 1996).
For management bureaucracies, changes in policies involve high transac-
tion costs, so they seek decisions that are as permanent as possible. Eco-
system approaches depend on the flexibility to make changes in response
to shifting system parameters (Wilson and Dickie 1995). Moreover, bu-
reaucratic personnel decisions depend on the clear identification of arenas
of responsibility and mechanisms of accountability, whereas ecosystem ap-
proaches see ‘responsibility’ for outcomes in the interaction of many are-
nas (McCay and Wilson 1997). Bureaucracies are not well designed to ad-
dress ecosystems, and many of the institutional design characteristics that
make an ecosystem approach difficult are basic requirements of coordina-
tion of large-scale policies in a democracy.
One attempt to reduce the governance problems created by the EAFM is
the promotion of marine protected areas (MPAs). In fact, MPAs are a good
example of where a particular management agenda is closely linked by
many people to the ecosystem approach. MPAs are areas where fishing
and other human activities are restricted or prohibited, and they range
from highly protected nature reserves to large multi-use areas with modest
limitations on specific types of activities. As a fisheries management tool
MPAs have gained in popularity over the last couple of decades. MPAs are
expected to reduce fishing on spawning stocks and recruits, to increase
fish abundance within the protected area and to promote spillover of the
increased fish abundance into neighbouring areas where it may lead to
improved catches. By reducing fishing effort, MPAs can contribute to eco-
system conservation and enhance or preserve local biodiversity. Their in-
troduction is therefore often supported by conservation organisations (Hal-
pern and Warner 2003). Once they are established, MPAs typically require
much less biological information than other management tools, and they
may therefore be a more cost-effective way to conserve fish stocks than
either TACs or effort control.
Despite these advantages, MPAs have been met with criticism both
within and outside the discipline of ecology. Their protection is limited to
relatively stationary species, and they do little to protect migratory species.
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MPAs also sometimes simply force fishers to relocate and concentrate
their fishing effort in adjacent areas. Expectations for MPAs are often high
because of their popularity, and experience with MPAs shows that few
have fulfilled expectations. In a global assessment Kelleher et al. (1995)
classified only 31% of the MPAs surveyed as achieving their management
objectives. Various reasons have been attributed to the lack of success with
MPAs. They may be too small, poorly designed, or lack economic input or
stakeholder participation in their establishment (Degnbol et al. 2006). The
various forms of MPAs established in Europe have done little to settle ar-
guments about their effectiveness because of serious design flaws. They
have not been based on an experimental design with measurable objec-
tives; indeed, there has been little agreement on identifying what one
might measure to evaluate them. In many instances the established regu-
lations have been haphazard, with little or no monitoring of their imple-
mentation (PROTECT Project 2006).
Degnbol et al. (2006) argue that MPAs are particularly popular among
biologists and environmentalists because the idea is fundamentally rooted
in the idea of the fishery as essentially a biological and ecological system
that must have its complexity recognised and all its parts protected. It has
therefore become a ‘technological fix’ for the fisheries management prob-
lem for many biologists and environmentalists. While small MPAs are ar-
guably not meaningful for the management of many non-sedentary fish
species, large MPAs are fixes that have some severe weaknesses from the
point of view of both the economics and politics of management. They are
economically inefficient because they impose a direct constraint on fish-
ers’ decisions, and they are politically difficult because they tend to have
strongly disproportionate impacts on different fishing communities (Wil-
son 2000). One important exception to this is the temporary closure of
spawning areas during spawning periods. This is a measure that is actually
very popular with the fishing industry when it is linked to ‘real time man-
agement’, meaning that the spawning times and areas are identified by
fishers who then put the closure into place for a limited period of time.
One of the great fears that the industry has about MPAs is that they will
always be permanent. As one industry representative put it at a stakeholder
meeting:
Q 6.7 MPAs should have measurable targets. Fishers’ experience is that
closures are never raised again. As a fisheries management tool we are very
hesitant, we are against the idea of using MPAs as a tool for reducing fish-
ing mortality, existing boxes are much more political than biological. And
boxes are never lifted, boxes are like coffins. (Observer’s notes at the North
Sea RAC Spatial Planning Working Group meeting, May 2005)
Within MPAs the basic tension between multi-scale decentralisation and
inter-agency coordination reappears in a reduced form. The permanent
imposition of large MPAs with strong and inflexible restrictions on fishing
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and other uses would certainly reduce the governance problem while en-
suring the continued health of the marine environment. One might say it
would deal with the EAFM governance problem by sweeping it off the sea.
The political feasibility of doing this across any really large area is at best
questionable. Any attempt to make MPAs less permanent or give them a
flexible rule-making structure reintroduces the decision-making problem
at the new level of the MPA. Various agencies and stakeholders would
have to be involved, and the science would have to be developed. This
might well be a very good thing; it could allow a fresh start at a new deci-
sion-making level with new, ecosystem-oriented objectives and rules of
participation. It would help the problem, but not solve it.
Table 6.1 Responses to attitude scales about the ecosystem approach
by type of last expert group
1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree
Type of last expert group
None Non-stock
assess-
ment
Stock
assess-
ment
Total P
It is critical that fisheries management re-
tain species-by-species management as its
basic approach.
Mean 3.72 3.44 3.71 3.61 0.31
N 146 166 121 433
The requirements of implementing an eco-
system approach to fisheries should be a
central principle when reorganising na-
tional and international fisheries manage-
ment agencies.
Mean 5.69 5.46 4.93 5.39 0
N 144 166 123 433
It is difficult to see how any management
bureaucracy could effectively implement an
ecosystem approach to fisheries manage-
ment on any marine area large enough to
be shared between two or more nations.
Mean 3.14 3.02 3.63 3.25 0.01
N 144 165 121 430
Excluded in all questions are 20 who did indicate participating in an expert group but who did not
make clear which kind of expert group, and six who failed to answer whether they had been in an
expert group or not. Furthermore, six did not answer the question on species-by-species management;
six did not answer the question on the ecosystem approach as a central principle; and nine did not
answer the question on effective implementation of the ecosystem approach.
The results of our survey of northern European fisheries scientists confirm
these bureaucratic difficulties with EAFM. We asked three questions in the
form of seven-point ‘strongly disagree to strongly agree’ scales related to
different aspects of the implementation of the ecosystem approach. The
same result was found in similar research in the United States (Wilson et
al. 2002). Average scores on all three of these questions were in the direc-
tion of greater support for the ecosystem approach (Table 6.1). When the
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scores were compared by the type of last expert group attended, no differ-
ence was found for the basic idea of moving away from species-by-species
management. More complex statements, however, showed systematic dif-
ferences. On both a question dealing with the ecosystem approach and
bureaucratic reorganisation and a question dealing with using the ecosys-
tem approach on large geographical scales, scientists whose last expert
group had been an assessment expert group were less supportive than the
other scientists (Table 6.1), while still on the ecosystem approach side of
the centre of the scale (4).
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When the same questions were broken down by type of employer, sys-
tematic differences were found for the first two, while the third question
revealed differences between two categories and all the other categories
combined (Table 6.2). For all three questions, scientists working for con-
servation NGOs were the most supportive of the ecosystem approach,
while scientists working for the European Commission were the least sup-
portive. For the basic question about moving away from species-by-species
management, the Commission scientists were the only group among any
examined whose average scores were beyond the centre of the scale, away
from support for the ecosystem approach.
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 tell almost exactly the same story that was found
in a similar survey of fisheries scientists in the United States (Wilson et al.
2002). The closer a scientist is to the day-to-day implementation of fish-
eries management, the more cautious he or she is about the ecosystem
approach. Everyone supports it, but those tasked most directly with man-
agement decision-making seem to have a greater appreciation of the prac-
tical and political problems associated with its implementation. Table 6.2
also reminds us that species-by-species management, while hard to justify
on scientific grounds, is used to solve some very real political problems in
the ways that fisheries are organised and managed.
The bottom line from these scientific, social and bureaucratic considera-
tions is that ecosystems are not a unit of management that fits easily with
democratic, science-driven management as it is carried out on large scales
through government bureaucracies. Rather the approach that these studies
seem to call for is a more Habermasian one (see Chapter 1) that relies on
communicative rationality to ensure timely responses to a widely defined
set of problems. This would mean resisting the temptation to define the
EAFM as an essentially technical challenge where the ecosystem is seen as
a big machine that needs to be properly maintained, and so the first thing
we need to do is to diagnose its problems.
The alternative is to view the EAFM as a social dilemma as well. The
social dilemma is finding ways for people who see problems in the ecosys-
tem to initiate a decision-making process to effectively respond to those
problems. The question then becomes how to ensure that all concerns
have access to the management process. From this perspective the man-
agement system responds to individual issues as they arise and does not
try to figure out how to deal with everything at the same time. The ‘poly-
centric’ or dispersed networks of groups concerned in various ways with
the ecosystem discussed in Section 3.2 have an important role to play
here. This way of thinking about the EAFM requires trusting that there
are enough people concerned about the marine environment that all the
problems will be identified. Yaffee’s (1996) analysis of a large sample of
attempts at an ecosystem approach found that the successful ecosystem-
based approaches were not the highly technical ones that began by creating
complex ecosystem models, followed by goal determination exercises and
then adaptive management. Rather, tentative and experimental approaches
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undertaken by groups of people faced with immediate problems showed
the strongest results.
A central institutional issue here might be called ‘burden of proof’,
although it is unfortunate that this phrase has its source in law rather than
science, because what I am talking about here is a more scientific than
legal idea of ‘proof’. If the EAFM is to be rooted in ensuring that people
have the ability to effectively raise concerns about the environmental im-
pacts of certain activities, then there has to be a level playing field. It can-
not be the case that those taking a conservative position in relation to sus-
tainable use are always reacting to existing uses. A participatory approach
to the EAFM requires balance, and such balance is achieved when the
onus is on the users to demonstrate that their activities are sustainable.
This cannot be taken too far, of course, especially in a legal sense. We can-
not require that a permit be obtained for every new fishing net. Placing the
burden of proof on economic interests has also led to real scientific diffi-
culties, as in the case of drug trails (Guston 2001b), where insisting that
the industry pay for the science leaves it under the heavy influence of those
who gain from particular outcomes.
This idea of the EAFM as both a technical and social dilemma is re-
flected in the programmatic tension identified earlier between the EAFM
as interagency coordination and the EAFM as increased stakeholder parti-
cipation. These approaches to the EAFM are complementary in the sense
that the social approach relieves the technical one of always having to have
the big picture ready, while the technical approach provides the social ap-
proach with a filter to sift signal from noise. This tension is also reflected
in science in the form of comprehensive and particularistic approaches to
generating ecosystem science for advice discussed below. Results-based
EAFM is an institutional framework that considers both dilemmas that I
return to in Chapter 8.
In the midst of these complex governance challenges, the question of
how best to produce scientific advice for an EAFM has fallen most heavily
on ICES. How ICES has responded to this challenge is the subject of the
next section.
6.3 ICES: The challenges of scientific advice for the EAFM
6.3.1 Introduction
Science for the EAFM is extremely challenging and faces a host of un-
knowns. A marine ecologist provided me with the following list of priority
areas of research:
Q 6.8 The ecology and life history of most fish species in European waters
is only partially known, and large gaps in knowledge exist. This knowledge
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is primarily restricted to some of the commercially most important species,
and even here serious gaps exist. For example, modern tagging methods
are only now beginning to quantify how factors such as size, gender, prey
abundance and environmental conditions affect the spatial distribution of a
well-studied species such as cod. Moreover, many fish species are moving
to new geographic areas as climate change progresses; ecology and life his-
tory of species in these new situations are therefore unknown and will be
insufficient for management applications as new fisheries on these species
develop in future. Similarly, ecosystems and food webs undergo important
changes in structure and function over time (e.g. due to fishing, climate
variability, etc.); even if particular species remain in present locations as
climate change progresses, new knowledge of how the ecology and life his-
tory of those species are affected and will respond to different ecosystem
and food web configurations is needed. Studies which improve knowledge
of reproduction, migration, growth and survival of various life history
stages, and of how species interact in time and space are needed to improve
biological, ecosystem and fishery management models (Brian MacKenzie,
personal communication).
The ICES leadership sees the EAFM as requiring a good deal more than
just providing information from a broader range of marine science disci-
plines. The major conceptual challenge is how to integrate these disci-
plines into a research programme that will become a source of compre-
hensive, coherent and consistent advice. In fact, the Advisory Programme
has for many years included the Advisory Committee on Ecosystems
(ACE) and the Advisory Committee on the Marine Environment (ACME)
in addition to the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM),
even if in the past the first two committees had not had to field nearly as
many requests for advice as ACFM did. These three committees are now
combined into the Advisory Committee (ACOM). A scientist who is a lead-
er in the Advisory Programme:
Q 6.9 Scientist One: The ecosystem approach means an adaptive approach,
with social balance, focuses on the process. Integrating assessment groups
means using long-term perspectives, emphasis on topics will vary over
time. There are GLOBEC groups working, SGSE groups working on sea
bird ecology, and cooperation with the REGNS process. Is there a problem
of coordinating this with the advice process? We are being asked for long-
term status approaches such as harvest control rules, recovery plans, and
ecosystem health indicator frameworks and to contribute to the implemen-
tation of an ecosystem approach on an appropriate geographical scale. (Ob-
server’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme meet-
ing, September 2004)
Several things are important to note in this quote. The first is that the
EAFM is coming to ICES at a time when they are also trying to deal with
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several other more or less related problems such as long-term fisheries
management strategies and harvest control rules. Both of them are related
to the demand for multi-species, fleet-based advice discussed in Section
6.1. The second thing worth noting is the way this scientist defined the
ecosystem approach in very broad terms as an adaptive process with a so-
cial balance. ICES as an organisation is determined to remain a purely ma-
rine science group. They have strongly resisted frequent suggestions, in
my opinion for very good reasons, that they should take economics and
other fisheries social science on board as part of their advice. Many people
within ICES, however, recognise the importance of understanding the de-
velopment and use of scientific advice as a social process. This is evi-
denced, for example, by the creation of the Working Group on Fisheries
Systems to focus on just these issues. While as scientists their first re-
sponse is to see the EAFM as a primarily technical dilemma, many mem-
bers are also open to understanding how it acts as a social dilemma as well.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the ICES leadership sees a series of
issues around their institutional organisation and culture as central to
meeting the conceptual challenges of the EAFM. Even the single-species
models used in fisheries management, while grounded in good science
(Rosenberg et al. 1993), are caught in a squeeze between demands for
more precision and the costs of delivering that precision (Degnbol 2003).
These problems increase literally exponentially when species interactions
are considered, as became evident in the discussion above of the multi-
species, fisheries-based approach. This has resulted in a situation where
models purporting to be useful for ecosystem-level decision-making are
being subjected to scientific standards that are much lower than those for
single species (ICES 2000).
ICES is trying to deal with a tension that is similar to the one discussed
in the last section between the technical definition of the EAFM that em-
phasises comprehensive, inter-agency, decision-making processes and the
social definition that emphasises transparency and participation. One
would think that scientists always jump to a technical understanding of
the EAFM. And when dealing with it in the abstract, that is what they
usually do by defining the problem as a need for ‘integrated assessments’
of ecosystems or something very similar (Google Scholar yielded 1420 hits
for the exact phrase ‘integrated assessments’ in documents with ‘ecosys-
tem’). Many scientists are searching for models that can be used in the
ecosystem approach in a similar way to the stock assessment models cur-
rently being used for single-species management. A number of the activ-
ities around developing the ecosystem approach, e.g. the Regional Ecosys-
tem Study Group for the North Sea (REGNS) within ICES that is trying to
build a set of ecosystem models of the North Sea, have as an eventual ideal
the idea of managing with an integrated assessment.
Q 6.10 Scientist One: None of us can produce integrated advice, we don’t
know how. It has to start from the bottom and move up. Scientist Two: We
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can do this within the existing system. Scientist Three: I would like to see
one group giving integrated advice before I change the whole organisation.
Observer from DG MARE: A structure to integrate advice? What are the
questions we are posing? What do you think we clients are asking you to
do? The Commission is not as interested in integration as they are in spe-
cifics. We want long-term management, effort management, and impact
assessment for stocks, the environment, the economy and society. You
should keep looking at what your clients want to see. (Observer’s notes at the
combined meeting of the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management, the Ad-
visory Committee for Ecosystems and the Resource Management Committee,
September 2006)
The reaction of the observer from DG MARE is very important because it
shows how the tension between a comprehensive versus particularistic ap-
proach to the EAFM exists among ICES clients as well as within ICES
itself. This person is not concerned with integrated advice, let alone overall
ecosystem modelling. He wants specific answers to specific questions and
doubts the utility of integration in achieving this. This attitude is not
shared by everyone at DG MARE (see Q 6.46) and is likely to be much
less prevalent among other clients such as DG ENV, HELCOM and OS-
PAR, but DG MARE is currently the single most influential client. DG
MARE focuses on fisheries and sees the EAFM as mainly about improving
fisheries management. HELCOM and OSPAR are concerned with the gen-
eral marine environment and are much more interested in developing
comprehensive, inter-agency, decision-making processes. Integration ef-
forts like REGNS, including attempts at developing ecosystem-level mod-
els, will continue to be an important part of ICES’s response to the EAFM
regardless of the clients’ desires. This is because they a) represent the cut-
ting edge of knowledge with a scientific appeal and b) adhere closely to the
scientists’ ideal of the kind of information that the EAFM should be based
on. They understand the difficulty of modelling an entire ecosystem; rea-
listically, they are hoping to be able to derive a set of general indicators of
ecosystem health that could be used as the basis of management.
The remainder of the chapter focuses on how ICES took on developing a
system to produce scientific advice for an EAFM. The main focus is on the
fisheries aspects of this, i.e. how ecosystem considerations would be incor-
porated in fish stock assessments and then into fisheries management ad-
vice. This is because this was ICES’s main focus in the meetings I ob-
served, but developing advice based on fisheries impacts on the
environment would have many similar social aspects. I begin by examin-
ing how the tension between the particularistic and comprehensive ap-
proaches to the EAFM led to a two-pronged development strategy. Then I
turn to the relationship between methodology and the two basic scientific
cultures within the ICES community. Finally, I examine the issues around
the mobilisation of knowledge and quality control.
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6.3.2 EAFM advice and the two-pronged strategy
Within ICES, the mainstream view of the role of science in policy, intro-
duced in Chapter 3, is the assumed starting point. The challenge becomes
fitting the realities of the EAFM into that model of the role of science. For
ICES, harvest control rules and their associated precautionary trigger
points form the framework for how objective scientific advice is translated
into a policy decision. The report of the Working Group on Ecosystem Ef-
fects of Fishing Activities (WGECO) describes this ideal:
Q 6.11 This framework is embedded in a social and policy governance sys-
tem. The governance process has a vital role in augmenting the science-
based framework with targets and societal values that influence decision-
making. However, the intent of these science-based precautionary frame-
works is to ensure that scientific knowledge is captured clearly in objective,
rule-based advice to management. In the end, society may choose not to
comply with the science-based advice, but well-tested empirical rules at
least make the science input to the decision-making process explicit and
objective (ICES 2007b, p. 7).
In the standard application a stock assessment model estimates one para-
meter about the condition of the stock – the spawning stock biomass or
SSB – and one parameter about the fishing pressure to which it is being
subjected – fishing mortality or F – and these two estimates with asso-
ciated measures of uncertainty are plugged into an ‘if/then’ harvest control
rule. The form of this rule might be, for example, ‘if SSB falls below X,
then F must be reduced to Y’. The automatic nature of the harvest control
rule creates a feeling of objectivity because the ‘science’, i.e. the SSB para-
meter, is formally separated from the ‘management’, i.e. the new target for
F. This ‘social and policy governance’ narrative hides any lack of objectivity
– including most strikingly in the WGECO quote (Q 6.11), the application
of the highly political precautionary approach – firmly within a black box
on the science side, while leaving society with the political choice ‘not to
comply’.
In the search for an equivalent framework, the basic logic is the same. F,
current SSB and future SSB are examples of pressure, state and response
indictors that form the basis of most approaches to understanding ecosys-
tems. The problem is the far greater complexity of the ecosystem, which
makes the separation of politics and science even more difficult. The fish-
eries problem is an industry-driven problem with fairly clear agreement in
principle on the objective: catching as many fish as possible in the long
term. This problem drives the selection of indicators, making the science
‘simple’ in that sense. Finding equivalents for an EAFM depends on agree-
ing on what are often contested objectives and developing useful indica-
tors. Hiding political choices on the ‘science side’ becomes that much
more obvious and difficult.
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In trying to figure out how to provide advice for an EAFM, ICES self-
consciously adopted a two-pronged strategy with an ‘integrated’ prong –
that holds onto system-level modelling as an ideal – and an ‘event’ prong
that links fisheries management advice to specific events in the ecosystem
that have implications for fisheries advice. As the leaders of the Advisory
Programme put it in a document addressed to clients:
Q 6.12 ICES has been working on the development of an ecosystem ap-
proach to fisheries management through two routes:
Incremental additions of ecosystem aspects to the fisheries advice in ACFM
and advice on ecosystem health and specific issues through ACE;
An overall ‘system health’ approach, integration of multiple sources of in-
formation using the North Sea as a case study through the REGNS process
(MCAP-MICC 10-11 April 2006 Doc 9).
One prong, the second in Q 6.12, was given an early form by the REGNS
group, where an integrated assessment of the North Sea ecosystem was
attempted. It was based on the eventual goal of producing models that
could be plugged into the ideal governance framework in the same way
that fisheries stock assessment models are used in the single-stock situa-
tion. Because of the complexity of this goal, the intent of the REGNS group
was very exploratory in the ways it was linked to possible approaches to
advice given. The REGNS group is no longer functioning. The other prong
is given form by WGRED, the Working Group for Regional Ecosystem
Descriptions, which tries to carefully develop instances of ecosystem-ap-
proach advice based on the link between environmental events and specif-
ic stocks to help the stock assessment better reflect environmental condi-
tions. In other words, it describes specific ways that changes in the
ecosystem have an impact on fisheries. In this approach the role of the
stock-assessment parameter would be filled by the observation of environ-
mental events that had implications for fish stock assessments. All that is
required is that this link be understood and specified, a challenge that re-
quires a tremendous amount of research based on the accurate anticipa-
tion of what events are likely to be important.
One helpful way to talk about the mid-term goal is being able to provide
integrated rather than concatenated advice. Concatenated advice is advice
based on a series of discrete descriptions of nature that are of sufficient
quality in and of themselves, but the relationships among these parts are
not addressed. Integrated advice is based on some understanding of these
interrelationships. At first, such advice would not need to be based on a
fully integrated ecosystem assessment, but rather on particular links, such
as the link between a type of event and the condition of a particular fish
stock. Building the ability to provide specific forms of integrated advice
would also be a path towards a capacity for integrated assessments.
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Prong 1: Moving towards integrated assessments
REGNS was part of ICES’s initial attempt to develop models and data for
integrated assessments for the EAFM. The North Sea ecosystem was cho-
sen because a great deal is known about its fisheries, and the physical pro-
cesses have also been relatively well studied (ICES 2006a). In presenting
REGNS at the ICES Annual Science Conference in 2004, the organisers
emphasised that REGNS was finding ways to complement current ICES
activities. The immediate goal was to enable ‘partial integrated assess-
ments’ that were able to look at single changes in pressures on the ecosys-
tem and the corresponding state changes. A central focus of the REGNS
effort was to identify the required data and where it was available, starting
with a list of 70 parameters that they saw as important for describing the
ecosystem structure and function of the North Sea (Kenny 2004). Even the
humble goal of partially integrated assessments was to be achieved within
a broad and expensive ecosystem context.
Reactions to the REGNS presentation immediately took a practical turn:
Q 6.13 Scientist One: [After expressing appreciation] How can you argue
that this is complete? Scientist Two: ... It was fairly easy to start with an
ideal wish list and that is where the 70 parameters came from. Scientist
Three: Lots of redundancy and they use MDS [multidimensional scaling, a
statistical technique that summarises correlations among many variables]
to deal with it. Scientist Four: What about geological processes? Scientist
One: You are tempted to completeness ... you end up with a huge list that
no one will pay for; the pragmatic way is to look at what data is already
there, the third way is the Wadden Sea example, which is to choose these
things according to issues of concern. Scientist two: We will eventually
come to identifying gaps, we started from theory. Scientist Five: We are
trapped in the past. We are trying to look at an ecosystem for management
and have the data that was generated in respect to other interests. So a gap
analysis is important. We are also dealing with an ICES WP structure not
organised around delivering holistic information. (Observer’s notes at the in-
formal presentation of the REGNS process, ICES Annual Science Conference,
September 2004)
A tension emerged almost immediately between scientists concerned with
how this huge number of parameters could be handled practically and the
concern of Scientist Five that there were still gaps in what was being exam-
ined because the data had not been generated by looking at the ecosystem
for management purposes. This vision of not being ‘trapped in the past’
includes a ‘holistic’ picture of the ecosystem that will require a restructur-
ing of ICES’s expert groups. It is interesting that one of Scientist One’s
alternatives, the ‘Wadden Sea approach’, began by seeing the problem as a
social rather than a technical dilemma. The conversation soon turned to
the political dimensions of the problem:
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Q 6.14 Scientist One: ICES has mechanisms for getting the Delegates to
support this, and that is a clear set of terms of references. A Delegate:
Don’t shoot the Delegates. Countries’ money has not gone in the ICES di-
rection in the last 10 years. We need to approach politicians to convince
them that money for ecosystem work needs to be made available. Scientist
Two: We could write a proposal if we know what we are doing and take it to
OSPAR. Scientist One: On that topic, this is related to the Marine Strategy
that DG Environment and DG Fisheries intend to bring forward. This
could have important funding opportunities, but we need to use compatible
language. Scientist Three: ... This will definitely not be a marine equivalent
of the Water Directive which was very expensive and did little. The Com-
mission will not buy another of those. Scientist Two: This is the crux, the
funding comes from national governments, but the customers we have, e.g.
OSPAR, want this done but don’t have the money. (Observer’s notes at the
informal presentation of the REGNS process, ICES Annual Science Conference,
September 2004)
The EU and the member state governments are formally committed to an
EAFM but are still going to be very careful about what they fund. The
scientists in OSPAR and elsewhere that do support developing integrated
assessments do not control the needed funds. The problem is how to con-
vince the politicians. The problem also has national and regional dimen-
sions where some countries and areas are more concerned about the
EAFM than others, as is evidenced by the following quote from a WGRED
report:
Q 6.15 No countries around the Baltic Sea sent participants to the working
group meeting. The working group updated some time series data in cases
where 2006 values could be located. Otherwise, however, the OVERVIEW
HAS NOT BEEN UPDATED AND WILL NEED ATTENTION FROM ICES
(ICES 2007a, p. 1, emphasis in original).
Caught between the ideal and the practical, REGNS spent two years trying
to figure out what an integrated assessment should be. In the end, they
dealt with the problem, as is so often done, by broadening it so far that
they could not be accused of leaving anything out:
Q 6.16 There was confusion about the meaning and nature of Integrated
Assessment which took time to resolve in REGNS – in fact, the first two
meetings (2 years) were spent resolving this issue. For example we con-
cluded that Integrated Assessment should be considered at three levels,
namely: (i) policy drivers13; (ii) scientific understanding of ecosystem pro-
cesses; and (iii) the provision of advice and the development of manage-
ment tools. REGNS recognised that most of what is being called Integrated
Assessment can be assigned to at least one of these three areas (ICES
2006a, p. 97).
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Integrated assessments, following REGNS, cover policy, management and
everything in between. It was a way to finesse a contentious issue. The
objectives of integrated assessments are also quite different among the
potential user groups. The REGNS group suggested that there were three
groups that might want to use the products – policymakers, research scien-
tists, and environmental managers – and that these groups had such dif-
ferent needs that sub-groups would need to be formed:
Q 6.17 If the Integrated Assessment is aiming to deliver a report for policy-
makers, research scientists and environmental managers, then it is neces-
sary to establish three subgroups to deal with their specific needs. REGNS
made the mistake of trying to do it all at the same time with representatives
from each area – the result was difficult to chair as each end user group
tended to pull the work programme to meet their own needs. The policy-
makers tend to be most interested in indicators of marine ecosystem
health, etc. and smiley faces. They want integrated outputs to show how
effective or otherwise their marine stewardship policies are. Likewise, re-
search scientists have specific needs to do with testing significance and un-
derstanding cause/effect relationships, whereas the environmental man-
agers wish to maximise the effectiveness of their monitoring programmes
(ICES 2006a, p. 99).
It is striking that the REGNS report assumed that integrated assessments
would contribute solely to top-down management processes. This is parti-
cularly striking because of the amount of effort that the Advisory Pro-
gramme has placed in communicating ICES science to user groups and
other stakeholders over the past five years. However, REGNS was a study
group taken mainly from the science side of ICES, and this is a good ex-
ample of the cultural differences between the two discussed below. The
second interesting assumption is that the managers and policymakers
want to use the integrated assessments for monitoring and reporting on
ecological conditions, while the use of the assessments in management
decision-making is not mentioned. Even for this limited group the man-
agement implications of their conclusions are unclear:
Q 6.18 The assessment has provided some valuable insights into the signif-
icance of the relationships between different pressure and state changes at
different scales and the time scales over which changes take place. For ex-
ample, plankton community data in relation to the physical and chemical
oceanography reveals both gradients of response to the major riverine in-
puts of nutrients into the North Sea and sources of nutrients from the
Atlantic. In addition, an assessment of all variables reveals two relatively
stable states in the North Sea, one pre-1983 and the other post-1997. The
intervening years are dominated by high ecosystem variability which repre-
sents a transition from one state to another and in part explains the number
of studies which highlight different years for regime shifts. We conclude
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that defining such shifts is sensitive to the number and type of variables
included in such an analysis (ICES 2006a, p. 1).
They did catalogue pressure-state relationships, such as nutrient inputs,
that could usefully inform the management of some stocks. This useful-
ness would come into play if changes in these pressures were observed
and sufficient research had been done before this observation to make a
meaningful statement about the magnitude of the state change. This sug-
gests a major challenge in the anticipation of important events and the
prioritisation of research. This in itself seems a reasonable justification of
efforts like REGNS. At the integrated system level they were able to say
that the ‘big picture’ matters, in the sense that stable general states or ‘re-
gimes’ could be observed, but with little clarity about what causes shifts
between the states, or even when they happen. Integrated assessments for
management do indeed seem a long way off.
Prong 2: The impact of ecosystem events on fisheries
The following exchange took place at a meeting of the Management Com-
mittee on the Advisory Process (MCAP), the ICES committee charged with
overseeing the advisory process.
Q 6.19 Scientist One: We are being asked for long-term status approaches
such as harvest control rules, recovery plans, and ecosystem health indica-
tor frameworks that will contribute to the implementation of an ecosystem
approach on an appropriate geographical scale. Scientist Two: The first task
for area-based groups would be to compile existing information on linkages
and impacts and not pretend to try to integrate on a system level; to start in
a humble way. (Observer’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory
Programme meeting, September 2004)
If humility means that trying to ‘integrate on a system level’ is not going to
be practically feasible for a very long time, then how can the link be made
between science and advice? Even if an equivalent to a stock assessment
model could be constructed, the number of parameters and the extreme
uncertainty about their measurement would make their translation into a
useful ‘harvest control rule or other rule about some type of fishing behav-
iour more difficult’. A more immediately practical device for translating an
ecosystem assessment into objective advice for fisheries management is
the ‘occasional environmental anomaly’, or more simply ‘event’. The fol-
lowing quote is from the Working Group for Regional Ecosystem Descrip-
tion (WGRED), which is charged with aiding the transition of established
stock-assessment expert groups towards producing advice for the EAFM.
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Q 6.20 If risk of very poor (or good) productivity does increase markedly
under certain environmental and/or biological conditions, these conditions
could be effective trigger points for conditional control rules. Such rules
would be more effective in ensuring that ICES advice is robust to the occa-
sional environmental anomaly; circumstances where advice based on as-
suming ‘typical’ conditions could go badly wrong, with severe conse-
quences for the resource (ICES 2007a, p. 145).
The objective observation of events can be tied to the science side of an ‘if/
then rule’ as long as a logical argument is developed for the link between
the event and the response. This last requirement makes the focus on
events a tentative and exploratory move:
Q 6.21 Scientist One: Nobody is thinking that an integrated assessment in
REGNS and integrated advice are the same. We don’t know what their rela-
tionship is. We can’t know that until we see an integrated assessment. But
what we want in the integrated advice are discussions of significant events
each year. We get information on big signals, and we give it a paragraph in
a three-page summary of the ecosystem. We had better know what we want
to say about it, and we are doing nothing to prepare ourselves to know. One
example was the absence of capelin in the area around Iceland. That is as
significant even in that part of the world, and we did not know what to do.
Scientist Two: Who knew about it, just fisheries people or the whole com-
munity? Scientist Three: We did not have any quantitative way of linking it
to advice, we know the direction, but we don’t know what else to say about
it. Scientist One: If we all support integrated advice, we need to think about
what was done and who should have done it so when we get that signal we
know what to do. This is what we need to think about. What do we do when
we see that the food supply has failed? It is fine the first time it happens to
not know what to do, but then we need to ask about the relationship be-
tween the food supply and fisheries advice as a part of integrated advice ...
Scientist Four: There are two issues here. One is to create a methodological
approach and have that ready for the advisory groups. When the capelin
disappear, it is too late to start the scientific process, we have to have a
methodology ready. We need a procedure within the advisory system. (Ob-
server’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September 2004)
In this case the event – the absence of capelin, an important prey species –
and its relevance are clear in a qualitative sense, but the tools for translat-
ing the event into advice are not. What is called for is an adaptive approach
in which events are anticipated (not predicted!) and methodologies devel-
oped in advance for preparing advice when they happen. Such methodolo-
gies could be aided by research into an integrated understanding of the
ecosystem level, but are themselves a much more humble endeavour.
These discussions around the table made their way eventually into the re-
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port of WGRED along with suggestions for how the relevant expert groups
could incorporate the events in their stock assessments:
Q 6.22 The three events which were identified were:
The continued low abundance and restricted distribution of capelin around
Iceland. The consequences of low food availability should be taken into ac-
count in weights-at-age and other estimates of productivity used in short-
term and medium-term projections.
The very warm conditions in Barents Sea in 2005, combined with the high
abundance of young herring, suggest that the predator-prey relationships
currently included in the analytical assessment models for cod and capelin
should be scrutinised carefully, and 2005 data examined for evidence of
anomalous predation rates.
The very low abundance of Norway pout and low abundance of sand eel in
many parts of the North Sea suggest that the prey base for higher predators
might be anomalously limited in 2005 and 2006. The most recent possible
data should be used for weights-at-age in the projections, and survey data
should be examined carefully for anomalous distributions.
In addition, it was noted that the NAO has changed from strongly positive
to near neutral in 2005. It is too soon to know if this change has important
ecosystem consequences, and it is considered premature to speculate that
another regime shift has occurred in the Iberian Sea (ICES 2006b, p. 1).
The identification of these events set the stage for the next step of trying to
link the events to the stock assessments. This meant mobilising a very ex-
tensive research agenda that is still ongoing. It requires anticipating the
kinds of events that may have an impact, and then understanding the rela-
tionship between the events and the fishery well enough to translate them
into advice. It requires developing an anticipatory and adaptive knowledge
system.
6.3.3 Scientific methods and cultures in ICES
The two-prong approach helps, but hardly resolves the disputes around
how to approach the EAFM. The following quote illustrates a number of
other issues.
Q 6.23 Scientist One: We should not ask a group of people to compile
[everything] we know and then we use that. We have to know what we want
and I don’t have a clue what to write in the ecosystem section of an ACFM
report. Have we decided to write something we can document? The client
will not be happy with some general statements. I don’t know how to move
forward from here. ICES needs to look at what will fill our needs. Scientist
Two: The idea is not to make filler text. The job done by ACE [the Advisory
Committee on Ecosystems] is what we need to do. They have information
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about cycles in horse mackerel and the impacts on North East Arctic cod.
Icelandic capelin was another example with the collapse of the food source
in the system. The beginning is to take whatever is known ... Scientist
Three: I have two main concerns. We want to model these things but we
don’t know the mechanisms, without that we risk doing things without
knowing why. We are putting a lot of energy into moving from the single-
species assessments while we sit and blame this approach for not working,
but it has never been implemented in a political sense, and then we go off
and move in a scientific direction we do not know anything about. Scientist
Four: We can put in some time series of the status of the ecosystem, tem-
peratures, plankton production and standardise these things. Scientist Five:
ACE ... has identified some steps ICES can take to get over this hurdle.
Scientist Six: I don’t speak against the ecosystem approach, but I am con-
cerned with the impact on the ability of ICES to provide high-quality fish-
eries advice. We are overloaded just with fisheries advice, and now we are
adding this ecosystem approach, but the Commission still needs high-qual-
ity fisheries advice. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries
Management meeting, September 2004)
The discussion collates a complex mixture of questions such as: modelling
versus qualitative descriptions; what constitutes adequate advice; feasibility
from a work-load perspective; and basic doubts about whether or not
changing the scope of the analysis to include the ecosystem will increase
the effectiveness of scientific advice within policy settings. Different scien-
tists place more or less faith in the possibility and practical efficacy of find-
ing a quantitative link to fisheries advice based on either ecosystem-level
modelling or on links between specific ecological events and fishing be-
haviour.
Q 6.24 Scientist One: If the REGNS approach succeeds, why have we in-
vested so much in this if it is not to provide integrated advice? Scientist
Two: It will only be one part of integrated advice. These are two lines feed-
ing into the shared product. Scientist One: I belabour this to make sure
they do converge. Scientist Two: The WGRED is not integrated assess-
ments, they are doing literature reviews. Scientist One: This word game
will not sell to Delegates. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee
meeting, September 2004)
Perspectives on methodological questions are related to the structural and
finally cultural division within ICES between the Advisory Programme and
the Science Programme. To some degree these two groups resemble proto-
epistemic communities in that they show similar ways of approaching
questions, but they do not have the sort of scientific consensus that char-
acterises a full-blown epistemic community. The degree of cultural cohe-
sion – and hence the appropriateness of the epistemic community desig-
nation – is certainly much higher in the Advisory Programme, with its
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more frequent and more intensely focussed events, than in the larger and
much more diffuse Science Programme. There are also some disciplinary
differences here as the most intense activities of the Advisory Programme
are related to fish stock assessment carried out by quantitative fisheries
scientists, while the Science Programme involves marine scientists of
many disciplines. These differences are changing in response to the scien-
tific demands of the EAFM, and this is an important driver of the cultural
shifts needed in ICES.
The Consultative Committee (ConC) is the committee with primary re-
sponsibility for the ICES Science Programme. It is the structural equiva-
lent of what MCAP and now ACOM are for the Advisory Programme.
Scientist One in Q 6.24 is a leader among scientists involved in the
Science Programme who are frustrated with what they perceive as an in-
ability of getting more influence from ‘science’ into ‘advice’. He is also
someone with a great deal of previous experience on the advice side, and it
is interesting to observe the degree to which his concerns about quality
control led him to present himself, at least in these meetings in September
2004, as speaking for the science side of ICES. Like many other stake-
holder groups, scientists see the EAFM as a tool for addressing their gen-
eral concerns about management. This perspective on EAFM is both
stronger and less self-conscious on the science side than on the advice
side. In the following quote, this same Scientist One debates with his col-
leagues working on the advisory side.
Q 6.25 Scientist One: The science community ought to want to move faster
than the client commissions want to move in ecosystem approach, if we are
doing our job right we are hitting a balance. They would like ICES to move
at a glacial speed with ecosystem, and the science community doesn’t think
we are doing anything more than changing the package. Are we taking the
whole of ICES’s scientific knowledge, this has to be done ... Scientist Two [a
leader in the Advisory Programme]: I saw the opposite, scientists wanting
to go slower; this auditing [of the ICES strategic plan] is about auditing the
science rather than the advice process. Clients expect more done by 2006
than we are moving towards. Scientist Three [also a leader in the Advisory
Programme]: I agree with Scientist Two’s assessment, internally in ICES we
need to accelerate the scientists’ support for this. What is not filled in yet is
the science side of the advisory process. Scientist Four [also a leader in the
Advisory Programme]: You can go to the action plan, we can’t. Scientist
One: This is where I am uncomfortable. The strategic plan was built for all
of ICES; the science part does not take its orders from the client commis-
sions. The audit should be on whether or not the science part is being used
in the best way to support the advisory process. Sitting in ACFM last spring
about Icelandic cod, we are still moving at a glacial pace in ecosystem as-
pects for fisheries advice, we clearly have no interest in this even though the
other parts of ICES have put out a lot of data that they think ACFM should
be using. There is a disconnect, and we need to find it and fix it. Their
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perception is that the ecological and physical are affecting advice, they see it
as relevant. If we are promoting ourselves in an ecosystem framework, we
need to either fix the information they are producing or fix the way the
advisory process uses the information from the other parts of ICES. (Obser-
ver’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme meeting,
September 2004)
One important distinction between Scientist One’s attitude and that of his
colleagues is a different understanding of what ICES’s advisory role is all
about. For Scientist One the problem is that not enough of the ICES
science has been brought to bear on advice. Indeed, he sees the two sides
of ICES as moving away from one another. This is another understanding
of the science boundary that draws the line within ICES itself. Scientist
One, ‘speaking for’ the science side, wants ICES to draw on its scientific
expertise as a way to accelerate the EAFM, with ICES taking the lead rather
than just responding to the client commissions. At some points in the
meeting, this construction took on the colour that EAFM is a scientific
imperative that real scientists have to get behind. Indeed, at this meeting
and afterwards, those representing the advice side in this conversation ex-
pressed some irritation at this construction of advice and science. If indeed
Scientist One is speaking for a substantial body within ICES, there are ex-
pert groups that want to have an impact on the ‘nature and content’ of the
advice and have felt frustrated that this has not happened.
Table 6.3 Attitude scales related to the role of ICES
Type of working or study group last attended Mean N
ICES should become much more direct in advocating fisheries conservation
Has not attended a working or study group in the last 5 years 5.14 144
Last group was not a stock assessment group 4.83 166
Last group was a stock assessment group 4.27 123
Total p = 00 4.77 433
ICES should focus more on pure science and less on producing scientific advice for managers
Has not attended a working or study group in the last 5 years 3.56 147
Last group was not a stock assessment group 3.45 165
Last group was a stock assessment group 3.03 124
Total p = .05 3.37 436
Scales run from: strongly disagree = 1 to 7 = strongly agree. Excluded in both questions are 20 who did
indicate participating in an expert group but did not make clear which kind of group and therefore
did not fit in any of the three categories, and six who failed to answer whether they had been in an
expert group or not. Furthermore, six did not answer the question on ICES advocating fisheries con-
servation, and three did not answer the question on ICES focussing more on science.
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Table 6.3 provides some evidence that Scientist One was not speaking just
for himself. The first question relates to the degree to which ICES should
advocate for fisheries conservation. Regardless of expert group, average
scores are fairly close to the centre of the scale, suggesting at most a slight
preference towards ICES increasing its direct advocacy of conservation.
But there are significant differences between the three groups. Those who
are not active in expert groups are the strongest advocates of this position,
while those involved directly in stock assessment are its weakest advocates.
The middle group includes the active ICES scientists who are not involved
as much in assessments, exactly the group that Scientist One meant by the
‘science’ part of ICES. The difference between the two groups suggests
that perhaps there is a group of active ICES scientists who would like to
have an impact on the ‘nature and content’ of the advice, moving it to-
wards a stronger conservation posture. However, the same pattern is found
with respect to the statement that ‘ICES should focus more on pure
science and less on producing scientific advice for managers’. All groups
are neutral with a slight preference against more emphasis on pure
science, but the stock assessment group is significantly less supportive
than the others. This suggests a relative reluctance on the part of the non-
assessment group to get ICES further involved in the advice aspects, but
this difference is clearly not large. On the whole Table 6.3 suggests that
while Scientist One was not speaking only for himself, the scientists are
broadly satisfied with ICES’s current balance between advice, advocacy,
and pure science.
The Advisory Programme is organised around responding to requests
from the client commissions. ICES has a quite specific memorandum of
understanding with the clients, and they are the source of much of ICES’s
funding. The clients are interested in the EAFM, so ICES is concerned
with the EAFM. Scientist Two is frustrated by trying to get more informa-
tion for advice generated by the science side in response to client pres-
sures, hence he sees the scientists as slow in responding to the EAFM.
Scientist One is also very concerned about advice for the EAFM. He com-
plains that ‘we are still moving at a glacial pace in ecosystem aspects for
fisheries advice’. Yet in nearly the same breath he says, ‘the science part
does not take its orders from the client commissions. The audit should be
on whether or not the science part is being used in the best way to support
advisory processes’. What he is pushing for is seeing ICES’s scientific ad-
vice as not being primarily about responding to client commissions. That
is a relatively minor bureaucratic issue related to how some of the work is
funded. Instead, he wants ICES to understand itself to be a group that is
publicly committed to the EAFM and to the precautionary approach, and
that is duty-bound to make these things a reality in the most progressive
way possible. With respect to the ecosystem approach (Table 5.9) and the
precautionary principle (Table 6.1), our survey results suggest that he is
not alone.
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This difference in starting points reflects the kind of scientific changes
described by the Mode Two science theory (described in Section 2.2.1) that
places emphasis on what happens when science is driven by the needs of
clients rather than the desires of scientists. Mode Two theory suggests that
the area where these conflicts are acted out is scientific quality control. In
ICES this takes the clearest form in constant discussions of ‘consistency’
(Section 7.3.1). This helps explain how the cultural and methodological dif-
ferences between the advisory and science sides in ICES are linked. This is
not a dispute over basic methodology, nor does it reflect highly polarised
positions. But there are noticeable methodological differences in terms of
what constitutes adequate science for clients in the short term and promot-
ing the EAFM in the long term.
Scientist One believes that the production of quantitative ecosystem ad-
vice is necessary and is eventually going to be possible (as in the reference
to the ‘word game’ that the same scientist made in Q 6.24). He is con-
cerned that his colleagues working on the advisory side will become con-
tent with qualitative descriptions that are injected into the current ap-
proach to advice as a sort of EAFM gloss on business as usual. Scientist
Two is a leader on the advisory side. The scientists working on the advisory
side may or may not have a scientific scepticism with regard to integrated
assessments in the long run, although as one of them put it:
Q 6.26 Even in 20 years time when we have the whole integrated model in
place, we are always going to get requests for advice on little things, we will
always have incremental changes in advice. (Observer’s notes at the Consulta-
tive Committee meeting, September 2004)
They are most concerned, however, with what can be done to meet their
clients’ current expectations about advice for the EAFM. They want to be
ready with ‘soft predictability’ that describes scientifically plausible scenar-
ios while steering away from precise numerical forecasts about future
states of nature. This is expressed in the following quote from a document
prepared for a meeting with clients by leaders of the Advisory Programme:
Q 6.27 The further implementation of an ecosystem approach will require
that ecologists and stock assessment scientists cooperate more closely, and
it should be accepted that advice can be given even if classical predictive
models cannot be applied. The discussion so far has revealed that an eco-
system approach will imply a change in the predictability from the form
ACFM has produced it in the past to a softer predictability based on indica-
tors. A management system that is based on an ecosystem approach is
likely to be more adaptive, which leads to a new role for science to add to
the learning mechanism in an adaptive management framework (MCAP-
MICC 10-11 April 2006, Doc 9).
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Conscious or not, there are noticeable links between the different metho-
dological emphases, the role that ICES members play on either the science
or advisory side, and the different ways they imagine the role of science
within the larger marine environmental management system. Those with
responsibilities for advice are more apt to consider issues from the per-
spective of seeing the social dilemmas underlying the EAFM. They are
more focussed on particulars, more concerned with stakeholder participa-
tion, and more comfortable with creating ‘serviceable truths’ (Guston
2001b) for use in decision-making that may not contain the complete
scientific picture. Those on the science side are more apt to think of the
EAFM as a primarily technical problem, to follow more traditional stan-
dards for science and to be more optimistic about the value of integrated
assessments. The two-pronged approach is a mechanism for keeping the
whole ICES system on track towards the EAFM while these issues are
worked out.
6.3.4 Cultural and organisational shifts
The ICES leadership sees the need for producing integrated advice as re-
quiring much more than just a shift in subject matter and the develop-
ment of methodologies. They also see it as requiring a shift in the ICES
culture that goes well beyond different perceptions of scientific issues. An
important part of this is the relationship between the Science Programme
and the Advisory Programme.
The Advisory Programme has historically been heavily weighted to-
wards the production of fish stock assessments. The annual round of as-
sessment expert group and advisory committee meetings, often involving
the same people year after year, has created its own culture. This culture is
described in detail in Chapters 4 and especially 5. In brief, these scientists
are sent by the member state governments that employ them to assess
stocks that are important to their country. They meet in very intense work-
ing environments. In response to a set of ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToRs), they
produce assessments of fish stocks that meet the requirements of the TAC
Machine. These experiences often leave scientists frustrated that their real
insights about the condition of fisheries are not being communicated.
They do not have much time for figuring out how to make new scientific
information fit into their ToRs (Q 6.28).
The Science Programme also has its own, less articulated culture rooted
in the disciplinary interests of the attendees. As discussed in Chapter 4,
the science expert groups are more attractive than the assessment groups,
and there is a tendency for very senior scientists to attend these groups and
not the assessment groups (Table 5.5).
Discussions among the ICES leadership also suggest that it can be chal-
lenging to convince the scientists attending expert groups under the
Science Programme to respond to ToRs that do not fit into their particular
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scientific interests or even their understanding of what processes are im-
portant. Several times I have heard the ICES leadership expressing strong
frustration over particular expert groups, and their chairs, that consistently
ignored advice-related ToRs. Groups also exert leverage simply by deciding
which of their several ToRs they will emphasise. While on the advice side
scientists are sent by their governments to assess fish stocks of national
economic interest, scientists attend the expert groups on the science side
to share research. Such expert groups are more like small, highly focussed
scientific conferences than the scientific assembly lines on the assessment
side. As a leader in the Advisory Programme put it when addressing a
meeting of chairpeople from the science side:
Q 6.28 We have two cultures. The advisory culture is about meeting dead-
lines, not summarising new knowledge, and it is conservative in adopting
new science. The science culture is less pressured and less conservative ...
The bottom-up works well, the top-down works poorly, sometimes science
does not listen, and the advisory committees want some science to be done,
but these requests are lost, advice does not listen to new science. (Observer’s
notes at the Workshop on Expert Group Performance, March 2006)
As reflected in the previous section, the cultural differences do not reflect
so much two different understandings of what it means to do science in
the general sense as what it means to practise science day-by-day. This is
an important distinction within the Post-Normal Science perspective dis-
cussed in Section 2.2.1. The Advisory Programme worries about time
deadlines and delivering the information that clients want. The Science
Programme worries about pushing the conceptual edge. It often also takes
a harder line in matters of scientific quality. The chairperson of one study
group, who was trying to make some multi-disciplinary progress that
would be useful for stock assessments, told me the following story:
Q 6.29 At the first meeting I had an idea that it would be a collection of
biologists, oceanographers and assessors, and we would be very focussed
on producing a model and methods that would enable working groups to
do forecasts taking into account biological processes. My feeling about that
was that they should be biotic, in other words ... say you have Barents Sea
cod that are dependent on capelin, and you would be modelling cod on the
basis of the capelin population, which is predictable to a certain extent, cer-
tainly for a couple of years because you have some stock structure rather
than basing it on temperature, which is probably ... the key driving factor
but you can’t forecast it. There were all these biologists and oceanographers
who had their pet data sets of sea surface temperatures in the North Sea or
something that they felt had to be included, whether you can forecast with
them or not. (Interview with ICES Study Group Chairperson)
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The ‘pet data sets’ in this case reflected the scientists’ interests. But they
also reflected what even the person telling the story calls ‘the key driving
factor’. Indeed, the REGNS groups argued that the North Sea fisheries re-
flect abiotic changes more closely than anything else (ICES 2006a). The
chairperson had a background within the ICES Advisory Programme. He
understood why the study group needed to focus on the biotic elements.
But this meant trying to get the scientists to ignore the ‘key driving factor’
because that factor was not useful for the forecasts needed. This proved a
difficult task, especially as few scientists place very much faith in assess-
ment forecasts in the first place. They both recognised the same ‘key fac-
tor’ from the perspective of the scientific description of how nature
worked. They did not agree about the use of this key factor in practice.
The organisational and cultural problems that ICES is addressing in or-
der to make the EAFM possible can be seen as falling into three categories
that I discuss in turn: motivating scientists to bring ecosystem information
into the advice and make use of it when it is available; setting up the
needed communication systems to collate that information; and finding
the required time and money.
Motivating EAFM contributions
One of the basic requirements of achieving the integration needed for the
EAFM is a substantial input from the Science Programme to the Advisory
Programme, and this requires a change in culture.
WGREG is one of the expert groups looking for this kind of input:
Q 6.30 It is clear that if ICES is serious about placing its assessments and
advice into an ecosystem context, that is not going to happen by having
most of ICES continue business as usual while a few working groups some-
how develop and apply new suites of much more complex – but scientifi-
cally equally sound – tools for ecosystem approaches to each step in devel-
oping advice. ICES – and the national laboratories – have to fully commit to
this framework as the foundation for their science efforts, if the policy com-
mitments that have been made to the ecosystem approach in the Bergen
Declaration, the Common Fisheries Policy, the EU Marine Strategy, and
many other policy documents including ICES own centennial Copenhagen
Declaration are to be matched by practices in science and management
(ICES 2007a, p. 143).
WGRED is making an appeal to the Science Programme expert groups on
several levels here. First, they are making it clear that the development of
science for the EAFM is not merely good science, it is the new and more
complex – read exciting and publishable – science. They also appeal to a
sense of duty towards progressive policies embedded in recent, and fragile,
policy declarations.
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Even when environmental information is made available, the advisory
culture can block it from being incorporated into the assessments and re-
lated advice. This can happen because of issues of saliency, as in the exam-
ple of water temperature being the key, but useless, driver in Q 6.29, or
because of issues of credibility, especially when having to use categorical
information that might be difficult to link to fisheries advice. The WGRED
as part of its facilitation role did some direct documentary research on how
and how often the various assessment expert groups were incorporating
environmental information:
Q 6.31 WG members reviewed the environmental content of a number of
assessment working group reports ... [the table finds a number of working
groups that did not take advantage of available information]. From this re-
view of content, it is clear that the concern is real. At the same time, the
reservations of the working group chairs were heard clearly. It is far from
clear how to use many types of environmental information, even if it is
relevant to accounting for stock fluctuations (ICES 2006b, p. 117).
The problem may not be so much a lack of will as it is doubts about the
credibility of the information and unclarity about how to use it as part of
the stock assessment process. Part of the problem is that the environmen-
tal information is mainly qualitative, and the assessment groups must pro-
duce quantitative descriptions of stocks. This, by itself, is challenging, and
the assessment groups are very hard pressed for time. WGRED, while un-
derstanding the perspective of the expert groups, is still frustrated:
Q 6.32 The near total lack of uptake of environmental information in the
computation aspects of population reconstructions/analysis is undesirable.
However, there is nothing we can think of that would have a better chance
of affecting the population analyses than the work of SGPRISM and
SGGROMAT, and neither of those expert groups produced a detectable im-
pact on practice (ICES 2006b, p. 117).
Setting up the communications systems
The second part of the problem is developing the communicative systems
needed to mobilise and focus knowledge for the EAFM. When knowledge
about ecosystem events relevant to advice exists at all in ICES, it exists in a
diffuse form somewhere in the expert groups of the Science Programme.
To be mobilised for advice, it must be found and focussed. The organisa-
tional strategy they employed was to set up what they called a ‘clearing
house’ for identifying, locating and also directly facilitating the participa-
tion of the expert groups in the EAFM.
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Q 6.33 When one group of experts observes a significant event, then ICES
knows about it. I have never heard what the mechanism for such a clearing
house is, but we have discussed it before. Another thing is tools and guide-
lines that, when the clearinghouse disseminates the information, the as-
sessment groups treat it the same way, consistent, credible advice. (Obser-
ver’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September 2004)
REGNS took on this facilitator role early with respect to the North Sea.
Q 6.34 Scientist One: REGNS is developing quantitative skills, tools to
serve the future. In 2004 they gave ToRs to a selective set of working
groups, and we examined their responses in their reports. One or two ig-
nored it, one or two asked why they did not get ToRs. Feedback came at the
ASC [Annual Science Conference where group ToRs are determined], and
more ToRs which are for more specific data sets at particular resolutions.
They may not like these specifics, but that is fine as they need to be think-
ing about specific data. They [REGNS] have appointed five facilitators to
work with the working groups. They will have a workshop in Copenhagen
in May to pull the data together. They are going to invite experts from Cana-
da who are looking at the Scotian Shelf. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative
Committee meeting, September 2004)
Figure 6.1 WGRED’s diagram shows the different types of groups in ICES that will
make it possible to develop integrated EAFM advice. The shapes reflect the nature
of the various groups. Oval groups are science-oriented expert groups, rectangles
with curves on the right are advisory working groups, rectangular groups straddle
this boundary, octagonal shapes review, while hexagonal shapes are strategic, ad-
vice production and certification groups.
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The REGNS group went to work creating ToRs for the information they
needed for the North Sea integrated assessment and got mixed responses.
Some groups were happy to respond, while others ignored the requests;
still others wanted to be asked to participate. REGNS’s response was to
appoint facilitators who would be able to monitor the content and quality
of the data being collated while coordinating the communications between
REGNS and the other expert groups. REGNS became a ‘clearing house’ for
mobilising information about the North Sea ecosystem. As REGNS was a
temporary group with a specifically North Sea focus, WGRED, the group
carrying out the linkages between ecosystem events and stock assess-
ments, i.e. the second prong in ICES EAFM strategy, soon found itself tak-
ing up the clearing house role on a more regular basis.
Figure 6.1 is the latest iteration of WGRED’s work on designing this
clearing-house function. The diagram is the idea of one expert group
charged with this work and is very much at a draft stage, but it does give a
picture of what a functioning clearing-house dynamic might look like. The
science groups are related to the advice groups through what amounts to a
series of groups carrying out parallel clearing-house functions. The most
important of them are the groups dealing with general methods and ap-
proaches; in ICES jargon they are referred to as benchmark groups be-
cause they review scientific approaches to developing advice on a periodic
basis greater than a year. Benchmark groups have traditionally focussed on
advice for a fish species or a group of species, but the idea can certainly be
expanded to other units of advice under an EAFM. The review group di-
rectly underneath the benchmark groups reviews everything coming out of
the box above it, where general methods and approaches are considered,
and a ‘benchmark standard’ is set for a particular assessment (Jake Rice,
WGRED Chair, personal communication).
Other clearing-house type groups in the diagram include groups that
evaluate the effectiveness of various approaches to management and
groups that develop regional ecosystem descriptions. Some groups do the
expert evaluation of status and trends of individual ecosystem compo-
nents. This can mean individual fish stocks but could also be aggregations
of species. They assess the condition and behaviour of these components,
i.e. the state and response in the well known PSR model. The Ecosystem
Impact Expert Groups mainly deal with the ‘P’ – pressures. However, the
individual component groups will often examine pressure in the case of
fishing mortality because the standard stock assessment models actually
link pressure (fishing mortality), state (population size and structure), and
response (forecast population size and structure) (Jake Rice, personal com-
munication).
The communication aspects of the cultural change problem are in some
ways the most basic element because it is here that the cultural and techni-
cal issues meet each other, particularly in the form of problems with qual-
ity control. This is a key to moving towards integrated rather than concate-
nated advice. This issue is taken up in more detail in the next section.
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Time and money
The third organisational challenge is mobilising the time and money
needed to get the ecosystem information into the advice. The ICES leader-
ship is aware that the most difficult challenge is addressing the problem of
an already overburdened system.
Q 6.35 Scientist One: We have a lot of things on the table. One is about the
culture. Scientist Two addressed that in his presentation. We have to
change the culture and tradition and that is more than the ecosystem ap-
proach, it is also time dimension, measures. We are getting all these groups
to look at different issues, and this is more work on an already overbur-
dened system. So this question of ecosystem cannot be stuck onto working
groups. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September
2004)
The appeals needed are not just to the consciences of their colleagues but
to those who control the purse strings. ICES’s position as a link between
other institutions consisting of a set of both contractual and voluntary rela-
tionships may be a source of its flexibility, but it is also a source of vulner-
ability and dependency:
Q 6.36 ICES cannot meet the requirements in isolation and must work
with other organisations to deliver advice that is timely, responsive, relevant
and credible. These issues to be addressed in cooperation with other orga-
nisations include:
1) The extent to which National laboratories commit the scientists needed to
support the implementation of an Ecosystem Approach.
2) The extent to which Client Commissions request and pay for advice that
is strategic as well as tactical.
3) The extent to which the activities of the ICES Science Committees sup-
port work that will underpin the implementation of an Ecosystem Ap-
proach.
4) The extent to which the National and International bodies that fund the
science conducted in National laboratories are supporting projects consis-
tent with the development of the Ecosystem Approach (from Document
Nine: Key Issues for improving the output of the Advisory Committees,
ICES Clients Meeting 2006).
The following two quotes from the informal REGNS meeting show the
practical need for input from the science expert groups, and the difficulty
of getting that input, and link them to the delegates’ control over the ‘vol-
untary’ input of the employees of the National Fisheries Institutes.
Q 6.37 Scientists One: ICES probably already holds 19 of the 70 parameters
[needed for the REGNS ecosystem assessment]. The German SYCON study
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could offer a potentially significant contribution of data. It is a bit impene-
trable. They have a time line. If they don’t have the data in time, they will
not stop but start reallocating resources to fill the gaps, but they hope they
will have it because of all the studies on the North Sea. Scientist Two: In
theory this is excellent. We had talks in the oceanography committee which
has a lot of requests, but they have no members here in the relevant groups.
We have to convince the Delegates that this has value. (Observer’s notes at the
informal presentation of the REGNS process, ICES Annual Science Conference,
September 2004)
The second suggests that what is needed is an appeal to interests as well,
because the needs extend beyond the delegates’ reach.
Q 6.38 Scientist One: WG Habitat wants to spend next year working on a
cooperative research report, not getting stuff for us, so we will need help
getting stuff like this. At the moment I don’t think you have got to this
stage. Scientist Two: People are interested in what is happening. This Cana-
da stuff is good science. ICES does not have all the skills we would want to
apply. How do we attract skills beyond the control of the Delegates? (Obser-
ver’s notes at the informal presentation of the REGNS process, ICES Annual
Science Conference, September 2004)
ICES has a unique structure as a multi-lateral organisation, a scientific
association dependent on many voluntary elements, and an official source
of scientific advice to governments. This structure has many benefits in-
cluding most importantly being a network in which the knowledge needed
for the EAFM can be found. Many of the same elements that make possi-
ble the willing participation of many scientists, however, make the fo-
cussed mobilisation of their knowledge more difficult.
6.3.5 Mobilising knowledge and quality control
In addition to bringing about the changes needed to mobilise ecological
information for advice, ICES also has to address a question they usually
referred to as ‘consistency’ but, as discussed at some length in 7.3.1, this
term points to multiple aspects of quality control. Many scientists see con-
sistency as one of the most critical issues in giving advice (Wilson and
Delaney 2005), and it is an important consideration when trying to mobi-
lise ecological knowledge across ICES. The problem emerges in facilitating
the uptake of the science into management and is less often an issue of
credibility than it is one of legitimacy:
Q 6.39 Scientist One: The advisory committees cannot themselves be the
ones to draft this, but it is just something to put in front of clients who are
now saying you talk a lot and you show us little. Scientist Two: This last
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point is why we continue this. When we do the work plan, we position
ourselves to more than just talk a lot. In all my experience, when advice is
weakest is when they can exploit inconsistencies that lets them throw it out,
it is in these inconsistencies between the few cases we know what to do and
the many where we don’t. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee
meeting, September 2004)
At the simplest level ICES faces a problem of consistency in the compat-
ibility of data gathered in different places for different reasons and in dif-
ferent ways (type B consistency in the discussion in section 7.3.1). This
kind of technical consistency is being addressed through the ICES Data
Centre and the ICES Quality Assurance Programme. The EAFM creates
new challenges, but they remain issues of technical collation.
Q 6.40 Scientist One: Our work has centred on a more pragmatic approach
with the addition of some elements of the ecosystem approach in an incre-
mental process. We cannot afford two different data sets on the same thing.
We have started with physical oceanography forcing on the development of
stocks and then other fisheries interactions. (Observer’s notes at the Consul-
tative Committee meeting, September 2004)
A problem REGNS encountered with these technical inconsistencies was
that the required data were held by so many different organisations. Their
solution was to develop regional assessment databases:
Q 6.41 In the experience of REGNS, it is simply too ambitious to expect that
we can simply download all the relevant data with appropriate QA from the
numerous sources on the fly for assessment purposes. The systems are
simply not sufficiently well developed at a consistent level across the var-
ious organisations to do this efficiently. This is not likely to change signifi-
cantly over the next 5 years, so the need for regional assessment databases
is a solution for our immediate needs and will also help to prioritise access
to the most relevant data from the archive databases (ICES 2006a, p. 97).
All of these problems of technical data collation, however, are well within
ICES’s expertise and simply a matter of finding the resources to address
the amount and the complexity of the data needed for the EAFM. The
EAFM, however, presents deeper problems with data types that are much
more difficult to address. Much of the environmental information relevant
to the EAFM is qualitative. This is not qualitative in the social science
sense of textual information subjected to hermeneutic analysis, such as
the qualitative research you are reading right now. The issue here is using
information that is qualitative in the statistical sense of being categorical.
Ecological information is often in the form of state changes. These state
changes can be observed and measured in a rigorous fashion to meet the
requirements of scientific credibility through a transparent explanation of
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how what is known is known. The problem here is saliency rather than
credibility or legitimacy. This kind of categorical information is difficult to
resolve into specific quantities: the kind of numerical conclusions on
which the TAC Machine depends to divide the fish.
Q 6.42 Scientist One: We have generic resolutions for each working group,
and one of them points at using the WGRED. Scientist Two: We are looking
for a mechanism to more formally present qualitative information; I don’t
see this as a problem, as in the past when all qualitative advice got thrown
out, as long as we now have a change of philosophy. Scientist Three: We
have to make sure this change of philosophy takes hold, and that all groups
take these phenomena into account. Scientist Two: The North Atlantic oscil-
lation is the example. We don’t know how it works, so working groups will
treat it differently. Scientist Three: If this is the key way that we intend to go
as we go through ToRs, and we find that we don’t know what to do, we
figure it out. Scientist Four: We need the change to take place that we move
towards the systematic qualitative information, we can’t take this on board
in the old-fashioned way that says you have to predict numbers. This re-
quires a cultural change for us and for managers. (Observer’s notes at the
Consultative Committee meeting, September 2004)
Scientist Two sees the issue as one of presentation: if the qualitative infor-
mation can be presented in a rigorous way, then it should in principle be
as useful as quantitative information. The only real block to the use of
qualitative information is the philosophy of the user of the advice. The
question is, of course, more the usefulness of the information to the man-
agement bureaucracy, which is more a matter of institutional and political
imperatives than of philosophy as that term is usually understood. The use
of the term ‘philosophy’ here is a boundary device seeking to keep the
decision about the saliency of types of information for policy a scientific
rather than a political one. At this particular meeting of the Consultative
Committee, it was also clear that some scientists – those more involved in
the Science Programme – were using the term ‘change in philosophy’ with
an emphasis on the integration of ecosystem information in management
advice, while others – those more attached to the Advisory Programme –
were placing more emphasis on receptivity to qualitative information and
soft predictability.
Scientist One is also concerned that the consistency between groups will
be hard to maintain because not enough is known about the underlying
processes. It is not sufficient that they see a correlation between, for exam-
ple, the North Atlantic Oscillation and stock abundance. They also have to
understand the mechanism beneath the relationship; otherwise, different
expert groups will interpret the correlations differently. There is disagree-
ment in the group about how difficult this general problem is to address:
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Q 6.43 Scientist One: We need to be comfortable with the idea that the
chapters that are the integrated overview are just as good science as the
other chapters. We can’t just get people together and write them. I have no
faith in a bunch of scientists writing an essay on the environment. SGE and
WGECO with more or less the same ToRs produced products that were
irreconcilable. Scientist Two: In my mind this is not complicated; it is clear
what needs to be done. A lot of linkages ... Last comment first, that is not a
unique problem, that is a problem for all our advisory committees. For
ACFM a different sub-set of members would make different conclusions
about a stock. This calls for good peer review. At WGRED we said we
wanted to be proactive and get members from the science committees,
good people, and have peer review mechanisms. (Observer’s notes at the Con-
sultative Committee meeting, September 2004)
At another point in the meeting, Scientist One says with respect to the
issue of what kind of ecosystem advice is adequate for the EAFM that ‘this
is really convincing me that ICES will divide down the middle and the
advisory and science sides will go their own ways’, and at another point he
becomes annoyed and accuses the advisory scientists of not seeing the
complexity that WGRED has to deal with.
Scientist Two is a leader in the Advisory Programme sitting somewhat
uncomfortably in a meeting of the committee that oversees the Science
Programme. (This is the inverse of Scientist One in quote Q 6.25 who in
the MCAP meeting was surrounded by Advisory Programme people. The
same person is Scientist One in both quotes.) From his perspective the
problem of consistency and quality control has always existed in fisheries
stock assessment. There it has been addressed by peer review processes,
and this approach should work for the ecosystem aspects of advice as well.
He is also someone who has been promoting more open and participatory
approaches to ICES science, and these two aspects are related in important
ways (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990). He (Scientist Three in the following)
also expresses real frustration during the meeting with regard to what he
sees as resistance to needed reorganisation because certain scientists and
certain expert groups have unrealistically high expectations of what kind of
science is required for EAFM advice. (This continues on from Q 6.24, and
for continuity’s sake I have kept the same numbering for the same people.)
Q 6.44 Scientist One: This word game [qualitative descriptions of ecosys-
tems in the reports of assessment working groups] will not sell to Del-
egates. Scientist Three: ACE should embody this stuff; it should not have a
separate working group to do this. WGRED should be a way to bring these
different things together. Scientist Two (annoyed): It is mind boggling that
we go back to square one. It is clear that the working groups do not want to
deal with working groups. WGRED pulls together information to give to
the assessment working groups. That is not advice. Scientist One: I have
worked 20 years on this, and we do not have the tools to do anything but
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write an intellectual essay. I don’t see us focussing on how to do this. We
will have a chapter that says these events happened, and we don’t know
what it means. I don’t see this taken up by anybody. (Observer’s notes at the
Consultative Committee meeting, September 2004)
One strategy that emerged for addressing these quality control dilemmas
is having a series of coordinated research foci over time. The idea is that by
mobilising expertise step by step, on one issue set at one time and on an-
other issue set at another time, ICES will be able to develop a repertoire of
methods to link environmental events to advice. The hope is that when a
critical mass of experts has been mobilised, they will produce tools that
assessment working groups, as well as other groups charged with produc-
ing advice, will be able to take up on their own when events arise:
Q 6.45 Just as the classic approach to single-species assessment and advice
did not have to be reinvented for every stock, perhaps we are on the verge of
learning tactics and strategies from these intensively explored cases that
will make application to additional stocks, species, and ecosystems move
much more swiftly. But that is optimism, however cautious, and not a cer-
tainty (ICES 2007a, p. 143).
When this strategy was suggested at this meeting, the response from the
DG MARE observer (a different person than the one quoted in Q 6.10) was
to ask about REGNS. REGNS in many people’s minds was the model of
the future ecosystem approach that would make ecosystem advice based
on system-level analysis possible:
Q 6.46 Scientist One: I support focussing on a few things and doing the job
to the point where you can recommend changes in practice. If you are
going to deal with trophic dynamics and species interactions, the easy prob-
lems are the ones we can model with a VPA. If you are going to go to the
hard questions, we need sea bird and marine mammal people there. Scien-
tist Two: I agree we have to limit the scope of what we can handle in a week
or so instead of coming up with a list of things we should have done. First,
we should make things really operational. DG Fisheries Observer: My recol-
lection of REGNS was that it was to be the model, and it seems to be the
best shot of ecosystem advice, we need to have a discussion with the clients
if this is working before starting in another direction. Scientist One: I was
Chair [of a supervisory committee] when we said to go with the REGNS
process, it was not to be the basis of advice, but a way of looking at integra-
tion for what groups designing advice should do. REGNS was never meant
to be the starting point of advice generation. (Observers notes at the combined
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management, the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Marine Environment and the Advisory Committee on Ecosystems,
September 2006)
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The first prong of ICES’s response to the EAFM, embodied until recently
by REGNS, will certainly continue, but for the immediate future the sec-
ond prong, embodied by WGRED, will be the priority for the ongoing pro-
duction of scientific advice. WGRED sees itself as an organisational loca-
tion for the coordinated research focus strategy:
Q 6.47 In its role as the clearing house and communication link between
the accumulating science and knowledge of how stock dynamics are af-
fected by the physical and biotic environment and the activities of specific
assessment and advisory components of ICES, WGRED proposes to focus
each meeting on a well-defined set of tasks to facilitate transition from re-
search to operations in this important area. It proposes that in 2007 one
focus would be a consideration of several case histories on how to test man-
agement strategies and harvest control rules for their robustness to envir-
onmental uncertainty (ICES 2006b, p. 118).
The hope is that a comprehensive approach to science for the EAFM can
be built up one issue at a time, leading to an eventual convergence be-
tween the system-level and the particularistic approaches.
6.4 Conclusion
Any ecosystem-based approach to governance contains two simultaneous
requirements that can easily work against one another in practice. On the
one hand, an ecosystem approach requires increased interagency coordi-
nation; meaning in practical terms the mobilisation of many different
forms of both scientific and managerial expertise. This requires centra-
lized decision-making. On the other hand, an ecosystem approach re-
quires more decentralised and participatory decision-making across multi-
ple scales. This requirement is mainly driven by the need for detailed
information, and finally knowledge, about processes – both ecological and
social – that could be taking place across many scale levels from local to
global.
This dual character of ecosystem approaches is reflected in the two ways
that we can think about the kind of knowledge dilemma that the EAFM
presents. The first is conceiving EAFM as an essentially social problem
where EAFM works by ensuring that anyone can effectively identify issues
needing attention. The strength of this approach is that it recognises that
the information requirements of EAFM are vast and boundless, and it de-
fines how an adaptive social system can be sensitive to environmental
changes. Its challenge is the scaling-up of information about problems
from the anecdotal form, in which it will be initially generated, to systema-
tic information that can characterise higher-scale natural processes.
The other half of this dichotomy is conceiving of the EAFM as an essen-
tially technical challenge, where the workings of the ecological machine
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have to be systematically described and its problems diagnosed. The
strength of this approach is that it makes possible an analysis of how eco-
logical system processes are related to one another and can be most effi-
ciently addressed. The challenge is the complexity of the system, which
can never result in a fully satisfactory model. Problems arise at the level of
measuring and gathering information that can be integrated into systemic
models and in having a good grasp of the limitations of the models and
their associated uncertainties. It also presents a danger that the informa-
tion that feeds the models will receive more attention than the information
that does not, based simply on this fit rather than on more substantive cri-
teria.
These approaches to the EAFM are not mutually exclusive, indeed they
are complementary in the sense that the social approach relieves the tech-
nical one of always having to have the big picture ready, while the technical
approach, cautiously and humbly applied, provides the social approach
with a filter to sift signal from noise.
Tackling the scientific problems of the EAFM led ICES to adopt the two-
pronged approach to finding ways to produce useful advice. As described
earlier, one prong is based on anticipating and understanding the implica-
tions of important environmental events for fisheries. The other prong
seeks to develop ever better integrated models in the hope of more inte-
grated assessments. Any specific piece of advice will be related to some
event. What integrated advice will mean is selecting and putting together a
fairly small number of relevant issues, not simply as a concatenation of
descriptions in an advice document, but with an analysis of their implica-
tions for one another. The ad hoc nature of the events-based approach, of
course, means that the integrated modelling approach is more attractive to
the scientists. So while the long-term hope is for an eventual convergence,
both prongs will continue to be needed for the foreseeable future. The ex-
pert group scheme offered by WGRED in Figure 6.1 assumes that they will
both continue to be important. One hopeful suggestion has been for a co-
ordinated scheme under which ICES shifts focus and concentrates exper-
tise first on one set of related issues and then on another. Each time the
goal will be to create frameworks for consistent advice. This may turn out
to be an important mechanism for this eventual convergence. One can
imagine that the events will define the issues to be addressed while the
state of the modelling art will define the frameworks for advice.
Table 6.4 is suggestive. It combines the idea of the social and technical
dilemmas with ICES’s dual approach. Each of the cells contains a short
description of the institutional outcome of the resulting combination.
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Table 6.4 Contrasting approaches to EAFM and its related advice
EAFM as a technical dilemma EAFM as a social dilemma
Integrated models Quantitative management produc-
ing advice based on decision-sup-
port rules
Participatory modeling to clarify
and test assumptions of those ne-
gotiating advice
Events-based advice Categorical information requiring
an extended peer community to
translate into practical advice
Stakeholder input into scientific
analysis to translate anecdotal
concerns to systematic informa-
tion for eventual advice
The mainstream view of the role of science in the advice process appears
in its pure form only in the upper left cell. While I have critiqued the uto-
pian application of that view, this should not be interpreted as meaning
that final decisions based as much as possible on some objective criteria
are not desirable, they are merely far from sufficient. There is still a critical
role for science in management, especially with respect to setting overall
limits on ecosystem impacts. The discussion in this chapter suggests that
at the current state of the art, and given the uncertainty of the marine en-
vironment, this could be a permanent constraint. This mainstream, objec-
tive, limit-setting role should be based on some very simple indicators and
causal assertions. The remainder of the science for the EAFM is going to
require new ways of working with the science boundary. The other three
cells suggest forms that supporting institutions could take.
The interesting question is whether ICES has the capacity and willing-
ness to find new ways of working. This question does not have a single
answer. ICES is many things and has many attitudes towards the meaning
of science. All the parts of the ICES culture are in agreement over what it
means to do science, but there are many different and sometimes incom-
patible ideas about what it means to practise science. These differences
form an important background to understanding ICES in general, as well
as understanding ICES with respect to the EAFM. The next chapter exam-
ines the more general political realities of ICES in the hope of tracing
changes in the understanding of scientific practice and of the science
boundary, and their implications for the EAFM.
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7. The debate over the reorganisation of
the ICES Advisory Programme
This final chapter in the ICES case study examines a recent episode of
restructuring the Advisory Programme. This restructuring provided an in-
teresting research opportunity. Chapter 6 presented the institutional is-
sues around developing an effective scientific knowledge base for the
EAFM. The debates around restructuring the Advisory Programme allow
us to examine how the EAFM requirements fared as just one of the issues
driving the restructuring. As an intergovernmental organisation charged
with producing scientific advice in a high-stakes, high-uncertainty environ-
ment, ICES is a political system as much as anything else. An episode of
major change allows the political tensions to come to the surface.
The new advisory structure’s most important change was the dissolution
of ACFM, ACE, ACME and MCAP, to be replaced by the creation of a
single advisory committee – ACOM. Diagrams and basic descriptions of
the old and new ICES structure can be found in Section 4.1.4. The new
system came into being on 1 January 2008 after an intensive discussion
that began in earnest at the ICES Annual Science Conference in Septem-
ber 2006. The beginning of 2008 hardly put an end to the debates around
the restructuring and its implementation. Nor did the restructuring pro-
cess have any real beginning point. One Advisory Programme leader I in-
terviewed pegged the beginning of the current round of reorganisation to
the mid-1990s when there were a lot of debates on the reform around the
Advisory Committee on Pollution. The fact that that committee did not
have formal, national representation became an issue as it began to have a
higher public profile. This respondent sees issues of balanced representa-
tion between member states being an important driving force in the re-
structuring process.
ICES is an institution adapting to a political environment that in turn
reflects the evolution of environmental concerns. It is always restructuring
itself one way or another, going through phases of more or less intense
changes. When you are structuring marine biology, an ICES leader ex-
plained, you always end up with two choices: you can structure the science
‘holistically’ by areas, or you can structure the science ‘atomistically’ by
species, or more often species groups such as pelagic, demersal, shellfish,
etc. Both have scientific advantages, and both have scientific adherents. So
to understand what is going on in ICES now, it is essential to see that the
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current restructuring is a pendulum movement towards a holistic area
structure, happening because of the ascendance of ecosystem considera-
tions. Griffith (2003), a former Secretary General of ICES, describes this
cyclical movement from area to species in detail. His figure showing the
evolution of the science committees (Figure 7.1) clearly reveals the move-
ment between the area and the species-based groups and the compromises
between the two. The final phase moves into a more programmatic distri-
bution of tasks that uses categories such as ‘living resources’ and ‘fisheries
technology’, which are even broader than areas.
Figure 7.1 History of ICES restructuring from Griffith (2003)
These broader categories are perhaps an attempt to get around the inher-
ent trade-offs, but it is very difficult to organise science to be both atomis-
tic and holistic at the same time. One very important example of the cost
was the conceptualisation of the precautionary approach as ‘stochastic pre-
dictability’ (Degnbol 2003) that I have mentioned several times. In the
early 1990s there was a lot of enthusiasm around developing an ecosystem
approach. But this development was overtaken by an atomistic conceptual-
isation of the precautionary approach driven by the single-species advisory
needs of the TAC Machine. Because of international movements and
agreements after the Rio Summit, the precautionary approach and its im-
plementation became the top priority. The residual regret from this shift is
still evident, as can be seen in Q 5.12. The ICES leader cited above called it
a step backwards in science terms, because suddenly scientists had to use
their energy to define reference points and analyse stock recruitments. He
believes that this intense focus on the single-species approach continued
right through the 1990s, and that serious attention to the EAFM within the
ICES community did not begin until 2000, a change marked by the crea-
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tion of the Advisory Committee on Ecosystems (ACE). At that time there
was an extensive debate on the advantages of a single advisory committee,
but that idea did not prevail until the creation of ACOM eight years later.
Attempts at restructuring carry a lot of baggage. When major changes in
ICES’s structure are being contemplated, the opportunity arises for a num-
ber of agendas to be ‘bolted on’. Because of the sense in which the restruc-
turing is always going on, one leader views this process in historical terms,
arguing that the bolting-on is what makes the basic restructuring impera-
tive:
Q 7.1 Delegate: But you can build in, in redefining a new process, you can
build in, you know, better quality systems or whatever, because that was one
of the weaknesses of the old system, that it began simply as an advisory
committee for fisheries actually. And people did it the way they thought it
needed to be done 25 years ago. And then as the demands of the system
increased, for example because you needed better quality control, because
you needed more transparency to involve stakeholders – those kinds of
things were bolted on. And you ended up with a more and more cumber-
some system.
Indeed, the question ‘how did the EAFM fare in all of this?’ introduces its
own bias about what is central and what is being bolted on. Many, but far
from all, ICES scientists saw the EAFM as the main issue for the restruc-
turing.
The chapter begins with a general description of how the restructuring
discussion process took place, basically from the 2006 Annual Science
Conference (ASC) through the final decision by the ICES Council. Then I
turn to an overall description of the general political context around ICES.
The next section describes six important themes in the restructuring de-
bate. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the
restructuring for the EAFM.
7.1 The process of restructuring
The final decision on restructuring the ICES Advisory Programme had to
be made by the ICES Council. The decision on the proposal discussed here
was taken by the Council in October 2007 for implementation in January
2008. By the time the proposal reached the Council, however, it had gone
through a considerable process of discussion.
The initial ideas for the new advisory structure were formally presented
for the first time at the ASC in Maastricht in September 2006. The ASC is
not merely a science conference, there are also a great many ICES commit-
tee and research project meetings going on around the edges. Representa-
tives of MCAP, the committee responsible for the Advisory Structure, and
the ICES Secretariat worked together to formulate an initial set of issues
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and ideas and present them to the major committees on both the science
and the advisory sides. This generated considerable and ongoing feedback.
Over the following year the restructuring proposals gradually solidified. By
the ASC in Helsinki in September 2007, a fairly detailed proposal was on
the table. At this point, with the Council meeting only one month away,
MCAP began to treat the process more as one of selling the existing propo-
sal than discussions to develop a proposal. MCAP developed a presenta-
tion, and the Advisory Programme leadership carried it around to both
science and advisory committees, selling the proposal. This included a
meeting with some of the delegates, at which the critical group of the NFI
Directors was well represented.
The response of the scientists varied. Many were nervous about what
they were creating, but at the same time the process was advanced, and
major changes were not going to be entertained. A long discussion took
place at the ACFM meeting in which many people suggested that ICES
should experiment with the new system in an incremental way. Perhaps it
could be an experiment with just some groups. They were afraid of ‘the
devil in the details’ and were reluctant to jump into a new system all at
once. The conclusion was that this was not a very practical suggestion.
The basic structure would have to be one way or another, and ICES does
not have the time or resources for parallel systems.
The critical response came from the meeting with the delegates. This
was not an official Council meeting; this was an informal meeting of del-
egates present at the ASC. The main concern that MCAP and the Secre-
tariat had at this point was that the proposal would not be acceptable to the
delegates. This was their last chance to get feedback from them, and feed-
back they got. The informal meeting produced a list of 33 issues about the
proposal and its implementation that they were concerned about. Ten of
these concerns were structural issues that the delegates themselves would
have to decide about, the others were more general issues for the whole
ICES community to address. The EAFM was clearly not the most immedi-
ate issue for the delegates with respect to restructuring. In fact, the only
two concerns the delegates had about the EAFM were quite similar: The
17th item asked, ‘How will the integration work?’, meaning the structure
of the new committee, and the 24th asked, ‘How will the integration of
advice happen?’, referring to its product.
Nevertheless, the EAFM played an important background role in Coun-
cil discussions. In response to a question about what was the hardest thing
the Council had to address in the restructuring, a delegate said:
Q 7.2 To think what the problem was, that we were trying to solve. I think
trying to get a clear idea of what the issues really were. And I’m not so sure
that that has actually been identified. This ecosystem approach was kind of
talked about a lot in the context of the restructuring. I’m not sure that’s
really understood, and therefore it’s not really very clear what it is we’re
trying to do in restructuring.
214 The Paradoxes of Transparency
The delegates also set up a committee to work on these issues and create a
final proposal to come before the Council in October. The announcement
of this decision at the last meeting of MCAP was greeted with some ner-
vousness. Everyone knew that the delegates had the final say, and one
scientist pointed out to MCAP that the creation of the delegates’ group
was exactly what was needed to ‘get the ball over the line’ in the Council
meeting. But seeing the final month of the development of their proposal
taken out of their hands by a group of NFI Directors was not easy for the
leadership of the Advisory Programme. Several responded in typical ICES
fashion by sitting in the MCAP meeting making up descriptive, and some-
what disrespectful, acronyms for the delegates’ group. They will not be
repeated here.
At the meeting in October, the delegates did adopt the new proposal. A
respondent from the Advisory Programme leadership described the two
main issues discussed with the full delegate group at the October 2007
meeting. He said the delegates were most concerned about the relation-
ship between the ACOM leadership – the chair and three vice-chairs, and
the Secretariat. Some were concerned about setting up parallel structures
and wanted the new advisory group under the Secretary General. Others
wanted the ACOM chair to report directly to the Council. The other main
concern was the separation of the review groups and the advice production
groups. The only major structural change they made to the proposal from
MCAP was that they separated the groups charged with the scientific re-
view of the outcomes of the expert groups from the groups that created the
advice based on those outcomes. In the initial proposal these two functions
had been placed in a single group. The arguments for these two ap-
proaches are presented below.
7.2 The main fault lines in ICES politics
Before addressing the major themes within the restructuring debate, it will
aid their understanding to describe a bit of the general political tensions in
which ICES operates. As an inter-governmental organisation, ICES politics
are driven mainly by the political imperatives of the governments of the
countries that make up its membership. These are usually expressed
through the National Fisheries Institutes, although the relevant central
ministries are sometimes directly involved. These two do not always ex-
press the same priorities. One ICES leader commented at the September
2007 MCAP meeting that when central ministries ‘say they will do some-
thing, the NFIs are often quite independent of this’ (see also Q 7.57). The
relevant ministries for ICES range from those having a primarily econom-
ic focus to those having a primarily environmental focus. ICES’s role as
advice provider for the Common Fisheries Policy, a policy critical to some
but not all of the member countries, complicates matters even further. We
could conceive of most of ICES’s political tensions as running along a
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three-way circuit among ICES, the member governments, and the Euro-
pean Union.
One of ICES’s basic purposes is to take a strong leadership role in ma-
rine science, which includes both speaking with an authoritative voice and
setting an international scientific agenda.
Article 1 of the ICES Convention reads:
Q 7.3 It shall be the duty of the International Council for the Exploration of
the Sea, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Council’,
(a) to promote and encourage research and investigations for the study of
the sea particularly those related to the living resources thereof;
(b) to draw up programmes required for this purpose and to organise, in
agreement with the Contracting Parties, such research and investigations
as may appear necessary;
(c) to publish or otherwise disseminate the results of research and investi-
gations carried out under its auspices or to encourage the publication there-
of.
To maintain this leadership role is something many ICES scientists see as
a very high priority. The catch is expressed in the Convention with the
phrase ‘in agreement with the Contracting Parties’. Each member country
has its own national strategy for marine research, which forces ICES to try
to bring these strategies together in a fairly top-down manner without any
leverage beyond persuasion. This creates ongoing tensions with respect to
both setting a science agenda and speaking with an authoritative voice.
The following notes from a discussion at the committee charged with over-
seeing the Science Programme illustrate these tensions. The last comment
by Scientist Two also illustrates how the third pole in ICES’s three-way
political circuit, the EU, influences these tensions between ICES and the
NFIs. The ICES hand is strengthened vis-à-vis the NFIs of EU member
states because a common voice has a greater influence on the Commis-
sion. As we will see below, ICES member countries outside the EU also
strengthen ICES vis-à-vis the EU.
Q 7.4 A Delegate: The framework document is different from the other
science strategy in that it recognises that ICES is a headquarters and each
country has a national strategy for marine research. ICES can try to bring
these together. This is different from bottom-up, it is very top-down, but we
are an intergovernmental organisation. Another issue is the lack of support
for the activities. The view of the Council is that this is not our fault as lab
directors, if someone proposes a working group I am not going to vote
against it, but it does not mean I will send anyone. We have lots of commit-
tees that do not attract anyone, and they [the Council] conclude that there is
a lot of science going on that is not really important. Society expects ICES to
have a science view but it does not, except what goes through Council.
When working groups produce something it has a big ‘you can’t use this’
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on it. [All expert group reports have a caveat that they are not to be cited
without the permission of the Secretary General]. They are not the ICES
spokespeople. But other [science providers] are jumping in, and ICES is
being marginalised. We would like the science side to be more empowered
and focussed on key programmes that make a difference and so that society
can see we are making a difference. Scientist One: On the one hand you
highlight that each NFI has its own priorities, on the other you say the Del-
egates feel that the things ICES is doing is not that important. Is this just a
competition that ICES is losing because each Delegate is promoting his
own institute instead of a community? There is some kind of contradiction
here. What ICES can do is take advantage of its being international, and
that means setting the agenda for its own research. Delegate: My own view
is that all the members would love ICES to be more dynamic. It is not just
wanting their own institutes to be more powerful. Scientist Two: Scientist
One is sort of right, but wanting an institute to be best means partly going
through ICES. If you have a number of member states Europe listens bet-
ter. (Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September 2007)
This ‘more dynamic’ general marine-science leadership function, and
maintaining the authoritative voice that goes with it, is not easy. Resources
are available for generating ongoing advice through the NFIs. But the NFIs
must compete with academic institutions for the pure (or at least less di-
rectly applied) science funding that is available. The ICES network lends
its participants important advantages in seeking funding. There are ma-
rine and fisheries areas within the EU Framework Programme where the
size and experience of the NFIs give them advantages over universities,
but the funding for which this is true also tends to be for short- to med-
ium-term science for policy support. ICES scientists are very concerned
about the availability of this ‘less applied’ funding.
Q 7.5 Scientist One: ICES’s main weakness is a lack of money. The work we
do for national managers or RACs has money involved, and this leads to a
vested interest, so working for these groups the question is, can you show
scientifically that X is possible. In ICES we can set the scientific agenda and
not be told what to do. Scientist Two: In comparison in STECF you have a
sense of continuity, in ICES you can look at bigger questions. (Observer’s
notes at the Resource Management Committee meeting, September 2007)
ICES – in the sense of the legal entity created by the Convention – is in-
volved in few research projects itself, and ICES scientists have said that the
NFIs actively discourage this. ICES – in the sense of the network – is deep-
ly involved in large, multi-partner research projects involving both NFIs
and academics. ICES facilitates these projects in many ways, and the pro-
jects create powerful synergies with ICES expert groups, but the project
resources remain with the NFIs. The majority of these projects are EU-
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funded and involve EU NFIs; Iceland and Norway count as ‘EU’ in this
context, because they have reciprocal agreements with Brussels.
Later in the same Resource Management Committee meeting, an ICES
leader said ‘until a few years ago we were in the business of organising
international projects, in those days the resources for this were in the
NFIs, now they are not. I do not see ICES in the business of doing pro-
jects, but there is a niche for feeding the priorities to the funders’. This
comment, from a leader who happens not to come from an EU country,
expresses a common idea among ICES scientists about ICES’s research
leadership role. It is interesting because the most direct NFI influence on
the single most important science funder, the EU’s Framework Pro-
grammes, bypasses ICES altogether and flows instead through the Euro-
pean Fisheries and Aquaculture Research Organization, which is made up
of the directors of the NFIs. The ICES delegates do not choose ICES as
their primary vehicle for seeking to influence marine science research
priorities in Europe.
There is also direct competition between ICES and the NFIs for the re-
sources needed for the Advisory Programme. One lab director told me that
he considers this a symptom of a much deeper contradiction within the
CFP:
Q 7.6 The European member states have decided that the Commission
should be the one handling the fisheries questions, but they’ve not been
willing to also then let the Commission have control of the resources on
the national level necessary to do the job.
Another lab director, however, put a little different spin on this tension:
Q 7.7 I’ll have to give you a bit of history. The way ICES traditionally has
worked for fishery advice, which I guess is probably, you know, maybe 80%
of all the advice that ICES does, is that it set up stock assessment working
groups that met for a fixed time in a fixed place and then they passed on
their reports to the ACFM, and the meetings typically took place in Copen-
hagen. And that was probably okay when the demands of doing an assess-
ment were much less than they currently are, you know in the past a typical
stock assessment report might have only been 60 pages, whereas now it’s
probably about 1000. That reflects the fact that for any particular assess-
ment, the quantity of work done is huge compared to what it was 20 years
ago, and yet you’re still expecting the same sorts of people to do the same
amount of work in a week in Copenhagen.
For at least the five years that I have been observing ICES, the leadership
of the Advisory Programme has been striving to shift the role of their ex-
pert groups from actually crunching the numbers on the stock assess-
ments to finalising and reviewing the assessments and beginning the task
of translating them into advice. The idea is that the initial analysis will be
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done at the NFIs before the expert group begins. This desire was forcefully
expressed in the proposals for reorganisation. Expert groups, especially
those related to assessments are simply much more effective if the scien-
tists, and the data, are prepared ahead of time. From the NFIs’ perspective,
however, this means an expansion of ICES activities beyond just the time
boundaries of the ICES expert groups to the home offices as well. The
following is a quote from a communication from a lab director to MCAP
expressing strong concern about this aspect of the changes:
Q 7.8 It is obvious from [a preparatory document for the meeting] that
more work and responsibility shall be moved from ICES into the national
labs, i.e. personnel shortcomings shall be reflected (or guided) towards the
national labs, and the Delegates shall have the responsibility to safeguard
that there is enough qualified staff for the EGs [expert groups]‘as required
by ICES’ and for the RGs [review groups] ‘as required by ICES’, these being
two phrases which bring a new taste into the recipe. In other words: instead
of making a numerical analysis, if at all the necessary resources are avail-
able for the new structure, the responsibility for (probably) more input is
shifted elegantly to the national labs. (Observer’s notes at the Management
Committee for the Advisory Programme meeting, September 2007)
To this a leader of the Advisory Programme responded:
Q 7.9 [The lab director] sees this new plan as pushing work from ICES to
NFIs, but all we are asking is that people do their work at their desks at the
NFIs rather than at ICES.
Again this tension between ICES and the NFIs has an important EU di-
mension. A leader of the Advisory Programme in an interview:
Q 7.10 We are in a competition situation with the EU and STECF because
they pay travel for the people participating here, and, not surprising, the
institutes are more likely to send someone to STECF for two reasons, the
one is that it doesn’t cost them anything on the travel budget, and secondly
you’re one step closer to the decision.
The problem of the effective use of scientists in expert groups is consider-
ably exacerbated by demands from member governments that their na-
tional scientists be included in various expert and advisory groups, regard-
less of the scientific necessity for such inclusion. Issues of national
representation create complexities in the assignments to expert groups. A
leader of the Advisory Programme described it this way:
Q 7.11 Resources are used inefficiently, and the reason why they’re used
inefficiently is because of mistrust ... Countries do come running and say
‘we want our scientist to sit there’. There is an enormous amount of people
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sitting in working groups doing nothing except observing. They are for-
mally participants, but actually they are not contributing and every chair of
a working group, very unofficially and so on, is ending up with four, five
people he doesn’t really know how to keep busy.
An efficient approach to ICES work would depend, for example, on having
a Danish institute that is very good at a certain task come to ICES expert
groups and focus on that task. But the Danish government (and this is not
to pick on Denmark, the same is true to some degree of all the EU ICES
members) sends its people to expert groups that they see as politically sen-
sitive. This could mean sending them to groups working on the assess-
ment of a stock of interest to the Danish industry – and in this case the
Danish scientists would likely be the real experts – but it could also mean
sending them to groups working on issues that are politically sensitive at
an EU level. When, in the respondent’s example, Danish scientists attend
the Deep Sea Working Group, they are doing so because someone in their
ministry sees this as an environmental issue of general European interest
and wants Denmark involved.
This same problem of distrust among the member governments has led
to differences in rules about attendance at expert group meetings. Scien-
tists can attend the meetings of expert groups under the Science Pro-
gramme at the discretion of the chair, but if the committee is under the
Advisory Programme, then they must be nominated by a delegate. This
has led to political games around the programme assignments of expert
groups. It also plays into the debates around stakeholder observers of
ICES groups. The organisation of observers for expert or review groups
meeting remotely, by video-conferencing for example, has been questioned
by delegates on the grounds that it is impossible for everyone to know
what kinds of conversations are going on between scientists back in their
labs and the stakeholder representatives.
As the following exchange at a meeting of the Advisory Committee for
Ecosystems indicates, this problem will become even greater with the im-
plementation of the EAFM because of the smaller pool of more specialised
knowledge that will be required:
Q 7.12 Scientist One: I think for a group like ACE the key thing will be the
review groups where you integrate the advice. How do we find the expertise
to draw on and make sure it is represented in all review groups? I see a few
of them with lots of people wanting to sit on them while others will be
lacking in expertise. This needs to be communicated to the bureau, Del-
egates and NFIs. The expertise we need is only concentrated in particular
parts of the ICES community. In many of these areas people will be asked
to look at things outside their national interests. The Delegates need to un-
derstand this problem as they are used to having fisheries experts that know
their local stocks. Scientist Two: We need to build the capacity through the
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international ICES community. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee
for Ecosystems meeting, September 2007)
This three-way political circuit between ICES, its member governments,
and the EU suggests that it makes a significant difference if a member
government is within the European Union, or more accurately the Com-
mon Fisheries Policy, or not. This distinction, however, is really three-way.
There are those governments that are part of the CFP, those that negotiate
with the EU over issues for which ICES gives scientific advice, and those
that are outside both the CFP and these negotiations. Most ICES members
fall within the CFP, the second category is made up by Norway, Iceland
and Russia, and the third category by the USA and Canada. When asked
about how these differences influenced the reorganisation debate, a del-
egate responded:
Q 7.13 I would say that that’s probably one of the most significant areas of
cleavage on the Council and not surprisingly Norway, Iceland and Russia
feel, I think, that [the reorganisation has] been driven by the needs of the
EU countries ... I think there’s a worry in Norway and Iceland, and I’m not
sure how much Russia necessarily shares it, that the EU’s needs can under-
mine ICES – not deliberately but just because of the ways things move. I
mean, you could argue for example that STECF could do everything ICES
does in terms of fisheries management, and I think Norway in particular
and to a lesser degree Iceland is worried about that. And so they want to
make sure ICES is strong and functioning so that it’s a bastion against the
EU-bloc.
Scientists within the Advisory Programme have to be continually aware of
these differences. This is illustrated by the following exchange that took
place at one of the central meetings for the coordination of the Advisory
Programme.
Q 7.14 Scientist One: Because ICES is wider than the EU, and the RACs are
basically EU, and they are just one of the industry bodies (sic)14. The impor-
tant thing is to be aware of this and not exceed the boundaries. Scientist
Two: That is an important observation. I had an issue [at a pelagic RAC
meeting] about mackerel in January, I asked for the Norwegians to come
and they were not included so I declined to participate ... you as chairs of
working groups may be in a similar situation. We are not part of a directed
process serving one part of the community. Scientist One: It is also fair to
have a distinction between stocks and areas that are internal EU and those
that are shared. Then the relation between RACs and the Commission and
ICES will be different. (Observer’s notes at the Annual Meeting of Assessment
Working Group Chairs, February 2008)
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Scientist Two had to decline participating in this event because the RAC
was an EU body that was addressing a stock shared with Norway, while
excluding Norwegian participation. ICES has been making a conscious ef-
fort to support the RACs as much as it can given resource constraints, and
Scientist Two, as it happens, has been deeply involved in this effort. But
ICES cannot be ‘part of a directed process serving one part of the commu-
nity’, even when the ‘one part’ in question, the EU, is ICES’s largest client.
Some within ICES believe that ICES should go further in using the CFP/
non-CFP cleavage among its members to increase ICES independence vis-
à-vis the Commission. Here is one delegate’s opinion expressed in an in-
terview:
Q 7.15 Delegate: We put too much weight on what the Commission wants
[people argue that it is because they are the paying client, but] it is in the
Commission’s interest, as well as Norway’s interest, that the Commission
does not come to the negotiation with one recommended TAC and Norway
comes to the negotiations with another recommended TAC ... it would be
completely impossible for the Commission [to refuse to use] ICES advice
because they don’t like the way ICES is organised.
He is, of course, well aware that the Commission contributes a consider-
able part of ICES’s income and that the Commission always has the option
of getting its advice from STECF without using ICES. However, he be-
lieves that the fact that the EU must negotiate the sharing of stocks with
Norway, Iceland and Russia means that they must use ICES advice rather
than advice from a body internal to the EU. So it follows that the fact that
the Commission can turn to STECF should not be seen by ICES as a rea-
son to give the Commission’s opinions extra weight in the debates over the
reorganisation. Of course, one can point out to this delegate that there are
many EU stocks that are not shared with outsiders, but he will rightly re-
spond that the shared stocks in question are among the largest and most
valuable ones in European fisheries.
Finally, the other category of ICES members, the non-CFP members
that do not share fish stocks with the EU, also plays an important role.
The following is a quote from an interview:
Q 7.16 Delegate: With the exception of the advice about sonic impacts, Ca-
nada and the United States don’t have any vested interest in the advisory
process ... those countries, in particular the United States and to some de-
gree Canada as well, are able to speak with some authority because they
don’t actually participate in the advisory process, well they’re not customers
for the advice – they’re honest brokers, and that has helped. Because of this
these two countries played an important role in the restructuring.
The United States held the chair of the Council sub-group that was formed
in September 2007 to finalise the restructuring plan and present it to the
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full Council for approval in October 2007. The current chair of ACOM is
also an American, creating the interesting situation that an American is
the single most important person in the system creating scientific advice
for European fisheries.
This concludes this very short description of the political landscape
around ICES. Obviously, describing the political dimensions of a network
this size and this layered could be a book in itself. However, I think this
sets the main context needed for understanding the themes and agendas
that made up the debate over restructuring the ICES advisory process.
7.3 Themes within the restructuring debate
This section outlines six recurrent themes in the debates over the restruc-
turing of the Advisory Programme. Clearly, a complex debate can be di-
vided into an endless number of ‘themes’. What is presented here repre-
sents an interpretation that I arrived at through the process described
below. Indeed, all of the qualitative material in the book was organised for
presentation in a similar fashion, although the goal of identifying a set of
themes for a specific discussion gave the method a sharper than usual
focus.
The themes were identified by going through the material from the in-
terviews and meeting observations, paragraph by paragraph, and assigning
to each paragraph any number of short codes naming a topic or specific
argument. Examples of such codes include ‘workload’, ‘regionalisation’
and ‘advice must be consistent’. These codes were not created beforehand;
instead they were generated by reading, interpreting and comparing the
paragraphs using a well-established social science technique called
‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967). For the material in this sec-
tion a total of 53 such codes were created. Then similar codes were merged
together. The results were examined for the amount of material that they
covered. The themes presented here came from codes that seemed to cov-
er a distinct part of the debate and were attached to more than a few para-
graphs, the smallest number being ten. I do not report these numbers
because they do not mean anything in a statistical sense. Indeed, no check
was ever made to ensure that every paragraph in all these documents that
could be coded by a particular code was so coded. That would not only have
been an exercise in spurious precision, it would be misleading because it
would imply that the boundaries between these coded concepts are well
enough defined to yield countable units. These numbers were simply a
rough guide helping me focus a purely qualitative, hermeneutic exercise.
The codes are described below using the relevant parts of the paragraphs
that were used to define them in the first place. Not all paragraphs that
attach to a theme are reported, many are redundant and others appear else-
where in the book illustrating other points.
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The themes that emerged to describe the discussion around reconstruc-
tion are ‘consistency’, ‘advice and review groups’, ‘workload and timing of
advice’, ‘the respective roles of the Secretariat and ACOM’, ‘observers’, and
‘the EAFM’. I present them in this order.
7.3.1 Consistency
Few words are used in ICES with the consistency of ‘consistency’. Setting
aside basic scientific review, which is the topic of the next section, consis-
tency is the most common concept ICES scientists draw upon when dis-
cussing quality control. Inspired, I suppose, by the Mode Two science the-
orists who point to quality control as a key question in examining changes
in science institutions, thinking and asking about what is really meant by
this word when ICES scientists use it has become a preoccupation of
mine. I am convinced that the combination of the importance of this word
for these scientists, and the various things they mean when they say it, is
an important clue to the relationship between science and scientific advice
and to the tools they are building to respond to the paradoxes of transpar-
ency.
In an interview a leader of the Advisory Programme indicates that he
thinks that consistency is the real problem that the reorganisation is trying
to address:
Q 7.17 Advisory Programme Leader: When we started this, it was not as
much integration per se, but to make sure that ICES had consistent an-
swers, of course that requires integration, but the real concern was the con-
sistency, that we had three voices. Three different people for all their quali-
ties, of course, will have a slightly different tack on anything, and we didn’t
have a proper coordination device in the old system ... They had rather free
hands. I must also say that over the years we have had relatively few prob-
lems, but it became very clear that the issue of integration or needing con-
sistent advice became more and more important because of the ecosystem
approach which meant that we had several organisations dealing with, if
not exactly the same issues, then very much the same.
The change from three advisory committees to a single ACOM means that
it will be easier for ICES to put out a consistent message because there will
not be three advisory chairs with relatively ‘free hands’. The reason that
this had become much more of an issue than it had been before is because
with the EAFM, the former advisory committees, ACME (Marine Environ-
ment), ACFM (Fisheries Management) and ACE (Ecosystems), were being
asked to address the same issues, where in the past they had been able to
operate relatively discretely with little problem. In the past, consistency has
been more of an issue for fisheries advice. ACE and ACME tended to ad-
dress fairly discrete requests for advice, while the fisheries advice was gi-
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ven for a variety of issues that were very similar in form. The ecosystem
and environmental advice was also usually given only once for the same
issue while in fisheries the same kind of advice recurred, so questions of
temporal consistency arose as well.
This placement of consistency at the heart of the motivation for restrict-
ing the Advisory Programme, and the linkage to the EAFM, is echoed by a
delegate:
Q 7.18 Delegate: I think that one of the most important things was that we
couldn’t have a system that allowed different groups of experts to give dif-
ferent opinions.
While another delegate feels that the Council has still not addressed this
question forcefully enough:
Q 7.19 Interviewer: Have you noticed much concern with consistency in
advice among the Delegates? Delegate: To the extent we have discussed
that, which we have done too little ... I don’t think there has been very
much; the question has not been raised very much.
Some clients have also expressed concern with consistency of advice, while
others have not:
Q 7.20 Advisory Programme Leader: The key example of a client was Nor-
way, who repeatedly has said to us that a key feature of ICES is consistency,
in time, between areas, and this has been followed up, so, yes, it’s a client
concern. We have not had the same thing from the EC surprisingly enough
because the area they are dealing with is much bigger and therefore by
definition much more diverse.
Norway, with its comparatively homogeneous set of fisheries, is particu-
larly interested in consistency. The EU, however, with its comparatively
heterogeneous fisheries, is less concerned with consistency. The Advisory
Programme Leader finds this surprising. From a formal perspective, great-
er heterogeneity would seem to increase the demand for consistency, but it
may also make it seem less desirable if attempts at consistency were to
hide critical differences.
Types of consistency
Just in this short introduction to the discussion of consistency, the term
has been used in several different ways. I find it helpful to identify six
different meanings of the term consistency as I have heard it used in
ICES. They are ordered along an intuitive continuum from technical to
social consistency. Types A and B are almost entirely technical in nature
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while the last four are related directly to advice. Types C, D and E have to
do with both the social and technical organisation of advice, while type F is
almost entirely social and, in fact, is an issue that arises for any large or-
ganisation, scientific or not.
– Type A is consistency with the accepted standards of science, and it
responds to questions of credibility;
– Type B is consistency of methodology across time, space and scale that
allows the integration of information and creation of new knowledge. It
is related particularly to methods of data gathering. Again it responds
to questions of scientific credibility;
– Type C is consistency with standards of advice, and it responds to ques-
tions of legitimacy;
– Type D is consistency in advice in response to a single policy question
that involves multiple scientific disciplines. It responds to questions of
saliency;
– Type E is consistency in the way scientific methods and scientific ad-
vice are linked across time, space and species. It responds to questions
of legitimacy;
– Type F is consistency of message from the various parts of ICES, and it
also responds to questions of legitimacy.
Type A is seen by ICES as primarily a question of peer review and is dis-
cussed in the next section. Type B was addressed in Chapter 6 in respect of
the question of integrated as opposed to concatenated advice. Type B con-
sistency makes integration possible.
One of the background agendas in the restructuring was to facilitate Coun-
cil oversight of the Advisory Programme because of a concern in the Coun-
cil about Type C consistency. In this case it is consistent adherence to ad-
vice practices that reflect international agreements. This has meant the
precautionary approach in particular, but interest in ensuring adherence
to EAFM is beginning to be felt as well. Under the structure where MCAP
sat at the top of the advisory pyramid, there was a fairly weak link between
the Council and the advisory committees. Council would set policy but,
with MCAP meeting only twice a year to oversee the advice, the Council’s
own oversight, at least on a formal level, was distant and somewhat after-
the-fact. According to one Advisory Programme Leader, the Swedish gov-
ernment in particular was concerned about creating clearer lines of com-
mand from the Council on down. Our respondent described this as ‘not an
attempt in any way to influence the science’ but to ensure that the precau-
tionary approach was being used. As discussed several times in this book,
within the ICES culture, insistence on the precautionary approach is not
considered a source of influence, or at least undue influence, on the
science. This desire was justified in part by the fact that the member gov-
ernments are signatories to international agreements that require the pre-
cautionary approach. Currently, a parallel movement is taking place with
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respect to the EAFM, with citation to the 2001 Reykjavik Declaration
through which governments have committed themselves to the EAFM.
Type D consistency is raised by ICES leaders with respect to coherence of
advice between fisheries, ecology, and environment now that they are
being asked to tackle similar issues in a multi-disciplinary framework.
One hypothetical example of this kind of consistency, offered to me by one
of the delegates I interviewed, was that if ICES is giving advice about the
exploitation of a fish stock, the former ACFM might advise one level of
exploitation based on sustainable harvesting, and the former ACE might
advise another based on the needs of sea birds. ACOM in this case would
presumably choose one of these two levels as the ‘ICES advice’. This would
require either an ICES judgement about which was more appropriate, or
more likely a dialogue with clients about which one they really wanted.
Type E consistency is the most interesting. I asked the leader of the Advi-
sory Programme, who had told me that consistency was a main driver of
the restructuring, what he meant by ‘consistency’:
Q 7.21 Interviewer: What does consistency mean in this case, consistency of
quality? Advisory Programme Leader: Consistency in making similar judge-
ments on similar types of issues. So if you have lousy catch-data in one area
then you provide an assessment and an advice on that basis, and in the
other area you have the same lousy data but you don’t provide them an
assessment and an advice. I think the concern is mostly on the advice part,
but there’s also some concern about why do you have this method in area
VI A for haddock and this other method in the Irish Sea when you have
exactly the same data situation? Interviewer: Is that ever arising enough to
send you back to the work you’ve done to do it over? Advisory Programme
Leader: No. Interviewer: Have you ever done that? Advisory Programme
Leader: No, I think what happened is that review groups have raised ques-
tions; why do you do this? But there’s very little follow-up on what happens
with that question.
The question is one of ‘similar judgements’ about ‘similar issues’. The
question often seems to be couched as questions about methodology, and
failure to meet this kind of consistency is often referred to as an ‘error’ that
should be caught by review. A good example of this is the herring incident
discussed in the next section in which the problem was not an error in the
sense that a scientist used a method that was wrong, it was that a scientist
used a method linked to a piece of advice that was not the same method
that had been linked to that piece of advice in previous years. The last part
of the quote is also interesting as it points beyond a simple concern with
consistency to a concern that consistency is very difficult to control. Fol-
low-up on quality control issues is a problem that ICES scientists have
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mentioned in a number of contexts. This is also discussed further in the
next section.
This respondent offered the following as an example of a client-raised
problem with Type E consistency. There was a debate whether the deep-
water redfish (Sebastes mentella) should be treated as one population all
through the northeast and actually a bit into the northwest Atlantic, or
whether it can be separated into a number of different stocks. There is no
consensus on this. So after much debate, ICES decided to treat the deep-
water redfish as just two stocks. A similar assessment had to be done on
the black scabbardfish (Aphanopus carbo) that ranges from south of the
ICES area deep into the North Atlantic. The evidence for treating this as a
single stock is also uncertain. Our respondent in fact thought it was per-
haps even less certain than for the deepwater redfish. However, ICES
decided to divide the black scabbardfish into a number of separate stocks.
A client then wanted to know why one fish was treated one way and the
other fish was treated the other way. Type E consistency raises some very
interesting sociological questions about the meaning of consistency that I
return to at the close of the section.
Type F consistency is very much a concern of the ICES leadership because
ICES is such a public body acting on the public stage. This is often cer-
tainly the primary way the Council, as the intergovernmental overseers,
imagines ICES. From this perspective ICES must not only be consistent, it
must speak with a single voice:
Q 7.22 Delegate: The advice given out by the three advisory committees for
ACFM, ACE and ACME was advice given on behalf of the Council. So the
Council basically said, ‘we will give advice, but in order to do that we have to
set up an advisory committee to do that for us, and we delegate that respon-
sibility to ACFM or whatever’. And so whatever is in that document coming
out of ACFM is ICES advice. But you have, as you pointed out, all these
other science groups, you know working groups, or various descriptions
that produce reports that say certain things, and you see on the ICES web-
site all sorts of interesting articles about scientific things, which are just
things said by scientists that happen to be publicised in some form or other
through ICES. That’s not what ICES says, that’s just interesting work that
ICES is involved with, and so it shouldn’t really be talked about as ‘ICES
says’. But of course if you’re an outsider and you log on to the ICES website
and you see a sign which says ‘latest hot topic’ and it refers to some inter-
esting science done by a working group, you don’t know that that isn’t what
‘ICES says’. It’s on the ICES website!
ICES is a large network that is involved in many events. It also hosts a
website where research results are shared. While expert group reports all
say, ‘The document is a report of an Expert Group under the auspices of
the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and does not ne-
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cessarily represent the views of the Council’, many readers will not know
what ‘the Council’ is or why its views matter.
ICES members have gotten into trouble over much less formal commu-
nications than an expert group report. One example is an incident when
the Annual Science Conference was held in Scotland. ICES made a strong
effort at the time of that meeting to reach out to the public. Part of this was
publicising the meeting, and to this end some initial abstracts and titles
were distributed. These were abstracts of conference presentations, a long
way from peer-reviewed results. However, one abstract about sea lice was
submitted from a scientist at Scotland’s NFI, the Fisheries Research Ser-
vice (FRS) in Aberdeen. This abstract led not long after to the BBC pound-
ing on the Minister’s door saying, ‘this paper says that your policy on sea
lice is a load of rubbish!’ This, of course, quickly meant that the Minister
was pounding on FRS’s door. Of course, it is clearly the journalist’s re-
sponsibility, when reporting on science, to understand the difference be-
tween an abstract of a conference presentation and a peer-reviewed find-
ing. It was an ICES meeting, however, and ICES is the official advice
provider. This means, for one thing, that ICES must reach out to the gen-
eral press – and especially to the rather volatile fishing press – rather than
deal only with professional science journalists as an academic group of
scientists might. It also means that when the press does associate a ‘find-
ing’ with ICES, however unjustified, it will give that finding increased
weight. More serious examples of this problem of the official ICES voice
versus ICES as a scientific network have arisen in the very sensitive area of
work within cod and climate change. Research has been placed on the
ICES web page that in the eyes of many members of the public was incon-
sistent with what the official ACFM advice has said about cod. For ACFM
to include this in their advice would require generally accepted mechan-
isms for making that link.
How ICES as a large network speaks in the press with one voice is one
challenge. However, there are also problems with how the press is handled
just within the Secretariat and the Advisory Programme:
Q 7.23 A Leader in the Advisory Programme: Yeah, there were specific in-
cidences that happened about who takes responsibility for the press for ex-
ample after the meeting. Where by tradition the Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee will handle the press, but a lot of the press was going to the
Secretariat, and it was unclear what the balance was between the two. It
especially became an issue when [a Secretariat employee] was no longer
participating in the meeting.
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Ensuring consistency
Plans and ideas for ensuring consistency contain the same or very similar
mechanisms to those described in the later part of Chapter 6 for mobilis-
ing knowledge for an EAFM:
Q 7.24 Scientist One: How do we ensure the consistency of the advice, that
has been a big issue for us, the documents say the AMG [Advisory Manage-
ment Group, i.e. the ACOM Chair and Vice Chairs] should ensure consis-
tency, which is quite a task. Scientist Two [A leader in the Advisory Pro-
gramme]: There is a Secretariat behind them. Scientist One: Yeah, but they
are not touching the advice, how can this be ensured if the advice is not
touched by an overarching group? Also another idea was that the review
groups would have outsiders and people will change, we will lose this.
Scientist Two: The review process will give us the final draft of advice, but
there will also be a review process focussed explicitly on science that is part
of the timing discussion we go to next. We will have a link between the
review group and the benchmark system. Scientist One: Two different re-
view groups then? Scientist Two: Yes, one for advice and one for methods
with different participation. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for
Fisheries Management meeting, September 2007)
Benchmark and review groups have a role in ensuring consistency. In-
deed, from an organisational viewpoint, consistency and integration are
the same, or perhaps more accurately, they lead to the same kinds of orga-
nisational structures because consistency is what makes integration possi-
ble. In Q 7.18, in response to the interviewer’s opening question about
what the respondent saw as the most important issues to be addressed by
the reorganisation, the delegate emphasised the importance of consistency
in the sense of ‘one voice’. This quote is what he said next:
Q 7.25 Delegate: And I think also there was also recognition of the fact that
many advisory requests required more than simply fisheries specialists,
you know, chemical knowledge or something. But there were many advi-
sory requests which required a sort of multi-disciplinary view. And there-
fore we needed a system where you didn’t simply arbitrarily say: ‘Well, we
need a fisheries committee or an ecosystem committee and a sort of pollu-
tion type committee.’ We needed something that allowed that expertise to
come together where it was necessary. Interviewer: So while setting up
quality control and an ecosystem approach are two different considerations,
they’re actually all very deeply interlinked. Delegate: Yeah. But you can use
the ecosystem approach ... I prefer to think of it as more of integrated
science, as one of your design criteria.
Other aspects of the EAFM threaten consistency. Most ICES scientists
agree that the EAFM must be regionally based. For many, this means that
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the Advisory Programme must have strong regional organisational compo-
nents. Many of the proposed review and advice drafting groups are to be
regionally based. Yet, a number of scientists are very concerned with losing
consistency of the advice because of the regional orientation, and they
want to see more cross-regional interaction and structures set up to ensure
cross-regional consistency:
Q 7.26 Scientist One: In Canada we have had to hold meetings on how to
do the science in different regions. It is being done differently. How can we
ensure that the work done at an NFI level treats the problem the same way?
In ACFM we saw how FISHBOAT [a research project] did exactly the same
work that an earlier working group had done with no indication that people
knew that. We can’t continue to do business in the new framework this way;
we need the equivalent of methods working groups for these environmen-
tal issues. The NFIs will have to operate under a common framework even
if they don’t want to. This culture already exists in the fisheries side. (Ob-
server’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Ecosystems meeting, September
2007)
The consistency debate continues and will only intensify in the develop-
ment of the EAFM. On the one hand Type B consistency is what makes
the integration of information possible. Pieces of information must be
blended together from different areas and different times, from different
units of analysis, disciplinary concepts, and data-gathering procedures. All
the little differences that block the comparisons needed to build a picture
of the sea have to be beaten into a smooth conceptual consistency.
On the other hand, the questions that the EAFM proposes to address
makes one wonder how such consistency can ever be possible:
Q 7.27 Delegate: To be quite honest how can you be consistent on an advice
if the stocks are reduced dramatically one year to another? Look for example
what’s happening in the North Sea, where one copepod suddenly disap-
pears, to be replaced by another copepod ... but ... the first one was ready to
be eaten when the fish spawned and now when the fish are immature there
is nothing to eat because they have been replaced by the other one.
Type E consistency and the science boundary
Types A and B consistency are for the most part questions of scientific
standards and requirements. In clear contrast, Types C, D and F are mainly
questions of advice and are not treated as scientific questions within ICES.
Type C consistency involves adherence to legal and political standards.
Type D consistency – as in the example of the sea birds – involves organis-
ing information to answer a coherent set of questions. Type F is not even
really an issue of scientific advice. Having a single official voice is a general
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question for any organisation, scientific or not, and in this case it is made
more complex by ICES’s network structure, and the weight of that voice in
policy-making, but not because it is dealing with science as such.
It is Type E consistency that most solidly straddles the science boundary.
Here, the consistency question illuminates the line between science and
advice. The advisory scientists in ICES often talk about Type E consistency
as if it were consistency of method, i.e. Type B consistency. But they do this
with respect to questions which are similar merely in form. This is not the
methodological consistency that is needed to integrate scientific knowl-
edge; this is something entirely different, and equally important, hiding
under the same term.
The question the client asked about deepwater redfish and black scab-
bardfish is in no sense a scientifically coherent question. Science asks for
factual evidence about how many stocks of deepwater redfish or black
scabbardfish are in the area. The client’s question does not address the
evidence about how many stocks of deepwater redfish there are, nor does
it address the evidence about how many stocks of scabbardfish there are.
Rather it is asking a question about ICES as an institution. Did two differ-
ent groups of scientists, looking at a similar question about two different
stocks, approach the question in the same way?
This is the form of a classic scientific reliability test. The reliability of
any measure is how it performs under repeated tests. Does it get the same
result every time under the same circumstances? The reliability test is
being applied to ICES to see how well ICES measures the fish in the sea.
One might speculate that the question being in the form of a reliability test
may help account for the way it is taken as a question about the quality of
science. But the application of reliability testing here is purely metaphori-
cal. ICES is not a Secchi Disk, and deepwater redfish are not black scab-
bardfish.
The source of the question is not, in fact, in science at all. The source of
the question is the notion of fairness about the equal treatment of black
scabbardfish fishers and deepwater redfish fishers, transmitted through
politicians, ministers, NEAFC, and/or DG MARE. These groups are look-
ing for science to provide the same transparency of argument to each advi-
sory issue, indeed Type E consistency is about increasing transparency by
making the scientific methodologies involved more tractable and accessi-
ble.
This argument in no way demeans the seriousness of Type E consis-
tency. This is a very serious question, but it is not a question about the
quality of science, it is a question about justice and accountability in the
legal process of fisheries management as it is expressed in the practice of
science. It is a question about justice rooted in a scientific reality: the high
degree of uncertainty about the number of deepwater redfish and black
scabbardfish stocks. If there was enough evidence to justify the differential
treatment of deepwater redfish and black scabbardfish, then that evidence
would be how ICES would answer the question, rather than promising
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quality control mechanisms that would allow it to pass a metaphorical re-
liability test. This form of consistency is about scientific practice under
conditions of uncertainty. The question it raises is if it is ever possible to
identify scientific methodologies that achieve this kind of consistency, or
can this form of consistency only be approached through procedures for
interactive social processes.
7.3.2 Advice and review groups
The only major structural change made by the Council to MCAP’s propo-
sal in September 2007 was the separation of the advice drafting groups
from the review groups. It is not surprising that the Council focussed its
main attention on the review process. Review and quality control are of
central concern within ICES.
Q 7.28 Interviewer: So in terms of Delegates where would the actual im-
petus [ for the restructuring] have been then? Delegate: Yeah. I think most
Delegates wanted change, but I think the reasons why they want a change
was somewhat different. I think a large number of countries felt that the
quality of the advice coming out wasn’t good enough.
Quality control in the ICES system is just plain difficult. There was an
incident with the forecast for a very important herring stock that happened
in the autumn of 2007 when the restructuring debate was at its height.
The ‘error’ was in a technical calculation and was an error only in the sense
that the procedure followed was not the one generally followed by ICES.
Because the usual scientist was not able to come to the expert group, an-
other scientist did the analysis, and he did it in a slightly different way. Not
a mistake in the sense of doing science badly, simply a way that was not
consistent with ICES’s usual practice. It happened because the expert
group was under pressure, the new scientist did not know that the soft-
ware had already been written to do this analysis, so he wrote his own
spreadsheet and made the calculations in a slightly different order. This
was not a conceptual mistake, either order could be justified. It was simply
not the order that ICES had been using. The change made a very large
difference in the result, however – 200,000 tonnes of herring. No ques-
tion was raised until the results were presented to the Pelagic RAC. Their
questions led ICES to investigate, they found the problem, corrected it,
and explained to the RAC what happened. This is an excellent story for
illustrating why so many scientists, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6,
would like to stop trying to base fisheries management on quantitative
forecasts – 200,000 tonnes is a lot of fish to depend on the order of a
calculation. This incident was a very public failure of the ICES system in
terms of scientific review, taking place right around the time of the reor-
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ganisation decision. It was mentioned as an example of the quality control
problem by one of the delegates.
Time for reflection, feedback and follow-up is hard to find in ICES’s
tightly coupled system. One problem ICES is actively trying to address,
but one that is very difficult in a large and complex network, is making
sure that recommendations made by review groups are implemented. An
Advisory Programme Leader said that even when clients have problems
with advice to the point where they decide to reject it, for example to turn
to STECF instead, there is no formal feedback to ICES, and ICES scientists
only find out about it through informal channels.
In the reorganisation debate these problems were addressed in the con-
text of the review process. As outlined in Chapter 4, expert groups on the
advisory side are given a set of Terms of Reference (ToRs) based on client
requests, in the past by MCAP and now by ACOM, that outline the scien-
tific investigations needed to generate the advice. The ideal model of re-
view that most ICES scientists have is that the expert groups produce a
report outlining the scientific, factual findings required by the ToRs. This
report is then subjected to a review process that allows it to claim the man-
tel of ‘peer-reviewed’ science. When the review process is complete and the
facts are verified – ‘ICES officially says this is the truth about the world’ –
then advice is drafted based on those facts – ‘ICES officially says this is
what you should do about it’.
This is the ideal model but, of course, various boundary issues confound
this ideal model. It is difficult for expert and review groups to divorce the
facts that need to be identified from the decisions that are to be based on
those facts. It is also difficult to distinguish which parts of ‘what you
should do about it’ are scientific judgements and which parts are political
ones. When the question is how these processes should be structured and
implemented, then all the logistical and practical problems of mobilising a
scientific network come into play.
A delegate describes how he saw the debate in the Council:
Q 7.29 Delegate: The review process was a big issue. The original proposal
that MCAP put on the table was that the review process and advice drafting
would be in one group. And people were very concerned with the idea that
the review of the scientific quality would be coupled with the formulating of
the advice. So that I think was the main concern. Interviewer: What are the
arguments on both sides? Or on all sides ... Delegate: The argument for
having a separate review group is that you can bring in people that are
scientific experts who are not necessarily very good in writing, and then
you would have a group of people who are more communicators who could
take that information and write an advice. That’s the one side of the coin,
the other is that by having the review groups that we used to have on the
ACFM, we have a very layered system with a number of small bottlenecks,
so we have a working group that is sort of providing draft advice to the
chair, so that’s not necessarily a group view that is submitted there. And
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then there’s a review group that looked at the assessment but also looked at
the advice, and that consists of just two or three people, so they had their go
at the advice. And then there would be a drafting group on the ACFM and
then there was the ACFM. So there were many layers that started fiddling
with the text, and any text that you put to a group like that or to a group of
scientists will be dissected. You can’t just put a text and say, well this is the
same text as last year – don’t look at it. Because people will say; but I don’t
understand this sentence.
He highlights two of the key practical issues for advice and review groups.
The issue of advisory skills versus reviewing skills was an important part
of this discussion, as was the flow of the textual information as it moved
from the expert groups through to the final advice. A scientific culture is a
questioning culture, and few scientists are shy about raising questions or
making changes in the text in front of them, even when such changes are
not really the ones being asked for in the particular role they are supposed
to be playing. There is a real price to pay in efficiency when the text passes
through another group. A leader in the Advisory Programme describes the
issue of advisory versus review skills with details that illuminate how hard
it can be to get scientists to stick to assigned roles:
Q 7.30 Advisory Programme Leader: The [advisory] committees themselves
did not have the expertise. Now what we tried was to take and say, we accept
that these three advisory committees are not technical committees, and do
not have the necessary strength. Because what happened was that ACFM in
particular actually made judgements and said, ok, there are two conflicting
views here, we make a choice, and when you analysed it, it came down to
the choice of very often highly competent people, but few. There were two
people sitting in ACFM who knew what they were talking about, and they
would then carry the day because all the rest had to look to whoever it was,
and say, ‘you know what it is, you are a sensible guy and I will go with you’.
But, as an individual, and I’ve been in that situation a number of times, I
would not have an opinion because I don’t have a clue… Interviewer: So, the
problem was on the level of the review? Advisory Programme Leader: No, it
was at the level of the advisory committee who behaved as if it was a techni-
cally competent committee. Interviewer: So they behaved as a review com-
mittee rather than an advice committee. Advisory Programme Leader:
Yeah, precisely ... they didn’t have the technical competence to write the re-
view. Interviewer: Once something was reviewed they could write the ad-
vice? Advisory Programme Leader: Yeah, yeah… I would never be able to
review a paper on the sampling of, let’s say, contaminants in the North Sea,
it’s outside my competence, but I may be able to write an advice and say, ok,
the scientific, reviewed information tells me this, I can also read and see
there is a lot of debate, uncertainty here, and therefore the information is
not particularly strong ... I believe that science has a role here; you can
make a science judgement saying that your best guess considering the in-
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formation is that, but that best guess includes value judgements in techni-
cal areas which are outside your competence, and that goes for all of us.
The last part of the quote illuminates one way that advice writing skills are
understood. At that stage, technical expertise is no longer a requirement,
but a kind of scientific literacy is. The advice writer must be able to make a
‘best guess’ that ‘includes value judgements in technical areas which are
outside your competence’, but this is still a situation where ‘science has a
role’. The scientist is the one who possesses the required scientific literacy
to make the judgements about the implications of the technical expertise
of others. A key part of this scientific literacy is making judgements about
degrees of certainty.
An important question in this discussion is that actual meaning of ‘re-
view’. Here is an interchange from an ACFM meeting:
Q 7.31 Scientist One: To me a very big problem is that the review is so
important; it does not matter where we get the information from as long as
it is reviewed properly. I don’t see the review group as also a [advice] draft-
ing group, these are two different processes. You need special people for
scientific review, and they are not necessarily the right people for drafting
text when you have to know management issues and the regional issues.
Scientist Two: The review group name keeps changing in the last year be-
cause of this mix of review and advice. It is two ways of reviewing. Review is
connoted with research review of papers and so forth. I am not too sure if
the expertise types exclude each other, but we need the people. We may
need less technical review and more overall review of quality. Scientist
One: I was looking for how much this is more concrete. In many points it
is still quite open ... I am not so worried about the scientific peer review, but
someone must have the authority to reject a poor assessment. (Observer’s
notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, September
2007)
Scientist Two contrasts the classical understanding of peer review with an-
other kind, one that ‘may need less technical review and more overall re-
view of quality’. This scientist is a leader in the Advisory Programme. He
wants the review to ensure, or perhaps also ensure, that the product is of
sufficient use in the advice. Scientist One’s final point is also a very practi-
cal one; he is not looking necessarily for the standards of journal peer re-
view, but the gatekeeper function must still be in place. Both of these
scientists are very active in the Advisory Programme and sitting in the
ACFM. The topic of the meaning of review takes a different tone when an
Advisory Programme Leader, the same one who just contrasted advice and
review skill in Q 7.30, is sitting among the leaders of the Science Pro-
gramme. He is Scientist Two:
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Q 7.32 Scientist One: My question is, peer review from these review groups,
is this ICES or outside, I see peer review in ICES as being incestuous.
Scientist Two: We have some money to recruit from the outside. We do not
have funds for a full external review, and we try to circulate external re-
viewers among groups. Scientist One: It is not needed every year but on a
periodic basis. Scientist Two: At the moment we have more money than we
have reviewers, it is very difficult to get people to come from far without
honoraria. Scientist One: It can be someone in the system but not in the
current process. Scientist Three: There is not enough difference here be-
tween the expert and the advisors. It is like a change to the past, presently
the advice is not really in the expert groups, and I don’t see why you have to
ask the groups to start drafting advice, the experts are the experts, and writ-
ing advice is different, and presently the review groups do it. Scientist Two:
We have had the practice that the chair provides the first draft [of advice] for
20 years. Scientist Three: Perhaps that is wrong. Scientist Two: The argu-
ment has always been that the expert groups are the best place to identify
the key features of the advice. The problem with expert groups is not that
they don’t have a good feel of the features as much as not knowing so much
about the context of the advice ... Scientist Four: Your clients are insane. ‘I
want in 10 minutes a sound paper on the EAFM for the 21st century’. This
is difficult to deal with. On the role of experts in advice, I do not agree with
Scientist Three. They are the right people to write it, but they are volun-
teers, and you cannot order them to make the advice. I am not sure if the
advisory system, which is a big machine, is not forgetting this limitation.
(Observer’s notes at the Consultative Committee meeting, September 2007)
Here notions of review no longer stem from the practical grind of advice
production in ACFM, rather questions about ICES’s deviations from the
ideal model of review dominate. Reviews should be carried out by external
people, otherwise the process is ‘incestuous’. Reviews must be clearly dis-
tinct from advice, and advice considerations must certainly not apply to the
expert groups, even to the extent that the chair of the group writes the
initial suggestions, as has long been done. Scientist Two does get some
support from Scientist Four, who can see that serious practical issues arise
when trying to mobilise ICES expertise to serve the needs of ‘insane’ cli-
ents. However, the ‘your’ in the sentence ‘your clients are insane’ may be
the most revealing word in the exchange as it shows us how little some
parts of even the leadership of the science side of ICES identify with the
struggles of the Advisory Programme.
Another consideration in the separation of expert groups from advisory
functions is potential bias:
Q 7.33 Scientist One: If the EG [expert groups] draft the advice, it may be
influenced strongly by national interests. The backbone of a good advice is
the objective and distant view on the assessment, forecast and outcome.
EGs are usually blinded by details. An important strength ICES has so far
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is the EG-disconnected discussion in ACFM with a broad range of opinions
being presented and turned upside down over and over again. (Observer’s
notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme meeting, Sep-
tember 2007)
This passage reminds us of the very important point that this issue of the
separation of review and advice is very much a part of the overall political
context in which ICES advice is being produced and used. The final quote
in the section delves deeper into this aspect. This delegate constructs po-
tentials for stakeholder involvement as a key aspect of what might be re-
garded as the very technical and practical question of the dividing line be-
tween advice and review.
Q 7.34 Interviewer: One of the decisions you made was to separate the tech-
nical review and the advice drafting. What were the arguments for and
against that? Delegate: Well, I think the argument for was primarily to try
and reduce the workload of the next step in the process so if you have an
expert group which is sort of by definition the experts – if they draft the
advice, the next group have got a basis to work from, they are slightly ahead
of the game in progressing. The argument against it ... has to do with the
interaction between stakeholders and scientists – if you have an expert
group which is also tasked with drafting advice and you allow observers or
stakeholders to be engaged at that step, the stakeholders’ focus is more con-
cerned with what comes out in terms of the advice rather than technical
details or the assessment. So there would tend to be pressure to produce an
assessment which gave the particular advice that you wanted. Where my
argument is that if you keep the expert group as an expert group, you can
still have your stakeholders there, but you focus purely on the validity of the
evidence. Then when you go to the advice drafting stage, again you can
have stakeholders there, but now there’s a constraint that you have agreed
evidence.
This is an interesting twist, indeed in some ways an extension, of the ideal
model of review and advice. The quote goes back to peer review’s roots in
communicative rationality and applies it to the current problem of stake-
holder participation. Indeed, the delegate is making use of the communi-
cative rationality-based linkage between scientific credibility and process
legitimacy (Section 3.1.3) to design an interaction process to increase the
legitimacy of advice. Separating the reviewing of evidence and production
of advice becomes a way to facilitate communicative rationality by separat-
ing discussions that presuppose a consensus on factual truth from negotia-
tions over values and interests. Clearly, boundary issues between facts and
actions based on those facts already haunt the ICES system. This is true
even when only scientists are considered. With increasing stakeholder in-
teractions these boundary issues will not go away and will, in fact, intensi-
fy. Linking types of participation, however, to these basic distinctions of
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communicative rationality is not a denial of the importance of boundary
issues. Quite the contrary, it is a way to design processes of interaction for
handling boundary issues that can increase the saliency and process legiti-
macy of the advice, while leaving its credibility intact.
7.3.3 Workload and timing of advice
While the quality and consistency of integrated advice may have been the
most important conceptual drivers in the restructuring of the Advisory
Programme, the following quote from one of the delegates suggests that it
was not necessarily the squeakiest wheel:
Q 7.35 Interviewer: Who were the people that were pushing the change the
most from the Council’s perspective? Who did they feel like they were re-
sponding to? Delegate: I think there was an element of dissatisfaction
amongst those engaged in the advice process that it wasn’t working, that
they were overloaded.
The way scientists within the advisory system feel that they are stretched to
the limit is dealt with in some detail in Chapter 5. One of the main issues
the restructuring debate was grappling with was the demand from the
European Commission and its constituents that advice be delivered earlier
in the year. The shift is often referred to as ‘frontloading’ the TAC setting
process. A Commission Representative explains this imperative in terms
of the basic political demand of shifting towards a more participatory man-
agement system:
Q 7.36 Commission Representative: The main purpose of moving the ad-
vice is to leave time for the decision process for more interaction with the
RACs and the Council of Ministers so we don’t get the December stamped.
This conflicts with stakeholder involvement. You can’t set up a participatory
process and then ignore it because of timing problems. (Observer’s notes at
the ICES Clients meeting, April 2006)
His point is supported, along with related frustrations, by the following
excerpt from a letter from the North Sea RAC to the Commissioner:
Q 7.37 The RACs consider frontloading to be of vital importance to the
success of the RACs in providing strong, scientifically based advice. How-
ever, over the past two years, 2004, 2005, frontloading has on the whole
remained an aspiration rather than a reality. In concrete terms this has
meant that the Commission has not been able to provide adequate ad-
vanced information on its proposals to the RACs, or discuss the key ele-
ments in such a way that the RACs could provide considered comment.
(RAC letter to Commissioner Borg, 2 February 2006)
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This is a difficult question because the TAC Machine functions on an an-
nual cycle that is rooted in the biology of most fish species and institution-
alised in the rhythms of data-gathering. Responding to DG MARE’s de-
mand is not simply a matter of shifting the whole system back a few
months. It requires processing the information and producing the advice
through a more compressed process. Here is a leader of the Advisory Pro-
gramme reporting on an early experiment with frontloading:
Q 7.38 Scientist One: For the timing of the advice in fisheries there was a
North Sea pilot project. What happened? Scientist Two: This was not im-
possible, but unhealthy. We reduced the meeting to 8 days from 10, and
did it in May instead of September. They did the same amount of work in
the 8 days so it was unhealthy. If we task groups to do jobs we have to have
realistic expectations. If we want earlier meetings and advice, then we have
to remove other jobs from the agenda. We propose shorter meetings earlier
in the year, but deal with fewer stocks, and you will not address methodol-
ogy. The methodology issues will be done in the easier part of the year.
(Observer’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme
meeting, September 2007)
The group they are referring to here is the same expert group mentioned
in Chapter 5 where, when we were observing the group in 2003, the only
time one of the scientists wanted us to know something specific for our
report was that she had been working until 4:00 a.m. the night before.
This increased pressure leaves little margin for error, so it would be nice
to know ahead of time how much error is going to be acceptable:
Q 7.39 Scientist One: About timing under the new system, the advisory
committee makes observations, but they do not do the work if it needs to
be redone, but this will leave very little time for reconsideration following
the client’s needs. Scientist Two: The main thing we can do is planning
with clear communication between ICES and clients. We need to know
how perfect advice they want. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for
Ecosystems meeting, September 2007)
It is not just a matter of having a too tightly coupled system for dealing
with error, although tight coupling, meaning that the components of a sys-
tem have a prompt and strong impact on one another, is a dangerous con-
dition for any system. As the North Sea pilot project mentioned in Q 7.38
implied, it is also a matter of the advisory process losing flexibility and
creativity as time for reflection and change is squeezed out of the system.
Methodological issues cannot be addressed in the expert groups, they will
have to be addressed in the ‘easier part of the year’, meaning the period
after the advisory requests for the year have been met.
As discussed in more detail in the section on basic political tensions, the
question of time and money resources for the Advisory Programme go
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beyond ICES to requiring increased input from the NFIs. This is not an
easy thing to coordinate:
Q 7.40 Scientist One: The national labs are supposed to have more respon-
sibility in data compilation, formatting, index calculation and assessment
performance, whereas the EGs [expert groups] are considered to have more
emphasis on the advice formulation based on the assessments provided by
the labs. It needs to be pointed out here that usually data compilation, for-
matting and assessment performance are done by the same group of per-
sons, who at the same time are members of the EGs and at least some of
them being involved also in the RGs [review groups]. ICES is in danger of
trying to make use of one and the same resource more than once. (Obser-
ver’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Programme meeting,
September 2007)
Coordination is also required with other international advice generation
efforts:
Q 7.41 Advisory Process Leader: The key aspect is the workload. And then
the [world] becomes a little bit bigger than ICES of course. And what I’ve
been trying to do, and that’s not necessarily connected to this change in the
advisory process but more on a general level, is to remove the overlaps be-
tween groups that are operating under different umbrellas. So as an exam-
ple we have removed the separate group on anchovy that was on at STECF.
We have now brought that into the ICES system and taken it out of the
former expert group that we had in ICES, so that we now have a dedicated
group in ICES dealing with anchovy to remove this extra group we had in
the past.
Streamlining the advice generation process involves judgements that are
political and social as well as scientific. One obvious way to reduce the
workload is to be more selective about which fish stocks should be as-
sessed at which frequencies. The following discussion at ACFM shows the
complexities of deciding how and by whom these decisions should be
made:
Q 7.42 Scientist One: I worry about criteria used to select the stocks that
will get different rhythms. Is it biological, clients, commercial? Will it shift
around or not? The small stocks with few data will be left out and the big
stocks always done, this is not the criteria. It would be better to decide by
long- and short-lived species. Scientist Two: I have a similar concern as
Scientist One in choosing stocks. If we need multi-annual advice, how do
we start this process? In the transition year the working groups should be
working on this specific task of determining the rhythm of the stocks.
Scientist Three: What we have tried to do in the last two days we have
looked at the expertise and WG chairs, we have here to make an initial
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proposal on rhythm. I agree with both of you we need criteria. My initial
proposal was based on how it was used in the advice, but I agree we need
to consider biological characteristics ... Scientist Four: I agree we need to
reduce the number of stocks, and the criterion is conservation ... Scientist
Three: We will provide advice when we have annual information that is
useful for providing advice, where we only have catch trends, we don’t
need to provide a number every year. Commission Observer: Advice cannot
be separated from the management procedure for a stock, short-lived and
data-poor are specific issues, if there is no basis to updating, for other
stocks a change to multi-annual advice must be linked to a multi-annual
management plan. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory Committee for Fisheries
Management meeting, September 2007)
Some ACFM scientists are leaning towards criteria that reflect the biology
or the condition of the fish stock. Another one agrees but is also concerned
with those stocks that are feasible to address in terms of information flows
and the mechanism of the advisory system. The Commission Observer’s
view is that choices about how to assess stocks should be driven by their
overall management plan, not ad hoc judgements made by concerned
scientists.
Much of the debate consisted of finding ways to do more with less, the
reorganisation has created the potential for shorter meetings and more
work at home:
Q 7.43 Delegate: So you now have the potential to offer a great deal of flex-
ibility and therefore as a lab director it’s easier if that happens, it’s easier to
allocate resources because they’re not tied down in quite the same way
where you got more choices to do things than in the current arrangements.
Interviewer: And travel days there’s probably differences. Delegate: Yeah,
and certainly if you ... You know, if your assessment is done offline, in other
words not at a meeting in Copenhagen, you know, it can be done over a
longer period, the people involved can still be in the laboratory [than all the
way in ...], so it saves a bit of trouble and a bit of money.
A lot of emphasis was placed on finding technological means to work at
greater distances.
Q 7.44 Scientist One: We must do something about the workload on the
working groups. So we separate this into two, a) a meeting for the basic
advice strategy and b) video conferences with a text to discuss to look at
particular areas and stocks ... Scientist Two: Can Russia and others do this?
Scientist One: This system we have chosen is that the Secretariat provides
the system costs; the individual countries need the headphones and the
camera. Scientist Three: ... The video conference requires a much more
specific agenda. Scientist Four: Will this work over 10 days with 2 hour
slots. Scientist Five: We don’t know all the implications, but we really have
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to go this way. Scientist Two: Russia and the US with different time zones
and different technology and costs, we can’t make solutions that are implic-
itly discriminatory. (Observer’s notes at the Management Committee for the
Advisory Programme meeting, September 2007)
The discussion of what to do about the workload contains many warning
signs about a too tightly coupled system: separation of action and reflec-
tion; little opportunity to identify and respond to errors; and increased re-
liance on communications media that a) require specialised and central-
ised expertise, b) demand ‘a much more specific agenda’ and c) are even
‘discriminatory’. Tight coupling results from many decisions that seem to
be wise and necessary in and of themselves. One of the points made by
many people in this book is, however, that ICES’s strength, even its ability
to provide advice for an EAFM, rests in the way it is a distributed scientific
network that has managed to find many ways for its members to effectively
raise questions. The danger is that the rationalisation of working practices,
born of a real need for efficiency, may interfere with the communicative
rationality on which ICES more fundamentally depends.
7.3.4 The respective roles of the Secretariat and ACOM
The General Secretary, through the Secretariat, is responsible for the or-
ganisation of both the Science and Advisory Programmes and ICES com-
munications. The Advisory Programme is not supposed to be concerned
with the content of the advice, but is responsible for technical support in-
cluding organising its production and ensuring standards of quality and
consistency. The Advisory Programme employs ten people within the Sec-
retariat. Its traditional tasks include handling the press and clients. While
there may be informal interaction between a client and the chair of an
advisory committee, as soon as there are any formal issues, the Secretariat
must become involved. Its heaviest work, however, is in the area of quality
assurance. A respondent who works in the Secretariat provides the follow-
ing description:
Q 7.45 Respondent: We check to see if a document we get from an advisory
committee is a lousy document, technically, and what I, we are checking
again for is consistency, and we’re checking for language. Interviewer: So it
is a natural scientific review process? Respondent: It is ... I’m just taking
the trivial example to make the point, the actual advice number in a fish-
eries document appears I think in 5 different places, and we find examples
every year where the number in one place is not the same number they
cited in the other ... we have five professional staff who each have their
block if you like. It [the advice] is about 1600 pages a year ... What really
costs is, you get a document which was discussed in ACFM, and then the
discussion stopped, and then it says ‘Tim update’ or whatever. This is high-
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lighted in yellow, and then you get a paragraph with no author, and you start
speculating if this is the old text or the new ... Then you read through the
document, and if you find, let’s say, nonsense ... to give you an idea, I have
heard, to do a little bit of study on the email conversations after the ACFM,
and I think there was about 350 emails exchanged after the meeting.
This is basically an editorial function, but the amount of work and the
number of judgements required make it a kind of ‘natural scientific review
process’. These were my words that the respondent agreed to, not the re-
spondent’s own words, and the example that followed immediately made it
clear that what he had in mind when he agreed did not approach the ‘peer
review’ level in the meaning of ‘review’. However, it is clear that this is a
very extended, lengthy and difficult scrutiny. Considerable discussion fo-
cussed on the relationship between the Secretariat and the new ACOM.
This was not a new issue. As is illustrated in Q 7.49, the relationship be-
tween the three advisory committees, which had the final say over the con-
tent of the advice, and the Secretariat, which was responsible for the or-
ganisation of the production of the advice, has often involved tensions
over day-to-day responsibilities. The Secretariat reports to the General Sec-
retary. Under the old system the advisory committee chairs reported to
MCAP, and under the new system the ACOM chair reports to the Council.
However, one of these chairs told me, ‘the relationship between the MCAP
chair and myself had very few interactions, usually only around meetings
and not on a day-to-day basis, [while] the interactions with the Head [head
of the Advisory Programme in the Secretariat] were much more often, at
least ten times more’.
With the reorganisation, the ACOM becomes a more independent body
than the previous advisory committees. It combines the powers of the
three former advisory committees and MCAP, and reports directly to the
Council. Its status was laid out as follows at its first meeting in February
2008:
Q 7.46 Document 31 as it has been adopted by the Bureau: 1. Empower the
Advisory Committee (ACOM) – ACOM should be the sole competent body
for ICES for scientific advice in support of the management of coastal and
ocean resources and ecosystems. It should be empowered to design strate-
gies and processes for preparation of advice, manage advisory processes,
and create and deliver advice, subject to direction from the Council (includ-
ing the criteria of version 3, which should hereafter be referred to as operat-
ing principles for ICES advice), budget constraints, availability of scientific
expertise from member states, and practical constraints on the resources of
the Secretariat. The content of scientific advice should be solely ACOM’s
responsibility not subject to modification by any other ICES entity. (Quote
from background Document 31, Advisory Committee, Februrary 2008)
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Several members of MCAP talked about the new division of labour be-
tween the Head and the ACOM chair in terms of the ACOM chair being
the face of the advice to the outside world, while the Head addressed hu-
man resources and logistical organisation. But this was still unclear, and
some believed that even greater unclarity existed in the division of labour
between the Head and the three vice-chairs because they dealt more di-
rectly with organisational issues than the new ACOM chair is expected to
do. The discussions at ACOM itself, as well as remarks in interviews, sug-
gested that many issues about the respective roles of the ACOM chair and
the Head would not be worked out until the ACOM chair was selected.
Aside from roles, to the consternation of several MCAP leaders, people on
the Council even questioned if the ACOM chair really had to be located at
the Secretariat, or could he or she operate just as well from one of the
NFIs. Their reaction was that the ACOM chair must be independent and
that independence could only be achieved by attachment to the Secretariat.
This lead to a rather impassioned speech by someone from the Secretariat
to MCAP:
Q 7.47 Scientist One: I was surprised there was so much dissent on the way
this new position should be. We have to make sure this person is indepen-
dent and highly qualified. To make sure this person is independent, they
need a good basis, and this cannot be in a single institute, it must be in the
Secretariat. This is the executive of the Council and Bureau and has full
control. This is where it can be fully independent. So the full-time profes-
sionals must be in the Secretariat ... There is continual cross-funding of
ICES’s core budget and advisory budget, this is fair enough as it is the ‘core
business’, but to organise that we need a person who is at the Secretariat
management group meeting every week while being independent and ac-
countable to Council ... the person should also be paid by ICES not an in-
stitute, the person should be in the Secretariat day by day, or it will just go
back to the Head of the Advisory Programme [executive responsible for the
Advisory Programme within the Secretariat] and we will have two parallel
systems. (Observer’s notes at the Management Committee for the Advisory Pro-
gramme meeting, September 2007)
However, the employee of the Advisory Programme within the Secretariat
that provided the description in Q 7.45 believed that the division of labour
was clearer than many other scientists seemed to think:
Q 7.48 Interviewer: What’s your take on issues around ACOM versus Sec-
retariat roles? Respondent: I think it’s grossly overemphasised. To me a
Secretariat has to operate within defined policies, and these policies are
laid down by the Council in general, by the ACOM on more specific issues,
and my take on it is that simply because the way they are nominated, let’s
say all executive things are through the Secretariat. Everything for which
there is a consistency issue has to be done through the Secretariat, and a
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number of cases actually have to be done by – or checked by – the Secre-
tariat because the, what we see, we see it from our, every time we change a
chair there is no history ... The other thing is that I believe that in order for
the system to work efficiently, any advisory group has to consider policies
and see that the Secretariat adheres to the policies, but accepts that the ex-
ecutive branch is the Secretariat, not the committee itself.
Another respondent who is a leader in the Advisory Programme, but not a
Secretariat employee, and who was particularly active in ACFM, sees the
division as less clear:
Q 7.49 Interviewer: How does the new system envision the relationship
between ACOM and the Secretariat? Advisory Programme Leader: There
will be a more active steering from ACOM on the direction of the advisory
process and a stronger link between ACOM and the Secretariat through the
Chair and Vice Chairs process of the Advisory Committee ... The interest-
ing part of it is where is going to be the boundary between what is the
policy of ACOM and what is the technical implementation of that policy in
the Secretariat. And the idea is that [with the new Chair and Vice Chairs]
there is a more professional basis to work on the policy of the Advisory
Committee and to better steer the Secretariat approaches ... but ... the line
between technical support and policy-making is a very difficult line to draw,
and there has been a perception with some people, for example in ACFM,
that the Secretariat was doing too much steering on content rather than on
the logistics ... Interviewer: When does it arise? Advisory Programme Lead-
er: It is not that much; well, it used to be quite regular in those days when
the ‘professional Secretariat’ participated in the advisory meeting as the
Secretariat by helping out on the formulation issues and things like that.
There is a subtle balance there on how much input the Secretariat gives at
that stage, and we had quite a number of incidences [three years ago] which
I thought were inappropriate uses of the Secretariat in the meeting by sit-
ting down, saying we did not like the proposal from ACFM and then writ-
ing something that they thought was better. Interviewer: Was the concern
driven by thinking that they did not meet the requirements of clients? Ad-
visory Programme Leader: Yeah, well, no I can’t say that explicitly, they
didn’t think it was consistent, or they didn’t like the way it was formulated.
He argues in contrast to Q 7.48 that ‘the line between technical support
and policy-making is a very difficult line to draw’ and believes that it has
created tensions around the degree to which the Secretariat should involve
itself in the content of the advice. An Advisory Programme employee in
the Secretariat thinks it would be helpful here to make a distinction be-
tween the ACOM chair and the vice-chairs, because as the chairs have an
‘executive role’, here in the sense of practical and logistical rather than
decision-making, they should also be accountable to the Secretariat:
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Q 7.50 Interviewer: What has the debate been over who the ACOM Chair
should report to? Advisory Programme Employee: There has never been a
debate on the Chair. Interviewer: OK, he reports to the Council? Advisory
Programme Employee: Yes, full stop, no debate. My take on it is that there
is an issue on the Vice Chairs because they act as executives, and that is a
major problem to me, that they actually go as far as starting discussing how
the Share Point [a computer communications system located in and man-
aged by the Secretariat] should be, again just to give you an example of the
problem. We have established a Share Point system and so on, and it has a
certain number of deficiencies, there is one particular feature which the
chair wants to use, there is a number of arguments, technical, and I have
forgotten them, against using it, the key point is that if you use that facility,
you gain here but you lose other facilities, and the interim evaluation in the
Secretariat was the gain did not outweigh the loss. From our perspective we
used the other facility which will lose much more often than the first one.
The [Vice] Chair, ok, can argue, but he tries to implement it himself, and
that’s normal. It’s a trivial example, but it’s just illustrative.
The tensions between the Secretariat and the ACOM system must be
worked out through a series of small day-to-day decisions about how the
computers will work. The most serious tension, of course, is over what
counts as a decision about the content of the advice, which is now ‘solely
ACOM’s responsibility not subject to modification by any other ICES en-
tity’ (Q 7.46) and what counts as simply an editorial decision as the Secre-
tariat prepares 1600 pages of consistent advice in the week or so following
ACOM meetings. These are all people who are used to playing the role of
edited author, and most of them will have experience as editors as well, so
they will muddle through while they exchange their 350 emails. However,
this muddling through takes place within the broader ICES political land-
scape. There the ACOM-Secretariat tension reflects the larger divisions be-
tween the CFP members in ICES and those who negotiate with them.
The two quotes below come from interviews with delegates. The first
one is a delegate from a member state within the CFP.
Q 7.51 [continues from Q 7.13: … ICES as a bastion against the EU-bloc ...]
and where that has come to the fore in this ACOM-thing is in the status of
the Chair. Now, Norway has argued that the chair and the senior advisors
should be employed within the Secretariat. The other position, and it’s true
in a number of countries including North America, is that if you do that,
you detach the responsibility of the advisors from the scientific community
producing the evidence, because now you have a reporting line through
essentially a bureaucrat. You know the General Secretary is now responsible
for these employees who are bringing advice to customers. And so it’s a bit
like the prime minister reporting to the head of the civil service, which is
not the right balance of responsibilities and ... But Norway’s reason for
doing that is that they’re fearful that if you create these positions outside
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the Secretariat and they are funded, that somehow that organisation be-
comes, you know the ACOM-organisation becomes a parallel organisation
to ICES.
In contrast, the views of a delegate from a country external to the CFP:
Q 7.52 Interviewer: How is the Council envisioning the relationship be-
tween ACOM and the Secretariat? Delegate: Well, that’s interesting, be-
cause I do not like the present model. Why? Because as it is, it could reflect
the way you look upon an organisation, and it definitely reflects different
national cultures. And I’ve been disagreeing very much with [other Del-
egates] on the way we decided it. You have an ACOM that should do the
advice. I would strengthen the Secretariat to develop the necessary data to
make the expert groups work, to make the review groups work, and to com-
pile and to finish the advice. That’s something that the Secretariat should
do. Some of my colleagues at the Council want the Secretariat to be only a
technical meeting facilitator. What I see is that we are now building a paral-
lel structure to the ICES Secretariat by developing ACOM and ACOM Chair
and three Vice Chairs ... that would definitely establish an alternative Secre-
tariat.
At issue is partly the question of what is the ‘real’ ICES. One part of this
identity question is between ICES as a network or ICES as the Secretariat.
On the one hand there are the 100+ expert groups who provide the intel-
lectual currency in which ICES trades. The other is a building in Copenha-
gen where these expert groups often meet and where the only people who
see themselves as actually ‘working for ICES’ are sitting. It is important to
remember that ICES in legal fact is neither the network nor the Secretariat.
It is an intergovernmental convention governed by a Council of Delegates
of its constituent member countries. These delegates are the ones that
hold the purse strings for both the network and Secretariat activities.
The first delegate sees the ACOM chair as a sort of prime minister. This
is an unusual metaphor when you think about it. Both the ACOM chair
and the General Secretary are employees of the Council. He is concerned
that the ACOM chair being part of the Secretariat would ‘detach the re-
sponsibility of the advisors from the scientific community producing the
evidence’, so both this concern and the use of the term ‘prime minster’
place an emphasis on how the ACOM ‘represents’ the broader ICES net-
work that gives the science its legitimacy in a way the Secretariat does not.
This emphasis is rooted, however, in a formal notion of representation.
ACOM is, like the Council itself, made up of two representatives of each
member country. This was an important point emphasised within MCAP
and other Advisory Programme meetings while they developed the reor-
ganisation proposal. The bulk of the review and advice writing should take
place in review and advice-drafting groups lower down, and then ACOM,
where representatives of the member countries sit, will give this advice the
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international stamp of approval. So ACOM is indeed representative, but of
the member countries first and of the ‘scientific community producing the
evidence’ second. Indeed, while most scientists now appointed by their
governments to ACOM have been active members of ICES, several have
not been much involved in ICES activities before.
The first delegate’s characterisation of the concern of those outside the
CFP is that they fear that the network, led by ACOM, will develop its own
organisation and even gain control of a budget. This seems accurate, given
that the second delegate fears the eventual ‘outsourcing’ of the advice. He
knows that the ACOM will need some sort of Secretariat, so the efficient
thing to do is to strengthen the one ICES has. If not, he fears another
parallel Secretariat will emerge, but it is hard to see where the resources
for this would come from.
Other voices also have concerns about the degree to which the Secretari-
at embodies the ICES network. In this quote, from an Advisory Pro-
gramme Leader not employed in the Secretariat, the concern is with the
fact that the Secretariat takes its character partly from its location:
Q 7.53 Interviewer: So why was the role of the Secretariat an issue when you
did the reorganisation? Advisory Programme Leader: Well, it’s the issue of
what is the process from an international community that is going to give
internationally agreed advice. You have a Secretariat which is somewhat
dominated by Denmark, based in Denmark, with professionals that have
been working there for many years and may have their own ideas about
how the advice should be ….Interviewer: So this has to do with what the
actual authoritative voice of ICES is? Advisory Programme Leader: Well,
yes. Ultimately it is about who is providing advice. Is that an international
committee that is embedded in the ICES system, or is it also in part run by
the professional Secretariat that may have their own inputs?
This quote is an interesting contrast with Q 7.47, where the Secretariat was
held up as a guarantor of independence. Here the Secretariat is seen as
rooted in a particular national culture. Perceptions play an important role
in both quotes. Denmark has no formal influence beyond that of any other
ICES member. However, the Secretariat is in Denmark and employs many
more Danes than any other nationality. The ICES Secretariat employs 48
people including the three ACOM vice-chairs. Of them, 15 of the 28 ad-
ministrative and technical employees and 8 of the 20 scientists and man-
agers are Danish. Many different kinds of independence contribute to per-
ceptions of legitimacy.
The underlying concerns are with scientific legitimacy as I have defined
it in Chapter 3. Is the scientific institution sufficiently balanced in its
make-up to be trusted as a source of advice?
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7.3.5 Stakeholder participants and observers
Questions about when and how stakeholders should act as observers, and
even in some cases participants, in ICES deliberations was an ongoing
theme in the reorganisation discussion. Many ICES scientists saw this
theme as something extraneous that was being ‘bolted on’ to the reorgani-
sation. Others saw it as a critical part of the discussion. This respondent
tied the question to the EAFM:
Q 7.54 Interviewer: How is concern about relating to the RACs an impor-
tant or less important aspect of the reorganisation? Advisory Programme
Leader: Well ... I think there have been a lot of mixed views on that. And to
me it has been a very important aspect. The issue of transparency of the
advisory process to me is a very important issue. And that links into the
RACs, but it can be wider than the stakeholder organisations. It’s not a
necessary part of the changes in the advisory process. In my view I’ve sort
of coupled it in with this, but I see also people who have worries about
making the scientific system more open, being afraid of influence, etc.
And I think the way I see this ecosystem approach is that it’s not only about
including ecosystem aspects in the way management is carried out, it also
involves a different process of how the management is carried out. So I see
the involvement of stakeholders in the process as part of an ecosystem ap-
proach.
Concerns about the impact of the stakeholder observers on scientific legiti-
macy were widespread in the discussion. The concerns articulated in the
following statement, and the use of different steps in the process to bal-
ance those concerns, is quite typical:
Q 7.55 Scientist One: The other thing is the proposal in documents for
stakeholders to be participants in review and expert groups. I am not
against stakeholder communication before the assessment in terms of the
data we are using, such as data from the fishing industry, also after the
assessment in review groups this will be productive to communicate well.
But in the assessment groups producing the draft advice, we know very well
that the stakeholders have a strong economic interest, so we may then ques-
tion if they will influence the assessment in the early advisory process, that
will not be good, and it will question the integrity of ICES, and that is im-
portant. In some meetings the scientists should be able to sit and do assess-
ments without the stakeholders pushing. (Observer’s notes at the Advisory
Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, September 2007)
The CFP/non-CFP distinction also played a role:
Q 7.56 Interviewer: Where among the Council did you note any tensions
arising in the reorganisation between EU countries and non-EU countries?
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Delegate: There are two issues that have come to light where there is a
difference of opinion, and one is the engagement with stakeholders – how
much of the system is open and where are the points that stakeholders can
get involved.
The idea that stakeholder participation in science should be regulated ac-
cording to the steps in the science and advice development processes is a
near-consensus at ICES; disagreement focuses on how to handle particular
steps. In the following, the reference to ‘reasons I have described earlier’ is
to the delegate’s belief that the biggest problem with observers would arise
in meetings taking place remotely, over the Internet for example, because
scientists would not be able to see the interactions between the other scien-
tists and the stakeholders from their country.
Q 7.57 Delegate: I do not want them in the advisory drafting groups, for the
reasons I described earlier, [another Delegate] wants them there. Inter-
viewer: But you wouldn’t object if they, if they’re in the same room? Del-
egate: No, that’s quite fine with me. Interviewer: So the issue is the struc-
ture, not the observers themselves? Delegate: Yeah. Interviewer: OK.
Delegate: My ministry strongly disagrees with me. They want them out of
the advice drafting groups. Interviewer: Why’s that? Delegate: Fear of influ-
ence. Interviewer: But this is [the Delegate’s country]? They bring their fish-
ermen’s associations with them when they go to the negotiations. Delegate:
Yeah. Interviewer: So, what do they fear? Delegate: Do not ask me.
The delegate’s ministry is very likely concerned that those observers will
influence the advice, and they do not want the CFP industry to have influ-
ence at an earlier stage than their own fishing industry. The delegate him-
self, however, is actually concerned with structuring the stakeholder parti-
cipation in a way that increases rather than threatens transparency.
The CFP/non-CFP divide does not explain all of the differences among
countries in terms of observers.
Q 7.58 Delegate: The countries that are most in favour of stakeholder/ob-
server participation are EU, sorry not EU, UK, Netherlands, Denmark ... I
don’t know about Ireland, but United States and to some extent Canada.
Those who tend to be nervous are Russia, Norway, Iceland, Spain, Belgium
... France tends not to express an opinion … I think with that particular
issue, you know, whether it’s a participatory role or an observership role – I
don’t think that cleavage comes as an EU/non-EU. I think that has a lot to
do with self-confidence, national self-confidence if you like. I think that
some countries are further down the line of understanding that if you don’t
involve stakeholders, you might get technically good advice, but which is
not accepted and therefore is of no use. While other countries feel that
scientific integrity overrides everything, and therefore you must exclude all
undue influence from non-scientists.
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The overall discussion in ICES has reduced transparency to mainly a ques-
tion of the presence or absence of observers. However, observers are only
one technique to increase transparency. Observer programmes are clearly
delicate. The paradoxes of transparency make formal attempts to ensure
transparency complex. When techniques to increase transparency are not
sufficiently transparent, the situation is worse than before. So if we are to
have observers, the process of having observers must itself be observed.
These ICES scientists place this problem in the context of countries ob-
serving countries. Just as critical, however, the legitimacy of the process
depends on both the industry and the conservation NGOs being able to
observe each other observing.
We also have to look beyond the question of the forms and structures of
transparency to the quality of the processes. This last quote (Q 7.58) calls
our attention to transparency as a function of capacity-building and scien-
tific confidence. This confidence includes a willingness to be seen being
unsure.
7.3.6 The EAFM and the reorganisation
As mentioned above, the issues that the informal delegates’ meeting out-
lined in Helsinki did not place much emphasis on the EAFM. In fact, the
EAFM did not play a very large direct role, although it did play an impor-
tant indirect role, as evidenced in the discussion of these other themes,
making up an important part of the context of the required changes. Dif-
ferent ICES scientists also had different perceptions of how much of a role
the EAFM was playing. In the Council, in the perception of this delegate,
the EAFM was more a gloss than part of the substance of the reorganisa-
tion, a gloss that was needed more by some countries than by others:
Q 7.59 Delegate: ... And I think some member countries are probably more
concerned about being seen to be doing an ecosystem approach than others
because their local politics demands it ... Interviewer: In terms of trying to
figure out advice for the ecosystem approach, how much does the Council
tackle issues like what integrated science would mean? Is that something
you guys would discuss? Delegate: No [the Council] tends not to deal with
that sort of technical level at the Council meeting. ... there was an agree-
ment that the current advisory system wasn’t working as well as we wanted
it to. There were some countries who said, well in that case, you know, what
should inform any reorganisation is the ecosystem approach. So ... I’m sure
if you asked some countries ‘Why did you want to change the advisory sys-
tem?’ they would say ‘In order to get an ecosystem approach’.
One interesting point that emerges from this quote is that the whole ques-
tion of integrated science, i.e. the entire discussion outlined in Chapter 6,
is not something that this delegate sees as relevant to the Council’s work.
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Here it is constructed as a purely technical question, not rising to the
Council level. I think it safe to presume that this attitude is not shared by
the entire Council, because of the frustration that the other delegate,
quoted below in Q 7.64, feels about how ICES is moving towards inte-
grated advice.
The EAFM is also a different priority for different clients:
Q 7.60 Interviewer: How much of the change towards the ecosystem, in the
parts of the reorganisation you were involved in, would you say the clients
played? Advisory Programme Leader: I think there’s a considerable influ-
ence from the clients. Interviewer: Which ones? Advisory Programme
Leader: Particularly from the European Commission. They have a very
strong driver for getting advice on a more integrated basis. The other com-
missions like NEAFC, NASCO, they sort of seem to be more like: Yes, we
[all] want this ecosystem approach, but we don’t really care too much about
it. And in the Commission there are a number of people quite motivated to
move in this direction. And the [MoU] between the EC and ICES is also
much more explicit.
This perception that DG MARE is particularly interested in the EAFM is
reinforced in the following exchange:
Q 7.61 Scientist One: Another aspect comes from the advice for the corals
we had to do this year. When dealing with non-fish quota, we have a differ-
ent science base, if we can’t quantify things it does not help people do their
business very well. Demands like that are going to grow. Scientist Two: We
can see that in the requests coming in, not just coral but climate changes
and fish and ecosystem. Scientist One: We are not being nearly as helpful
as we can be ... Commission Observer: There is a difference between evalu-
ating what has been done and what is asked for here, which is how to have
a forward role of implementation. As a client, I see a high pressure for
sound proposals on the table. We need to see this get to the advice level, as
Scientist One has implied this is actually the easy part. Once we get into
aspects we are less used to, it will be even worse. Politically, we must get
our tactics into strategies, and we need advice for that. (Observer’s notes at
the Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management meeting, September 2007)
This discussion rehearses the difficulties in producing advice for EAFM
and suggests that DG MARE at least is frustrated at the level of linking the
EAFM advice into management strategies.
The following reflects a background emphasis on regionalisation as a
way to approach the reorganisation that many ICES scientists shared. In-
deed, recall the Advisory Programme Leader who, at the beginning of this
chapter (p. 172), called the EAFM the rationale for the new historical wave
towards holism due to ecosystem considerations.
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Q 7.62 Interviewer: So what kind of more change would you like to see?
Delegate: I think that we have now changed the advisory process, we have
decided that we should adopt the ecosystem-based approach, but still, we
have the thematic expert groups, and then we have clients or customers,
use whatever word you like, who ask for advice on a single-stock basis. So,
what I think we should do is that we should have in a way regionalised the
ICES advisory process, not the science process. I think the science process
needs to be thematic, but the advisory process should be organised in a
kind of regionalised way, that in a way causes the process itself to use a
broader, more ecosystem-based approach. Interviewer: What kind of re-
gions would you be looking at? Delegate: I would prefer the LME [Large
Marine Ecosystem] level.
Some scientists also saw the combination of the three advisory committees
into the one ACOM as a way of forcing an EAFM agenda:
Q 7.63 Scientist One: As long as ACE and ACME existed, if we got a non-
fisheries advice request, they had another place to send it, this was because
they could not get them into the fish groups. From many years I know that
when fish stock assessment working groups were assigned things that did
not include SSB and F, these things did not get done. Now they have no
other place to send them. Now it will be sent to people who do fisheries
advice, and we will put people in the room who know about the bycatch
species – like birds for example – when you have a client that is mandated
to protect these species. If we give catch option advice ignoring other re-
quests to ICES, that catch option advice is irresponsible advice, not merely
not integrated. (Observer’s notes at the Annual Meeting of Assessment Working
Group Chairs, February 2008)
It is an interesting twist in this statement that the speaker is thinking of
advice to clients based on what those clients are ‘mandated’ to do, rather
than more directly in terms of the client’s specific requests. The question
of the EAFM and client requests also appears in the next quote. One of the
interviewed delegates, the same one who considers regionalisation so im-
portant in quote Q 7.62, is not so optimistic about how effective a regional
approach can be because client requests arise from the TAC Machine:
Q 7.64 Interviewer: I’m interested in a point you made a little while ago,
where you said that you should have worked more on ecosystem approach,
but … the rationale for ACOM is to bring the three advisory committees
together so that it becomes more integrated. So, how was that a failure?
Delegate: Unless you change the process, the underlying process, which
means [the way] you compose the actual working groups that work out the
data to do the advice …Interviewer: I was hoping they would be doing that
on a regional level, like you’ve described. Delegate: No, but they won’t … it
has never been really discussed. The advice groups will meet to compose
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advice about some kind of request … they will produce advice for the North
Sea herring, the Norwegian pout … etc. … because that’s what they are
being asked for.
It is important to note here that the reorganisation adopted by the Council
allows, but does not mandate, the organisation of review and advice groups
by regions. It is ACOM that will determine how regionalised ICES’s work
will become, and there are real disagreements over the desirability of this
because of consistency issues, as discussed above in the part of Section
7.3.1 that discusses ‘ensuring consistency’.
A basic question this delegate raises, however, concerns the group level
where integration takes place. This question is linked to regionalisation
because ACOM will decide the degree to which expert groups, review
groups and advice drafting groups are tied to regions. This question was
the most common way in which integrated advice and the EAFM arose
within the reorganisation debate. It is also a question that some scientists
feel has been left hanging:
Q 7.65 Scientist One: It seems like the integration stuff is always so vague,
and the responsibility seems to fall on the assessment working groups.
(Observer’s notes at the Annual Meeting of Assessment Working Group Chairs,
February 2008)
The group level at which integration will take place is critical. Many ICES
scientists believe that real integration will never happen unless it takes
place before the advice drafting group level and certainly before ACOM.
Given the breadth of ACOM’s mandate, there is little additional expertise
available there for advice drafting, their job is to make sure that the advice
is fit for its purpose. Even at the level below ACOM, if an advice drafting
group finds itself looking at nothing but a set of distinct, independent as-
sessments of different issues within some region, then they will be badly
handicapped in trying to produce integrated advice, especially in the few
days they have available to them. In the terms of the next quote, they will
not have time to integrate advice; they will only have time to concatenate it.
For many ICES scientists, integrating information for EAFM advice has to
begin at as low a level as possible. One ICES leader explained it this way:
Q 7.66 What the EAFM does is make one discuss a lot of different issues,
almost all of which would be discussed anyway somewhere in ICES, but
discuss them in one place and relative to each other. It is the people who
can talk to all the different specialists and see how the individual parts inter-
relate to each other that are in short supply. That breadth of perspective has
to be present in the review process, because if advice is to be integrated,
then expert group reports need to be reviewed in two ways. One is relative
to the specialised disciplinary content, which is the traditional and easier
part of the review. The other is when this expert product is to be linked
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with others, the reviewers have to ask questions about how correct it would
be to interpret and apply the results in ways that might not have been on
the minds of the specialists who created the work being reviewed. And of
course, the drafting groups have to have those people with the breadth of
experience to understand several different sets of specialist results well en-
ough to frame decent integrative views of them, and they tie the pieces
together in a whole. Otherwise you don’t get ‘integrated advice’, you get
‘concatenated advice’.
Indeed, this ICES leader gave this as the most important reason why he
supported keeping the advice and review groups together. Given the lim-
ited number of people who are able to handle the breadth of the specific
issues that arise with respect to the EAFM, ICES cannot expect to be able
to move advice along four separate levels and have it be truly integrated.
Integrated advice should begin at the expert group level, and then be re-
viewed and carried forward to advice by the limited expertise that is actu-
ally available, and which is unlikely to be able to staff both a review and an
advice drafting group.
7.4 Conclusion
Two more quotes provide illustrations of what I think are the main conclu-
sions that can be drawn from this discussion of the restructuring of ICES.
The first asks and answers a very interesting and basic question:
Q 7.67 Scientist One: Why do we come to ICES? If we had a choice, would
we choose ICES? Scientist Two: Here we sit in a big community and we are
happy, then we are home and have another reality? How important is it?
Scientist Three: It is important that the programmes come in and are more
integrated and cross-disciplinary, ecosystem-based, this is why we want
ICES. Scientist Two: It can do things we can’t do alone ... Scientist Four:
One argument is that it is more than just Europe. Scientist Five: We do
need ICES, but we need more people, and we are being pulled into a num-
ber of organisations, ICES has to work more efficiently with other organisa-
tions. (Observer’s notes at the Resource Management Committee meeting, Sep-
tember 2007)
These scientists did not reflect at all on ICES as an intergovernmental pro-
vider of official advice. They know that is why it is there – it is the reason
why they do not ‘have a choice’ – but it is not their motivation. ICES pro-
vides a network that makes it possible for these scientists to achieve their
goals, particularly with respect to the EAFM. Yet, their desires for ICES
reflect some of its contradictions. They want the network, but they want it
to work more efficiently, and it is under-resourced. They see in the ICES
system a source of some of the frustrations described in Chapter 5. The
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next quote also addresses the question of the network, but it is the voice of
someone who is directly responsible for the intergovernmental aspects of
ICES:
Q 7.68 Delegate: In my opinion, it’s the distributed networks that gives
ICES the authority to speak. Interviewer: OK. Delegate: It is as simple as
that, because what you get is that you get every scientist to promote their
views, their results, their findings, and then they have a kind of scientific
consensus process that automatically feeds in the authority for ICES to
speak. Because everybody has been participating, everybody has the oppor-
tunity to say their ideas, and, if there is agreement it is allowed to show it ...
And the strength is they are very distributed ... In my opinion, ICES author-
ity is based on the scientific activity in its distributed groups. If it had not
been for the number of distributed groups, you wouldn’t have the authority,
because then there would have been the possibility that many would rest on
the outside saying: Hey, you didn’t hear me!
This delegate is arguing that the network is the source of ICES’s authority
because it makes criticism of results possible. No one is silenced, and this
is what makes the authority of ICES’s voice so strong. The network pro-
vides a social context that allows scientific process legitimacy in the sense
described in Section 3.1.3. It allows both the scientific credibility and the
‘something more’ (3.1.3) that gives the credibility of the scientific process
legitimacy in the eyes of its beholders.
He is describing something that is a bit contradictory: a distributed net-
work that speaks with one voice! Yet, I think there is an important insight
here, even if it seems paradoxical. What he is describing is what ICES,
which often seems to have two faces, actually does do. This paradoxical
structure has some great gifts, as will be discussed in the final chapter
when I try to pull this case together.
However, it often seems to mean that ICES just continues in a state of
constant reform. The final decision made by the Council forced ACOM to
separate the advice and review groups, but left other critical decisions in
ACOM’s hands. These include the ToRs of the expert groups, which will in
turn determine how low in the group hierarchy integration begins to be
considered, and the degree to which the review and drafting groups will
reflect ecosystem regions. The creation of ACOM is certainly one step to-
wards organising the EAFM, but it cannot be said that any of the main
issues are really resolved at this point. They are in the hands of the new
structure.
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8 Conclusion
8.1 A case of adaptive learning
In spite of the fact that the system of marine management that ICES feeds
into has not been a successful one, I believe that this case study is a sub-
stantially positive example, and that ICES has lessons to offer to other in-
stitutions seeking to produce knowledge that can support an ecosystem
approach. Of course, I cannot claim that ICES has been ‘successful’ in a
general sense because the EAFM is only really beginning in earnest, and
ICES plays one set of roles among many in determining policy outcomes.
However, I do think that ICES has approached the EAFM in a way that is
an example of ‘double-loop’ learning at an impressive magnitude. Double-
loop learning is the idea that institutions not only learn and change in
response to that learning, but that they also learn about how they learn.
ICES has attempted to mobilise a vast array of expertise to meet a complex
problem. For an intergovernmental organisation of this size and complex-
ity, it has made an impressive start.
What is it about ICES that has made this adaptive learning possible?
That seems to me to be the question around which to fashion a concluding
chapter. Asking the question this way is not meant to ignore ICES’s prob-
lems and constraints. It is to do quite the opposite. The fact that ICES is
part of a bureaucratic management system which has often made the lives
of its scientists miserable while failing to sustain fish stocks is precisely
what makes the question interesting.
My response to this question can be summarised this way:
a. the ICES network contains a number of ‘creative tensions’ that provide
space for ongoing reflection;
b. these creative tensions are very costly from the perspective of a large-
scale bureaucratic system attempting to manage fisheries, and finally
an EAFM, so there is a lot of pressure to ‘resolve’ them by suppressing
or ignoring them;
c. the ICES network, however, is made up of so many distributed power
centres in constant negotiation that the creative tensions are very diffi-
cult to suppress; and
d. out of these constant negotiations new mechanisms for transparency
are being developed that are subject to the paradoxes of transparency
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and require tightly drawn social spaces and associated languages to re-
solve the paradoxes.
This concluding chapter describes these four points. After doing so, it
turns to a short reflection on the usefulness of the CST theoretical perspec-
tive. Then the final discussion focuses on the implications of the lessons
from this case study for the institutions that evaluate, select and maintain
policy responses within an EAFM. The central recommendation is to
structure institutions generating and using knowledge for an EAFM by
ordering them according to larger and smaller communicative scales,
based on the complexity of the mechanisms needed to ensure transpar-
ency. I briefly describe this in terms of a results-based EAFM approach.
8.2 ICES’s creative tensions
The major form taken by the creative tensions within ICES is the contrast
between the Advisory Programme and Science Programme cultures. For a
number of reasons, this contrast should not be overdrawn. For one thing
all ICES scientists draw on a general scientific culture that is much more
pervasive and stronger than any sub-culture within ICES. The two scientif-
ic ideologies that have repeatedly arisen in this case study – the EAFM and
the precautionary principle – vary somewhat in levels of commitment (Ta-
ble 6.1), but they are still very generally accepted. Furthermore, for any of
the tensions I describe below, there are far more than two different posi-
tions. In fact, given that these are cultural ideas, and we are talking about
scientists here, it is likely that ICES contains 1600 positions on each one.
Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the distinction between the cultures of the
science and advice sides of ICES is a useful one. It does describe fairly well
the main poles of these tensions. Most importantly perhaps, the distinc-
tion is not my creation; ICES scientists commonly use it themselves.
8.2.1 Placing the science boundary
One tension between the science and advice sides is contrasting attitudes
about the placement of the science boundary. This distinction became very
clear in the discussions of how ICES should approach scientific review.
‘Review’ remains the key word in describing mechanisms for deciding
what will and will not be declared science; but ideas about what review
means vary.
On the science side, an ideal model of review, derived from the more
general notion of ‘peer-reviewed science’, retains substantial force. Peer re-
view requires trained experts in the subject of the review, and it should be
independent, not carried out by anyone who was involved in the work that
is being reviewed or otherwise with any sort of stake in the outcome. It
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should be substantially divorced from the advisory process and focussed
only on the factuality of the description of nature on which the advice
should be based (Q 7.32).
On the advice side, practical experience with the questions of credibility,
legitimacy and saliency of advice has made them much more open to an
extended peer community (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990) understanding of
review in the development of advice. Illustrations of how practical issues
have this effect is found in discussions of how to explain advice to man-
agers (Q 4.11, Q 4.12 and Q 6.1) and even in suggestions that advice should
be made conditional on management actions (Q 4.14). A philosophy has
emerged among some advisory scientists, reflecting the idea that develop-
ing advice, including reviewing the outcomes of expert groups, should be
based as much on general scientific literacy and skills as it is on specific
technical expertise. Review should be rooted in experience with advice,
rather than in very specific forms of substantive expertise, i.e. ‘less techni-
cal review and more overall review of quality’ (Q 7.31, see also Q 7.30). This
is not to say that scientists on the advisory side downgrade the value of
technical review or reject the ideal model of review in principle. But there
is recognition that it is not enough, and ‘the more’ that is needed may not
fit the ideal model of review or involve the retention of all scientific de-
cisions in the hands of ICES scientists.
The discussion of the skills of review and advice, especially the contrast-
ing of technical expertise with the scientific literacy needed to write advice,
provides some insight into the practical meaning of an extended peer com-
munity. The emphasis in Q 7.30 is on the ability to distinguish the degree
of underlying uncertainty in the results. The extended peer community
needs exactly this kind of expertise; judgements about uncertainty require
the ability to judge scientific methods and background knowledge about
the sources of the data. Judging the degree of uncertainty in a practical
sense also requires judgements about the implications of that uncertainty
for relating the results to the practices to be regulated.
8.2.2 Scientific activities within ICES
A second creative tension between the advisory and science cultures con-
cerns scientific activities within ICES. This is mainly played out in issues
over the role and function of expert groups. A large part of this is simply
the degree to which scientists are used to putting their particular interests
aside and responding to a specific set of advice-driven ToRs. These are
differences about what sorts of questions are really worth the time of a
group of scientists when they go to an international meeting to produce
some product. These difficulties here are nicely visible in Q 6.29 where
the chairman, who was used to working on the advice side, was perfectly
ready to ignore the surface temperatures that everyone – himself included
– agreed were the key driving factor in the relationships being examined.
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Most of the other scientists wanted to work with their ‘pet data sets’ simply
because they addressed the most important factor. The chair knew that
these temperatures – key factor or not – had no saliency for policy, and the
group’s time was better spent on things that actually mattered.
When considering an EAFM, the question of how expert group time will
be spent is not trivial. Perhaps the main organisational challenge for ICES
in contributing to an EAFM is mobilising expertise that has not previously
been part of the mainly fisheries-driven advisory process. The expert group
culture on the science side is much more used to doing what is interesting
to them, rather than what is interesting to a client. ICES’s leverage over the
way ToRs will be emphasised, or even addressed, is limited. The scientists
who attend these groups tend to be somewhat more senior than those who
attend the assessment groups (Table 5.5), and this also strengthens the ‘we
are volunteers at ICES’ attitude.
While the ICES leadership may sometimes feel like they are herding
cats, it is not entirely a bad thing that scientists in expert groups follow
their own interests. These interests are about understanding ecosystem
processes, and the inquiries cannot be limited to results with immediate
use to policy setting.
8.2.3 Adequate Science for Advice
Another tension exists around ideas of what constitutes adequate science
for advice. This is the tension that I am the least comfortable characteris-
ing as being between the advisory and science sides. While one side of the
debate, those advocating ‘soft predictability’, tends to be from the advisory
side, strong advocates of having quantitative forecasts as an important goal
are also found on the advisory side. Managers want quantitative advice
because solving the political problems they face starts with having a divisi-
ble quantity. This is not at all the same thing as the scientific motivation
for quantification, which is about precision for the clear statement of hy-
potheses and potential replicability. Nevertheless, the high value that gen-
eral scientific culture gives to quantification is drawn upon in support of
the need for quantitative advice. This is evident, for example, in the dis-
paraging references to a ‘word game’ and ‘intellectual essays’ in Q 6.44.
This is broadly evident in the overall vision of developing integrated mod-
els for EAFM. Scientists also see quantification as a mechanism for in-
creasing their own control over policy, as is illustrated for example in Q
4.17.
An internal connection exists between the desire for quantification and
ICES’s concern with ‘consistency’. Within ICES the various types of con-
sistency are what allow the different parts of the network – including the
broader network of clients and ministries – to negotiate and hold each
other accountable for the results. They are mechanisms of transparency
forged in the face of the paradoxes. This case study has identified three
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types of consistency – Types C, D and E – that most directly link the social
and technical aspects of advice. Of them, Type E is the most sociological in
nature and attempts to keep track of the coherence of a particularly com-
plex set of decisions. Type E consistency is consistency in the way scientific
methods and scientific advice are linked across time, space and species. As
argued in Section 7.3.1, this kind of consistency has very little to do with
science as such, in fact the questions it asks are not particularly coherent
from a purely scientific perspective. For Type E consistency, quantification
plays still another distinct and critical role. It names the methodologies in
their linkages to advice functions. The failure of Type E consistency in the
herring incident (Section 7.3.2), for example, was identifiable through the
equations used in the spreadsheet. To use a bit of STS jargon, the science/
advice relationship is ‘inscribed’ by the methods of quantification, and
therefore answers to questions about Type E consistency will consist of the
comparison of equations and measurements. Textual information in most
cases will prove too imprecise to allow evaluation. Quantification here is a
tracking mechanism for ensuring the transparency of managerial rather
than scientific decisions. It is a form of accounting in both senses of the
term.
The other pole of this axis, soft predictability, is a child of uncertainty.
Soft predictability describes scientifically plausible scenarios while steering
away from precise numerical forecasts about future states of nature. It has
emerged from the experience of the advisory side that humility is a virtue
when one tries to base advice on predictions about the future. Soft predict-
ability recognises that many ecosystem processes are going to have to be
understood qualitatively, based on categorical variables and indicators. It
asks that focus be placed on the substance of the issues people care about,
in a manner that is not defined by the degree to which the issues are
amenable to measurement and modelling.
Soft predictability also means that decisions are going to be made using
judgements that will be difficult to document objectively in the sense that
other scenarios may be equally plausible. This means that the transparency
needed for collective action cannot be achieved through methodological
rigour, not even for technical experts. Soft predictability interferes with
Type E consistency as every issue has to be worked out on its own. It will
be very difficult to meet the constant political demand that the links be-
tween methods and advice reflect similar judgements. This suggests that
we should begin to think of Type E consistency as a requirement for con-
sistency of social practices and forms of interaction related to advice pro-
duction, rather than as a requirement for consistency in mathematical or
technical procedures.
Qualitative inference requires a participatory approach to translate cate-
gories into advice because there are no other ways to get the needed trans-
parency. Hence, to some of the advisory scientists soft predictability is not
a loss of quality, it is a way to improve quality by moving away from reli-
ance on predictions, putting more emphasis on uncertainty, being more
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participatory, and resisting the inappropriate inflation of the science
boundary.
8.2.4 Promoting the EAFM
Finally, there is a creative tension within ICES about the role that it should
take in promoting the EAFM. Some scientists on the science side want
ICES to draw on its scientific expertise as a way to accelerate an EAFM,
with ICES taking the lead rather than just responding to the client com-
missions. This was illustrated in Q 6.25, while the idea that scientists on
the science side are stronger supporters of ICES playing an advocacy role
is supported in Table 6.3. This is arguably also related to an emphasis on
the EAFM as a technical challenge, because that makes their expertise a
greater asset in seeking the changes they want. Support for such an inter-
pretation was found by Dietz et al. (1989) for other environmental issues.
Advisory scientists participating in this discussion tend to see ICES’s
role in terms of responding to clients. Rather than seeing ICES as a leader
in the EAFM, they see ICES as lagging behind the clients because of poor
preparation in providing advice. Again Table 6.3 suggests that advisory
scientists tend to be less supportive of ICES taking a more active role in
promoting an EAFM.
However, it is among scientists on the advisory side that an interest in
redefining the way ICES deals with the precautionary approach is most
often heard. Their frustration with the single-species ‘stochastic predict-
ability’ (Degnbol 2003) comes mainly from the idea that basing the treat-
ment of uncertainty on the error term in a single-species model not only
ignores many sources and types of uncertainty; it has also been a real im-
pediment, in the opinion of several leading ICES scientists, to the develop-
ment of an EAFM.
The precautionary approach is an important driver for reform because it
places the question of uncertainty in the centre of the problem; and that
uncertainty is the elephant on the table that is exactly what the scientists
working within the Advisory Programme experience every day. Where the
initial responses to developing the precautionary approach were hijacked
by the priorities of the TAC Machine to be just an addendum to the single-
species model, the EAFM restores a broader meaning to the precautionary
approach and gives it a new power as an organising principle. While there
are differences in emphasis, ICES scientists working in many different
areas see an EAFM as an opportunity for real reform.
8.2.5 Guarding communicative rationality
These areas of disagreement and disparate emphasis are rooted in the de-
sire of both sides to guard the communicative rationality that makes
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science possible. But the science and advisory sides see different aspects of
communicative rationality as being the one most directly threatened.
One of the basic principles of rational communication is that anyone
has the right to raise a claim. This is the aspect that the advisory side has
come to respect and guard in a new way by recognising the importance of
non-scientist input to the advice-development process. The advisory side
has learned to relax their ideas of science in respect of ideas such as
science being an “objective other” delivering “the truth”. They have begun
to focus on the creation of serviceable truths (Guston 2001b) that meet
needs without necessarily being the best and most comprehensive science.
They have begun to build in double-loop learning and carry out science as
a client-based practice in which an extended peer community is part of the
process of developing the knowledge base for policy. One of the key les-
sons that has emerged from ICES’s struggles with providing effective ad-
vice is the realisation (Q 6.3) that interaction across the science boundary
is not a way to dilute the authority of scientists, on the contrary it is a way
to clarify and reinforce the boundary.
Another of the principles of communicative rationality, however, is se-
parating claims with respect to truth from claims with respect to values.
One of the great benefits of the ideal model of review is that it separates
discussions seeking compromise from discussions seeking consensus on
facts. This came out strongly in Q 7.34 where a delegate linked the separa-
tion of the knowledge base from the negotiations over advice directly to the
question of transparency, when he argued that the different ways of involv-
ing stakeholders was his main reason for supporting the separation of ad-
visory and review groups. This is the underlying rationale for the ideal
model of review – and indeed the overall mainstream view of the role of
science in policy – where the emphasis is placed on getting a clear and
independent statement of facts before the related negotiations over values
take place. The same principle is seen in the desire to allow expert groups
to be about science and not have them unduly influenced by needs for
advice. The science side is guarding the mainstream, ideal notions of
science because they protect the rationality of the process and finally the
radical transparency of the scientific process.
What the advisory side has learned from experience is the power of the
paradoxes of transparency. The motivation for the protection, separation
and even isolation of science to protect the ideal model is based on institu-
tionalising communicative rationality and securing transparency; but tak-
en too far it undermines transparency by increasing exclusion. Several
times I have termed this kind of separation of science from policy as ‘na-
ive’ because it underestimates the tightness of the linkage in practice be-
tween the scientific results and the management based on those results.
Within an EAFM, relevant specialities may be so narrow that the ideal
model would even exclude many scientists; indeed, the overly rigorous en-
forcement of these ideals would undermine the EAFM by leading to the
concatenation rather than the integration of advice.
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The error that might lead to the ideal model being taken too far is the
confusion of transparency of method with objectivity of knowledge and the
related notion of the scientist as possessor of that objectivity. This is parti-
cularly an error when that objectivity is then attached to a social role and
put to work in a policy context. What will not be tolerated by the interested
public is the idea that some people stand outside the process. When gov-
ernment bureaucrats try to point to some outside, objective other to justify
their decisions, what people see is not science-based policy but the cover-
ing of backsides. The advisory side of ICES did not come to the conclusion
that the extended peer community is necessary by reading sociological the-
ories, but by trying to deliver on the needs of clients. A real danger is that
some scientists will continue to believe, in spite of the evidence, that their
policy influence depends on people believing that they are independent
authorities delivering objective truths. This may lead them to place their
energies into defending that image through excessive purity rather than
realising – especially given the level of uncertainty within an EAFM – that
the fact that they cannot reliably deliver objective truth means that their
skills, and their independent scientific processes, are needed more than
ever.
The opposite danger is just as real. This is the idea that the passing of
the white-coated other means that the mechanisms of transparency that
the science side has been defending are anachronistic. Yet again, the para-
doxes dictate that this cannot be taken too far, or transparency will be lost.
The strength of ICES is its dual culture and the creative tensions it pro-
duces. The advisory side’s ability to address the needs of an EAFM re-
quires that it remain linked with, and accountable to, the science side.
Type E consistency plays an important role as ICES tries to figure out
how to negotiate this shift. Type E consistency is an area where ICES scien-
tists experience a good deal of confusion, but this is partly because they
think of it metaphorically as a kind of scientific consistency when in fact
what is really required to meet this very real demand is a consistency of
social practice in clarifying the science boundary in the linkage between
methods and advice. Type E consistency is rooted in a desire for clarity
and fairness. It is transparency of political process, and the only real re-
sponse is consistent procedures of interaction. Boundary work is where
the deep transparency of science is pushed to become the basis of social
practice, which then becomes a direct challenge to the mainstream view of
science as an objective other.
8.3 Scale-based pressures
For social systems, especially large, democratic ones, the steps of adapta-
tion that come after sensing the need for change, i.e. finding potential ac-
tions, selecting and implementing them, take place under the organisation
and leadership of bureaucracies. The main problem that we face as we try
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to figure out an EAFM, at least for those of us who prefer large and demo-
cratic societies, is that an ecosystem approach is not an idea that reflects
the realities of bureaucratic management. As discussed in Section 6.2.2,
an ecosystem approach makes many basic bureaucratic requirements
much more complex, such as calculable rules to trigger responses, firm
legal definitions, low transaction costs and clear areas of responsibility.
Many of the institutional design characteristics that make an EAFM diffi-
cult are basic requirements of coordination of large-scale policies in a de-
mocracy. The most basic contradiction, perhaps, is between the need for
strong legislation and clear, practical, inter-agency, decision-making pro-
cesses and the need for cooperation from a very large number of interested
stakeholders that operate on multiple scales. The goal must be increased
interagency coordination through more decentralised and participatory de-
cision-making across multiple scales.
Scale is the most important thing. Indeed, in a way this book is guilty of
failing to examine the forest for the trees. I have focussed on what can be
learned from the ICES system by examining the details of the advice-gen-
eration process; but most of the problems actually stem from the overall
European fisheries management system. The sheer size of the attempt to
manage fisheries on a continental scale makes it absurd. The reason I have
not discussed this much, I think, boils down to the fact that for a sociolo-
gist of natural resources, this forest is a boring one. The basic problem
with the CFP is rather prosaic, it makes very limited use of the principle of
nested systems that has been recognised for many years (Ostrom 1990) as
basic to the effective governance of shared resources. No other fisheries
management system in the world seriously attempts to manage fisheries
through such a huge, top-down system. On a continental scale, the com-
plexity of the information needed simply cannot be handled.
From a CSTperspective, information-processing systems on large scales
rely too heavily on automatic mechanisms like authority and markets that
work well within their appropriate spheres, but rarely use, and often inter-
fere with, communicative rationality. A bureaucracy trying to administer
science-based policy on this scale is constantly going to look for ways to
inflate the science boundary – to squeeze out expensive and difficult moral
and practical problems and replace them with more tractable technical
ones that can be linked to simple authority and market-based solutions.
Indeed, bureaucracies will always contain such pressures, and a large scale
simply amplifies them. But treating a political problem as a technical one
does not make it so; it merely distorts it and likely makes it worse. As has
been repeatedly documented here, scientists resist these tendencies as best
they can to protect their sphere.
The main attempt to address the basic problems with the CFP was the
creation of the Regional Advisory Councils. This attempt was a very tenta-
tive one; the RACs are only advisory in nature and are small institutions
that still operate on extremely large scales for a fisheries management sys-
tem. They have taken this challenge on in an impressive way, and ICES
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has sought to support them, but they must be radically strengthened – and
many ‘sub-RACs’ created and funded – before they can make any real dif-
ference. From the perspective of this case, the creation of the RACs re-
vealed how tightly coupled the advisory system really is. The further incor-
poration of stakeholders, while an important goal in itself, has led to even
shorter time periods for delivering advice.
This has increased pressure on a system that already has serious prob-
lems with quality control. The advisory system leaves little room even for
the preparation of tasks, for example getting an initial assessment done
before the expert group meets, let alone chances for structured reflection
within the expert groups about how they might better address their tasks.
One of the most disturbing things the case revealed is how little follow-up
there is on what happens to scientific advice after it is passed on in the
system. There is no formal feedback between STECF and ICES. If STECF
rejects the advice for some reason, ICES may only be informed by word-of-
mouth or not at all. Nor is there much follow-up in terms of maintaining
the consistency of the advice, in spite of the emphasis the leadership places
on this (Q 7.21). In a system that is this tightly coupled, pressures towards
efficiency push out reflection and communicative rationality.
The excessively tight coupling of the system is also reflected in disagree-
ments over the role of the Secretariat. To a very real degree it is that small
group that provides the lubrication that keeps the system from freezing
up. The working conditions they face, in the period between the meeting
of the advisory committees and the delivery of the official advice to clients,
reflect the cost of this lubrication. In doing this preparation, they have to
straddle the need to prepare coherent documents with the need to honour
the fact that it is the committee that speaks for the delegates in the state-
ment of the advice.
The most serious problems emerge when the system is forced to con-
front scientific uncertainty. The stress that scientific uncertainty creates for
individuals within the system was documented in Chapter 5. Assessment
scientists often see themselves simply ‘turning the crank’. Uncertainty
contributes to difficult working conditions because it is so difficult to
know when your job is done when that job is to adequately answer a ques-
tion that is impossible to answer. It leads to scientists’ anomie, and mea-
surably lower job satisfaction, when they find that what they are doing has
very little in common with what they thought science was about when they
signed up (Table 5.10). Combining uncertainty with bureaucratic impera-
tives leads to scientists appealing to other scientists to ‘stop pretending we
know how many fish there are’ (Q 4.16). Effective responses to uncertainty
are further undermined when bureaucratic pressures lead to inadequate
characterisation of the uncertainty through attempts to reduce it to a set of
quantities or even a single quantity. Uncertainty is too complex a phenom-
enon to summarise in a precautionary reference point. Scientists know
this and surround the numbers in their advice with text that describes the
uncertainty. The degree to which such text has any influence on subse-
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quent policy is at best questionable. In many cases it is simply the number
that is desired.
The system does not look much better viewed from the top down. Man-
agers are frustrated by the difficulties of getting scientific advice that meets
their needs. There is increasing pressure to channel more of the advice
through STECF, where many of the same scientists take on a role that is
more directly controlled by DG MARE and so operate in a culture that is
somewhat more responsive to their needs. The incident of the mixed-fish-
eries advice described in Sections 4.2 and 6.1 demonstrated how such re-
sponsiveness makes it possible for DG MARE ‘to do more work with less
data’ (p. 114). This single anecdote was often repeated as a way of illustrat-
ing the differences that emerge between STECF and ICES. Another telling
description is the one in Q 4.7 contrasting science with engineering. The
idea that fisheries science is a form of engineering that is required to plug
quantities into slots created by the management bureaucracy is meant to
push aside questions of scientific legitimacy and peer review. Now, this
image was one offered by a DG MARE scientist describing how other DG
MARE scientists felt when they were under a deadline to get a manage-
ment proposal out and could not get what they needed from ICES. It does
not represent anyone’s ideal or goal, but it does show what these people
often feel they need. Engineering demonstrates its credibility by working.
But this is not an example of Mode Two science responding to society’s
needs; rather it is a caricature of science producing ‘serviceable truths’
(Guston 2001b). ‘Working’ here does not mean maintaining stocks of fish;
it means only facilitating the regulatory process in the narrowest manner
possible. It is the ultimate image in this book of the imperatives of author-
ity-based coordination squeezing the communicative rationality out of
science. It suggests a perversion of science born from an oversized, tightly
coupled, decision-making system that could never, in its current form, car-
ry out an EAFM.
One of the impacts of the bureaucratic system on ICES is that the debate
about transparency is cast as the presence of observers at various meet-
ings. The consideration of observers for meetings, as well as standards of
documentation for the sake of transparency, are required in the current
MoU with DG MARE. ICES is responding, and stakeholder participation
is being approached in a tentative way that attempts to balance the various
concerns. Casting transparency as simply an issue of observers may be
dangerous because of the ways the paradoxes of transparency undermine
formal approaches to transparency. The step-by-step strategy could be the
wrong one. The observer issue is itself ‘gamed’ in terms of which groups
and countries are selected. These issues can be addressed to some extent
by a much broader opening, as this would let the stakeholders, who have
quite different and conflicting objectives, check each other’s tendencies to
seek to influence outcomes. The paradox of precision and expertise, how-
ever, means that only stakeholder groups that have the ability to hire scien-
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tists to be the observers are really in a position to benefit even from this
formal transparency.
What is really needed, but which is costly from a bureaucratic perspec-
tive, is experimentation with ways that scientists can help stakeholders de-
velop transparency with each other, with the ultimate goal of agreement
about what is found in nature. Formal transparency does not come any-
where near tapping into the real power of transparency in accounting for
how one knows what one knows. This will require other techniques within
an extended peer community, based on practices of scientific facilitation
towards the creation of serviceable consensuses on facts within a results-
based EAFM framework (Section 8.6).
The need for this is evident in the strong desire that scientists have ex-
pressed for more interactive, advice-producing fora. Building interactions
into the science for advice mobilises transparency at a level that can make
a difference. One indication is the desire in Q 6.1 to move beyond directly
using models to produce numbers that serve political requirements to
building political options into the models as alternatives. This is an im-
provement on the less transparent habit of putting conservative assump-
tions into models in the name of the precautionary approach. It implies
acknowledging and moving away from the ‘hiding of political values with-
in models’ approach.
Scale plays an important role here as well. One pattern that has been
noted in effective, cooperative approaches to marine management is the
importance of cross-scale institutional linkages (Wilson et al. 2005; Degn-
bol and Wilson 2008). An example would be when an NGO, concerned
with a narrow set of issues across a broad geographical area, makes an
alliance with a local government concerned with a broad set of issues in a
small area. Cross-scale linkages are critical, because they team groups with
agendas that operate on various scale levels. This is going to become even
more critical as we move towards an EAFM. Cross-scale linkages often
make possible the small-scale interactive fora in which communicative ra-
tionality can take place, even when addressing problems at the large-scale
level. These activities bring the scale of interaction down to a level where
the paradoxes of transparency can be worked through in a way that avoids
or reduces gaming. This is beginning to happen more frequently in
Europe (Hegland and Wilson 2008). When scientists become involved,
activities focus on creating boundary objects that link science and policy.
The scientists function as facilitators in science-based decision-making
processes. An area where this is taking important form, addressed in other
publications (Hegland and Wilson 2008), is participatory modelling using
scenario-based approaches that place the uncertainty at the centre of the
negotiation.
The bottom line is that formal procedures to achieve transparency di-
rectly, whether through rigorous application of scientific ideals or through
formal observer programmes, often encounter the paradoxes of transpar-
ency and end up making things more obscure, while they may be good in
270 The Paradoxes of Transparency
and of themselves. The real power of transparency is achieved when scien-
tists address questions of the science boundary directly within an extended
peer community.
8.4 The benefits of distributed power
This case confirms and perhaps expands our understanding of the impor-
tance of the polycentric network for science in support of policy discussed
in Section 3.4. Both Ostrom (2001) and Cash and Clark (2001) emphasise
the information-processing aspects of polycentrism. Ostrom discusses
how polycentrism facilitates accessing various knowledge sources, identi-
fying feedback potentials and experimenting with different approaches.
Cash and Clark point to an improved capacity to provide coherence across
scale levels while still allowing local specialisation.
The ICES case certainly confirms these points, but it also focuses our
attention on the importance of the distribution of authority and control of
resources. Ostrom (2001) characterises polycentric approaches as hard to
govern, and the frustration of the ICES leadership with the simultaneously
voluntary and non-voluntary character of participation in ICES activities is
a good example. ICES is an intergovernmental organisation, a professional
association and a loose network of scientists, and this multiple character is
a critical aspect of how it functions. To various degrees, depending on the
urgency of the issues to be addressed, the individual’s seniority, and the
attitude of his or her employer, the ICES scientist is both constrained to
participate in an ICES expert group and has to be convinced to do so.
The scientists within the ICES network are related to various centres of
resource control, usually cooperating but often contending. Through the
delegates, the NFIs and the relevant ministries have formal control of
ICES, but the scientists in the ICES network can tap into many sources of
funds for their activities. While the Advisory Programme is formally inde-
pendent of the Commission, it remains to some degree dependent on it
for funds. When the scientists are operating through STECF, they are
more responsive, but not fully controlled in that STECF expert groups are
temporary structures made up of NFI employees who are also part of
ICES. Along the advice production chain some activities are funded by the
clients who want the advice and some are funded by the NFIs. Again the
relationship is neither completely voluntary nor completely constrained.
Both the clients and the NFIs, to a variable but growing degree, have to
respond to pressures from both user groups and conservationists that are
channelled through their ministries.
The European Commission is not just a client; along with the national
ministries, it is also a source of funding for a multitude of marine-science
research projects and focussed tenders. Many of the NFIs very strongly
encourage their scientists to compete for these projects so that they can
get a substantial part of their salary paid by them. Many of these projects
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are long-term and exploratory, while others are just a small step away from
advice provision. Who comes to ICES expert groups on the science side,
and what they do when they get there, are strongly influenced by these
projects.
One of the strengths of the widely distributed ICES network, with its
voluntary yet constrained working relationships, is that it forces negotia-
tions between its various power centres that must make use of communi-
cative rationality, and this creates room for reflection. The gamut of nego-
tiations and discussions required in the reorganisation of the advisory
system, and the number and complexity of the issues that were discussed,
make this very clear. The reference in the latter part of Q 7.32, that the
ICES ‘volunteers’ cannot be ordered to make a piece of advice, is a fine
illustration of how this system works to resist the systemic pressures de-
scribed in the previous section.
To address an EAFM, ICES needs to be able to tap into an extremely
wide range of expertise. The scientists in Q 7.67 see ICES as a network
that enables the projects and activities where integrated, cross-disciplinary
work takes places and makes it possible to develop an EAFM. ICES is de-
veloping a way to mobilise the network to make EAFM advice possible by
the shifting-focus strategy that will take individual issues one at a time and
push them as far as they can towards preparation for advice. This will
mean both anticipating and understanding the implications of ecological
events and moving integrated models as far as feasible. The strategy will
lead to knowledge about ecological linkages, and sometimes even integra-
tion, being developed by the main experts in a form that can be applied by
the less expert but still scientifically literate. The shifting-focus strategy is
designed to enable a network (and eventually an extended peer community
will be required) that can respond to the complexities of adapting to eco-
system changes. It will require resources and a huge commitment from
many experts from many disciplines.
As it seeks to respond to the EAFM challenge, ICES benefits from its
complex power distribution. The requirements for constant negotiation
slow the influence of systemic pressures within the large management bu-
reaucracy that threaten to squeeze out communicative rationality. Such
communications are costly and difficult to structure formally, hence the
squeezing, but they are needed if science for an EAFM is to be possible.
This implies that the cooperation needed from across the network to devel-
op an EAFM cannot be forced, making the motivation of ICES scientists
critical. These scientists are seeing many former assumptions about what
it means to be a scientist and to do science questioned. They are tired of
being asked questions they cannot answer, of being asked to create cer-
tainty, and of spending long hours in activities they do not see as science.
Some are beginning to see and act on new interactive styles of science
where they use their transparency skills with clients and stakeholders to
help them design realistic management strategies. These scientists are
committed to a precautionary approach to marine management, and the
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EAFM promises vehicles for achieving that in ways that deal in a much
more authentic fashion with uncertainty. It is a good bet that their motiva-
tion and creativity will allow the development of institutions that can create
and maintain the knowledge needed for an adaptive, ecosystem-based ap-
proach to marine management.
8.5 Theoretical ruminations: CST and STS
A central theoretical goal of this book was to explore how Communicative
Systems Theory (CST) could make a contribution to Science and Technol-
ogy Studies (STS). CST suggests the possibility of a meaningful approach
to understanding hybrid natural and social phenomena that has a systema-
tic place for an analytic distinction between nature and society. Trying to
understand human society as a system adapting to its environment re-
quires finding a way to define system boundaries, and defining society as
a meaning-based communicative system separate from its material sur-
roundings does that. Understanding adaptation, in my opinion, begins
with examining science as an institution and how science is linked to pos-
sibilities for collective action.
The vehicle for the linkage between CST and STS is the use of the Ha-
bermasian notion of rational communication. This is a sociological usage
of the idea, not the much more common philosophical one. Communica-
tive rationality is what allows people to make sense to one another day-to-
day. It never reaches the ‘ideal communicative situation’ of the philosophi-
cal system, nor does it need to, rather it describes criteria people actually
use to judge if the communication they are engaged in is leading to a mu-
tual understanding. In my interpretation, communicative rationality also
includes Habermas’s (1984) arguments about the communicative interpre-
tation of the objective, social and inner worlds. This is the idea that reach-
ing mutual understandings takes different forms and follows different or-
ientations in respect of those worlds, so that discussions of fact must be
oriented towards a consensus about what is true, while discussions of va-
lues and interests must be oriented towards an agreement about what is
fair. Science, in trying to achieve the radical transparency that is the ideal
goal of the scientific method, formalises and protects rational communica-
tion. Habermasian systems theory is built around this concept, and in this
linkage lies the promise that CST can contribute to STS. CST focuses on
the quality of communicative systems within a political context. Rational
communication’s internal connection to the scientific method makes it
possible to directly relate science to a system concept of society.
Therefore, one aspect of this study that I hope has demonstrated the
utility of CST for STS is the analysis of scale that is pulled together in Sec-
tion 8.3, based on the theoretical perspective laid out in Section 3.3.4. Scale
is a funny concept. On the one hand, we know a great deal about it, at least
judging from the amount of literature. On the other hand, a great deal of
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this writing boils down to an acknowledgement that scale is really impor-
tant. Science for an EAFM is confronted with problems stemming from
both the social and institutional scale. I think CSTprovides some new tools
for understanding scale and institutions that are relevant for science stu-
dies. One aspect involves examining how communication mechanisms ef-
fective on larger scales (Section 3.3.4) create systemic pressures to inflate
the science boundary. These pressures complicate the delicate negotiations
around boundary work, boundary objects, and building effective boundary
organisations.
Section 3.1.3 uses communicative rationality to illuminate the relation-
ship between scientific credibility and process legitimacy. The argument is
that process legitimacy results from applying the same set of basic princi-
ples that scientific credibility is based on – i.e. communicative rationality
expressed as the radical transparency of the scientific method – to the
broader social context in which the scientific activity takes place. I would
argue that the basic point of the extended peer review in a situation of high
stakes and high uncertainty is to provide legitimacy to the ‘serviceable
truth’ when the uncertainty is too high to establish credibility. If this is
reasonable, then this link between credibility and legitimacy based on ra-
tional communication sets up criteria that extended peer review should
meet to achieve that goal: that there is no manipulation involved in the
communication, that anyone involved can raise a question about any claim
being made (White 1988), and that discussions of facts are oriented
around finding a consensus about truth while discussions of values are
oriented around finding a fair compromise.
ICES has not formally adopted the idea of an ‘extended peer review’,
even while the Advisory Programme has increasingly moved in this direc-
tion in practice. This informality has its helpful aspects, but it pays a price
in not delivering the increased legitimacy that a more formal extended
peer review would. Currently, most extended peer review involves the cli-
ents and is more oriented around increasing saliency than legitimacy;
although this is shifting with the increasing importance of the RACs.
ICES’s main effort to increase legitimacy through extended participation
in scientific activities has been the ‘transparency through observers’. This
is a good idea, but its effectiveness is severely curtailed by the paradoxes of
transparency. Developing a set of rules for extended peer review grounded
in rational communication would be a helpful addendum to this strategy.
One result of the application of CST that I did not plan was the idea of
the ‘creative tension’ (Section 8.2). The paradoxes of transparency were not
something I had in mind when I began the study of ICES. The central role
played by questions of transparency within the case forced me to think
about the role that transparency and accountability played from a CST per-
spective. What I have concluded is that transparency and accountability act
as integrating devices that allow institutions to achieve the simultaneous
need to structure both competition and coordination in situations where
mechanisms for constraining behaviour are insufficient. Transparency
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and accountability are aspects of communicative rationality, i.e. they are
institutional forms that guard the ability to raise claims. They are ways of
structuring situations that make a mutual understanding possible. Within
ICES the disagreements that emerge between the science and advisory
sides, in some respects the product of an ideological competition, are
transformed into creative tensions through a combination of mechanisms
of accountability and fairly wide distribution of power within the network
(Section 8.4). The concept of creative tensions, which I first heard working
as a community organiser, strikes me as a useful one as a guide for institu-
tional design.
A related idea is the various types of consistency that emerged from the
study. Types C, D and E consistency are hybrid concepts that help clarify
how co-production is happening in ICES. What is interesting to me is how
type E consistency in particular expresses a new set of skill-based tacit un-
derstandings of review. Although it is not commonly understood within
ICES, as befits an emerging tacit understanding, the review criterion of
type E consistency is aimed at legitimacy rather than credibility. It is parti-
cularly well suited to, in fact in some sense it demands, an extended peer
review. In Section 8.6 below I apply this idea to EAFM institutions.
I would expect that the main ideas developed here could prove useful in
the analysis of other areas of developing science for policy and even in
other aspects of STS. Understanding the development of other extended
peer communities may be enhanced through the linkage of the credibility
and legitimacy of science in terms of rational communication. The analy-
sis of the types of consistency is very similar to a research agenda on ‘com-
mensuration’ that is already underway in other areas of social life (Espe-
land and Stevens 1998). The CST approach to social systems and
adaptation should be able to help clarify the links between the environ-
ment, bureaucratic or market-based management, and science in other
contexts.
8.6 Living with the paradoxes: A results-based EAFM
framework
When working to resolve the paradoxes of transparency, the term that
ICES scientists use most frequently is consistency. The forms of consis-
tency are mechanisms that they are creating to make transparency and
accountability possible among constantly negotiating power centres deal-
ing with very complex issues. These centres are found both within ICES
and among stakeholders and clients, so an extended peer community is
involved that includes different kinds of expertise. These mechanisms are,
I think, a bit more than simply the kinds of language developments one
would expect in any sub-culture, for example, the creation of jargon words
that allow people to save time when talking to people familiar with a field.
All of the different uses of the term ‘consistency’ are about ways of making
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things comparable. They are a language of accountancy even when they
are non-numeric. They are all tools that allow the different power centres
within the network to account to one another for the decisions, i.e. the
science/advice boundary judgements, they are making. They are critical to
the function of the science-policy network.
To a degree, they reflect tacit knowledge, meaning that knowledge about
how to use the forms of consistency is not fully articulated. This can be
seen in the way the same word ‘consistency’ is used to express several dif-
ferent and very important bases for judgement. They rely on the kind of
scientific literacy we were introduced to in Q 7.30 that is required when
scientists must make judgements about matters where they are not techni-
cal experts. They must get a sense of how certain or uncertain the knowl-
edge is, and in order to do this they look, more or less consciously, at how
settled the knowledge is in its application. This implies a judgement about
how consistently it is applied.
Once again attempts to create transparency lead to a new paradox. Ac-
counting for scientific judgements depends on the development of new
kinds of mechanisms for comparison that contain elements of tacit knowl-
edge. Within the scientific network charged with ensuring that our deci-
sions about the ecosystem rely on the most transparent knowledge possi-
ble, we are required to trust a sub-culture that is at times difficult to
describe, even for its initiates. We have already recognised (Barnes et al.
1996) how dependent the scientific community is on trust. Now, as we
seek to expand the transparency of the scientific community to include the
translation of science into advice and action, we find that the mechanisms
of transparency, while not limited necessarily to scientists or dependent on
specific forms of technical expertise, require a good deal of initiation to
make them work.
Transparency is always limited so knowledge institutions have to rely on
a degree of trust. Dealing with uncertainty further demands the develop-
ment of trust, because procedures of transparency are harder to bring to
bear. This is part of what must be understood with ‘extended peer review’.
There is a strange relationship between transparency and trust. They can
and must substitute for one another when one of them fails, but when
both are present, they reinforce and strengthen one another. The experi-
ence at ICES is that ensuring transparency in a complex environment cre-
ates a demand for new mechanisms of comparison that are themselves
complex and must be developed through experience and slowly articulated
through processes of reflection.
Once more we are brought back to scale. Because of the complexity of
the issues, the size of the group of people who have access to the lan-
guages required for transparency will necessarily be limited. This is social
scale I am referring to here, not necessarily geographical scale, and these
groups would often be created through geographical cross-scale linkages.
I would argue that an EAFM will require a nested results-based system,
organised around both sets of economic activities and geographical areas.
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The science to support these institutions will require the conscious attain-
ment of Type E consistency, achieved through consistent procedures and
styles of practice, rather than attempts to create a purely technical consis-
tency in forms of advice. At a minimum, three levels would be involved,
more might be required in practice, although this would not be desirable.
We can think of them as communicative “spheres” arranged one inside the
other like Russian dolls. Each sphere would have a complex interior char-
acterised by skill-based mechanisms of transparency, such as shared ideas
about consistency rooted in a context-specific scientific literacy. These
complex interiors would be encased, inside and out, i.e., facing both the
sphere further out and the sphere further in, by simple shells.
An example might be a group of managers, scientists, fishers, tourism
representatives, NGOs and other stakeholders who are concerned with im-
plementing an EAFM on a shared regional sea. The outer sphere would be
a public process of limit-setting that would create publicly sanctioned lim-
its on a series of potential impacts to protect ecosystem integrity. The mid-
dle sphere would again include many of the same stakeholders, for exam-
ple recreational and commercial fishers, managers, scientists and NGOs,
who are concerned with a bay (it could as easily be a set of mixed fisheries
or other sub-set of issues), and who are charged with translating the broad-
er public limits into operational limits on fishing in their bay. This might
be limits both on catch and on certain types of habitat impacts such as
bottom trawling or numbers of speedboats. This group would form a sub-
culture which does not share specific expertise, but does share the kind of
scientific literacy about their bay that allows internal transparency and the
reasoned assessment of uncertainty. Once this group has translated the
limits, the inner sphere, a smaller group of e.g. scientists and recreational
and commercial fishers would develop scenarios for catching and sharing
those fish within the constraints imposed by habitat considerations. Again,
from an interior perspective this would be a sub-culture that shares con-
siderable scientific literacy about the specific set of problems they need to
address.
The limit-setting process in the outer sphere would be dealing with both
environmental and social complexity, and they would be accountable in
limit-setting both to protect ecosystem functions and to allow as much eco-
nomic activity as possible given the constraints of protecting ecosystem
functions. But the product would need to be relatively simple: they would
need to set up indicators of compliance for the middle sphere. Two kinds
of simple indictors would be required that would form the simple outer
shell of the first sphere of decision making.
The first kind of simple indicator would be a set of social indicators that
would need to be developed that the middle sphere would have to meet to
show that it is made up of people who fully balance the relevant interests.
This is the absolutely critical requirement that the paradoxes of transpar-
ency create for any EAFM. It is just as important as the technical indica-
tors. What may not be obvious here is that it is in the outer sphere that
277
addressing an EAFM as a social dilemma is most required. It is very diffi-
cult for local interests, which are focussed so much on their own immedi-
ate problems, to be open to raising and dealing with new issues. This
openness must be enforced from above.
The second kind of simple indicator produced by the outer sphere is, of
course, a set of simple ecological indicators that demonstrates that the de-
cisions that the middle sphere is making are sustainable. The indicators
will have to be based on some sort of integrated model of the ecosystem;
the question of environmental events would be addressed in the middle
sphere because such events happen too rapidly for effective response at
the higher scales. These models must be very simple to get the job done.
This will often mean that they address broad processes. Many of the more
aggregate properties ecosystems are more tractable than individual proper-
ties. Total production, for example, correlates with many community prop-
erties, while trying to predict what happens to individual stocks is much
more difficult. The United States has, for example, set a cap on total bio-
mass removals from the Gulf of Alaska. What seem to be needed to set
limits on exploitation are processes that are broad and simple enough so
that models can provide useful forecasts of the implications of changes.
Fisheries scientists are also developing a set of simple indicators with very
general applications, based on the size of the fish (Hall et al. 2006; Pope et
al. 2006).
In the middle sphere, the need for inner complexity and outer simplicity
repeats itself. Limits are going to have to be clearly expressed. The pro-
cesses that set those limits involve a sub-culture that is scientifically literate
in dealing with the complexity of for example their bay. These groups are
going to have to address environmental events and relate them to imple-
mentation of limits on activities. The impossibility of full transparency
again requires that interests be balanced and that the limits themselves
are clear.
Finally, in the inner sphere operational plans are created to meet the
limits set by the middle sphere. The critical issue will be the burden of
proof. Those who wish to pursue the economic or recreational activity will
be responsible for ensuring the transparency that will allow them to be
held accountable for staying within those limits.
These ideas are not entirely utopian; several existing institutional mod-
els approach them. The Marine Stewardship Council, for example, has cre-
ated a broad set of indictors for sustainable fishing and uses scientist certi-
fiers to work in detail with fishing fleets to decide how the indicators can
be fairly measured and met in their particular situation. The complex de-
tails of ecosystem interactions are handled by a fairly small group, and
provisions are made for any interested party to get familiar with the issues
and comment on them. This model for handling information is a very
good one, independent of the form that the external accountability takes.
A government licensing programme could use this approach just as well
as a private eco- labelling scheme.
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The ICES network is uniquely positioned to contribute to such a multi-
level approach to knowledge institutions for an EAFM. The distributed net-
work is able to handle the development of many different kinds of scientif-
ic groupings involving cross-scale linkages. They are well ahead, for exam-
ple, of the EU in moving in this direction. The RAC expert groups are the
beginning of a structure for organising interested parties, but they are still
quite aggregated. ICES scientists have already shown leadership in moving
fisheries management in Europe in a more responsive direction. They are
also open to addressing new problems working with groups of stakehol-
ders.
To create an adapting social system, we must balance complexity and
simplicity to allow as much transparency as possible, recognising that me-
chanisms for transparency create their own obscurities. The ICES case in-
dicates that to achieve this we need to learn to trust and to pay the costs of
a wide distribution of decision-making power in creating and using
science in an ecosystem-based approach. The hypothesis it suggests is that
negotiations among multiple power centres create the space for open, ra-
tional discussion, without which a social system can never sense the need
for change.
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Appendix 1: Methods and Procedures of
the Random Sample Attitude Survey
The quantitative methodology used in this case was a random sample sur-
vey of European marine fisheries scientists employed in the countries
around the North Sea, namely Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, United Kingdom and the Far-
oe Islands. A total of 465 valid responses were received. The sample size
was 900, which indicates a response rate of 51.7% – a relatively high re-
sponse rate for a non-telephone survey.
Defining a valid respondent was not straightforward, as there is no gen-
erally applied, firm definition of a marine fisheries scientist. We chose the
following definition: a person who works (or has worked) in a fisheries-
related agency, academic department, advocacy organisation or consulting
firm and either a) has an advanced degree (MS/PhD) in a marine science
or b) whose duties include(d) substantial time spent doing or peer-review-
ing marine fisheries research. This definition corresponds to the defini-
tion used in a similar survey carried out in the USA (Wilson et al. 2002).
The sample frame was constructed on the basis of participant lists from
ICES events and groups and through referrals. It was ultimately up to the
respondent to decide if he or she fit the definition when receiving the in-
vitation to participate. The sample frame contained 1087 names of scien-
tists employed in the countries around the North Sea.
The first contact to the 900 scientists was established by email in Febru-
ary 2005. The email contained, on the one hand, our definition of a valid
respondent together with instructions and information about the survey
and, on the other, a link to a website with a blank questionnaire connected
to a unique ID number. After receiving our email, the scientist had the
following four options: a) reply that he or she did not fit the definition, in
which case the respondent was replaced with a randomly selected scientist,
who had not been selected in earlier random selections; b) reply that he or
she did fit the definition but did not wish to participate, in which case the
respondent was not contacted anymore and likewise not replaced; c)
ignore the email altogether; or d) follow the link and submit the question-
naire. Reminders and emails to replacements for those who replied that
they did not fit the definition were sent out in three subsequent rounds at
approximately two weeks apart during March and April 2005. After this,
paper versions of the questionnaire were sent to the respondents who had
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not yet responded with either a valid response or a refusal to participate (in
total 27 refusals were received). A total of 398 scientists, 86% of all valid
responses, submitted their questionnaire over the internet.
The choice to use emails and internet-based questionnaires contributed
most likely to the relatively high response rate. It is our belief that the use
of emails in itself did not introduce any bias; almost the entire population
of fisheries scientists in Western Europe are users of email and internet.
However, some problems with the use of the email procedure were also
experienced. A substantial number of emails bounced, and these fell into
three categories. The first category was scientists who had changed their
place of work. In these cases a search for the new place of work and email
address was carried out through the internet. If that search was not suc-
cessful, which it usually was, the respondent was put on a list of scientists
to receive a paper version of the questionnaire at the last known address.
The second category was scientists employed in institutions that had re-
cently changed the format of their email addresses. This problem was
usually easy to solve, and the email could then be resent. The third and
final category was the smallest. This was scientists with restrictive spam-
filters that did not allow our email to get through. These scientists were – if
an alternative email address was not available – added to the list of scien-
tists to receive a paper version. Another problem was emails that simply
disappeared. We also got some responses from a few scientists who indi-
cated that they could not read the questions in their browser. A paper ver-
sion of the questionnaire was sent to those scientists. Finally, a few respon-
dents chose to submit a completely empty questionnaire over the internet.
Those responses were treated as refusals. We have no reason to believe
that the difficulties experienced in the email stage introduced any systema-
tic bias in the results we report on here.
Paper versions of the questionnaire were sent (with a postage-paid en-
velope enclosed) to the 488 scientists who had not responded with either a
refusal or a valid response by the beginning of April 2005. This was done
in order to make sure that as many as possible of our selected respondents
actually received our invitation and were able to answer the questionnaire.
It is, moreover, reasonable to assume that some people, due to the fact that
sending electronic mail is free, regard a traditional letter as being more
serious and worthy of attention, something that would contribute to a
higher response rate. The use of paper versions worked also as an extra
safeguard against possible unrecorded problems related to the use of
emails and internet. In total, 67 valid respondents submitted their ques-
tionnaire by post. The response rate for the 488 scientists who were sent a
paper version was less than 14%, but this was not surprising since the
majority of them had already received our emails and chosen not to re-
spond.
The use of response scales to measure attitudes is standard in social
science, particularly in the form of Likkert items, as was done here. We
used a seven-point scale, which allowed the respondent to choose an en-
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tirely neutral answer. These scales are treated statistically as interval meas-
ures with reportable means on the basis of both the assumption that re-
spondents’ estimates are interval-based and the fact that statistical tests get
the same results when the scale data are treated as interval measurements
as they do when they are treated as categorical. Long experience and a great
deal of theoretical work with these kinds of scales have found that at suffi-
ciently high Ns, well under what we used here, they are very robust to
differences in interpretation among respondents, i.e. the fact that one per-
son would score a two when another person with theoretically the same
attitude but with a different mode of expression might choose a three.
Hence the comparison of means and the calculation of correlations among
such scales yield meaningful results (Nunnally 1978). However, the main
use of the means and correlations of these scales is to test for associated
attitudes and for differences among sub-populations. Standard statistical
methods such as t-tests or regressions have been shown to give reliable
results for these kinds of questions (Nunnally 1978). It is also reasonable
to make rough statements about where on a scale a group of respondents
scores, e.g. ‘well above the neutral point’ or ‘around the neutral point’, but
these scales are not meant to invent and then measure precise differences
among peoples’ attitudes.
One particular difficulty in the analysis of the survey data stems from
the importance in the analysis of distinguishing between scientists who
are the most active in the ICES/STECF stock assessment work and those
who are not. This is not something that lends itself easily to the survey
respondents’ self-identification. It is a difference that is important in our
analysis, but not necessarily something that a scientist would be comfort-
able with as a way to identify himself or herself. What we chose to do was
to use the type of expert group the respondent last attended as a proxy
variable. We classified as a stock assessment expert group any group asses-
sing stocks for advice or preparing data for immediate use in such assess-
ment, and/or reviewing assessments for use in advice. The classification of
people in this way is not entirely satisfactory, someone who is not deeply
involved in the assessment process could have attended just one such
meeting and it might have been the most recent one, alternatively a scien-
tist that spends a lot of time on assessment could have attended another
group. However, fisheries scientists are fairly specialised, and we think
that this variable did a reasonably good job of measuring the difference we
were after.
Fisheries scientists are employed in different types of institutions and
engage in various types of work. These affiliations affect how the scientists
perceive their working and career conditions (Wilson et al. 2002). We di-
vided the scientists who responded to our survey in the following cate-
gories based on present employer: NFIs, academic institutions, NGOs,
EU, other private and other government. We furthermore divided the
scientists into categories based on the last working or study group they
attended, which gives us an indication of the work the scientists engage
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in. Table 5.1 describes the composition of the surveyed scientists in relation
to employment and expert group participation.
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Notes
1. The problems I am addressing in this book are related to natural facts and the
roles of natural scientists. Much of what I say is applicable to social science, but
for a number of complex reasons I consider the use of social science and social
scientific advice in environmental management to be quite a different subject
that should be addressed separately.
2. I use an analytical definition of stakeholder: any organised group that has an
interest in a policy and can effectively influence either the content or implemen-
tation of a policy is a stakeholder in that policy.
3. Speaking of institutions as if they were actors is not accurate. Only people are
actors because only people decide things. However, it is a very useful shorthand
that avoids many awkward constructions such as the ‘If an institution is to con-
tinue to function, the collective decision-making of people participating in an
institution must somehow ensure that that institution continues in the face of’
that would otherwise have had to replace ‘Institutions face’ to ensure full accu-
racy.
4. The September 2003 meeting of the Working Group on the Assessment of De-
mersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak (WGNSSK); the October 2003
and September 2004 meetings of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Man-
agement (ACFM); the 2002 and 2004 meetings of the ICES/NSCFP Study
Group on the Incorporation of Additional Information from the Fishing Indus-
try into Fish Stock Assessments (SGFI); the September 2004 meeting of the
ICES Consultative Committee; and the September 2004 meeting of the Man-
agement Committee on the Advisory Process (MCAP). It also supported the
observation of two meetings of the Scientific, Technical and Economic Commit-
tee for Fisheries (STECF).
5. The March 2006 Workshop on Review of the ICES Committee and Expert
Group Performance; the April 2006 meeting between MCAP and representa-
tives of ICES’s clients; the September 2006 meetings of the ACFM, the Advi-
sory Committee for Ecosystems (ACE) and the Resource Management Commit-
tees (RMC); the September 2007 meetings of the ACFM, ACE and RMC; and
the February 2008 meeting of the ICES Advisory Committee (ACOM) and An-
nual Meeting of Advisory Committee Chairs.
6. Much of the data gathering and analysis work that went into Chapter 5 was
carried out by my colleague Troels Hegland, and he is acknowledged there as a
chapter co-author.
7. A more detailed discussion of the theoretical background of this section can be
found in Wilson and Degnbol (2003).
8. The Science Programme has now (i.e. in 2008 after this manuscript was com-
plete) also been reorganised, and this committee is now referred to as SCICOM,
for Science Committee.
9. I use the following conventions in quotes. Bold type is used in meeting observer
notes to guide the reader through the argument(s) that I am referring to in the
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text without getting lost in the cross-currents of complex and often non-linear
discussions. I retain the broader text because I believe that good qualitative re-
search requires that the context in which statements are made be clear to the
reader. Brackets [ ] indicate a comment I am making.
10. I need to caution the reader because many, but certainly not all, of the quotes
and exchanges I am using in making these points about the science boundary
are related to the single issue of what to do with mixed fisheries advice for
demersal fishing in the face of the collapse of the North Sea cod stock. This is a
function of the meetings I was observing and the fact that it was a very hot topic.
I will also point out, however, that the mixed-fisheries problem is a critical issue
in advisory reform, these events have influenced a lot of the thinking about new
directions at both ICES and DGMARE, and, as I argue in Chapter 6, the mixed-
fisheries problem can be thought of as a sort of introductory-level EAFM issue.
11. Much of what is presented in Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 first appeared in a section
I authored in the publication: Integrating fisheries and environmental policies.
Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 2003:521, ISBN 92-893-0892-3. Per-
mission to excerpt these passages was graciously granted by the Nordic Council
of Ministers.
12. It has become fashionable in the last few years to use the term ‘governance’
rather than government, governing or management. Under this fashion lies an
important idea: a lot of different institutions – governments, markets, civil or-
ganisations – make decisions that have an impact on our environment and our
lives. ‘Governance’ points to how all these things work together in decision-
making processes.
13. When natural scientists use the term ‘policy drivers’, they are usually referring
to policy documents rather than social or political forces that shape policy for-
mation.
14. There is a disturbing tendency among ICES scientists to treat RACs as fishing
industry lobbying groups, when they are in fact stakeholder fora with represen-
tatives of a number of non-industry groups, including conservation NGOs. This
tendency is potentially damaging to the ICES-RAC relationship and to the devel-
opment of the RACs themselves, because the responsibility of the RACs is to
give balanced stakeholder input. If RACs are to function, then they exist not to
lobby, but rather to be lobbied.
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